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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to assess the performance of the 
Algerian public industrial sector and identify the reasons for 
its inefficiency. The study is based on an empirical analysis 
of six public industrial enterprises: SONIC (pulp and paper), 
SNMC (construction materials), SNIC (light chemical), 
SONATRACH (hydrocarbons), SNS (iron and steel) and SONACOME 
(mechanical engineering). In this representative study of 
public industrial enterprises, 171 plants and complexes were 
investigated. In order to measure the efficiency of these 
public enterprises, input utilisation (raw materials, 
intermediate inputs, fixed capital and labour) is analysed. 
Given that Algeria is a capital-scarce econcny, emphasis is 
placed on fixed capital utilisation via the calculations of U1 
(ratio of actual over planned output), U2 (ratio of planned 
over technical output) and U3 (ratio of actual over technical 
number of shifts or time utilisation of fixed capital). 
It was found that the average rate of fixed capital 
utilisation for the public enterprises studied was 72.81%, 
76.64% and 71.27% as measured by U1, U2 and U3, respectively. 
With this information and according to evidence provided by 
the plant managers, it was concluded that the different inputs 
were inefficiently used in all the public enterprises studied 
and, by and large in the entire Algerian public industrial 
sector. Four causes of inefficient utilisation of inputs were 
identified: organisational factors, shortages of inputs, 
allocative inefficiencies and demand shortages. The potential 
for significant increases in industrial output and employment, 
therefore, exists. 
A cross country comparison among Turkey, Egypt and Algeria 
I 
ý, L i uweu znat several causes of inefficiency encountered in 
Algeria were also observed in the other, more experienced 
countries characterised by similar economic systems. From 
this study, some policy recommendations directly related to 
the problems encountered, emerged. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central purpose of this study is to assess the 
performance of the public industrial sector in Algeria and to 
identify the causes of inefficiency. The choice is governed 
by the important role played by this sector in the industria- 
lisation process of Algeria (in 1980 this sector contributed 
to more than 45% of the Algerian value added). This study is 
based on an empirical and an aggregative analysis of six 
public enterprises. The capacity utilisation measurement is 
chosen to assess the efficiency of these public enterprises. 
The main causes of underutilisation are identified. In order 
to analyse these different aspects, it is necessary to draw a 
general picture of conditions prevailing in the Algerian 
public industrial sector. 
This study is divided into three parts : 
the first part provides background information related to the 
Algerian economy which constitutes the environment in which 
the public enterprises operate. As previously mentioned, this 
thesis is only concerned with the industrial sector. 
Therefore the agricultural sector is not described and discus- 
sed in detail although some information is given in various 
sections. The First Chapter is devoted to the characteristics 
of the Algerian economy. These are the Algerian development 
strategy, the role of the government and state control of the 
economy, human and natural resources, development planning, 
Algerian gross domestic product, financing of public 
invest- 
ment and balance of payments and public 
debt. In Chapter Two 
the Algerian industrial sector at the time of independence 
(1962) and its evolution up to 1980 are discussed. The most 
important branches of the industrial sector are analysed. In 
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, -; napter Three the government policies that influence public 
enterprise performance are examined. Investment, financing, 
labour, foreign trade and price policies are described. 
In the second part of this work an analysis of the perfor- 
mance of the Algerian industrial public sector using empirical 
evidence from six public enterprises is presented. Capacity 
utilisation (raw materials and intermediate inputs, capital 
and labour) is calculated and the main causes of inefficiency 
are identified for each public enterprise studied. Chapter 
Four is divided into three parts. In the first part some 
background information concerning Algerian public enterprises 
is given (organisational structure, the decision making and 
control). Some theoretical background used in the analysis of 
the data is presented in the second part. This part is divid- 
ed into the methodology , the survey and sample, and the 
questionnaire. This is followed by the discussion of the main 
causes of inefficiency which constitute the last part. In 
Chapters Five to Ten the general profile, capacity utilisation 
and the analysis of the main causes of inefficiency are 
; presented for the public enterprises SONIC, 
SNMC, SNIC, 
SONATRACH, SNS and SONACOME, respectively. 
Finally part three consists of two chapters : Chapter 
Eleven is devoted to a comparative study of Algeria, Turkey 
and Egypt. The objective is to compare their economic perfor- 
mance and draw out similarities or differences between the 
different systems. Lastly, Chapter Twelve gathers all the 
findings and the main conclusions that have emerged. In this 
concluding chapter some specific recommendations 
to improve 
the level of capacity utilisation in the Algerian public 
industrial enterprises are suggested. Some proposals for 
further work are also presented. 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER ONE: THE CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY 
Algeria gained its independence in July 1962 after a seven 
year war of liberation. At that time the Algerian economy, 
massively disrupted by the war, relied essentially on the 
agricultural sector. It should be noted however that the 
economy as a whole was in a better state than that of many 
other newly independent nations. Oil and natural gas, which 
are some of Algeria's resources, helped to transform Algeria 
from a relatively poor agricultural country to one with a 
growing and diversified industrial economy. Despite the 
existence of some private firms, the Algerian economy is 
largely dominated by the public sector. This sector has 
encountered numerous problems which will constitute the core 
of our next discussion. In this chapter the characteristic 
features of the Algerian economy are presented and the level 
of Algeria's economic development is assessed. 
1.1. The Algerian development strategy 
The present socio-economic and political system and hence, 
development strategy, are the result of different ideological 
tendencies that prevailed during the post-independence period 
(1). Algeria's main objective has remained economic develop- 
ment based on a socialist system (2). The socialist 
ideas 
germinated during the war of liberation and were 
influenced by 
Nasser's ideology. The initial policies were dominated for a 
short period by self-management before a radical switch 
to 
state capitalism in 1966 (3). Since 
then the state took over 
all the main activities through the nationalisation of 
the 
existing industries and the creation of public enterprises. 
Algeria systematically followed the route towards an economic 
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ýjiuepenuence eased on a strong industrial sector and on state 
control of the production apparatus. Although the industria- 
lisation process is comparable to that of any developing 
country, Algeria's development strategy can be distinguished 
by the emphasis on heavy industries. 
In July 1962, the Tripoli programme was the first and only 
document which gave some indication of the ideological orien- 
tation and the model of development that were to be adopted in 
the post-independence period. The Tripoli programme advocated 
socialist principles and elaborated some of the bases for 
socialist options. The means to reach the objectives were not 
precisely defined. It should be noted that the formulation of 
industrialisation policies was made difficult by the lack of 
industrial experience. In the Tripoli programme the need for 
economic change and diversification prompted by the decline 
and change of Algerian economic relations with France regar- 
ding primary exports and by political reasons are implied. 
For instance, the birth of nationalism involved a rejection of 
the colonial past in all its aspects and the rising unemploy- 
; ment brought additional pressure for a change 
in the classical 
colonial pattern of production. 
The objectives defined in the Tripoli programme started to 
be implemented only in 1965 after president Boumediene came to 
power. Government policies emphasized industrial development 
controlled by the state instead of an unorganised 
laissez- 
faire. The elements of this doctrine are found only in the 
speeches of president Houari Boumediene. There 
is no doubt 
that the shortage of fertile land (4) and the abundance of 
local natural resources led to a development strategy based on 
a strong industrial sector which was thought to be 
the key to 
economic expansion. Algerian economic development 
is defined 
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as "based upon the industrialisation of the country"(5). The 
industrialisation objectives are "the increase of the national 
revenues, the improvement of the technical level of the 
workers, the increase of employment and the widening of 
markets, i. e., less dependency on the foreign markets"(6). In 
addition, industrialisation is believed to "realize a 
symbiosis between the industrial and agricultural sectors and 
achieve a real complement within ... (the ) national 
economy" (7) . 
The development of heavy industry is essential in order to 
produce and to provide the "most essential tools, raw 
materials, combustibles and economic plants which are 
necessary for the development" of the national economy (8). 
The establishment of a heavy industry means that solid founda- 
tions are set up for economic and political independence (9). 
Furthermore, the building of a heavy industry is thought 
necessary" to safeguard the independence and the sovereignty" 
(10). Consequently in order to satisfy the total national 
demand, the construction of an independent and integrated 
economy was necessary at that stage of development. 
The basic objectives that Algeria intended to pursue were 
defined in the 1966 Algiers Charter (11) and reaffirmed in the 
National Charter adopted after a nationwide referendum in June 
1976. These objectives are (a) the expansion and organisation 
of the productive base of the national economy 
in order to 
reach the stage of self-sustaining growth and full employment 
as quickly as possible; (b) the attainment of economic 
independence, which implies that Algeria must rely primarily 
on its own resources while broadening and diversifying 
its 
international economic relations; (c) the improvement of 
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. Lim; ume uistribution, especially between regions. Reflecting 
upon these objectives and taking into consideration Algeria's 
basic socio-economic characteristics, the long-term develop- 
ment strategy focuses on a number of key issues: development 
of a diversified and highly integrated industrial base, stren- 
gthening of new economic management structures at all levels 
and in all sectors, regional decentralisation within a planned 
framework, speeding up of education and training and austerity 
in consumption. The Algerian strategy of development reflects 
the nationalism springing from the liberation war characteri- 
sed by socialism and the perception of the state as an agent 
of change through integrated planning and state enterprises. 
1.1.1. The "industrialising industries" strategy 
The accelerated industrialisation undertaken in Algeria 
through the "industrialising industries" concept was initiated 
by the French economist G. Destanne De Bernis. Accordingly, 
the underdeveloped countries avoid the impasse of both the 
conventional import substitution industries and the merely 
export-oriented industries. This strategy is to some extent 
-; similar to economic development 
theories developed by Feldman, 
Domar and Mahalanobis as well as to the theory of equilibrium 
of Rosenstein-Rodan, the growth pole of Perroux (12) and 
the un- 
balanced growth of Hirschman (13). 
The cornerstone of the "industrialising 
industries" stra- 
tegy is the leading industry--"industrie motrice"--which (when 
chosen and launched) generates around 
it a multiplier effect-- 
''effect d'entrainement". The "industrialising 
industries" are 
characterised by important forward and 
backward linkages with 
other sectors, and therefore a quasi-automatic process 
of 
industrialisation. This model of development advocates a 
concentration of investment 
in heavy industry as opposed to 
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light industry, e. g. capital intensive as opposed to labour 
intensive industries. Agricultural development is also 
predicted to be an outcome of the industrialisation process 
since the two sectors use each other's output. Most of the 
new outputs are destined for the domestic market. Further- 
more, the main features of the industrialising industries are 
their large scale which necessitates important outlets, a very 
high capital concentration and a very high rate of investment 
together with the manufacturing of capital goods (not consumer 
products) (14) . Currently most Western economists do not 
advocate a development strategy based on these four elements. 
De Bernis, on the other hand, uses them as a basis for his 
development model (15). 
In Algeria De Bernis identifies the capital goods indus- 
tries and the oil industries as being the industrialising 
industries that have the highest multiplier effect. These 
industries are mainly iron and steel, chemicals, petrochemi- 
cal, natural gas liquefaction and refining industries. These 
industries supply intermediate inputs to other sectors; for 
instance, to the automobile, farm machinery, electrical goods 
and plastic industries. In 1962 the only industries which had 
a strong industrialising impact were the metallurgy (and its 
derivatives), the mechanical and the energy industries. Other 
modern industries such as chemical industries and particularly 
fertiliser and plastic industries, which were considered 
important in modernising the agricultural sector, had to be 
developed. 
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1.1.2. Analysis of the industrialising industry strategy 
Since 1967, following the De Bernis development strategy, 
Algeria has invested the bulk of its capital in siderurgy, 
metallurgy, petrochemistry and other basic industries. 
Consequently, social needs (such as housing and water supply) 
and the development of the consumer goods industries were 
neglected. Similarly, agriculture and infrastructure lacked 
investments. The foundation of this strategy was only partia- 
lly adapted to the local conditions. This resulted in the 
occurrence of several problems which will be reviewed in 
detail later. The reasons for these problems are manifold. 
Firstly, as argued by Andreff and Hayad (16), the iron and 
steel industry which was chosen and developed was not an 
industrialising industry. De Bernis' recommendations there- 
fore may enhance the probability of failure of such a 
strategy. Secondly, the strategy advocated the installation 
of the most sophisticated capital intensive technology. This 
involved enormous investments in the industrial sector which 
absorbed almost all the resources. Consequently, the other 
; sectors did not benefit from sufficient investments (such as 
social, infrastructure and agriculture) which resulted in an 
imbalanced development between the different sectors. Third- 
ly, the capital intensive technology required skilled workers 
which formed only a small minority of the Algerian work force. 
This led to problems encountered at all levels. Fourthly, the 
creation of many job opportunities (a basic objective of 
development) is, at least in the short term, inconsistent with 
the choice of capital intensive industries since it is well 
known that the latter do not create enormous employment oppor- 
tunities. Fifthly, while large investments were allocated to 
education, training was in fact only available to a small 
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minority of the labour force. This problem was aggravated by 
inadequacies in the system of training. Lastly, the 
protection of heavy industries brought about a lack of 
competition and hence an almost complete monopoly of the local 
market by the public enterprise. 
The problems encountered in Algeria cannot only be attri- 
buted to the adoption of this strategy. The causes of these 
problems arose from the application and implementation of the 
strategy. The realisation of the projects took longer than 
planned. The plants were built by a product-in-hand contract 
or by a turnkey contract both of which are expensive contracts 
and lead to a lot of problems as discussed in more detail in 
Appendix C. 1. The planning process seems to be inefficient. 
The decision-making process is too centralised. This situa- 
tion derives from the intervention of the state in the manage- 
ment of public enterprises. This leads to an increase in 
heavy procedures. The system is also to blame since for 
example, a more adequate and adapted educational system should 
have been emphasized. All these points will be developed in 
more detail later. 
After having presented briefly the different criticisms of 
the "industrialising industries" strategy, the next step 
brings us to the explanation of possible solutions. The 
government seems to have been aware of these problems and 
started to pay more attention to social objectives as it 
appears from the 1980-84 five year development plan (31% of 
the total investments were allocated to this sector). For 
instance, changes in government policies such as foreign trade 
policy would overcome many of the inefficiencies. Some 
positive suggestions are outlined in the concluding chapter of 
9 
this thesis. 
1.2. Role of the government 
The role of the state, which has become important since 
1965, has as its objectives the liberation of the economy from 
all foreign dependence and the build up of a genuine national 
economy. Behind these objectives lies the basic desire to 
reduce the existing disparities in income distribution not 
only between upper and lower individual incomes but also 
between economic sectors (e. g., modern and traditional 
agriculture) and between the coastal and inland regions. The 
National Charter adopted in 1976 supports state control over 
the economy. Later the New Constitution of 1976 allows the 
existence of a private sector only if it contributes to the 
development of the country and is socially useful. 
The emergence of the government as the major force in the 
economy did not result solely from the underlying strategy but 
it also reflected a combination of circumstances that accompa- 
nied independence. These forced the government into an extre- 
mely activist position. It was believed that development as 
-foreseen by the state could not be accomplished by private 
investment. No private Algerian enterprises after independen- 
ce had the necessary size to support the development of capi- 
tal intensive industries. Skilled workers and entrepreneurial 
abilities were lacking. Again, foreign investment was discou- 
raged by the government for the very reason that it would be 
directed towards highly profitable short term ventures. This 
was supported by the fact that there was no model allowing 
dynamic industrial growth under the dominance of a private 
sector without the creation of a powerful dominant class and 
its enrichment. Thus the state had to play a major role in 
the process of industrialisation. 
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In order to apply the adopted strategy of accelerated 
" industrialisation, Algeria needed most of its resources. The 
nationalisation process (with compensation) was therefore 
inevitable since it is a normal procedure to ensure control of 
resources by the state. The assumption that the oil reserves 
would not last long (17) reinforced the nationalisation of 
hydrocarbons. The recovery of national resources started 
after independence but the most important occurred in 1971, 
when the government nationalised the oil companies and conces- 
sions at 51% and the natural gas resources and concessions as 
well as the gas and oil transport facilities totally. 
In order to realise these objectives and build up a strong 
national economy, the government promoted the public sector 
setting up modern industries under the exclusive control of 
the state. This development strategy requires large invest- 
ments. Since 1967 several plans have been undertaken and a 
large number of projects have been implemented under the 
control of the state. This underlines the role of the 
government in the Algerian economy. 
1.3. State control of the economy 
On the eve of independence the economy was largely domi- 
nated by privately owned enterprises except for the public 
utilities and the sizeable government investment in the petro- 
leum sector. After independence the state authority expanded 
to cover almost all aspects of the national economy through 
nationalisation and investment planning so as to implement its 
political programme. To start with, only the modern agricul- 
tural sector and a few industrial plants were under state 
control (those abandoned by the French settlers who fled to 
France after independence). These were first under the 
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control of former workers who instituted self-management in 
the agricultural and industrial sectors. The foreign-owned 
mining sector was nationalised in 1966. This was followed in 
1968 by the nationalisation of the major foreign-owned 
manufacturing companies. By 1971 all the petroleum operating 
companies and concessions were under state control (at least 
51$) and all the natural gas concessions and operations as 
well as the gas and oil transport facilities were recovered by 
the government (18). This larger state control of the economy 
included also the self-managed industrial enterprises which 
were all absorbed by 1974 (19). The takeover of the self- 
management sector by the public enterprises which held a 
quasi-monopoly of the whole national economy was not 
officially explained. It is believed that this was achieved 
in order to speed up the production which had remained 
constant and relatively low since 1962. At the end of 1971, 
the government initiated a land reform by nationalising some 
large Algerian owners, the land of absentee-owners and 
communal land. This reform advocated the reorganisation of 
the land distribution. Soma Algerian privately owned 
manufacturing companies were also nationalised. Meanwhile, 
public finance was reorganised through the development of 
state control of the banking system, the 
insurance companies 
and the administrative network. In addition, 
the foreign 
trade system was also restructured (20). 
Management of nationalised interests was assigned 
to 
government owned or controlled state enterprises or national 
companies. Each state enterprise had control over a subsector 
of the economy. In some cases the state enterprise accounted 
for the entire subsector (e. g., Mining and hydrocarbons), 
in 
some other subsectors private enterprise was permitted. 
By 
the mid 1970s more than 500 establishments belonged to the 
state public sector, hundreds more were owned by local govern- 
ment. These public enterprises have carried out investment 
projects financed by capital provided by the state or the 
banking system. In addition, regarding the management of the 
state agricultural land, the modern agricultural sector and 
the agrarian reform land were under the self-management system 
organised in cooperatives. These cooperatives also receive 
financial, physical and educational inputs to modernise their 
production methods in order to increase output. 
Table 1.1: The share of the public sector in VA by 
different sectors in percent (current prices) 
Sectors/Years 1969 1973 1974 1977 1978 
Agriculture 24 19 23 26 27 
Industry 
-Hydrocarbons 19 86 82 83 83 
-Mines and energy 97 95 97 98 98 
-Manufactur. ind. 48 49 61 74 73 
-Construction & 
public works 37 47 70 79 73 
Transport & 
communication 76 88 89 91 91 
Services 18 19 19 22 25 
VA without 
hydrocarbons 37 46 48 55 58 
Total VA 34 55 62 65 66 
Source : MPAT: La Synthese du Bilan Economique et Social de 
La Decennie 1967-78, Algiers, May 1980, p 53. 
The extent of government financial participation in 
indus- 
trial projects for the different plans is not known in exact 
terms. According to some available. figures public participa- 
tion was higher than that of the private sector (21). In the 
early post-independence period, a number of foreign companies 
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(mainly French) financed part of the investment directly 
(hydrocarbons). Since the nationalisation process however, no 
foreign capital has been invested except in joint participa- 
tion with the state. In fact the investment cede specified 
that the state should take a leading role in investment in all 
vital sectors but when financial resources are limited mixed 
enterprise (state and foreign private with 51% owned by the 
state) may be created. In effect the public sector accounts 
for the bulk of the new investments. Industrial investment 
has become almost exclusively a government activity undertaken 
by the various organisations of the public sector. 
This is confirmed by Figure 1.1 which shows that from 1970 
to 1978, the contribution of the public sector VA to"the total 
VA was higher than that of the private sector. As indicated 
in Table 1.1, in 1978 the former generated more than two 
thirds of the VA. The public sector contributed almost three 
fourths of the manufacturing industries' VA and more than 
fourth fifths of the hydrocarbons' VA. The services and 
agricultural sectors' value added are still dominated by the 
private sector. The public sector value added rose parallel 
to the growing public industrial sector value added, whose 
importance increased as a result of the hydrocarbon sector 
growth and the creation of new manufacturing enterprises. 
State control of the economy, although very important in the 
industrial sector, is still dominated by the private sector in 
agriculture and services. By 1980, the only parts of the 
economy that remained under private control were the 
traditional agricultural sector (59% of the cultivable land, 
fruit trees and vineyards), some small consumer manufactures 
and small-scale retail trade. The government dominated all 
other sectors of the economy--all foreign trade, most 
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Figure 1.1 : The share of the public sector in value added. 
Source : La Synthese du Bilan Economique et Social de la 
Decennie 1967-78. MPAT, May 1980, Algiers, p 53. 
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Figure 1.2 : Age distribution of the Algerian population. 
Source : Ibid Figure 1.1. p 134. 
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industries, much of the wholesale and retail trade, all 
utilities, transportation and the banking system. 
1.4. Human and natural resources 
Algeria, which is the second largest African country, is 
situated between Morocco and Tunisia with a Mediterranean 
coastline of nearly 1,000 km and a total area of 2,361,741 sq 
km. The climate of the Northern regions, the Tell, is of 
Mediterranean type with warm wet winters and hot summers. The 
high plateaux region is characterised by a semi-arid or steppe 
climate and the Algerian Sahara by large temperature varia- 
tions, wind and an arid climate. Barely 3% (22) of the total 
land area of Algeria is agricultural land. The rest is 
desert, mountains, high plateaux and steppes. The soil and 
vegetation of Algeria reflect the climatic contrast between 
the humid Tell, the semi-arid lands further South and the dry 
Sahara. Cereals, grapes, olives and fruit constitute the main 
vegetation in the fertile plains and valleys of the coastal 
regions while only dates are grown in the oases which depend 
on permanent supplies of underground water. 
As a result of the rapid population growth favoured until 
recently by government policies (23), the Algerian resident 
population grew from 12.1 million in mid 1965 to 19.6 million 
in mid 1981 (24) at an average annual rate of 3.3% (25), one 
of the highest in the world. The population of Algeria is 
characterised by large family cells, 6.7 persons (26), a very 
young population (in 1980 about half the population was under 
15 years old (27) (Figure 1.2) and a high level of illiteracy 
(in 1977 65% of the adult population was illiterate) (28). 
One should add that the sustained investment made in the 
educational system resulted not only in a large increase of 
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enrolled students at all levels (e. g., from 1966 to 1978 the 
number of students doubled in primary schools (29), increased 
by a factor of 5 in secondary and high schools (30) and rose 
by a factor of 15 in universities (31)) but also in a conside- 
rable decrease in the proportion of illiterate. Furthermore, 
having the same proportion of males and females, the Algerian 
population which is concentrated in the Northern part of the 
country is mainly centered in the urban areas (43.5%(32)). 
In 1980 the size of the labour force (33) was estimated at 
3.86 million (34) and was characterised by an annual rate of 
growth higher than 4%. This rate, which is larger than that 
of the population growth, reflects the progressive entry of 
Algerians born during the period of rapid natural increase 
(1950's) into the labour force. The ratio of the labour force 
to total labour resident population, 20%, remained constant 
between 1967 and 1980. The age distribution of the labour 
force is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Despite the fact that 
half of the population are female, their participation in the 
labour force is very low (6.7% of the total labour force in 
-: 1978 (35)). The level of education among the employed 
population is very low: among the employed labour force in 
1977,85% of the males and 54% of the females were without 
formal qualifications and only 1.45% of males and 4.79 % of 
the females were managers, technicians and supervisors (36). 
This, despite the large effort invested in the educational 
system, does not meet the present needs of the expanding 
economy due to the lack of emphasis on technical, scientific 
and vocational training. 
The high rate of growth or the labour force has conseq ie7- 
tly meant a massive demand for employment. As Table 1.2 and 
Figure 1.4 indicate, the contraction of the agricultural 
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la Decennie 1967-78, op cit. p 134. 
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labour force was exceptionally rapid dropping from 51.8% of 
the total employment in 1966 to 25.3% in 1980 (37). This 
rapid drift from the countryside may be the result of the 
competition between the different sectors of the economy. In 
addition, since 1969 remarkable progress has been made regard- 
ing the creation of non-agricultural employment (8.6% per 
annum during the 1970-81 period). The ratio of industrial to 
total labour force increased sharply from 6.9% in 1966 to 
24.35% in 1980. Similarly, the ratio of service to total 
labour force rose from 27.75% in 1966 to 33% in 1980. The 
proportion of employment within the industrial and service 
sectors remained almost the same. The most rapid growth was 
recorded in the industrial sector (particularly construction). 
The high rate of growth in construction is the result of the 
large number of industrial project construction. As a result, 
the rate of non-agricultural unemployment was reduced by 
almost half during the 1970s. This was achieved mainly by the 
creation of new jobs in the public sector (84%) (38). It 
should be stressed that the creation of jobs did not match the 
increase in the labour force. In 1980 11% were unemployed and 
another 10% held part time jobs (39). This unemployment is 
particularly felt by the young population with half of the 
unemployed between the ages of 18 and 25 (40). 
The most important resources of Algeria are hydrocarbons. 
They include crude oil, natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) and condensates (41). Major oil and natural gas fields 
were discovered in the North central, Southeast and 
South 
central regions of the Algerian Sahara. The main producing 
areas are Hassi-Messaoud, Hassi-R'mel 
in the North central 
region of Algeria and Chanet in the Illiz 
Bassin near the 
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Libyan border. Algerian crude oil is a light oil with a low 
sulphur content (42). The proven reserves of crude oil are 
limited. They were estimated at 8,080 million barrels in 1981 
(43). They should last for about 20 years at the 1978 
production rate. In addition, the natural gas proven reserves 
are estimated at about 4,300 billion cubic metres representing 
5% of world reserves (44). In 1980 Algeria ranked 4th in the 
world among natural gas producers (45) and 15th in the world 
in crude oil production (46). 
Algeria is also rich in mineral resources discovered 
before the petroleum era and after independence. The main 
ones are iron ore, phosphates, lead, zinc, antimony, wolfram, 
uranium and gold. Most of the iron ore is found in the Nor- 
thern regions (Bouari in Batna), near the Eastern border at 
Ouenza (47) and Boukara and near the Western border at Gara 
Djibilet (48) and Kenadra. In 1978 the Gara Djebilet reserves 
alone were estimated at 3,000 million tons of medium grade ore 
(49) and the deposit at Ouenza represented 75% of the national 
production. Zinc and lead are mostly found on the Algerian- 
Moroccan frontier at El Abed-Oued Zuonder. They are also 
found at Kherzet-Youcef in the Willaya (county) of Setif. The 
phosphate is found at Djebel Onk near the Eastern frontier and 
in the Northeast of the Algerian Sahara. Gold, uranium, 
wolfram and tin were discovered more recently in the Southeast 
region of the Sahara (El-Hoggar). This region is said to be 
particularly rich in other minerals too. In 1980, the 
reserves of uranium oxide were estimated at 50,000 metric 
tons, mostly in the Tingaouine area (50). Mercury 
is found in 
the Kabilia region (near Algiers). In 1980 Algeria ranked 3rd 
in the world in mercury production (51). Other minerals such 
as antimony, tungsten, manganese, copper and salt are also 
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found in the Northern part of Algeria, but are only processed 
on a small scale. 
1.5. Development planning 
The strategic development adopted in 1966, emphasized the 
necessity to orient state intervention toward the building of 
a strong economy, granting priorities to development problems. 
This strong will brought about the establishment of an essen- 
tial instrument of the organisation of development: planning. 
By planning the planners expected to develop backward and 
forward linkage effects throughout the economy and most of all 
set up a basis for an industrialising economy. Algerian 
planning is based on aggregative (or interrelated) sectoral 
models of planning. The plans are also capital centered being 
basically of the Harrod-Domar type in which the rate of growth 
of GDP is seen to depend on the rate of saving and the 
incremental capital/output ratio. The main condition to reach 
a certain rate of growth is an adequate level of investment 
which explains the high investment in Algeria. Planning is 
strictly controlled by the state. 
This centralised planning is very much like that encoun- 
tered in the Eastern European countries, in Egypt (at the time 
of Nasser) and in India (from the second development plan). 
It was late in the 1960's that the Algerian government started 
investing directly in industry. Just after independence, 
planning had a limited form as it was restricted to the 
elaboration of only the annual equipment budget. 
The first significant act for centralised planning was the 
creation of the "State Secretary of Planning" (SEP) 
in 1971 
which became the Ministry of Planning in 1977. Before 
that 
planning was under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
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Finance. After 1965, a long term plan (15 years) was elabora- 
ted with the help of the IBRD and the Russian GOSPLAN (52). 
Government orientation of economic development started to 
emerge based on the "industrialising industries" strategy. 
Thus from a combination of branch studies analysis, the 
adopted strategy and the prospects for the 1980-82 horizon, 
the different plans were formulated. The Council of the 
Revolution fixes the accumulation rate to be reached during 
the coming years. The different plans are foreseen taking 
into account the 7% planned rate of growth of the GDP (53). 
Until 1970 the plan was indicative but with the launching of 
the 1970-73 four year plan, the plan has become imperative and 
highly centralised (54). 
Organised development planning started with the 1967-69 
three year plan which represented the first phase of an 
extended long range development programme. The 1967-69 plan 
was followed by the 1970-73 four year plan and the 1974-77 
four year plan. Previous to these, three plans had been 
launched in 1947,1953 and 1959 (Constantine plan). The 
period extending from 1962 to 1966 saw only the continuation 
of some projects that were launched as part of the Constantine 
plan (55). 1978 and 1979 are characterised by a transitional 
period in anticipation of the 1980-84 five year plan. 
Although the development plans form the core of the develop- 
ment effort, 13 special programmes (56) were launched outside 
the framework of the plans to alleviate economic and social 
needs in low income areas, notably employment and education. 
Since 1967 fixed capital formation has shown a rapid 
evolution. From the early 1970's more than 40% of 
GNP has 
been used for the growth of national fixed capital. During 
the 1967-79 period, the investment ratio exceeded 39% of GDP. 
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It rose to 58% in 1977 before declining slightly to 44% in 
1979. This ratio, which is exceptionally high, is similar to 
that encountered in such countries as the USSR and Japan. 
The 1967-84 period can be divided into two distinct 
stages. The first aimed at setting up the structural reform, 
at introducing central planning and at preparing and starting 
large industrial projects. The objective was to create the 
technical and institutional supports to form a basis for a 
long term development strategy. Investment during that period 
was directed towards the development of the hydrocarbon sub- 
sector which would finance future development and would result 
in the creation of substitution industries leading to a lowe- 
ring of consumer goods imports, especially textiýes, weather 
and shoes. This period was characterised by a massive increa- 
se in oil prices in 1973 which marked the end of the first 
stage. During the second period, the country has experienced 
a rapid expansion of investment in industry and in hydrocar- 
bons in particular. This period is characterised as well by 
the development of intersectoral imbalances which led to 
markets social tensions and to underdevelopment of social 
services e. g. housing, health, training and urban transit. 
The 1978-79 interplans aimed at narrowing the widening gap 
between industry, particularly the hydrocarbon sub-sector and 
the rest of the economy before launching the 1980-84 plan. 
The 1980-84 plan shows different objectives when compared to 
the first three. These objectives do not favour costly 
capital investment but aim at correcting 
imbalances that 
appeared in Algerian economic development. This 
is expected 
to be achieved by reducing industrial investment in favour of 
other sectors such as agriculture, water, housing and public 
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works. The emphasis has shifted towards the satisfaction of 
basic needs. In addition, preferential attention is given to 
local investment and inland regions. Furthermore, another 
objective is the completion of ongoing projects. These 
accounted for half the financing of the 1980-84 plan (57). 
Investment in this plan is supposed to provide links with the 
existing industries and to realise the constraints placed upon 
existing capacities. 
1.5.1. The 1967-69 three year development plan 
This plan was the first development plan launched by the 
government after independence. Realised investment at current 
prices amounted to 9.164 billion AD. More than half of this 
went to the industrial sector as shown in Table 1.3 and Figure 
1.5. The agricultural and the social sectors were 
allocated less than 20%, respectively. The actual cost was 
2.15 times the planned cost, while the rate of investment 
realisation amounted to only 49.5% of planned investment. The 
rate of investment realisation was particularly low in the 
industrial sector (58) as illustrated in Table 1.4. This may 
lpe attributed to the fact that the investment cost was subject 
not only to international and domestic inflation but to the 
underestimation of the investment cost at the planning level. 
Carry-over to the 1970-73 plan was therefore very important. 
1.5.2. The 1970-73 four year development plan 
The objectives of this plan were more ambitious than those 
of the previous plan. Actual investment was almost 4 times 
that of the previous one. Government determination to invest 
in projects is confirmed by these Figures. The industrial 
sector again received the largest share of investment, which 
in relative terms is even larger than that of the previous 
plan (see Table 1.3). The social sector continued to receive 
26 
Table 1.3: Structure of planned and actual 
investment since 1967 (a) in percent. 
Sectors 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 1978-79 1980- 
plan plan plan interplans(b) plan 
Agriculture 13.9(15.2) 10.5(8.1) 10.9(4.8) 3.3(7.9) (d) 6(e) 
Industry 59.6(53.5) 44.8(57.2) 43.6(61.2) 42 (61.7) 38.6 
Social 
sectors(c) 13.7. (19) 26.7(18.5) 25.9(17.5) 25(20.2) 31.1 
a The figures in brackets show actual investment. 
b No investment was planned during this period, the figures 
concerned budgeted investment. The figures in brackets 
relate to 1978 only. 
c Housing, education, training and other community facilities. 
d The 1978 planned figure contains fisheries. 
e The planned figure contains fisheries. 
Sources : Tables A. 1 and A. 2 in the Appendix A. 
Table 1.4: Rate of realisation of investment 
since 1967 in billions of AD 
Sectors 1967-69 1970-73 1974-77 
prog. rate prog. rate prog. rate 
cost real. cost real. cost real. 
Agriculture 
Hydra & fisheries 1.9 100 9.5 46 
31.6 28 
industry 14 35 36 
57 166.7 44 
Social sector 2.3 75 15.2 
44 75 28 
Source : Ibid Tabe 1.3. 
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Industry 
the same proportion. On the other hand, the agricultural 
sector received an even lower proportion. In addition, the 
actual cost was 2.46 times larger than the planned cost 
despite a realisation ratio of only 53% (see Table 1.4). 
This may be attributed to identical reasons discussed in part 
1.5.1. The rate of realisation of the agricultural sector was 
lower than in the previous plan. Again the carry-over to the 
following plan was very high. 
1.5.3. The 1974-77 four year development plan 
Actual investment during this plan amounted to more than 3 
times those of the previous plan. The large increase in oil 
prices in 1973 reinforced the government willingness to pursue 
a policy of even larger investments. The industrial sector 
was again allocated the largest share (see Table 1.3 and 
Figure 1.5), this time more than three fifths of the total 
investment. The relative share attributed to the agricultural 
sector is less important than that of the previous plan. The 
social sector received a similar proportion in relative terms. 
The actual cost was again 2.85 times larger than the planned 
cost for similar reasons (outlined in part 1.5.1. ). The rate 
of realisation, 39 %, was lower than that for the previous 
plans. The agricultural and social sectors experienced the 
lowest rate of realisation ever compared to the previous 
plans. One should mentione that the rate of realisation in 
the industrial sector does not exceed 45% (see Table 1.4. 
The number of unrealised projects at the end of this plan was 
so high that the government decided not to launch a new 
development plan for the two following years. 
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L. -'). 4. The 1978-79 interplans 
Although no plan was launched during this period, large 
investments were realised. The amount allocated was compara- 
ble to that of the previous plan, amounting to more than 
100,000 billion AD. The industrial sector received more than 
half of the investments and the agricultural and social 
sectors were allocated almost the same proportion in relative 
terms as in the 1974-77 plan. Despite these efforts the 
carry-over to the 1980-84 plan was still very high (49% of the 
total investments of the new plan: 196.7 billion AD) (59). 
The carry-over was particularly high in the hydrocarbon sub- 
sector and social sector as they represented 40% and 38% of 
the investments allocated to these sectors, respectively (60). 
1.5.5. The 1980-84 five year development plan 
This plan is the first five year plan undertaken in 
Algeria since independence. Planned investment amounts to 400 
billion AD. This is almost one and one half times the total 
realised investment for the 1967-79 period. About half the 
total investment is used for financing ongoing projects. As 
Apposed to the previous plans only 38% of the total investhuent 
is allocated to the industrial sector (see Table 1.3 and 
Figure 1.5). In addition, most of the investment allocated to 
the industrial sector is targeted at fostering light 
industries which are expected to meet consumer demand. The 
social sector planned investment increased to almost one 
third 
of the total investment while the planned 
investment in the 
agricultural sector in relative terms was comparable 
to that 
of the previous plans. The rest 
is devoted to water, 
transportation and economic infrastructure. 
During the 1967-79 period, investment rose sharply at an 
average rate of 36% particularly after 
the revision of petro- 
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leum prices in 1973. These investment efforts mainly 
benefited the industrial sector which occupied a key role in 
Algerian development strategy until the 1980-84 plan. The 
share of investment in the agricultural sector fell steadily 
while the share of investment in the social sector remained 
constant until the 1980-84 plan. One should add that the 
share of investment allocated to the industrial sector is 
higher than the planned figure. Consequently, investment with 
regard to planned goals in the agricultural and social sectors 
has been falling steadily. This is illustrated in Figure 1.5. 
The real resources of the economy were essentially concentra- 
ted in the industrial sector. The high carry-over to 
successive plans refleted the low realisation ratio which 
averages 48% for the 1967-79 period. In industry, for 
instance, ongoing works to be completed during the 1980-84 
plan consist of 248 out of 490 large and medium-sized projects 
and 28 out of 93 expansions launched since 1967. These 
figures do not include the 587 small projects which were 
planned but not carried out (61). These ongoing projects were 
estimated at 80 billion AD, nearly half of the total amount 
allocated to the industrial sector. 
The slow growth of investment reflects the difficulties 
and delays in implemention. The reasons for the low rate of 
investment realisation are manifold. Firstly, problems are 
generated by the lack of care in preparation of studies, by 
extremely cumbersome administrative procedures, by inadequate 
coordination of the establishment of surrounding infrastruc- 
ture and by the form of contracts and difficulties during 
contract negotiations. Secondly, there is the inadequacy of 
Algerian infrastructure and execution capacities, the 
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complexity of the projects characterised by their large size, 
the possibility of the wrong choice of constructor or 
location, an inappropriately high level of technology and high 
degree of required integration of production lines. Thirdly, 
the need to train management and manual workers parallel to 
the construction of projects creates difficulties because of 
the significant lack of skilled workers. Finally, project 
implementation is burdened by cumbersome government procedures 
required to obtain financing and to import capital goods and 
other products required for the projects. Other causes 
include difficulties due to the planning itself. These causes 
will be seen in more detail in the investment policy (see part 
3.1). All these difficulties have led to substantial delays 
which have themselves generated considerable incremental 
costs. 
1.6. Algerian gross domestic product 
The Algerian gross domestic product (62) at current price 
rose from 21 billion AD in 1969 to 154.76 billion AD in 1980 
(63), at an average annual rate of 20%. This increase of 700% 
-is the result of 
large investments made in the public sector. 
It should be noted that the sharp increase in GDP for the 
period starting in 1974 coincides with the worldwide oil price 
increase. As shown by Figure 1.6, as one would expect from the 
investment figures, the highest average annual rate of growth 
was reached by the industrial sector, 26.25%. The agricultu- 
ral and the service sectors grew at a similar annual rate of 
15% although the growth of the agricultural sector was 
irregu- 
lar as opposed to that of the service sector. By and large 
the annual rate of growth of Algerian GDP and of the various 
sectors was irregular over the years as seen 
in Figure 1.6. 
These figures are not representative of the average annual 
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Table 1.5: Average annual rate 
of growth of GDP (1969-80) 
Years 1969-80 1967-78 1967-69 1970-73 
Current prices 20% 12.7% 
1978 prices 7.2% 11% 6.6%(9) 
Years 1974-77 1977-78 1978-80 
Current prices 16.2% 23.5% 23.75% 
1978 prices 6.6%(9) 6.6%(11) 8% 
( )The figures in brackets are the planned average annual 
rates of growth. 
Sources : La Synthese du Bilan Economique et Social de la 
Decennie 1967-78, op cit. pp 49,51,59 and Table 
A. 4 in the Appendix A. 
Table 1.6: Percent of GDP 
_in 
Alger_ia, Mexico and Brazil 
at current prices. 
Algeria Mexico Brazil 
1980 1981 1980 
Agriculture 68 13 
Industry 55 37 34 
-Manufacturing (1) 11 23.80 23 
Services 39 55 53 
1 Manufacturing sub-sector is part of the industrial sector 
but its share of GDP is shown because it typically is the 
most dynamic part of the industrial sector. 
Source : 1983 World Development Report, World Bank 
Publication (Oxford University Press) p 
153. 
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rate of growth of GDP (total and sectoral) which, as indicated 
in Figure 1.6, fluctuate greatly. These large variations may 
be attributed to domestic and international inflation. This 
high average annual growth of GDP (at current prices) is also 
reflected by a high average annual- rate of growth of GDP in 
real terms (at 1978 prices) which amounted to 7.2% during the 
1967-78 period (Table 1.5). The real rates of growth of GDP 
were lower than the planned figures as seen in Table 1.5. 
These rates reflect relatively good economic performance. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.7, the most important changes 
that have occurred in the sectoral composition of GDP have 
been the steady decline of agriculture and the growth of 
industry, particularly hydrocarbons. Agriculture's contribu- 
tion to GDP which, in absolute terms increased from 2.216 
billion AD in 1969 to 9.845 billion AD in 1980 (64), declined 
almost annually in relative terms from 10.53% to 6.3%, 
respectively. On the contrary, industry's contribution grew 
from about 38.6% in 1969 to as much as 57.1% in 1980. This 
happened despite the decrease in the contribution of GDP from 
the manufacturing sub-sector which dropped from 13.2% to 
11.1%, respectively. Meanwhile the contribution to GDP from 
services declined from 32.7% to 21.7%, respectively. 
The sectoral composition of the GDP of the Algerian econo- 
my differs from that of other middIte--inco1ne countries like 
Mexico or Brazil for instance. This is illustrated in Table 
1.6. The main contribution to GDP is due to services in the 
case of both Brazil and Mexico while it comes from the 
indus- 
trial sector in the case of Algeria. The industrial sector 
is 
dominated by the manufacturing sub-sector in the former and by 
the hydrocarbon sub-sector in the latter. The manufacturing 
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sub-sector contribution to GDP in Algeria is almost half of 
that of Brazil or Mexico. The agricultural sector contribu- 
tion to GDP is insignificant in the three countries although 
it is higher in Brazil than Algeria and Mexico. The GDP in 
Algeria is based on the production of one group of products 
(hydrocarbons), while the GDP in Brazil and Mexico is more 
diversified. This situation has prevailed in Algeria since 
the pre-independence period. Thus Algeria is characterised by 
a weak manufacturing sub-sector and agricultural sector, a 
situation which is alleviated by the existence of a strong 
hydrocarbon sub-sector. 
Reflecting the high level of investment which corresponded 
to an increase in GDP, income per capita rose from 1,547 AD in 
1970 to 8,199 AD (US $2000) in 1980 (65) (at current prices) 
at an average annual rate of 16.4%. The fact that this 
increase does not reflect the high rate of growth of GDP for 
the same period may be attributed to the high rate of growth 
of the Algerian population. The average annual rate of growth 
of per capita income in real terms (at 1978 prices) is 4% for 
the 1969-78 period (66). This rate is higher than in the 
neighbouring countries of Morocco and Tunisia though lower 
than in other oil-producing countries. 
As indicated in Table 1.7 (at 1974 prices), output (67) 
per worker for the period 1969-80 increased at an average 
annual rate of growth of 2.22%. This figure, which 
is smaller 
than that for output (6.48%), reflects the large increase in 
employment. It should be noted, though, that the 
increase in 
overall labour productivity is solely due 
to the growth in 
productivity in the agricultural sector resulting 
from a 
decline of the labour force. In the industrial sector govern- 
ment policies regarding the adoption of advanced 
technology 
37 
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partially failed in the sense that the expected long term 
improvement in labour productivity did not materialise. The 
massive growth of employment in this sector led to low or 
negative rates of growth of labour productivity. Output per 
worker in services and construction remained essentially 
constant over this period. In spite of these increases, the 
level of agricultural productivity remains by far the lowest 
of any sector and the industrial sector, or more particularly 
the hydrocarbon sub-sector, by far the highest of any sub- 
sector or sector. 
The VA rose from 17.23 billion AD in 1969 to 131.772 
billion AD in 1980 at current prices. The VA rose more rapid- 
ly in the industrial sector than in the agricultural or 
service sectors. This is clearly illustrated by Table 1.8 
which shows the contributions to VA from the different 
sectors. The industrial sector contribution to VA increased 
while that from services decreased by nearly a factor of two. 
In addition, the share of the manufacturing sub-sector decrea- 
sed. This is because the VA rose more quickly in some sectors 
: than in others. In real terms the VA rose from 38.55 billion 
AD in 1967 to 81.20 billion AD in 1978 (at 1978 prices). The 
contribution by the different sectors is as shown in Table 
1.9. The contribution from the industrial sector increased 
until 1973 and then remained essentially constant for the 
1973-78 period. At the same time, the agricultural sector 
contribution dropped steadily over the years while the service 
sector contribution increased, though only slightly. 
1.7. Financing of up blic investment 
Since independence the financing structure of public 
investment evolved continually. Prior to 1971, the invest- 
ments of public enterprises were financed by non-reimbursable 
39 
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Table 1.8: The contribution to VA from various 
sectors in 1969 and 1980 (percentages). 
Sectors 1969 1980 
Industrial sector 47.2 67 
-Hydrocarbons 17.2 38.3 
-Mines and energy 2.2 1.7 
-Manufacturing 16.1 13 
-Construction and public works 11.7 14 
Agriculture 
Services 
12.8 
40 
7.4 
25.5 
VA without government services 100 100 
Source : Table A. 3 in the Appendix A. 
Table 1.9: The VA contribution 
by sector in real percentage terms (at 1978 prices). 
Sectors 1967 1973 1977 1978 
Industrial sector 60.3 62.6 62 61.5 
-Hydrocarbons 37 36 31 30 
: -Mines & energy 1.2 1.6 2 2 
-Manufacturing 10.2 13 13 13 
-Construction and 
public works 12 12 16 6.5 
Agriculture 13.4 9.5 8.6 8.2 
Services 26.3 27.7 30 30 
source: Table A. 6 in the Appendix A. 
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grants from the Treasury, foreign aid and to a small extent by 
the public enterprises' own financial assets. From 1971, the 
investments of public enterprises have been financed by reim- 
bursable long term loans from the Treasury supplemented by 
external borrowing and medium term loans from the Primary 
Banks. The financing of public investments by public enter- 
prises was introduced to deal with the rapid growth of planned 
public investments. These long term loans are channelled 
through specialised financial agencies such as the Algerian 
Development Bank (BAD) which lends directly to public enter- 
prises according to the terms set up by the Treasury. All the 
investments are subject to approval by the government within 
the context of the central planning procedures (see part 3,1). 
Since 1971, the aim of government financing policies has been 
to give the banking system control over public enterprise 
investments. This restructuring has made the banking system 
responsible for project financing. Selected projects, there- 
fore, are required to guarantee their financial feasibility 
and proper execution. In addition, for public enterprises, 
this is expected to stimulate a choice of project which shows 
an adequate financial rate of return, i. e., generates the 
necessary funds, for new capital goods and for repayment and 
debt servicing. Thus, since 1971, the financing of public 
enterprise investments is the responsibility of the Treasury 
and the banking system. This part proposes to assess in 
general terms the share of government and public enterprise 
investments. The magnitude of internal and foreign resources 
required by the different development plans and the share of 
gross public and private savings in total national savings are 
revealed. 
41 
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1.7.1. The different sources of public investment financing 
The rapid growth of public investment during the 1967-80 
period needed the mobilisation of large financial resources. 
Since 1967 public investments have been financed by the gover- 
nment through the Treasury and by public enterprises (68). As 
Table 1.10 and Figure 1.8 indicate, the reorganisation of 
public investment financing that occurred in 1971 resulted in 
a sharp increase in public enterprise financing and 
consequently in a sharp decline of direct government financing 
of public investment. The former increased from 2% to 71% 
while the latter declined from 79% to 29% for the 1967-73 
period. This rapid increase in the share of public enter- 
prise investment in the total amount of public investment 
corresponds to a rapid growth in public investment for the 
same period. The large share of public enterprise financing 
attained in the 1970-73 period continued over the 1974-79 
period. The financing system introduced in 1971 resulted in 
the replacement of non-reimbursable Treasury grants by long 
term loans and the introduction of medium term bank lending as 
Ya source of investment financing. 
The dynamic growth of public investment by public enter- 
prises did not outstrip the growth in gross domestic savings 
capacity since generated saving increased in terms of the 
percentage share of total public investment from 68% 
during 
the 1967-73 period to 80% during the 1974-77 period (as 
indi- 
cated in Table 1.11). The share of gross 
foreign financial 
sources declined in relative terms 
from 32% during the 1967-69 
period to 20% during the 1974-77 period while 
in absolute 
terms it rose by a factor of eight between 
the two periods 
concerned. Thus although 
the ratio of foreign financing to 
total public investment decreased, foreign 
financing increased 
42 
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Figure 1.8 : Share of government and public enterprises 
financing of public investment for some 
selected years. 
Source : Table 1.10. 
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in absolute terms. Algeria had to turn to Euro-market and 
international. banks which were more than willing to grant 
loans to a country with exportable reserves of oil and gas. 
This insurance reinforced the government's willingness to 
pursue productive investments at a high rate (50% of GDP) (69). 
The increase in the capacity of gross domestic financial 
sources follows the large increase in oil exports after 1970. 
Public enterprises were thus mainly financed by gross domestic 
financial sources in relative terms which, as indicated in 
Figure 1.9, have been dominated by public savings since 1973 
1.7.1.1. Government financing 
The government financing of public investment takes the 
form of non-reimbursable loans which are part of capita? 
budget expenditures. Capital budget expenditures consist of 
public investments made mainly in agriculture, education, 
irrigation, infrastructure, social services and in some public 
enterprises and agencies (non-productive investments). These 
investments are financed by government revenues and foreign 
borrowing. The most important source of government current 
revenues comes from the taxation of petroleum products which 
includes royalty payments and an income tax payment as shown 
in Table 1.12 and Figure 1.10. In 1980, the ratio of petro- 
leum revenues to total revenues reached 61%. The successive 
rise in oil prices led to important financial resources 
despite the stagnation of the volume of crude o; + and 
condensate exports. The continued rise in petroleum resources 
corresponds also to an increase in refined products exports, 
liquefied petroleum gas (which tripled from 1973 to 1978) and 
liquefied natural gas (which more than tripled from 1969 to 
1978) (70) . 
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Figure 1.9 : Percentage share of gross private savings, 
gross public savings in gross national 
savings - 1967 to 1977. 
Source : Attal A. A. : Financing Economic Development 
in Algeria 1967-77. Ph. D Thesis op cit. p 162. 
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Figure 1.10 : Percentage share of petroleum revenue in 
total revenues - 1968-79. 
Source : Table A. i in the Appendix A. 
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1.7.1.2. Public enterprise financing 
The different sources of public enterprise financing 
expressed as a fraction of total investments are shown in 
Table 1.13. Reimbursable Treasury loans for public enter- 
prises investments increased from 46.3% for the 1970-73 period 
to 60% for the 1978-79 period. These investments are financed 
by long term loans from the Treasury through specialised 
financial agencies such as the BAD. They are financed by the 
overall budget surplus resulting from government current 
revenues and expenditures and capital budget expenditures. 
Primary Bank loans decreased from 28.2% for the 1970-73 period 
to only 4.4% for the 1978-79 period. These loans are medium 
term loans granted by the Primary Banks to the economy. On 
the other hand, foreign sources of public enterprise financing 
increased from 25.5% for the 1970-73 period to 35.6% for the 
1978-79 period. This shows that the financing structure 
introduced in 1971 was inadequate to satisfactorily handle the 
sharp increase in investment. In addition, the bulk of 
foreign financing went to a few public enterprises, mainly 
; SONATRACH, SONELEC, SONACOME, SNS, SONITEX and SONIPEC. The 
other sectors did not benefit at all from this type of 
financing (Table 1.14). The light industries benefited from 
foreign financing only from 1980. 
By and large public enterprise financing has increased 
since 1971. This means that public enterprises are merely 
financed by reimbursable loans. The Treasury continues to 
provide the greatest share of the funding required to finance 
the different plans through non-reimbursable or reimbursable 
loans. In addition, these investments are mainly financed by 
gross domestic financial sources, despite the 
fact that the 
share of gross foreign financial sources has, 
in absolute 
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terms, increased over the years. 
ly financed by public savings. 
Public investments are ma!. n- 
The government's efforts to 
mobilise savings has therefore improved over the years. 
Furthermore, despite the introduction of the new financing 
system, the contribution from the banking system has not 
improved. This can be seen from the fact that the medium term 
loans have declined sharply during the development plans. The 
fact that public enterprise investment is more dependent on 
foreign sources may be attributed to the difficulties encoun- 
tered by public enterprises to generate their own financing. 
Important efforts, however, have been made to mobilise 
domestic and foreign sources of financing for the current 
development strategy. 
1.8. Balance of payments and public debt 
Algeria's balance of payments was strongly influenced by 
the investment strategy pursued, but one should add that 
external factors had almost as great an impact. Surpluses 
were recorded from 1971 to 1974, in 1976 and between 1978 and 
1980 as indicated in Table 1.15. The largest surpluses were 
recorded in 1974 and 1980 mainly because of higher oil 
revenues. Hydrocarbons played a fundamental role in maintai- 
ning a high rate of growth in export earnings. The substan- 
tial deficit of over 1.1 billion AD and 1.4 billion AD 
recorded in 1975 and 1977, respectively, reflects the decline 
in hydrocarbon exports coupled with a rise in imports of 
capital goods in 1975 and an increase in imports of capital 
and consumer goods in 1977. The balance of payments was 
heavily influenced by non-factor services, especially trans- 
port and insurance of goods, technical cooperation (payment to 
foreign contractors and consultants) and public works and 
services (of which the interest paid on the private debt 
is 
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the most important). The private debt consists of medium and 
long term loans contracted by the Algerian public organisa- 
tions (banks and public enterprises) with private foreign 
suppliers and banks. Since 1979, the interest on the private 
debt, transport and insurance and technical cooperation were 
the largest source of the deficit in the balance of payments. 
This is because public enterprises have become more dependent 
on private commercial sources for loans and technical coopera- 
tion. Serving to mitigate the impact of freight, technical 
cooperation and interest, are the large influx of medium and 
long term capital in the form of loans and investment, private 
transfer payments (which consist of gifts and remittances of 
income sent home by Algerians working abroad) and, only more 
recently, the trade balance. These have contributed to the 
overall balance of payments surplus and to the increase in 
international reserves. 
In 1981, the total mobilised debt was estimated to be US$ 
14.3 billion which is equivalent to about 55.4 billion AD 
(including disbursed loans only) (see Table 1.16). The 
contracted debt has always been important (this is for both 
surplus or deficit periods of the balance of payments). From 
1970 to 1978 there was a sharp increase in borrowing. In 
effect, between 1972 and 1978, the debt 
increased at an 
average annual rate of 36%. From 1979 onward a slight 
decline 
in borrowing has been recorded. The country's contracted debt 
has been growing mainly because hydrocarbon revenues 
have not 
allowed the government to sustain 
imports of capital, semi- 
finished and consumer goods and services. Loans 
from the 
international markets have been contracted to strengthen 
the 
deficit of foreign currencies and maintain the realisation of 
53 
1 
-92 a) v 
U 
eo 
c 
a 
x d 
c 
0 
aý c 
t 
ä 
U 
L 
4l 
0 
d 
U 
J 
C 
L 
4' 
4J 
x 
W 
'O 
d 
l0 
H 
U 
n 
(o c L 
4J x 
G) 
c 
0 
ä a 
L 
c) 
C 
0 
x 
w 
N 
4ý 
w 
V 
c 
x 
ui 
a 
44 4J to c 
te a, 
u 
tL 
s 
0 
t 1 ca "- 
0 
0) 41 41 
to c 
L O) 
u NtL 
C) a+ y 
V2a 
O>LC 
LO N 
X 
N /0 
0-8 
2"C 0 
ýa ýo 
Ii 
d 41 4. f 
to c L. C) 
V 
rL 
3 
O 
LC 
Jr 
O 
d 
41 4J 
Co c 
te a, 
u >tL 
J JJ 
Cz 
CG 
N 
L 
H 
D 
;n L 
ýo d 
Co M V1 
C: ) r4 V% 't Co Ln cý N1 ýt rM 00 tteg 
r- ý 
ý 
Co N 10 SN 't PMP ýO t#n 
v1 
0C> - NK NOr-IIt Vº1llCIO p. p. 
LA It in 1ý- 
170-MM C> 'n o. o. -V1N0 000 -M Itr- MN . 
fý . 
01Nap00NU11ý 
Ir-t10 P0> 
". -N OOMtl10 vi tt 
NMVýýe r-ý--NNcm CM 
M 1! 1 ýtf`r1l1ýOýýN 
O. iOO, AONNO; O0 u% 
. -- NItNM -týt V1ItMM 
(> 6-1 
)2 
s 
ýGNýtNN. tr- 
N2PMOVºMNO 
NooMOýttOOlf- 
( I- OOMNOM 
Nýt00ýr-'MOM 
ýýNN 
fV 
v 
M 
'O 
M 
I gyn 
. 
MPNM V1N. l%0LA 
.; 0'O O 
P MNMNO '- ."M 
P- V. O. -t'O M 1-O N 
ä '0v-ML%C02 - -MOM 
r-- MMt v1 CO 
I- 
MI VN LA 
r"" 
ýt 
r- I, - Pl- P- F- co co 
U 
P OK P ON OK O- 0ý P O% 0ý Ok 
54 
xa 
"Nx 
O_ 
a> 0 
.. 
0 ü 
NO to a 
4.10 (L) 0 
1 
t0 N4 
++ NN D1 
U "r J 
4.0 Co 
(A 4. J 
O CA 
a+ N 
4) c0 J > a+ W 
4) Vf . N Z; 
CV0 
NC7 
-h[ 41 (0 Q CCC "- l0 .. 
mýN 
Co tu - 4. J 
a o' o" Ja in to 
" C. 7 O w- ON 
.. y e) rý fý 
3 O" 
vN 
.0P O' MW 10 0! 
Co 
CL 
L 7 
37 O Co C 
N Ol 01 "J m º" C 
äPä 
aN 4º 
E (0 to 
L t_ .. 
O 01 Cº Co 
'- >> CI 
a+ <Q v 
N L 
DC ýý 
rN 
#vv N 
'144 
the development plans. For instance, from 1967 to 1977 more 
than 20% of public investment was financed by foreign sources 
(71). The largest borrowers among the public enterprises were 
SONATRACH, CNAN, SNS, SONACOME and SNMC (72). 
In addition, the mobilised debt to GNP ratio jumped from 
19% in 1970 to 52% in 1978. From 1979, however, it decreased 
steadily to reach 35.2% in 1981 (see Table 1.16). This means 
that in 1981 more than 35% of GNP was mobilised in the form of 
foreign loans. Consequently, a large fraction of the sources 
of financing for productive investment had to be sought 
outside the national economy. 
With the launching of big industrial projects the solvency 
of Algeria has improved and recourse to foreign loans from 
financial institutions has increased greatly. The foreign 
financial sources come essentially from financial institutions 
which are mainly private banks, credit suppliers in charge of 
the realisation of projects that are specific to public 
enterprises, bilateral official loans made by governments and 
finally, multilateral loans (see Table 1.17). Government 
ybilateral loans were granted (in order of importance ) by USA, 
Japan, West Germany, USSR, Canada, France, East Germany and 
Spain. The financial institutions come mainly from multiple 
lenders as well as French, American, Belgiam and West German 
financial institutions. Loans (73) have been subscribed with 
European, Japanese and American bank consortium (74), for 
example. 
In order to get a better insight into the Algerian 
situation, the external outstanding debt during the covered 
period is compared to that of other developing countries. 
In 
1979, Algeria was among the most indebted countries in the 
world, ranking third below Brazil and Mexico 
(as shown in 
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Table 1.17: External public debt structure. 
Years Total % % % %% 
Million bila- multi- suppli- finan. others us $ teral lateral ers institut. 
Undisbursed debt 
1972 2,827 43.5 0.6 40 13 2 1973 4,788 30 0.8 28 37 3.6 1974 6,789 29 3.1 31 34 2.5 
1975 9,003 19.7 2.5 37.5 38.6 1.4 
1976 11,340 17.5 3.3 35 42 1.6 
1977 13,785 15.6 4 35 43.5 1.4 
1978 20,093 14.6 3.5 26 52 1 
1979 23,376 15.4 4 23 56 1.4 
Average figures 23 3 32 40 1.4 
Disbursed debt 
1979 15,330 12.5 1.6 25.2 58.5 2.2 
AD (1,912) (245) (3,865) (8,965) (343) 
Source: Ibid source Table 1.16. 
Table 1.18: External public debt of Third World Countries 
higher than ten billion US$ on 31th December 1979 
Countries Total debt Debt per Service payment 
Million US$ capita US$ % exports 
Brazil 47,521 407 34.6 
Mexico 36,015 549 64.1* 
Algeria 23,376 1,283 25.6 
India 21,287 32 9.5 
Indonesia 20,840 145 13.4* 
Korea repub. 20,036 529 13.5 
Egypt Arab r. 16,037 412 15.8 
Turkey 14,652 331 12.9 
Spain 11,442 307 5.6 
Israel 10,673 2,816 10.3 
Pakistan 10,599 132 12 
Venezuela 10,238 757 9.4 
Sudan 33 
Mauritania 32.4 
* Service payment reflects prepayments. 
Source: 1981 World Bank Annual Report, op cit. 
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Table p1.18). These three countries accumulated more than 25% 
of the total world debt. Regarding contracted debt per 
capita, Algeria ranked first (with the exception of Israel) in 
the world. The difference, however, between contracted debt 
and mobilised debt is large. In fact, Algeria has never been 
in financial difficulty despite the fact that credits granted 
have more than doubled between 1976 and 1979. 
The service of the debt increased from 8 million AD in 
1968 to almost 10 billion AD in 1980 (see Table 1.16). Most 
of the loans contracted were long term loans and for a certain 
period repayment was less than 12% of annual export earnings, 
a fairly reasonable debt burden according to some scholars 
(75). Between 1979-81 the service of the debt accounted for 
about 25% of the exports of goods and services. 
From 1968 to 1979 the service payment increased by more 
than a hundred times. The highest increase was obtained in 
1972, but from 1973 onward the increase in the volume of 
hydrocarbon exports alleviated this situation. This propor- 
tion (i. e., 25% of total export earnings) is considered by 
international financial experts to be the highest ratio affor- 
dable by a country. This is slightly higher than the Algerian 
blueprints of financing of the plan which state that the debt 
service ratio should not exceed 20% of total exports (76). 
Compared to other countries, Algeria is in a better position 
in terns of the ratio of service payments to exports of goods 
and services since, in 1979, Algeria ranked ninth after Mexico 
(64ý), Brazil (34.6%), Sudan (33%) and Mauritania (32.4%). 
In addition, the debt service as a fraction of GNP rose 
tremendously from 1970 to 1980 (77) (see Table 1.16). This 
ratio goes through a peak in 1972 and from then on tends to 
57 
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decrease. It remained constant between 1980 and 1981. In 
1980 this service payment was as high as the contribution of 
the agricultural sector VA and that of the manufacturing 
industries (10%). The relative repercussion of the service of 
the debt on the Algerian economy is therefore quite 
significant. 
Algeria managed to maintain a surplus in the balance of 
payments except in 1975 and 1977 where a deficit was recorded. 
In addition, the Algerian debt burden remained within the 
limits of the country's capacity. The external financial 
situation has been improved over the past years. Despite a 
further increase in absolute terms, the ratio of mobilised 
debt to GNP declined tremendously from 52.6% in 1978 to 35.2% 
in 1981 and the ratio of debt service to exports dropped 
slightly from 25.6% in 1979 to 24.9% in 1981. The most impor- 
tant sources of foreign borrowings were banks, suppliers and 
bilateral official loans. When Algerian contracted foreign 
debt and debt service is compared to that of other countries, 
Algeria is among the most indebted country in the world (debt 
per capita is the highest and the ratio of debt service to 
exports is among the highest in the world). The Algerian 
situation, however, can be said to be much better than that of 
the countries with which it is compared. 
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CHAPTER TWO : THE ALGERIAN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
In this chapter we intend to assess the stage of 
development reached by the Algerian industrial sector. This 
is not meant to be an exhaustive balance sheet of the perfor- 
mance of the industrial sector. It is only proposed to show 
the main orientation of the Algerian development effort. We 
will first deal with the industrial sector at the eve of 
independence, as we want to estimate its contribution to the 
Algerian economy at that time and to assess the transformation 
and development accomplished since then. The analysis of the 
international 
most important branches of industry, based on thel(standard 
industrial classification of 1968, will follow the discussion 
of the Algerian industrial sector in the late 1970's. 
2.1. The industrial sector in 1962 
The colonial Algerian economy was based on the agricultu- 
ral sector and exports because Algeria was considered to have 
an agricultural calling. In the Algerian economy, wine and 
citrus products played a similar role to cotton in the 
Egyptian economy. Consequently the industrial sector was very 
limited. The few firms that existed in 1962 had been built 
only because of the seclusion of Algeria from France during 
World War II. These industrial settings (1) consisted of a 
few import substitution industries and public utilities (elec- 
tricity, gas and railway industries). The main industrial 
equipment at that time belonged to the colonial public sector. 
Most of the import substitution industries were of modest size 
and specialised in the final transformation of products. 
These were tied to the mining industry, construction materials 
(steel and cement works, plaster, tiles and brick work), light 
chemicals, electrical and vehicle assembling and food 
firms 
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(i. e., wines, alcohol and beer plants, fish, fruit and 
vegetable canning firms and flour and semolina pasta mills) 
(2). Some plants were still under construction as part of the 
Constantine plan (3). Algeria also inherited two oil 
pipelines, a substantial road network and airport, port and 
housing infrastructure. 
As indicated in Table 2.1, the contribution of the 
Algerian industrial sector to GDP was small. At the time of 
independence the Algerian economy was dominated by the 
agricultural sector and services. In 1962, the industrial 
sector contribution to GDP increased slightly with the exploi- 
tation of hydrocarbons. In 1962 the hydrocarbon sub-sector 
contribution to GDP and to the industrial sector VA was higher 
than in 1959. The hydrocarbon industries constituted half of 
total export earnings (4) and accounted for 15.8% of GDP (5). 
The manufacturing sub-sector contribution to industrial sector 
VA and to GDP was also small (see Table 2.2). Almost one 
third of the manufacturing sub-sector contribution to VA came 
from craftwork and small manufacturing (see Table 2.2). 
"y The branches that contributed the most to the manufactu- 
ring sub-sector VA were the agricultural and food industries, 
the electrical and mechanical engineering industries and the 
textile and leather industries (see Table 2.2). In the mecha- 
nical and electrical industries and in the agricultural and 
food industries the craftwork contribution was especially 
high. The steel, petrochemical, fertiliser and instrument 
industries were not at all developed. 
A comparison of the contribution of each industrial branch 
to the industrial VA between Algeria and developed countries 
(6) confirms the above conclusions. The different figures 
given in Table 2.3 show clearly that, in the case of Algeria, 
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the craftwork and small manufacturing industries' contribution 
was high while that of the large manufacturing industries was 
lower than those in developed countries. It should be noted 
that, with the increase in oil production, the contribution of 
petroleum production to the industrial sector VA increased 
tremendously. This is in contrast to the non-existent 
petroleum contribution in the developed countries . 
The weakness of the industrial sector reflected the lack 
of investment by indigenous and European populations in this 
sector. Up to 1955 only 11.9% (7) of GDP was invested, with 
only 36% of this investment going to investment going to the 
manufacturing sub-sector (8). In 1961 investment increased to 
38% of GDP. Despite this large increase, most of the 
investments were allocated to the hydrocarbons, housing, 
agricultural and infrastructure sectors. 
At independence, Algeria inherited a small and weak 
industrial sector which was further weakened by the sudden and 
massive departure of the European colony. 
2.2. The industrial sector in the late 1970's 
Since independence the government has paid particular 
attention to the industrialisation of the country following 
the "industrialising industry" strategy (see part 1.1). The 
main objectives have been to establish certain basic indus- 
tries, such as steel and chemical industries, which take 
advantage of Algerian natural resources. Sizable investments 
have been made and a thousand plants organised into public 
enterprises have been built (9). A large effort has been made 
in the steel, electricity, construction materials, petrochemi- 
cal, gas and petroleum branches. The processed food sub- 
sector has benefited from this effort too, but to a much 
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Table 2.3: The contribution of each industrial branch 
to industrial VA in percentages 
Algeria Developed 
1959 1962 countries 
Mining 3.9% 3.1% 5 to 10% 
Energy 6.5% 5.5% 2 to 4% 
Petroleum 7% 39.9% 
Craftwork and small manufact. 14.7% 16 % 5 to 10% 
Large manufacturing 38.8% 40.8% 67 to 75% 
Construction and pub. works 32 % 17.2% 12 to 15% 
Sources: Table 2.1 and Temmar, H.: Structure et Modele de 
Developpement de L'Algerie, op cit. 
Table 2.4: Public enterprises under ministry responsibility 
Ministry of Energy Ministry of Heavy Ministry of 
and Light 
Hydrocarbons Industries Industries 
SONATRACH and its SONAREM and Alrem SOGEDIA: Sugar, fats 
subsidiaries. : mining. oil, conserves, juices. 
SNS, Genisider, SNEMA: Mineral water 
Sidal, Realsider: carbonat drinks. 
SnNELGAZ: iron and steel. SN SEMPAC: Processing 
Electricity and 
gas. 
SONACOME 
and Almo: mechani- 
cal engineering. 
SONELEC: electric 
and electronic 
engineering. 
In project : 
CEMAL, SONARIA 
(engineering 
design & 
implementation) 
Source: Survey data. 
of cereals. 
SNTA: Tobacco & matches 
SNLB: Wood furniture 
SONITEX: Textiles. 
SONIPEC: Tanneries & 
shoes. 
SNIC: Light chemicals. 
SONIC: Pulp & paper. 
SNAT: Handicrafts. 
SNMC: Construction 
materials. 
INPED & SNERI: 
Consulting, training 
and design. 
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lesser extent. Apart from hydrocarbon products, no other 
exports have received immediate emphasis. Output is directed 
towards the satisfaction of domestic demand. 
The Algerian industrial sector is characterised by a large 
hydrocarbon sub-sector. Accordingly, the Algerian industrial 
sector can be divided into two distinct sub-sectors: the 
hydrocarbon sub-sector which is mainly export oriented and the 
rest, which is composed of import substitution industries. 
2.2. l. General analysis of the industrial sector 
2.2.1.1. Industrial organisation 
Three ministries are in charge of the industrial public 
sector. These are the Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons, 
the Ministry of Heavy Industries and the Ministry of Light 
Industries. Each ministry supervises and often directly 
intervenes in the management of individual public enterprises 
belonging to its corresponding sector. The ministries 
themselves are supervised by higher authorities. Each 
ministry is divided into a number of departments which may be 
specialised according to a particular branch of industry 
(e. g., textiles within the Ministry of Light Industries). 
Public enterprises are, as a rule, subordinated to a branch of 
the supervising ministry. 
The activities of the Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons 
extend to exploration and drilling, the production and 
transport of raw materials (hydrocarbons), liquefaction and 
refining, the production of fertiliser and petrochemical 
products (heavy chemicals) and the production of electricity. 
In addition, it is involved in international marketing of 
hydrocarbons and their derivatives as well as domestic 
marketing of electricity, gas and petroleum 
derivatives. 
Services, research and work associated with the above 
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mentioned spheres of action are also part of its activities. 
The involvement of the Ministry of Heavy Industries can be 
divided into four main activities: the research and exploita- 
tion of mining resources except hydrocarbons; first stage 
processing of ferrous and non ferrous compounds such as 
metallic construction, mechanical, electrical and electronic 
engineering; the design and production of industrial equipment 
and finally services, research and work associated with the 
above mentioned spheres of action. 
The activities of the Ministry of Light Industries cover 
large fields extending from food and agro-industry, tobacco 
and matches, textiles and ready to wear, leather and shoes to 
light chemical industry, wood, cork, paper and cardboard, 
traditional crafts and construction materials. Finally, it is 
also involved in services, research and work associated with 
its activities. 
In 1980, the main public enterprises were arranged under 
the responsibility of the three mentioned ministries as shown 
in Table 2.4. All public enterprises and plants are totally 
owned by the state except for a few exploration, consulting 
and processing plants (e. g., Alrem, Genisider, Realsider, 
Sidal, Cosider and Almo) which are at least 51% state-owned. 
In 1980 plans were made to restructure all public enter- 
prises. The restructuring process should be accomplished by 
1988 and public enterprises divided as shown in Appendix B. 2. 
This restructuring affects the various public enterprises in 
different ways. For instance, SNS, SNMETAL and SONATRACH were 
divided according to the types of activities which develop 
quasi-contractual relationships among themselves. On 
the 
other hand, SONACOME was restructured into largely autonomous 
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divisions based on families of products. 
2.2.1.2. The industrial gross domestic product 
From 1969 to 1980, GDP at current prices generated by the 
industrial sector grew from 8.12 billion AD to 88.38 billion 
AD (see Table 2.5). For the whole period the average annual 
rate of growth amounted to 26.25%, a higher rate than that of 
GDP, 20%. The rate of growth of the industrial sector was 
21.3% during the 1970-73 plan, 13.8% during the 1974-77 plan 
and 33% during the 1978-80 period. 
The relative importance of the GDP generated by the 
industrial sector compared to that of other sectors has 
increased (10). One may add that within the industrial 
sector, the contribution to GDP from various sub-sectors of 
industry changed. This is clearly illustrated by Table 2.6. 
The importance of hydrocarbons increased sharply, while 
that of the manufacturing industry and construction and 
public works declined slightly. Meanwhile, the industrial 
sector played an important role in the growth of GDP. 
2.2.1.3. Industrial investment 
The key role assigned to industry by the Algerian 
development strategy is confirmed by the investment goals of 
the various plans as indicated in Table 1.3. The industry 
share reached more than 43 per cent of total planned 
investment in the various plans. This emphasis is in fact 
apparent from the structure of actual investment in industry 
during the same periods (more than 53% of total investment). 
As indicated in Figure 2.1, this investment was unequally 
distributed among the various branches of industry. The 
largest share went to the hydrocarbon sub-sector and to the 
mechanical and electrical engineering 
industries. The number 
of plants achieved in each plan by branch of 
industry is as 
72 
Table 2.5: GDP, industrial GDP and the annual rate 
of growth of GDP and industrial GDP (AD at current prices) 
1969 1980 1969-80 
GDP 21.05 bit. 154.8 bal. 
Rate of growth of GDP 20% 
-Industrial sector GDP 8.12 bil. 88.38 bil. 
-Rate of growth indus. sec. 26.25% 
Sources: Tables A. 3 and A. 4 in the Appendix A. 
(bil. is for billion) 
Table 2.6: The contribution to GDP 
at current prices (in percentages) 
Sector and sub-sectors 1969 1980 
GDP industrial sector 38% 57% 
-Hydrocarbons 14% 32% 
-Manufacturing 13% 11% 
-Construction 9% 12% 
Source: Table A. 5 in the Appendix A. 
Table 2.8: Industrial value added in billions of AD 
Sectors and sub-sectors VA 1967 VA 1979 
Current prices: 
Industrial sector 6.36 66.15 
-Hydrocarbons 2.58 
33.7 
-Manufacturing industries 2.05 
14.28 
1978 prices: 
Industrial sector 23.11 55.83 
-Hydrocarbons 14.18 
25.02 
-Manufacturing 
industries 3.93 13.43 
Sources: Tables A. 3 and A. 6 in the Appendix A. 
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illustrated in Table 2.7. 
2.2.1.4. Industrial production 
In spite of the substantial investment allocated to the 
industrial sector, the evolution of industrial VA has been 
relatively slow. VA for the industrial sector and main sub- 
sectors are given in Table 2.8. For the 1967-79 period the 
hydrocarbon sub-sector VA in real terms (at 1978 prices) 
increased by a factor of 1.76, at an average annual rate of 
9.32%, and the manufacturing sub-sector VA rose by a factor of 
3.4, at an average annual rate of 11%. It can be seen from 
Table 2.9 that the average annual rate of growth of VA for 
both the hydrocarbon and manufacturing sub-sectors passed 
through a minimum for the 1974-77 period. T. T p to 1977 the mate 
of growth of manufacturing sub-sector VA was consistently 
lower than that for the industrial sector. Since 1978 it has 
risen more rapidly. Value added has risen more rapidly in 
certain branches of the industrial sector: construction 
materials (average rate of growth over the period was 18.57% a 
year), the metal industry (18.32%) and energy (18%). The 
lowest average rate of growth was recorded for the agricultu- 
ral and food industries (8.22%). Between 1970 and 1979 the VA 
for some branches of industry increased steadily while that of 
most of the others decreased. For example, the VA for the 
metal and construction materials industries rose steadily 
while the VA for the chemical, wood and paper 
indIstrics and 
agricultural and food industries declined constantly. 
During 
the 1978-79 period this increase was more rapid in the key 
industries: construction materials, textiles and leather, 
iron 
and steel and mechanical and electrical engineering 
industries. 
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Table 2.9: Average annual rate of 
growth of industrial VA in real terms (at 1978 prices) 
Sub-sectors & 1967- 1970- 1974- 1978- 1967- branches 1969 1973 1977 1979 1979 
Hydrocarbons 8.9 10.41 4.38 8.60 11.18 
Water & energy 13.03 14.12 24.64 9.42 17.94 
Mining 15.25 6.73 -2.11 -0.31 8.34 
Iron & steel, mech. 
& elec. engineer. 
Constr. materials 
Agri. & food ind. 
Textiles & leather 
Chemic., wood, misc 
23.25 5.72 10.17 24.94 18.32 
21.63 0.89 23.7 43.75 18.57 
10.54 13.32 3.09 -5.5 8.22 
6.39 12.53 0.28 31.85 14.15 
13.6 14.29 10.81 -10 9.12 
Subtotal 
Manufac. sub-sector 12.82 9.30 
Const. & pub work. 9.43 6.23 
Petro. pub works 25.64 -1.34 
6.43 11.11 11 
11.07 19.83 9.94* 
23.41 5.46 13.9* 
Total indust sect. 10.74 24.95 11.75 10.72 9.32 
* 1967-78 period. 
Source : Table A. 6 in the Appendix A. 
As Figure 2.2 indicates, the most important change that 
has occurred in the branch composition of the industrial VA 
has been the steady growth of the manufacturing sub-sector 
(particularly iron and steel and mechanical, electrical 
engineering and construction materials) and the decline of the 
hydrocarbon sub-sector. 
2.2.1.5. Industrial employment 
Regarding employment, the period 1967-80 was marked by the 
creation of 360,000 industrial jobs (11) (including those in 
hydrocarbons but not those in construction and public works). 
As a result, the number of workers in industry increased by a 
factor of 4.35. The contribution from the various sub-sectors 
and branches varied widely as seen in Table 2.10. The 
hydrocarbon sub-sector employs a relatively small percentage 
of the total work force. Within the manufacturing sub-sector 
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Table 2.10: Industrial labour force (1000 jobs) 
Sub-sectors and 1967 1980 $ branches of industry 
Hydrocarbons 7.3 92.4 10.25(1) 
Mines and quarrying 12 1 
6.74(2) 19.6 
. 24.2 2.68 
Electricty 5 8 
11.17 5.14 
. 24.5 2.72 
Agricultural & food ind. 20.2 
5.35 
64.2 
5.20 
7.12 
18.65 13.64 
-. Lexti. Les 7.7 
7.10 71.8 7.12 Leathers 7.3 15.25 
6.74 
Chemicals 6.3 32.8 3.64 
5.81 6.64 
Construction materials 7.5 27.7 3.07 
6.92 5.88 
Iron and steel 3.9 
3.60 97 10.7 
Mechanical and elect. engi. 15.3 20.61 
14.12 
Wood, paper & miscellaneous 14.9 36 4 
13.75 7.64 
Manufacturing sub-sector 329.5 36.58 
70 
Construction & public works ... 430 47.74 
Total industrial sector ... 900.6 
Total industrial sector 
without CPW 108.3 470.6 
Source: Table B. 2 in the appendix B. 
(1) The first line following each subsector or branch always 
indicates the percentage according to the total of the 
labour force in the industrial sector. 
(2) The second line under each sub-sector or branch always 
indicates the percentage according to the total of the 
labour force in the industrial sector excluding 
construction and public works. 
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the agricultural and food industries employ the largest 
percentage of the total labour force. The light industries 
employ many more workers than the heavy industries or the 
hydrocarbon sub-sector. 
From Table 2.11, it can be deduced that the highest 
employment growth rates are encountered in hydrocarbons, metal 
industries, chemicals, textiles and construction materials. 
Mining and wood, paper and miscellaneous industries showed an 
employment growth well below average. The chemical industry, 
the textile industry, the agricultural and food industries, 
the construction materials industry and energy showed accele- 
rating employment rates of growth at the end of the period. 
When comparing these data with the evolution of VA by 
branch and per person employed as illustrated in Table 2.12, 
two branches show an overall improvement in their work 
productivity. These are the energy and construction materials 
industry. In the other branches productivity declined 
sharply. This is particularly true of the textile and leather 
industries. Between 1967 and 1979 the overall tendency 
follows an irregular trend. The metal and construction 
materials branches followed a rapid recovery between 1977 and 
1979. 
2.2.1.6. Imports and exports 
The rapid development of the industrial sector is also 
reflected in the evolution of imports. From 1967 to 1-078 the 
total volume of imports rose at an average annual rate of 
13.6%. The share of the industrial sector increased more 
rapidly, 15.1% on average, rising from 77% of 
the imports in 
1967 to 89% in 1978, as indicated in Table 2.13 and Figure 
2.3. 
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Table 2.11: Average annual rate of growth 
of employment by planning period. 
Sub-sectors & 1967- 1970- 1974- 1978- 1967- 
branches of industry 1969 1973 1977 1979 1980 
Hydrocarbons 18.2 26.34 23 4.25 21.56 
Electricity 2.6 6.7 27.9 16.2 11.7 
Mining 2.8 2.1 8.3 9.7 5.5 
Iron & steel, mecha. 
& elec. eng. 
Construction materials 
Agricult. & food indust. 
Textiles and leather 
Chemicals 
Wood, paper & miscell. 
Subtotal manufactur. 
sub-sector 
Construction and 
public works 
14.8 18 11.56 7.6 13.73 
8.3 24 13.2 16.2 10.6 
17.6 31 10.4 22.8 9.3 
42.7 3.2 4.7 36 12.8 
9.1 1.6 20.6 65 13.5 
7.1 10.5 12.33 4.6 7 
17.35 10.22 11.5 19.2 11.2 
- - 25.25 0.9 12.4* 
* 1973-1980 Only. 
Source : Table B. 2 in the Appendix B. 
Table 2.12: Average annual rate of growth of VA 
per person employed in real terms (at 1978 prices) 
Sub-sectors & 1967- 1970- 1974- 1978- 1967- 
branches of industry 1969 1973 1977 1979 1979 
Hydrocarbons -7.3 -12.4 -11.5 -2.2 -5.3 
Water, energy 9.8 10.7 0.7 1.4 5.6 
Mining 24 1.7 -3 4.6 3.8 
Iron & steel/mechan. 
& eiect. engineering 7.5 -5 -4.5 32 2.1 
Construct. materials 12.1 -7.9 11.6 19.8 5.1 
Agriculture & 
food indus. -4.7 8.7 -4.6 -5.5 -0.8 
Textiles, leather -19.8 6.3 -3 2.6 -2.4 
Chemicals & 
; sc  10.1 -4.7 -12 
3 
Subtotal manufacturing 
sub-sector -4. ' 2.8 -5 
6.2 -0.8 
Construction, public 
works - - -2.8 
9.6 - 
Sources : Tables A. 6 and B. 2 
in the Appendix A&B, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.13: Average annual rates of growth of main 
categories of industrial imports (in percentages). 
1967-70 1970-74 1974-78 1967-78 
Total imports 18.2 17 7 13.6 
Industrial imports 22.2 17.8 7.4 15.1 
-Food products -17.3 45.2 -2.5 7.7 
-Capital goods 39.1 10.6 18.2 20 
-Semi-finished goods 26 17.5 0.3 13 
-Primary commodities 11.5 22.4 1.7 11.6 
Source: Table B. 3 in the Appendix B. 
One can also notice differences within the industrial 
imports according to their nature. Food imports for the 
agricultural and food industries increased much more slowly 
(7.7%) than the rest of industrial imports (16.8%)(12). It 
should be noted, however that the rate of growth of food 
product imports reached the highest value, 45%, between 1970 
and 1974. Between 1967 and 1978, imports of industrial goods 
machinery and transportation equipment increased at an annual 
rate of 20% and 32%, respectively (13). Imports of capital 
goods rose from 24% of the total in 1967 to 47% in 1978. 
-These imports increased by a factor of eight. In contrast, 
imports of semi-finished intermediate goods other than food 
products rose less rapidly, at an average rate of 13%. Raw 
materials and basic products show the lowest average growth. 
Finally, the highest average rate of growth was recorded for 
capital goods imports. This rate was high during all periods 
although it decreased slightly (10%) between 1970 and 1974 
after reaching a peak value of 39% for the period 1967-69. 
In 1979, as indicated in Figure 2.4, Algerian exports 
consisted almost entirely of hydrocarbon products (crude oil, 
liquefied natural gas and some refined products: 97%). This 
can be contrasted with exports during the 1960's which were 
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Figure 2.4 : Exports of major groups in 
percentages 1970-1979. 
Source : Table B. 4 in the Appendix B. 
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mainly agricultural and mineral goods. By 1970, exports were 
already dominated by oil and oil products. In 1979, 
foodstuffs, raw material and semi-manufactured goods accounted 
for only 1.2%, 0.7% and 0.5% of total exports, respectively. 
The rest (capital and consumer goods) accounted for less than 
0.5% (14). Figures 2.5 and 2.6 indicate that the geographical 
distribution of trading partners is still unbalanced in favour 
of the Western Countries as opposed to the Socialist and Third 
World Countries. 
The structure of imports and exports reveal different 
difficulties: Algeria's growing dependence on food imports and 
the creation of new dependency links on capital goods, inter- 
mediate products and spare parts for industrial machinery as 
well as technical assistance. The level of integration and 
self-sufficiency set by the Algerian government are far from 
being achieved. This may be attributed to the fact that the 
building and acquisition of new plants and the maintenance of 
existing capacity depend on the external supply of spare parts 
and technical assistance. 
2.2.2. Analysis by branch of industry 
2.2.2.1. The hydrocarbon sub-sector 
The hydrocarbon industry plays a major role in the 
country's regional and industrial development. The intensive 
activity of this sub-sector reflects the fact that Algeria is 
endowed with abundant hydrocarbon resources. The reserves of 
crude oil are less important than those of natural gas (see 
part 1.4). This sub-sector has a strategic position in the 
Algerian economy as it contributes to 97% of export earnings 
(see Figure 2.4). It constitutes the main source of finance 
of Algerian development (see part 1.7). In 1980, for example, 
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it contributed 68% of the total tax revenues that financed 
different projects. The outputs of this sub-sector are used 
within the sub-sector (e. g., raw materials in petrochemical 
and fertiliser plants) and by other industrial branches or 
sectors as a source of energy and/or intermediate inputs. 
Outputs supplied by other industrial branches are also used by 
this sub-sector. The hydrocarbon sub-sector is considered to 
be a perfect example of an industrialising industry (see part 
1.1) and thus is expected to stimulate industrial development. 
The petroleum industry involved in the production of semi- 
finished and finished products is not well-developed. 
Activities such as the liquefaction of natural gas and the 
transport and distribution of hydrocarbons are significant. 
Crude oil and natural gas production capacities have only 
increased since the rapid expansion of this sub-sector in the 
early 1970's. In 1980 the production of crude oil and 
condensates reached 51.54 million tons a year (15) (including 
4.32 million tons of condensates) and the production of 
natural gas was 21.38 (16) billion cubic metres a year (17). 
The production of crude oil and natural gas, together with 
transportation and the refining, liquefying and processing 
stages (almost all the activities of the sub-sector) are 
controlled by one public enterprise: SONATRACH. SONATRACH, 
which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Energy and 
Hydrocarbons, is a large public enterprise which was created 
in 1963 (18). The nationalisation process of hydrocarbon 
plants and concessions which started 
in 1968 and ended in 1971 
gave SONATRACH total control of all hydrocarbon plants with 
the exception of one small refinery (which is 
jointly owned 
with a foreign company (49%)). Exploration, on 
the other 
hand, is conducted by foreign companies which have only 
been 
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allowed to invest in this sub-sector because of technological 
and financial constraints facing the Algerian government. 
a. Refining and liquefying 
Substantial refining and liquefying capacities have been 
acquired. The first refinery (Algiers refinery) was built 
before independence. Since then its capacity has been increa- 
sed to about 2.7 million tons a year and five other refineries 
have been constructed. All the refineries except one, which 
is situated in the South, are located on the coast. In 1980, 
the total refining capacity was about 23.5 million tons a year 
with additional facilities in construction representing 
another 5.5 million tons a year. The refineries produce a 
full range of products, from lubricants (bitumen and naphtha) 
and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to all types of fuel 
including fuel oil, motor gasoline and diesel oil. This 
remarkable increase in production capacity was needed to 
supply domestic demand and meet the growing requirements of 
the petrochemical industry. For a number of years the refi- 
Hing capacity was sufficient to meet the domestic demand for 
petroleum products. More recently slight imbalances between 
domestic market requirements and refinery yields led to the 
exports of heavy products (e. g., diesel and residual fuel oil) 
and the imports of light products (e. g., gasoline). The first 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant was still in construction at 
independence. Since then three LNG plants and several exten- 
sions have been built. All the LNG plants are located on the 
coast near the ports (their entire production is exported). 
In 1982 the LNG capacity was 47.6 billion cubic metres a year 
with further capacity still under construction (19). The 
refineries and LNG plants are supplied by several pipelines 
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(see Figure 2.7) from the oil deposits which are located 
inland in the Sahara Desert. Two of these pipelines were 
built before independence. The high cost involved in the 
liquefaction process and shipping has recently encouraged the 
use of other means of supplies to potential buyers such as 
underwater gas line links. One is at present in operation 
linking Algeria to Italy via Tunisia. 
b. Petrochemical, fertiliser and plastic industries 
The petrochemicals, fertiliser and plastic industries rely 
upon Algerian oil and gas resources. Their development has 
been given priority in the development plans. All the plants 
have been built after independence in the late 1970's. The 
main outputs are methanol, resins, ethylene, nitrogen fertili- 
sers (ammonia and ammonium nitrate), phosphatic fertilisers 
(TSP, NPK) and plastic polymers (polyethylene and polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC)). These outputs are produced by 19 plants: 2 
petrochemical, 4 fertiliser and 13 plastic plants. The heavy 
petrochemical plants are highly concentrated: the Arzew 
complex comprises two ammonia and ammonium nitrate plants for 
the manufacture of nitrogen fertilisers, and a methanol and a 
resins plant. The Skikda complex consists of plants producing 
ethylene and PVC. Annaba, which focuses on fertilisers, 
comprises an ammonia and ammonium nitrate plant--duplicating 
the second Arzew plant--and a phosphatic fertiliser complex. 
The petrochemical and fertiliser plants are located near the 
supply point on the Algerian coast while the plastic plants 
are widespread throughout the Northern part of Algeria. In 
1979, the production capacity of petrochemicals was 368,000 
tons a year of which methanol comprised 115,000 tons a year 
(20). In 1980 the production capacity of plastic was 78,000 
tons a year and the production capacity of fertilisers was 
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1,309 tons a year (21). Since plastic production was just 
starting and the fertiliser industry encountered numerous 
problems, production in these industries was almost nil. To 
make up for this lack of production, fertiliser was imported 
to satisfy local demand. Work is underway to enlarge these 
plants and possible construction of additional plants are 
being considered, e. g., a polyethylene plant with a capacity 
of 80,000 tons a year and downstream processing plants 
manufacturing plastic products and tires. 
The production of this sub-sector is mainly for export. 
This sub-sector uses only capital intensive technology which 
reinforces its links to and dependence on the international 
market (22). Despite all efforts, this sub-sector is not 
integrated. Large quantities of crude oil are still exported 
but non-refined exports have decreased while the quantity of 
refined exports has increased. The contribution from the 
hydrocarbon industry to GDP rose sharply after 1974 following 
the worldwide increase in oil prices (32% in 1980). It should 
be noted that this increase was largely due to the rising 
price of petroleum since production rose only slightly (23). 
The development of this sub-sector was given first priority 
and therefore received more investment during the implementa- 
tion of the various plans than the other branches or sectors 
(as indicated in Figure 2.1). The substantial increase in 
investment was not followed by a similar increase in the VA. 
In fact the VA rose only from 2.58 billion AD in 1967 to 33.7 
billion AD in 1979 (24). The hydrocarbon sub-sector 
contribution to the total VA, 61.9% in 1979, indicates clearly 
the importance of this sub-sector in the national economy. 
Despite benefiting from the highest investment rate, the 
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hydrocarbon sub-sector employs only a relatively small percen- 
tage of the total employed labour force. In 1977, for 
example, the hydrocarbon sub-sector employed only 2% of the 
total work force (25). These industries cannot be counted 
upon for the creation of much local employment because there 
are very capital intensive. Employment in this sub-sector 
increased by a factor of twelve. Its contribution to total 
employment in the industrial sector (excluding construction 
and public works) rose from 6.74% in 1967 to 19.6% in 1980. 
The sharp increase in employment recorded in this sub-sector 
is due to the replacement of departing expatriate personnel 
and to the operation of new installations. In addition, the 
productivity of this sub-sector is low (see part 1.6). 
2.2.2.2. Energy and water 
The energy branch became Algerian state property in 1962. 
It was taken over by EGA which was replaced in 1969 by 
SONELGAZ which is the only enterprise operating in the power 
sub-sector. This branch of industry, as opposed to the 
hydrocarbon sub-sector, represents a group of social public 
utilities directed towards the satisfaction of domestic 
demand. Between 1969 and 1979,22 mainly gas turbine power 
stations were built (26). This added to the 4 steam power and 
gas turbine power stations which existed before 1969. In 1979 
the total installed generating capacity in Algeria was esti- 
mated at about 1,882 megawatts, of which 3% was diesel, 15% 
hydraulic and 82% thermic. Nine additional plants were going 
on stream in 1980. In addition, the distributional capacity 
of gas was evaluated at 28,200 million thermis. Since 
independence the energy distribution network improved greatly 
with the nationwide installation of electric and gas 
pipelines. The production of electrical power increased by a 
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factor of three. Similarly, in 1979 the number of consumers 
was 2.2 times that of 1969. Between 1967 and 1978 the final 
supply of gas in thermis increased by a factor of five. The 
number of cities supplied by natural gas increased to 64 in 
1979 compared to only 14 in 1969. This shows the increasing 
domestic and industrial demand for energy as the standard of 
living rises and the industrial sector expands. Moreover, 
average energy consumption per capita increased from 252 kg of 
coal equivalent in 1960 to 687 kg of coal equivalent in 1974. 
This figure is slightly higher than the average figure for the 
Middle East and North Africa (545 kg of coal equivalent) but 
is much lower than that for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(1,055.9 kg of coal equivalent). In 1980 the per capita 
consumption of electricity was 335 kilowatts/hour which is 
about 19.5% of the world average, 30% of that of Brazil and 
5.4% of that of Japan (27). Despite a concerted effort to 
strengthen this branch, the high industrial and consumer 
demand for electricity and gas is not fully met. This is 
especially true in high voltage electricity as will be 
illustrated later. 
The spectacular growth in the number of energy stations 
resulted in a high rate of growth of VA. From 1967 to 1980, 
the energy branch experienced one of the highest rates of 
growth of VA in the industrial sector (28), 18%. From 1967 to 
1977, energy production increased by a factor of 6 reflecting 
the large investments made. These varied between 4.8 and 7.3% 
of the total investment allocated to the industrial sector 
during the various plans. It should be pointed out that most 
of the investment allocated to energy and water industries was 
absorbed by the energy branch. Moreover, between 1967 and 
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1980 employment growth in the energy branch increased by a 
factor of 4.2. Its contribution to the industrial sector 
without construction and public works decreased slightly. The 
share of employment in the energy branch decreased from 5.35% 
in 1967 to 5.2% in 1980. 
On the other hand the water industry, which did not 
benefit from similar investments, suffers from the aging 
network inherited at the time of independence. Consequently 
the increasing demand is not met. For example, only 77% of 
the population had access to safe water, 80% in urban areas 
and 40% in rural areas. This problem is particularly acute in 
the industrial sector, which greatly suffers from the shortage 
of water (this will be illustrated later). 
2.2.2.3. Mining and quarrying 
The development of natural resources has been given a high 
priority by the government in its efforts to develop a modern 
and industrialised economy. While petroleum resources are 
exploited intensively and are the main source of income for 
Algerian development programmes, other Algerian mineral 
resources are exploited at a much lower scale. Government 
policies specify that these resources (mining) should be used 
by domestic industries and not used as a source of foreign 
currency earnings. This can be clearly seen from the 
production and export figures of natural resources other than 
hydrocarbons. 
Exploration, production and marketing of minerals other 
than hydrocarbons are controlled by a single public enterprise 
totally owned by the state: SONAREM. SONAREM was created 
after the nationalisation of the mining sub-sector 
in 1966 and 
is under the supervision of the Ministry of Heavy Industries. 
Before nationalisation, this branch was in the hands of 
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foreign capital and was mainly directed towards export. 
Nowadays SONAREM exploits a large range of minerals. Among 
the most exploited are the light grade iron ore, phosphates, 
lead, zinc and antimony. In 1978, the capacity of production 
of iron was 3.9 million tons a year, the phosphate capacity 
was 1.4 million tons a year and the zinc capacity was 42,000 
tons a year. The role of this branch of industry is to supply 
the domestic market whose needs in minerals have greatly 
increased since independence. The consumption of iron ore by 
local industries has increased gradually every year since 
independence particularly with the growth of a domestic steel 
and petrochemical industry. The iron ore of the Ouenza mine, 
for example, is expected to be totally used in 1999 by El- 
Hadjar complex (SNS) (29). Mineral production, which is not 
absorbed by the domestic market is still exported. This 
constitutes only a small proportion of total production and 
export earnings. For instance, in 1979,3.5 million tons of 
minerals were exported contributing to only 0.7% of total 
Algerian exports (30). The development of this branch has not 
been encouraged by the government and therefore numerous 
Algerian deposits are not exploited. The exploitation of the 
Saharan deposit is expected to start with the future increase 
in manufacturing needs. Regarding exports, SONAREM has widely 
diversified its partners over the years (Japan, USSR, Rumania 
and Hungary, to name the most important). This can be 
contrasted with a single partner -France- before independence. 
Production in the mining and quarrying branches rose 
during the first two plans, but it leveled off at the 
beginning of 1974. This is due to the conservation plan 
adopted by the government and to the exhaustion of some mines 
and quarries whose exploitation started before 
independence. 
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The development of mineral resources did not need large 
investments because no major development was planned. During 
the first two plans SONAREM received very little investment. 
This enabled it to almost triple its VA in real terms which 
rose to 395 billion AD from 1967 to 1973 (31). The 1980-84 
plan does not include any particular decisions regarding the 
exploitation of newly discovered resources (iron and uranium 
ores). In real terms employment in this branch increased 
(i. e., the number of employed workers doubled over a 14 year 
period from 121,000 in 1967 to 242,000 in 1980). Its 
contribution to the industrial sector dropped from 11.1% in 
1967 to 5.2% in 1980. 
2.2.2.4. Iron and steel and metal, mechanical and electrical 
engineering 
Iron and steel as well as metal, mechanical and electrical 
engineering, which were virtually non-existent in 1962, 
currently provide a fair range of products. The development 
of these branches has been largely motivated by the fact that 
they are industrialising industries and that Algeria has rich 
iron ore reserves. The iron and steel, and the metal, mecha- 
nical and electrical engineering branches are the core of the 
intersectorial integration process which is one of the main 
objectives of the Algerian development strategy. These 
branches of industry are dominated mainly by four public 
enterprises: SPAS, S:. 'METAL, SONACO: E and SONELEC. The private 
sector contribution to these branches of 
industry is small. 
Only a few small scale firms specialised 
in the production of 
finished products exist. The private sector employs an 
insi- 
gnificant number of workers when compared 
to the public 
sector. Since 1962 SNS, SNMETAL, SONACOME and 
SONELEC have 
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grown considerably. About half the plants were built after 
independence. The first Algerian steel complex, El-hadjar 
(SNS), was part of the Constantine plan and some plants in 
that complex started to produce in 1964. 
In 1980,37 plants belonged to SNS (13 other plants were 
going on stream) (32). Most of these are concentrated on the 
East coast of Algeria (in Annaba) and around Algiers and Oran 
(the two largest cities in Algeria). SNS is geared to the 
production of flat products including mainly cast iron (1.7 
million tons a year) and steel (2.3 million tons a year), 
first stage rolling mills (hot and cold) and second stage 
facilities which manufacture a whole range of finished 
products such as seamless tubes, gas bottles, metal containers 
and kitchen utensils. Despite all these efforts, the iron and 
steel branch is not yet integrated. 
SNMETAL is involved in metal engineering. In 1979 SNMETAL 
had 16 plants, 11 of which were built before independence. 
SNMETAL outputs range from holloware, wagons, industrial 
boilers and iron works (45,000 tons) and cranes (110 units) to 
metallic works (8,000 tons) (33). In fact, 77% of the semi- 
finished outputs produced by SNMETAL are used in the construc- 
tion of projects. Consequently, SNMETAL is also involved in 
industrial engineering and civil engineering. SNMETAL 
produces more than 85% of the outputs of the metal engineering 
branch and employs more than 75% of the labour force in this 
branch (34). Only a few outputs (17,000 accumulators for 
example) are produced by the private sector. In 1980, the 
metal engineering branch production satisfied only 40% of 
domestic demand; the rest was supplemented by imports. 
SONACOME is involved in mechanical engineering (the 
vehicle industry). SONACOME was created in 1967 and geared 
to 
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the production of metal products. Its main outputs range from 
agricultural machinery and tractors, machine tools, combustion 
engines and buses to lorries and cycles. The mechanical 
components entering into the production of the above products 
are produced by SONACOME (at 70%). Among the 17 plants and 
complexes belonging to SONACOME (integrated at 70%), 4 were 
built before independence (35). At the present time the 
vehicle industry is specialised in the production of lorries 
and buses only. The automobile industry is not developed at 
all. Plans, however, have been made to develop this branch. 
The private sector has seen its contribution to this branch 
decrease during the past years. SONACOME controls 90% of the 
branch activity. This can be contrasted with the increase in 
the contribution of private firms relative to that of public 
enterprises in other branches. The private firms are small or 
medium size enterprises and often specialised in the 
production of a very limited number of finished products. 
SONELEC, which was created in 1969, is mainly involved in 
electrical engineering. SONELEC is geared to the production 
of wires, cables and telephones (for example, 80,000 electric 
lines and 140,000 telephones and interphones), batteries, 
bulbs (23.6 million unit), refrigerators (300,000 units), air 
conditioners (150,000 unit), audio and video equipment 
(150,000 cassette players, 150,000 turntables, 50,000 color 
televisions and 190,000 radios) and gas cockers (15,000 unit) 
(36). The electronic and electric components entering 
into 
the production of the above products are produced 
by SONELEC. 
These outputs are mainly electrical appliances for domestic 
use. Among the 11 plants and complexes belonging 
to SONELEC, 
5 were built before independence. The private sector 
in this 
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branch (which accounts for the assembly of 36,600 black and 
white televisions) is almost non-existent. 
SNS, SNMETAL, SONACOME and SONELEC were created in order 
to satisfy domestic demand and to acquire heavy and import 
substitution industries. In these branches the plants and 
complexes built after independence are all large scale. These 
are widely spread throughout the Northern part of Algeria. A 
large part of their inputs are supplied by the local market. 
A few inputs such as coke, some semi-finished inputs and the 
bulk of capital goods and spare parts are imported. For 
instance, 30% of the semi-finished products used by SONACOME 
are imported. The burden of imports (semi-finished goods in 
particular) is becoming very heavy, creating an incipient 
dependence of Algerian industry on external assistance. The 
various outputs are semi-finished inputs used within the 
industrial sector (public and private) and consumer products. 
Most of the outputs of the iron and steel branch are intended 
for construction and public works (flat products), since the 
vehicle industry just started to develop. The increasing 
-domestic demand in long products is only met through imports. 
This is likely to be the case in the near future. It seems 
likely that these branches will develop further in the future. 
The iron and steel and metal, mechanical and electrical 
engineering branches benefited from a large and sustained 
investment effort aimed at building a capital goods industry 
in addition to the hydrocarbon sub-sector. Most of 
the inves- 
tment received by these branches came from public sources. 
Up 
to 1979, these branches absorbed the highest investment ratio 
in the manufacturing sub-sector. Despite all these efforts, 
the iron and steel and metal, mechanical and electrical 
engineering branches of industry are not 
integrated. Most of 
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the semi-finished and finished products are still imported. 
The high investments were not immediately reflected in the VA 
of these branches, which increased slowly compared to the VA 
of investments made before 1977. The construction of various 
projects and the training of the work force ran into severe 
difficulties delaying the execution of the programmes and the 
build up of production. In fact, of the 63 plants and 
complexes that had started in these branches since 1967,24 
(38%) were not completed by 1979. Nevertheless iron and steel 
and metal, mechanical and electronic engineering growth has 
become far from negligible (see Figure 2.2). Their contribu- 
tion to the industrial VA, which was only 3.6% in 1967, 
reached 10.1% in 1979. In real terms, the VA of these 
branches increased at an average annual rate of 18.3%, rising 
by a factor of 6 for the 1967-79 period, compared to a factor 
of 2.2 for that of the industrial sector without CPW. 
Iron and steel and metal, mechanical and electrical 
engineering are likely to further develop with the construc- 
tion of a second iron and steel complex at Jijel which will be 
geared to the production of long products (1.8-2 million tons 
of liquefied steel a year) supplying two to three mills which 
will produce rods and average sections. The construction of 
an electrical cable plant (33,000 tons a year) at Biskra, a 
battery plant (90 million batteries a year), an iron hardware 
plant, an electrical equipment plant for building co str%ctioA 
and a high tension post plant are also planned. The 1980-84 
plan also includes the development of several other plants. 
Expansion of existing plants is also planned in the 
development of these branches (37). 
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2.2.2.5. Light chemical 
The colonial inheritance in the light chemical branch was 
important. Nowadays it consists of small plants producing 
outputs absorbed by the domestic market such as paints, 
varnishes, cosmetics, detergents, maintenance products, 
household cleaning and ceramic products. These are mainly 
consumer goods oriented towards the satisfaction of domestic 
demand. The activity of the light chemical and allied branch 
is covered by two public enterprises : SNIC and "Central 
Pharmacy" and 303 private firms. 
SNIC is specialised in the production of light chemicals 
and the "Central Pharmacy" is involved in the production and 
conditioning of pharmaceutical products. Half of the 16 
plants belonging to SNIC were built before independence. Most 
of these plants are small scale. Those built after the early 
1970's are medium and large scale plants. In 1980 the paint 
production capacity of SNIC was over 76,000 tons a year, that 
of glass was almost 0.1 million tons a year and that of 
detergent was more than 50,000 tons a year (38). The 
pharmaceutical industry is only at the beginning stage of its 
development. The main task of the CENTRAL PHARMACY now is the 
conditioning and marketing of imported pharmaceutical 
products, but one should add that a plant producing 
antibiotics was built. Large efforts are being made to 
develop this branch. 
The light chemical branch is one in which the private 
sector plays an important role. In 1978, there were more 
than 
303 private plants providing 50.7% of the total employment 
in 
the light chemical and allied branch, contributing to 50.8% of 
the VA and 50.3% of the sales revenue in this branch. The 
private sector outputs are mainly household cleaning products 
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such as bleaching liquid (3,160 cubic metres), washing soda, 
liquid detergent (3,758 tons), soap (600 tons), cosmetic 
products and paints and varnishes (4,700 tons a year). Some 
plastic products (e. g., rubber products, pneumatics, plastic 
and rubber shoes) are also produced by the private sector(39). 
Investment in the light chemical and allied branch was 
relatively low. Despite the construction of some large 
plants, the relatively low increase in production reflects the 
difficulties encountered by this sub-sector. Consequently 
between 1967 and 1979 its VA increased by only a factor of 
2.7. This low rate of growth of VA is also due to the low 
realisation rate of projects. For instance, 60% of the total 
number of projects that had started in this branch since 1970 
were still unfinished at the end of 1979. Absolute employment 
remains low despite the fact that from 1967 to 1980 employment 
increased by a factor of 5. In the light chemical branch, 
relative employment with regard to that of the total indus- 
trial sector excluding CPW and the hydrocarbon sub-sector, 
increased only slightly between 1973 and 1980. The rate of 
growth of employment in this branch increased sharply between 
1978 and 1980 (48%) and may continue to do so in the near 
future. The light chemical and allied branch will continue to 
grow through public sector investments. The 1980-84 plan 
foresees the construction of three pharmaceutical plants, 
three adhesive and maintenance products plants, a sodium 
products complex (150,000 tons a year), 
industrial gas plants 
and three glass plants (40). 
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2.2.2.6. Construction materials 
Production in the construction materials branch is 
oriented towards satisfaction of the domestic market. Most 
inputs are obtained locally but all capital goods and almost 
all spare parts are imported. SNMC, which is endowed with a 
large production capacity, is the main public enterprise in 
the public sector. Half of the 74 plants belonging to SNMC 
were built after independence. For instance, seven new cement 
plants (8.3 million tons a year) were built. SNMC also posse- 
sses other construction materials plants producing plaster 
(267,000 tons a year), red brick and tile (1.89 million tons) 
and ceramic tiles (2.65 million tons), to name a few (41). 
Again, the contribution of the private sector (779 firms in 
1978) in this branch is important (SNMC produced the total 
output of only cement, cement asbestos, ceramic sanitary fit- 
tings and marble). The private sector produces the greatest 
share of plaster (50,400 tons), lime (20,200 tons), tiles 
(21,000 square metres), bricks (70,000 cubic metres) and 
ceramic tiles (425,000 square metres) (42). The private 
sector also accounted for 10.4% of the total sales revenue of 
the construction materials branch and contributed to 11.1% of 
the VA of this branch. The private sector employed 22.8% of 
the total workers in this branch as well. The construction 
materials branch is one of the few Algerian branches which is 
relatively integrated. Nonetheless, certain goods such as 
refractory tiles or special cement are still 
imported since 
they are not produced in Algeria. 
The development of the construction materials branch was 
irregular over the period 1967-77. During the 1967-69 plan, 
Algerian cement production exceeded demand, so this 
branch of 
industry received only 0.6% of total industrial 
investment. 
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The next two four-year plans have experienced exceptional 
efforts to overcome the shortage that followed the 
satisfactory production reached in the 1960's. Consequently 
the share of the construction materials branch in terms of 
total industrial investment rose. The problems that occurred 
at the time of the implementation of the investment, however, 
led to delays in their execution, a fact which entailed large 
costs. For instance, of the 71 large and medium size projects 
that had started in this branch since 1970,27 were not 
completed by 1979. The level of investment gave rise to a 
rapid growth of VA which increased by a factor of 6.7 between 
1967 and 1979. 
Similarly the level of employment in construction 
materials rose from 75,000 in 1967 to 277,000 in 1980. It 
increased by a factor of 3.6, one of the highest increases 
recorded in the industrial sector. Substantial investments 
are to be allocated to this branch during the 1980-84 plan. 
The new projects comprise cement works (4 million tons a 
year), brick works and a number of plants producing plaster, 
tiles, aggregates and concrete pipes. 
2.2.2.7. Agricultural and food industries 
In 1967, the agricultural and food industries were the 
most highly developed branch of the industrial sector though 
rather small at the time. This was reflected in 1967 by the 
high contribution of the agricultural and mood industries, 
31.5%, to the industrial sector VA. The agricultural and food 
industries are specialised in the production of tobacco, 
matches, beverages, grains processing (especially flour. 
semolina and pasta), oil fats, sugar, canned products, daily 
products and fish, meat and eggs. These industries are 
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directed towards the satisfaction of domestic demand. 
Tobacco and match production is monopolized by one public 
enterprise: SNTA. SNTA is a small public enterprise created 
in 1963 after the nationalisation of several foreign firms 
(e. g., JOB and BASTOS). Sixteen plants producing tobacco and 
matches belonged to SNTA. In 1979, the production capacity of 
tobacco was 22,000 tons a year and the production capacity of 
matches was 572 million boxes a year (43). 
Beverages are produced in part by three public enterprises 
: SNEMA, ONCV and SOGEDIA, and by a substantial number of 
private firms. ONCV, which was created in 1968, is specia- 
lised in the wine industry, SNEMA, established in 1966, is 
involved in the production of. spring water, carbonated drinks 
(e. g., Cocacola and Fanta) and beer, and SOGEDIA (for a small 
proportion of its activity) in the production of fruit juice. 
ONCV monopolizes the production of wine. SNEMA has four 
plants producing beer and three plants producing spring water 
for which it monopolizes the production. SOGEDIA, which in 
1972 was created by the fusion of three public enterprises 
(SOGEDIS, SOALCO and SNCG, created between 1966 and 1967), has 
25 plants of which 12 produce fruit juice (citrus products and 
grapes). The important private sector is only involved 
in the 
production of carbonated beverages (1.74 million hectolitres). 
SNSEMPAC, which was established in 1964, is involved in 
the processing and commercialisation of grains. SNSEMPAC 
is 
the most important public enterprise 
in this branch. Among 
the 88 plants belonging to SNSEMPAC, 73 were 
inherited from 
the colonial period. For instance, 63 plants are 
flour and 
semolina mills, 14 are pasta plants and 
3 are couscous plants. 
The production capacity of flour and semolina 
is 1.45 million 
tons a year (44). A large number of private firms contributed 
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to the activity of this sub-sector. These are small scale 
firms involved mainly in the production of wafers and biscuits 
(15,400 tons a year). 
Oil, fats, sugar and canned food are mainly produced by 
the public sector. SOGEDIA participation in this branch is 
relatively large. SOGEDIA also produces oil, sugar and canned 
food. SOGEDIA has 8 plants producing margarine, vegetable fat 
and soap. The production capacity of margarine and vegetable 
fat is 246,300 tons a year and that of soap 70,200 tons a 
year. SOGEDIA has 5 other plants producing sugar (231,000 
tons a year) and a conditioning capacity of sugar of 147,000 
tons a year (45). Local production covers only 55% of 
domestic demand, the rest is imported. SOGEDIA has 12 
additional plants which produce canned food as well as fruit 
juice. The production capacity of canned food and fruit juice 
is 85,000 tons a year (46). The private sector also plays an 
important role. A large number of small private firms 
contribute to the production of canned food (14,510 tons), oil 
(2,000 tons) and fats. * 
The rest of the activities of the agricultural and food 
industries are equally shared by the private and public 
sectors. The important role played by the private sector is 
outlined by the number of private firms (525 in 1978) and the 
fact that this sub-sector employed 24.5% of the total number 
of workers in this branch. Morcover, the private sector 
contributed to 16.1% of the sales revenue and 15.8% of the VA 
of the agricultural and food industries (47). 
In 1967, most of the inputs processed by the agricultural 
and food industries were supplied by the domestic market. 
This is in contrast to the fact, that due to increasing 
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ltural and food industries process mainly 
imported products. This underlines the increasing Algerian 
dependence on imported agricultural products. The different 
plants are widely spread throughout the Northern part of 
Algeria. The average age of the plants reflects the relative- 
ly low investment received by this branch during the three 
previous plans. It rose slightly in the 1978-79 interplan to 
keep pace with the extremely rapid rise in domestic consump- 
tion of this branch's outputs. The processing capacity of 
basic food products was too low to cope with the rapid 
increase in demand. This resulted from the fact that, at the 
end of 1979,67% (70 plants) of the large and medium size 
projects which had started since 1967 were still under way. 
Consequently, the rate of growth of VA in this branch is very 
low. Employment rose from 202,000 workers in 1967 to 642,000 
workers in 1980, increasing by a factor of 3.17 for the whole 
period. The agricultural and food branch of industry is one 
of the few branches showing very high productivity levels 
(48). The reason is that high productivity has to be 
maintained in order to keep up with domestic demand. The 
'1980-84 plan proposes a sharp increase in investment in order 
to alleviate the present pressure imposed by the increasing 
domestic demand. The creation of new cereal milling 
facilities (500,000 tons a year) and modernisation and renewal 
programmes are planned. 
2.2.2.8. Textiles and leather 
The outputs of the textile and leather industries are 
consumer goods directed toward domestic demand. These 
branches of industry are not very developed in Algeria. This 
is in contrast to a large number of Third World Countries, 
such as India and Pakistan. The development of the textile 
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and leather industries has not been considered a priority 
since Algeria is poorly endowed with the necessary resources 
(e. g. cotton). In 1967, the contribution of the textile and 
leather industries, which was second only to that of the 
agricultural and food industries, accounted for 23.4% of the 
industrial VA. At that time, the textile and leather 
industries were using labour intensive technology (most of it 
craftworks) requiring very little investment. 
SONITEX and SONIPEC are the two public enterprises 
operating in these two branches. SONITEX was created in 1972 
by taking over the activities of SONAC which was established 
in 1966. SONITEX, which is specialised in the production of 
textiles, has 44 plants widely spread throughout the Northern 
part of the country. SONIPEC, which was created in 1972, has 
19 plants specialised in the production of leather (tanning 
and finished products) and in the production of a few plastic 
products such as plastic shoes. The two public enterprises 
have only become involved in all stages of the production 
lines recently. The public sector was specialised in the 
production of cotton, bonded fibber thread, pure and mixed 
yarn, knitted wool, cotton and synthetic materials. Recently 
its activities expanded to the downstream stages of production 
lines of this branch, manufacturing all sorts of materials: 
cotton, woolens, blankets, underwear, shirts, trousers, 
readymade for e~, towels, sheets, footwear, leather bags, 
leather jackets and leather shoes. Cloth production capacity 
is 143 million metres a year, shoe capacity is 18 million pair 
a year and thread capacity is 24,200 tons a year (49). 
These two branches are characterised by a large contribu- 
tion from the private sector. In 1978 private firms numbered 
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1,596 in textiles and 805 in leather. In 1978, the private 
sector contribution to VA in the former was 60.4% and in the 
latter, 42.8%. The private sector also contributed to more 
than 50% of the sales revenue of each branch. In addition, 
the private sector in each branch accounted for 52.9% and 
45.6%, respectively, of the employment of each branch. The 
private sector is mainly involved in the downstream stages of 
the production lines of these branches, manufacturing products 
such as knitwear, readymade clothing (11.05 million units), 
footwear (13.72 million pair), mugs (33,900 square metres) 
and blankets (920,000 units) (49). It also produces cotton 
cloth (3.58 million square metres) and synthetic cloth (63.64 
million square metres). 
The public sector invested in capital intensive technology 
requiring the use of imported inputs such as cotton, synthetic 
and bonded fibbers and only a small proportion of domestic 
inputs such as wool hides of animals, goatskin and camel hair. 
Algeria does not produce any cotton and subsequently the 
outputs are mostly synthetic fibbers. The private sector, on 
the other hand, still makes use of traditional ways though 
some private plants are modern and use capital intensive 
technology. At present, production is sufficient so that no 
imports are required. One should mention that part of the 
demand is alleviated by the black market, supplied mainly by 
legal imports from immigrants and, to a lesser extent, illegal 
imports. 
These branches received relatively low investment during 
the first two plans (at least as far as the public sector was 
concerned), but this was followed by a rapid increase in 
investment. These two branches also suffered from delays in 
the implementation of the public projects. In fact, 60% (22 
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plants) of the projects that had started since 1967 were still 
in construction in 1979. Private investments were quite high 
during the two plans, however, somewhat balancing the lack of 
public investments. As a consequence of the low investment 
rate, the VA of the textile and leather branches rose at a 
rate below average. The 1980-84 plan foresees an increase in 
the public sector capacity regarding the manufacturing of 
finished products by the construction of eight clothing, three 
knitwear, one blanket and three footwear plants and a new 
tannery capable of handling 10 million square feet of hides. 
2.2.2.9. Wood and paper 
The public sector occupies a relatively unimportant place 
in the wood branch while it plays an important role in the 
paper branch of industry. The two public enterprises in these 
two branches are SONIC and SNLB. SONIC, which was created in 
1968, controls the paper industry. The eleven plants belon- 
ging to SONIC produce the total output of pulp paper and the 
major share of printing, writing and packaging paper and 
cardboards. The production capacity of straw pulp and esparto 
pulp is 106,600 tons a year, that of printing and writing 
paper is 55,000 tons a year and the capacity of packaging 
paper and cardboard is 96,000 tons a year (51). SNLB, which 
was established in 1972, is involved in the production of cork 
and the manufacturing of wood furniture in its 12 plants. 
SNLB relies on important imports since Algeria is poor in 
forest resources. Similarly, SONIC imports most of the inter- 
mediate inputs for the production of finished products. The 
wood industry, and particularly the cork industry, has not 
benefited from large investments. Consequently, production 
has not followed the changing requirements of the 
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international demand in this branch leading to a substantial 
lowering of cork export volume. 
In 1978,707 firms, mainly in the wood industry, belonged 
to private investors. This outlines the importance of the 
private sector in the wood branch. Private sector importance 
is further shown by the fact that this sector employed 47% of 
the wood branch work force and contributed to 34% of the sale 
revenues and 26.4% of the VA of the wood and paper industries. 
The private sector deals mainly with the manufacturing of wood 
furniture (272,700 unit) and the transformation of large quan- 
tities of paper into exercise-books, envelopes, wrapping paper 
and corrugated and compact cardboards (27,500 tons) (52). 
The outputs from the wood and paper industries are 
consumer goods for both the domestic and international 
markets. Currently no paper is exported. The ratio of inves- 
tment to total industrial investment was low. Thus, as one 
expects, the rate of growth of the wood and paper industries' 
VA is low. The increase in employment is relatively small. 
For instance, from 1967 to 1979, employment rose only by a 
factor of 2.3. This is also partly due to the low rate of 
investment realisation in the public sector. In fact, 65% (24 
plants) of the large and medium projects that were planned to 
be constructed for the period 1967-79, were still not 
operating by 1979. The construction of several new plants is 
planned in the 1980-84 plan. A household furniture plant, two 
plants producing communal facilities and plants producing 
cardboard packaging materials are planned. 
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2.2.2.10. Construction and public works 
The rapid pace of economic development and particularly 
the sharp rise in industrial investment have created needs for 
construction and for newer infrastructure as well as the 
development of operational capacity. At the end of 1979 there 
were more than 200 enterprises in the public sector and about 
600 small and medium Algerian private enterprises in construc- 
Lion and public works. The public sector consists of public 
enterprises at the national, regional, Willaya and Daira 
(commune) levels which are in charge of construction and 
public works. SONATRO (road works), SONATRAM (maritime 
works), SONAGTHER (water works), DNC, SONATIBA, ECOTEC 
(housing and community infrastructure), SORECO and SORECAL 
(regional enterprises for construction and civil engineering) 
were established. Later Willaya and Daira enterprises 
involved in construction and public works as well as in the 
development of inter-communal sites and services associations 
and municipal construction undertakings were created to 
reinforce the construction and public works sub-sector. In 
Y1978 and 1979, regional public works and water development 
capacities were strengthened by the establishment of six 
general works enterprises and four other public enterprises. 
The size and resources of some large public enterprises such 
as DNC in particular is 
work projects as can 19 
of Housing. The privat 
construction and public 
than 30% of total sales 
private sector works in 
enormous as DNC can carry out as many 
public enterprises under the Ministry 
e sector is extensively developed in 
works and in 1979 it amounted to more 
revenue in this sub-sector. The 
close collaboration with public 
enterprises but encounters serious difficulties 
in obtaining 
credit and equipment. 
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The high investment realised brought about an increase in 
VA. Between 1967 and 1978, the average annual growth of VA 
for construction and public works was 10% while that of 
petroleum construction work was 14%. In 1979 the contribution 
of construction and public works (including petroleum public 
works) to the total industrial VA increased to 27.6% (20% in 
1967). This irregular growth was inadequate to respond to 
Algerian needs. Between 1973 and 1980, employment in 
construction and public works doubled. In 1980 it accounted 
for 47% of total employment in the industrial sector. This 
high ratio reflects the use of labour intensive technology. 
The needs of the country are enormous, especially since 
social needs such as housing have only recently been taken 
into consideration. In addition, the recent earthquake of El- 
Asnam increased the demand for construction materials, 
construction and public works. The development of construc- 
tion and public works is expected to experience continuous 
growth. 
Under the initiative of the state and through public 
enterprises, the structure of Algerian industry has been 
deeply modified. From a public sector composed of a few 
industries mainly involved in the extraction of minerals and 
the production of consumer goods, there has been an expansion 
into the production of capital goods (heavy industries) and 
the installation cf import substitution industries. The 
public sector plays an important role in the Algerian 
industrial sector while the private sector plays a minor role. 
This may be attributed to the political options adopted by the 
Algerian government. In addition, foreign investment 
(exploration mainly) is almost non-existent except in a few 
113 
branches such as hydrocarbons, metal and mining but only as a 
joint partner with the state. Algerian industry is based on 
hydrocarbons and on construction industries (e. g., steel and 
construction materials). The consumer goods and mechanical 
industries, together with electrical and instrument enginee- 
ring, are not very developed. In addition, the economic and 
social infrastructure suffers from a lack of investment. The 
industrial sector is far from being integrated. Concerted 
efforts are still to be made. The development of the Algeri i 
industrial sector is in line with the country's domestic 
needs. Industrial sector dependence increased with the 
imports of inputs such as capital, skilled labour, interme- 
diate inputs and spare parts. Despite the enormous investment 
made in the industrial sector, a large number of plants do not 
produce at full capacity for reasons which are the focus of 
part two of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE : GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
The economic structure provides the framework in which 
firms operate and thus affects their industrial structure and 
performance. Government intervention in economic activities 
can therefore have a strong bearing on industrial structure 
and performance. In Algeria, the present policy framework is 
dominated by planning, by public investment leading to public 
ownership of modern means of production, by public financing, 
by Socialist Management, by a foreign trade monopoly and by an 
extensive administration of prices. The effects of economic 
policies may be direct or indirect, negligible or significant, 
immediate or delayed. Economic policies influence the rate of 
industrial investment, the pattern of industrialisation --the 
choice of product and the choice of technology as well as the 
I 
orientation toward foreign or domestic markets-- and the 
quality of economic performance. Thus, it seems appropriate 
at this stage to examine the main features of government 
policies in Algeria. We shall review the main policies 
insofar they relate to the public industrial sector. In the 
first section, investment policy will be described, followed 
by investment financing policies in the second part. In the 
third part, labour legislation and policies will be analysed. 
Foreign trade policies will be discussed in part four. 
Finally, price policy will be examined. 
3.1. Investment policy 
Following the promotion of rapid industrialisation, 
structural reforms were undertaken in order to reduce economic 
dependence on France. One of these structural reforms was the 
extension of central planning to the economy 
(see part 1.5). 
Since the launching of the 1970-73 four year plan, the plan 
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has become imperative and highly centralised. Investment 
decisions, the method of selection, the choice and the 
implementation of projects are the focal points of this 
section since investment structure and investment rates were 
already discussed in Chapter One. 
3.1.1. Investment Decisions 
Based on the directives of the "Council of the State", in 
line with the objectives set by the Algerian development 
strategy and the draft plan of each ministry, a decision 
regarding the investment share of the medium term plan for 
each sector is finally made by the Central Organisation of 
Planning (OCP) (1). The investment share decision is not 
concerned at this stage with the different projects to be 
chosen but with the gross objectives of each sector and 
branch. These objectives are related to the long term plans 
worked out by the planning department of each ministry and the 
MPAT. According to the ordinance of the 12th of November, 
1975, the draft plan proposed by each ministry includes not 
only the selected projects among those proposed by the public 
-; enterprises under its supervision but may include projects 
proposed by the Planning Department of the ministry itself. 
Projects proposed by public enterprises are only selected 
after discussion and consultation with the supervisory 
ministry. Proposed projects take into account recommendations 
and directives made by the government, the MPAT and the 
supervisory ministry as well as the long term plans. They are 
the responsibility of the Board of Directors of the public 
enterprise. Investment share decisions take into 
consideration the projects proposed by the Board of Directors 
of different plants and the recommendations of the Public 
Enterprise Workers Assembly (AEW). Before a project can be 
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implemented, pre-investment studies based on technical studies 
are made by the public enterprise under the supervision of its 
ministry. 
Proposals made by the ministry are analysed by OCP and 
projects are then selected. After a project is chosen by OCP, 
an inclusion decision is signed which means that the project 
becomes part of the investment programme (annual plan). This 
decision occurs within a month following the selection. 
During this month checks on norm, size, cost and geographical 
location for example are carried out. At this stage the 
investment programme is submitted to the government (2). A 
government decision is needed only for medium and long term 
programmes. For the annual plan, the OCP decision is 
equivalent to that of the government. 
Different projects are selected on the basis of technical 
and economic studies carried out by a public enterprise under 
the supervision of its ministry. These technical and economic 
studies are elaborated based on the directives and procedures 
presented in "The Evaluation of Projects Manual"(3). 
According to this manual each project proposal should include 
the following elements: 
1) market study results, 
2) main technical elements of the project, 
3) planning of the plant implementation and the 
progressive increase of production capacity over the years, 
4) total amount of investment subdivided into a number 
of specific subsections (terms). For example, total 
investment may be divided into local and foreign currencies in 
relation to the origin of capital goods and services. 
5) planned financing of the investment, 
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6) social, economic and financial information concerning 
the investment as well as the planned income statement for the 
first ten years which is in fact the study of the return on 
the investment (4). 
3.1.2. Selection methods 
Before proceeding to the decision to include a project 
into an investment programme, OCP requires a certain amount of 
information based on quantitative data in addition to the 
technical and economic studies. The decision is partly based 
on indicators of the efficiency of investment: value added and 
investment cost. This information is passed on by the MPAT 
and the Ministry of Finance. 
The MPAT identifies four objectives assigned to the 
industrial sector which serve as the selection criteria of a 
project. These are: an expansion of the country's capacity of 
accumulation (in foreign currencies), the creation of import 
substitution industries (which best satisfy essential consumer 
needs), economic integration and the decrease of local 
imbalances. Nevertheless, the correct evaluation of a 
-; proposed project based on the above criteria is difficult. On 
the other hand, the selected methods of the Ministry of 
Finance, as determined by Circular no. 1536 of the Ministry of 
Finance, are the independent constraints of public enterprise, 
the return on investment, the financial capacity of public 
enterprise (in order to pay back the loan contracted) and the 
particular nature of the investment (5). The financial aspect 
prevails among the objectives of the Ministry of Finance. It 
should be noted that the criteria taken into account for the 
selection of a project by the Ministry of Finance and by the 
MPAT are different if not contradictory. Contradictions 
appear between the social and the economic objectives 
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emphasized by the Ministry of Planning and the profitability 
objectives stressed by the Ministry of Finance. 
3.1.3. Choice of project characteristics 
The important characteristics of a project are output, 
scale, level of integration, geographic location, intensity 
(labour or capital) and level of technology. Outputs to be 
produced are worked out according to the plan aims, to the 
availability of resources and to the need for proper balance 
and integration of interdependent production processes. Scale 
depends not only on available technology but also on political 
decisions and on economic studies. In fact, the government 
has favoured large scale plants rather than small scale ones. 
Since independence, a high degree of integration has been 
encouraged by the government. Decisions concerning location 
are made mainly on political grounds (regional equilibrium) 
and partly on economic grounds when the availability of 
natural resources becomes a constraint. In fact, either the 
public enterprise or local authorities decide on the precise 
location. This decision must comply with government 
directives which specify the location of the project. For 
instance, the 1967-69 three year plan designated that all 
plants had to be located in the Northern part of Algeria. The 
1970-73 four year plan indicated that they had to be situated 
in the Northern inland regions. The 1974-77 four year plan 
designated that they had to be located in the regions 
bordering the Northern part of the Sahara. The choice of 
technology depends on the available technology on the 
international market and on political grounds. The most 
modern and sophisticated technology which 
is, nonetheless, a 
capital intensive technology, 
is generally favoured. Among 
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various production processes, the final choice is made by the 
public enterprise managers (a decision which is in fact made 
by the contractor). Advice on the technological aspects and 
on the standardization of capital goods are the tasks assigned 
to INAPI. 
3.1.4. Implementation of a project 
Following the decision to include a project in an 
investment programme, the public enterprise is required to 
obtain: 
1) the approbation granted by either the Market Central 
Committee (ministry) or the public enterprise Marketing Board. 
2) the signature of the external financing contracts 
after the bank negotiation. This implies that agreement 
between the Algerian Primary Bank and the foreign bank has 
been reached. 
3) the decision concerning transfer of funds as 
established by the exchange control services of the Primary 
Bank. 
4) approval of the contract by the BAD. 
5) the provision of the necessary credits to the Primary 
Bank by either the BAD or the Treasury, for credit payment by 
a public enterprise. 
6) the support of the Primary Bank regarding drafts on 
previous credits, provided that these drafts have been 
approved by the public enterprise (6). 
After having obtained all these documents, a public enterprise 
can adopt one of the following formulae for the carrying out 
of the investment: decomposed, turnkey, product-in-hand or 
cost-plus-fee contract. Description and advantages and 
disadvantages of these contracts are described in detail 
in 
Appendix C. 1. 
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3.1.5. Major criticisms of investment policies 
The execution of investment policies led to two different 
types of problems. The first type of problems results from 
the planning process itself (i. e., constraints due to 
administrative procedures) and from the chosen level of 
development (i. e., availability of skilled workers). The 
second type of problems is related to the functioning of 
instruments used in investment planning. 
The first criticism of public investment in Algeria is 
related to the absence of methods of project appraisal. The 
cost appraisal of a project is often characterised by an 
insufficient mastery of the parameters (7). This cost is 
supposed to determine the real cost as well as the foreign 
contractor cost. Consequently, technical and economic studies 
are insufficiently elaborated. Such inefficiencies generate a 
number of reappraisals. This situation is to be expected 
given an insufficiently skilled labour force, lack of national 
statistics and information which do not allow the mastery of 
certain key parameters. 
The inclusion decision phase of projects, which includes 
checks on norms, cost, size and location, for example, is also 
inaccurate and inefficient. This occurs because cost, which 
depends on existing infrastructure, cannot be assessed 
accurately at the preliminary stage. Often plant location is 
only decided after the evaluation of the project. Precise- 
planning regarding the origin of capital goods and services 
necessary for the construction of the plant cannot 
be made. 
These problems are well illustrated by the case of the paper 
plant of Mostaganem which was located 
in an area where there 
is a shortage of water and electricity. These constraints 
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were not taken into consideration when the site was chosen. 
The employment benefit to the region was considered to be more 
important than these constraints. Other examples are the 
large scale food plants (Blida, Mostaganem, Sfizef) built 
without taking into account the national agricultural 
resources. The above examples are the result of inadequate 
evaluation of projects, inappropriate project characteristics 
and delays and slowness of these procedures (8). 
An inclusion decision or a request to reevaluate a project 
may take 4 to 6 months. This leads to delays in the carrying 
out of a project. These delays occur either at the beginning 
of a project's carrying out or at the time of completion when 
a reevaluation is required. In addition, when the project is 
part of a programme of investment (which is often the case), 
all contracts or orders have to be countersigned by the BAD. 
This process, which takes about two months, delays the work in 
progress and also generates higher costs. 
The inappropriate choice of project characteristics may 
lead to problems at the implementation level of an investment 
and later at the production level. The choice of location, 
which is based mainly on socio-political factors, can have 
considerable effects on efficiency. These are due mainly to 
the weakness of economic infrastructure and imbalanced 
distribution of scarce skilled labour (9). Government 
policies regarding the scale of a project lead to excessive 
delays in project execution and to difficulties in mastering 
the plant (production) and managing personnel. For example, a 
large plant is obviously more difficult to organise, the 
management is more complex, the coordination and control more 
difficult and the requirement of skilled workers and social 
needs much higher than for a small plant. Besides, 
the 
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adoption of a highly integrated plant using sophisticated 
technology creates similar difficulties. This has led to 
increasing foreign dependency. The allocation of sites by the 
local authorities is another cause of delay in the carrying 
through of projects. For example, the request for the site of 
the tire project at Bouira (SONATRACH) was made in 1974, but 
the agreement was obtained only in 1977. 
As described earlier, the implementation of a project is 
submitted to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. For example, 
the transport of personnel and materials is often difficult 
and progress in the construction of plants is subject to the 
availability of resources (energy, water and telephone) and 
infrastructure. The authorisation of imports of capital goods 
(AGI) (see part 3.4) is often lower than that requested. For 
instance, the AGI investment in 1979 was only half of that 
required by SONATRACH for the completion of liquefied natural 
gas plant (LNG) no. 2. Consequently, planned investment was 
not carried out. In addition to these difficulties, the 
execution of an investment is often difficult due to problems 
caused by investment planning as described above(see part 1.5) 
and investment financing policies (described in part 3.2). 
Aid, international credit and technology available on the 
international market also play an important part in the 
execution of an investment and the efficiency of a plant, 
particularly in the steel industry. Consequently, the choice 
of an appropriate technology is sometimes limited by what 
is 
available and/or by what is offered by aid donors or 
interna- 
tional credit organisations, often leading to the adoption of 
a technology that has suboptimal characteristics. 
The large number of ongoing projects carried over from one 
plan to the next confirms the reality of the problems 
discus- 
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sed above. The effect of these problems is not only the long 
delays and high cost involved in the realisation and execution 
of a project but the underutilisation of production capacity. 
This will be analysed later in the following chapters. 
3.2-Investment financing policies 
Investment financing policies have been instituted in 
order to carry out various public investments. It was not 
until 1970 that clear investment financing policies were 
formulated. As described in Chapter One, public investments 
can be financed by different sources. As a consequence, 
different investment financing policies have been enforced. 
3.2.1. Investment financing op licy of investment financed 
by the banking system 10 
Parallel to the request for inclusion of a project is the 
application sent by the public enterprise to the Ministry of 
Finance (Department of Treasury, Credits and Insurance), the 
Primary Bank, the BCA and the BAD through its supervisory 
ministry. It is a request to establish the project financial 
plan and to seek for the necessary credit (11). This request 
must be submitted by the 10th of September of each year (12). 
Agreement on the investment financial plan is subject to the 
inclusion decision; however, no project can be undertaken 
without a financial plan. 
3.2.1. l. Elaboration of a financial plan 
Dining the month following the request a financia? study 
is conducted by the public enterprise's Primary Bank. The 
Primary Bank studies and assesses the independent constraints 
of the project, the return on the 
investment, the financial 
capability of the public enterprise 
to pay back loans and the 
special nature of the 
investment (13). These are, in fact, 
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the selection criteria of the Ministry of Finance. Besides 
the study, the bank indicates the medium term loans it is able 
to grant. On these bases, the financial plan for the project, 
which takes into account both long and medium term credit from 
local or foreign sources, is worked out by the Board of 
Directors of the BAD or the Technical Committee (14). As soon 
as the MPAT decides that a project is to be included in an 
investment programme, the financial plan is adopted. 
The adopted financial plan includes different means of 
financing which have been approved for project execution. The 
financial plan is then passed on to the Ministry of Finance 
(Department of Treasury, Credit and Insurance) for approval 
(15). Approbation of the financial plan must be signed by the 
Minister of Finance (16). The approved financial plan is then 
sent to the supervisory ministry, the MPAT, the BAD, the BCA, 
the Primary Banks and the concerned public enterprise. The 
financial plan covers the whole planned investment which may 
extend over a period of several years. The public enterprise 
is only authorised to use the granted loans when credit 
; conventions are signed between the public enterprise and the 
Primary Bank for medium term loans and between the public 
enterprise and the BAD for long term loans. 
3.2.1.2. The credit convention 
The credit convention binds the public enterprise to the 
Primary Bank and the BAD (17). The respective obligations of 
each partner, the precise amount, the credit conditions 
(e. g., the rate of interest and the duration of the loan) and 
the payment modalities are specified in the credit convention. 
In addition, avoidance clauses and stipulations which allow 
the bank to control project implementation are enclosed 
in the 
credit convention. The share of credit 
by nature and by terms 
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of the investment is stated in the appendix of the convention. 
Utilisation of credit is only authorised at the conclusion of 
the credit convention. This convention is similar to the one 
which exists in socialist countries (18). The different loans 
granted are progressively unfrozen when needed. The granted 
loans are deposited in the public enterprise investment 
account. To avoid any misuse of funds allocated for project 
implementation, the public enterprise is required to hold two 
separate accounts: an investment account and a current 
account. The Primary Bank keeps a strict record for each 
project separately, involving details such as long term cre- 
dit, short term credit, foreign financing and self-financing 
(19). Foreign loans are subject to more rigorous control. 
Every semester the public enterprise is required to commu- 
nicate its planned expenses to the BAD and to the Primary 
Bank. Payments are made by the Primary Bank for expenses 
approved by the BAD only when they are part of the project. 
In relation to the project, the public enterprise sends three 
reports per year to both the MPAT (Direction des Programmes) 
and the Ministry of Finance (Department of Treasury, Credit 
and Insurance). These reports include details on 
the physical 
execution and the financial implementation of 
the project. In 
the first report, which is due by the 31t of July, details, 
including the physical and financial commitments made during 
the first semester, planning for the second semester and new 
projects to be started during the 
following year, are given. 
An updated report is due by the 30th of 
September. Finally, 
the last report, which is due by the end of 
February, gives 
details on the physical and financial 
implementation during 
the passed calendar year (January-December). 
In addition to 
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these three reports which are sent to the two ministries 
concerned, the public enterprise is expected to give monthly 
information to its Primary Bank on the physical and financial 
implementation of the project and the utilisation of local and 
foreign loans. Each trimester, a schedule of payment orders 
by source of financing, utilisation of foreign credit state- 
ment, description of used credit and the realisation rate of 
investment as well as a brief presentation and analysis of the 
development of each project are sent to its Primary Bank. The 
Primary Bank may require any supplementary documentation. 
Based on this information the Primary Bank manages investment 
carrying out and may propose adjustments for the future. On a 
monthly and quarterly basis, the different accounts related to 
credit utilisation by project and by category (long, medium 
and foreign terms) are managed by the bank. These documents 
are transmitted to the BAD. Based on the information 
communicated by the Primary Bank and public enterprise, a 
monthly report is issued by the BAD. These reports are sent 
to the MPAT, to the Ministry of Finance, to the supervisory 
: ministry and to the public enterprise concerned. 
investment 
3.2.2. Investment financing op licy of self-financed 
Until 1971, depreciation and reserve funds of any public 
enterprise as well as profit had to be transferred 
to the 
Treasury in order to be recycled into the national economy 
(20). Depreciation and reserve funds and profit were only 
kept when a joint decision by both the Ministry of Finance and 
the supervisory ministry was granted (21). Treasury 
bonds 
were issued in return for the deposited 
funds. These bonds 
were issued for a period of 5 years with an annual 
interest 
rate of 5.5%. This practice prohibited self-financing 
of 
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public investment by a public enterprise. 
Since 1976 public enterprises have access to their 
depreciation and reserve funds and profit (22). A public 
enterprise may, therefore, self-finance public investments. 
Self-financing of investment, however, does not reduce the 
control exercised by the central planning and finance 
apparatus. The criteria of acceptance and control of self- 
financed investments are similar to those of investments 
financed by the banking system as described above. The only 
difference is that self-financed investment is not subject to 
a credit convention since the enterprise's own assets are used 
to finance the project. 
3.2.3. Investient financing ap licy of investment financed 
by the Treasury 
Each year the amount of credit destined to finance non- 
reimbursable capital goods expenditures is fixed by the 
budget. The granted credit is divided by sector of activity. 
A list of the projects to be financed with this credit is 
established by the Ministry of Planning. This list is then 
transmitted to the Budget Department of the Ministry of 
Finance in order to isolate and grant the corresponding credit 
(23). Financing of an investment by the Treasury is carried 
out as follows (24): a contract (engagement) is established by 
the Treasury which is then transmitted to the state financial 
controller for approval. A double check on the existence of 
the credit covering the proposed commitment and on the autho- 
rised expenses for the project are carried out before 
including this engagement in the budget. It should be noted 
that any investment expense must carry the approval of the 
state financial controller. The amount of the expense 
is then 
131 
precisely determined and payment may be initiated. Treasury 
accountants are in charge of payment and management of 
expenses. Payment is transferred to the bank account of the 
beneficiary public enterprise. The financial plan can be 
reassessed in the event of reevaluation. The demand for 
reevaluation goes through the same process as that described 
above. Demands for modification regarding cost, object, title 
or implementation cannot be made to the MPAT without the 
consent of the concerned ministry (25). This gives rise to a 
new decision by the Treasury. 
3.2.4. Criticisms of investment financing policies 
The low implementation rate of investments confirmed by the 
large number of ongoing projects at the end of each plan (see 
part 1.5 and Chapter Two) is not only due to investment 
policies (as described in part 3.1.5) but to investment 
financing policies. Inadequacies in the conditions of 
investment financing, worsened by ineffective project 
evaluation and delays in its implementation constitute the 
main financial problems encountered by public enterprises. 
-; These inadequacies are mainly the result of the financial 
structure and the duration of reimbursement of credit. 
3.2.4.1. Financial structure 
The financial structure of a project is decided by the 
BAD. The financial plan must respond to the financial requi- 
rements of the project. In a large number of cases, credit 
allocated through the financial plan is often 
insufficient. 
Technical, economic and financial studies of project prepara- 
tion frequently result in poor and inadequate estimates of 
financial need. This is due to initial financial undervalua- 
tion of the project, delay in the attainment of allocated 
credit, lengthiness of procedures and especially 
the absence 
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of resources for the prefinancing of some investments such as 
preliminary expenses, studies, training and safety stocks. 
Procedures involved in the attainment of an agreeable annual 
financial plan also lead to long delays. These procedures can 
take up to two months. During this period the public 
enterprise may have to contract high interest loans in order 
to pay for some orders. The BAD has to grant a visa to all 
the orders related to the project. This process hinders the 
operation. In addition, the undervaluation of investment is 
aggravated by the fact that the MPAT grants a lower amount 
than the amount requested by public enterprises (26). 
Imported capital goods which should be duty free are subject 
to heavy taxes due to lack of knowledge of the regulations. 
These heavy taxes are bound to bring about financial revalua- 
tion and supplementary credit demands which in turn lead to 
further delays in the implementation of a project. Lack of 
coordination between project approval and financing 
authorities frequently results in a lengthy time lag between, 
the two decisions. Consequently, in several cases it was 
necessary to revaluate the cost estimates. Such 
inadequate 
financial planning increases financial charges and leads to 
financial problems. 
3.2.4.2. Duration of credit reimbursement 
Delays in the implementation of projects and/or the 
allocation of credit are not taken 
into account when the 
average repayment period of loans 
is fixed. In fact a public 
enterprise is sometimes obliged 
to start repaying loans before 
completing the project. In other cases, repayments 
due are so 
large that they exceed the cash flow or the working capital 
of 
the plant. Public enterprises are therefore constrained 
to 
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resort to short term overdrafts in order to reach a minimum 
financial equilibrium. In addition, the existence of 
important cost overruns yields an inefficient initial 
financial plan even when adjusted from phase to phase. These 
adjustments only occur with long delays which means that 
public enterprises must search for new financial resources. 
Financing of an important proportion of investments by short 
term credit gives rise to high financial charges and 
consequently leads to imbalances in the financial structure of 
public enterprises (27). 
The confused financial situation of public enterprises and 
the absence of an accurate and complete financial plan have 
not allowed banks to set up the necessary instruments for an 
efficient analysis of projects. Banking procedures are, 
therefore, cumbersome, which results in paying strict respect 
to administrative rules without taking into account the return 
on the investment (28). One should add that insufficient 
resources such as infrastructure, transport, housing and 
training may have the same indirect effect. Expenses required 
. 
to mitigate this situation are often the responsibility of 
public enterprises. Such expenses, however, are not accounted 
for in the planned investment allocated to a project, 
resulting in the contraction of additional short term credit 
and therefore worsening the financial situation of public 
enterprises. 
3.3. Labour policies and legislation 
Labour policies and labour legislation are of importance 
in the study of the performance of industrial public enter- 
prises since they influence labour costs, recruitment, 
mobility and attitude at work. They can also affect 
labour 
performance through wages, conditions of work, number of 
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working hours and productivity. In addition, they can force a 
public enterprise to employ more workers than required and can 
prevent it from using its dismissal right. In contrast to a 
large number of other countries, labour policies and legisla- 
tion in Algeria have not been greatly influenced by trade 
unions (29). It cannot be denied, however, that worker 
benefits improved with the provisional installation of self- 
management between 1962 and 1966, during which trade unions 
played an important role. Workers' material benefits and 
working conditions, though, have improved greatly only since 
the introduction of Socialist Management (SM) in 1971. SM 
introduced workers to the opportunity of being directly 
involved in public enterprise affairs and indirectly in the 
economy. Thus, SM plays an important role in labour policies 
and legislation. First, the Socialist Management Charter and 
Code (30), together with problems encountered with SM 
introduction and effects on worker participation, will be 
described. Second, labour legislation will be examined. 
3.3.1. Socialist Management in Algeria 
The adoption of SM in public enterprises was an important 
turning point in labour policies and legislation. It 
coincided with the big wave of nationalisation and the 
emergence of a dominant public sector. SM, which was adopted 
in 1971 and applied in 1974, allowed workers' participation. 
With the adoption of SM, the government intended not only to 
establish solid foundations for Algerian development where 
workers play an important role in the production process, but 
also to involve workers meaningfully in management of their 
own productive efforts (31). SM requires a full and active 
association of workers in management. The worker becomes a 
135 
producer-manager and the public enterprise his own property. 
Objectives, interests and aims of the producer-manager and the 
state become inseparable. Workers are constantly encouraged 
to improve productivity, to eliminate waste, to report 
misappropriations and to check any tendency towards 
bureaucracy or technocracy. Workers are expected to be as 
motivated to increase plant and national production as they 
would be to increase their personal income (32). Through SM, 
the state guarantees and protects the stability of employment 
and intends to apply the equal pay for equal work principle. 
SM is also seen as a school where workers can be economically, 
politically and socially trained, through the association of 
workers in planning and management of public enterprises. 
It is through the existence of collegial organs such as 
the Worker's Assembly (WA) and the permanent committees, as 
well as the Board of Directors (BD), that workers' participa- 
tion is realised. The most important organ is the WA. The WA 
at the plant is elected by the plant labour force (APW) while 
the WA at the public enterprise level (AEW) is elected by the 
; different APWs. Each WA is elected for three years and 
has 
between 7 and 25 members (and sometimes more). All elected 
members must be members of the union (UGTA) for at least 6 
months and be over 21 years of age. Consultative and co- 
managerial powers have been attributed to the WA to protect 
the basic rights of workers and to watch over the just fulfil- 
ment of their obligations. Power of the WA extends 
to the 
supervision of management and to the 
implementation of 
programmes. The WA also makes recommendations related 
to 
proposed development plans, production programmes 
and 
investment expenditures. Thus worker-managers contribute 
to 
the general policies of the public enterprise and exercise 
a 
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certain amount of financial control. It is through one or two 
representatives of the WA on the Board of Directors (33) and 
the WA itself that workers are associated with all decisions 
related to the life and future of their plant. 
The functions of the APW and AEW are actually carried out 
by standing committees (SC). The number of these committees 
varies from one to five according to the size and needs of the 
public enterprise and plant. There are economic and financial 
SC, social and cultural SC, personnel and training SC, disci- 
plinary SC and finally; safety and health SC. These 
committees are composed of members of the WA except for the 
disciplinary SC and the safety and health SC which have half 
their members appointed by the managers of the plant or public 
enterprise, respectively. Each of these important bodies is 
responsible for a variety of duties. The economic and finan- 
cial SC studies all production and management problems 
associated with the conclusion of business transactions. It 
supervises all matters related to contracts, marketing and 
supplies. It also draws up plans in order to improve profita- 
bility. The social and cultural affairs SC is concerned with 
all social and cultural aspects such as welfare and raising 
the cultural standards of the worker-managers. The personnel 
and training SC participates in the development of personnel 
and training policies. It is also consulted on recruitment, 
salaries, fringe benefits and training matters. The discipli- 
nary SC gives a preliminary opinion on all questions regarding 
staff discipline. The disciplinary SC makes sure that the 
rights of workers are safeguarded and the regulations in 
effect are enforced in order to protect the general interest 
of the plant or public enterprise. The safety and health SC 
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is concerned with safety and health problems. 
A preliminary analysis of SM does not seem to be warranted 
in view of the lack of accessible information and in view of 
its recent introduction (1974). In 1980, SM was effective in 
92 businesses consisting of 1,051 units and employing 423,151 
permanent workers (34). The implementation of SM has been 
slow. The effect of workers' participation is difficult to 
assess, particularly because SM is a long term policy. 
Difficulties, however, arose from the beginning for a number 
of reasons. The major difficulty was the continuous conflict 
of interest between managers and workers (35). The 
appropriate role of managers appointed by the state and the 
representatives elected by workers was not clearly defined. 
The introduction of change was difficult to accept because of 
past experience, workers' backgrounds and managers' attitudes. 
For example, the managers were used to making decisions 
without the consultation of the labour force. This attitude 
is, to some extent, supported by SM because more emphasis is 
placed on production than participation. In addition, the 
-. dominant role of managers is still very much retained by SM. 
Managers feel more vulnerable than workers to possible 
government sanctions. 
Workers' participation is only effective through the two 
leading organs, the WA and the Board of Directors, but in 
fact, power is concentrated in the hands of the general 
manager of the public enterprise and the supervisory ministry 
(36). Essential factors such as price, level of integration, 
scale of the plant, conditions of supply and 
investment 
financing, are determined without consulting the public enter- 
prise and plant. Consequently, 
the representatives of the WA 
and various committees cannot always 
intervene in management 
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decisions. Thus, the WA and its committees do not function 
properly (37). This is mainly due to the low level of educa- 
tion of the work force and non-implementation of the texts. 
As far as the standing committees are concerned, they often 
have a restricted scope which limits their duties and thus the 
progressive side is often forgotten. The activity of the 
economic and financial SC, for example, is practically non- 
existent. This is greatly encouraged by managers who do not 
feel that the existence of this committee is justified (38). 
In addition, the texts do not clearly define the precise 
role of the WA. It is not clear if the WA should participate 
with the managers and/or control the management. Consequent- 
ly, there is an erroneous interpretation and apprehension 
about SM. From the SM Charter and Code it appears that equal 
importance was given to production, supervision, participation 
and democracy. In practice, however, the participation goals 
have been put aside. This may be attributed to the needs of 
the economy, to the economic situation and to the resistance 
to change of the managers. Finally, candidate selection 
methods are not satisfactory. The party (UGTA) and the 
supervisory ministry select the possible candidates among 
those who wish to stand. All of these different reasons have 
a negative effect on worker participation. 
Despite a number of problems encountered in the 
application of SM and the short term results which may not 
appear to be very successful, positive effects 
have already 
been felt regarding worker participation. It may, 
therefore, 
be said that the long term results may 
have positive effects 
on the performance of public enterprises 
and thus on the 
Algerian economy. Workers' participation 
depends also on the 
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satisfaction of their social needs. Effective worker 
participation, therefore, will only be reached when the 
workers' basic needs are satisfied. 
3.3.2. Labour legislation in Algeria 
Before and during the early post-independence periods, 
French legislation was effective. Some of the laws, such as 
social security, which became effective in 1949, collective 
bargaining, conciliation and arbitration, which were 
introduced in 1951, were appropriate to Algeria (39). Since 
independence a large number of changes have been introduced, 
particularly with the adoption of the current development 
strategy. Most of the labour legislation in practice now was 
published after independence. Algerian post-independence 
labour legislation started with decree no. 63.95 of March, 
1963 which legalised the workers' committee as the basis of 
the self-management system. Decree no. 63.98 of the 28th of 
March, 1963 legally set the distribution of income in self- 
management undertakings (40). Ordinance no. 66.183 provided 
the payment of compensation for employment accidents and 
: occupational diseases. 1971-73 saw the publication of 
ordinances related to social insurance in agriculture, to the 
SM Charter and Code and to collective labour relations in the 
private sector (41). 
According to the SM Charter and Code, workers are 
guaranteed some rights which are even reinforced 
by their 
direct association with the managers of public enterprises or 
plants. Workers are equal regarding their rights and 
duties, 
they receive the same salary and advantages for 
the same work, 
a guaranteed minimum 
income and family allowances. Workers 
may receive productivity 
bonuses, enjoy satisfactory health 
and safety conditions and 
be entitled to a part of the profit. 
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They also have a right to vocational training. Besides their 
rights, their duties are also defined. It is their duty to 
increase production and productivity, to strive for a constant 
improvement of quality and to accomplish the plans'objectives. 
They also have to ensure that national patrimony is firmly 
protected and that there is no waste nor malpractice of any 
kind. Other decrees published in 19,73 and 1974 clarify the 
application of SM in public undertakings. 
In 1975, ordinance no. 75.31 fixed the general conditions 
of work in the private sector, giving details on employment 
relationships, income, conditions of work, to name only a few 
(42). In addition, in 1978 act no. 78.12 made general provi- 
sions for workers'conditions of employment (43). This law set 
the basis for work contracts. Workers' rights (21 articles) 
and duties (17 articles) are defined in the first two chapters 
of this act. The right to work is guaranteed. Workers have 
equal rights and obligations. They are entitled to the same 
salary and advantages for equal amounts of work with equal 
qualifications and productivity. The state also guarantees 
social protection, stability and security of employment. 
Every worker has a right to training, health and safety 
conditions. Workers enjoy all the rights conferred to them by 
law in connection with the welfare schemes. Every worker is 
entitled to a vacation and to a retirement allowance. 
According to the law, strikes can only occur in the private 
sector. All workers enjoy the right to organise. 
Obligations 
of the workers concerning the 
increase in efficiency and the 
requirement to work, for example, are also 
defined. The 
employment relationship, giving 
details such as conditions and 
procedures for recruitment, 
hours of work, absence, leave work 
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rules, wages and training, is also covered. 
Initiated in 1978, act no. 81.03 prescribes the statutory 
hours of work. This act fixes the number of working hours to 
44 hours per week but with different possible daily arrange- 
ments. For example, an employee may work 9 hours per day for 
4 working days and 8 hours for the fifth. It defines the 
night shift working period between 9 pm and 5 am. It also 
regulates overtime. Act no. 81.07 states the purpose, the 
scope, the contracts and the supervision of apprenticeship. 
Act no. 81.80 sets the general rules and conditions for the 
annual leave which is fixed at two and a half days per working 
month. This entitles a worker to a salary during his leave. 
The basic period of leave may be increased in special cases. 
The minimum industrial salary had been fixed at 600 AD in 
1976 and increased to 800 AD in 1978 (44). In 1978, civil 
servant salaries rose by 30% while other sectors reported only 
an 18% increase (45). The guaranteed minimum wage in the 
agricultural sector equalled that in industry just after the 
election of Chadly Bendjedid to the presidency. In 1980, 
äpublic servant pay rose by 15% while salaries 
in education 
increased by 25%. In addition, in 1979, income tax was 
reduced and a tax free allowance for a minimum monthly 
income 
was decreed (46). 
All the decrees laid down by labour legislation benefited 
and improved the conditions of workers. 
Since the 
introduction of SM the labour force of the industrial sector 
has benefited greatly. There has not been a comparable 
improvement in the economic and social conditions of 
the 
workers, particularly 
in housing and social security. 
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3.4. Foreign trade policies 
The state felt that foreign trade had to be rapidly 
controlled after independence in order to prevent 
disorganisation of the economy, the appearance of a dual class 
system (rich and poor) and to break the ties between the local 
private sector and multinationals. As a result, foreign trade 
has become a state administered and controlled activity. As 
early as 1963, three measures were taken to regulate foreign 
trade. These measures are the import and export quota system, 
the increase of customs duties and the exchange control. In 
this protectionist state, two types of organs have iitervened 
successively to undertake the operation of foreign trade: the 
"purchasing group" and the monopoly of foreign trade. 
3.4.1. Historical development 
In 1963, the quota system was introduced and the nature 
and quantity of imported and exported goods were fixed in 
advance. These procedures, conceived by the Ministry of 
Trade, brought about import and export licensing, an effective 
means of controlling foreign trade. As early as late 1963, a 
; move towards a monopoly of certain 
imports by the National 
Office of Commercialisation (ONC) was started. The main 
function of the ONC was to import staple products such as 
sugar, coffee and butter for the local market. 
Commodities 
for industrial public enterprises were also sometimes imported 
by the ONC. No later than 1964, several monopolies were 
granted to companies. Professional purchasing groups 
brought 
state and private investors 
together to form foreign trade 
companies in which more 
than 60% of the assets were public. 
Five groups were constituted and granted monopolies 
for a 
given range of products. 
These included wood and its by- 
products, artificial 
textiles and cotton, milk and its by- 
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products, leather and animal skins and other textiles (other 
than the artificial textiles and cotton). Public and private 
enterprises were still able to import directly with a license 
granted by the Ministry of Trade. 
In the early 1970's, a monopoly on foreign trade 
operations was granted to public enterprises only. The system 
moved to a monopolistic foreign trade system. A monopoly was 
granted to nineteen public enterprises: nine public enterpri- 
ses under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry, six 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Agricultur_=, three 
under the Ministry of Information and one under the Ministry 
of Health. A monopoly was granted but imports and exports 
were not necessarily restricted to the monopoly holders as 
licenses were still obtainable. With the introduction of the 
monopolistic system in 1972, import and export licenses were 
abolished. Public and private enterprises had to go through 
the monopoly holder for any type of imports and exports. In 
1974, a more flexible system was adopted to alleviate the many 
difficulties and problems encountered by the monopoly holders 
regarding the organisation and planning of foreign trade. 
Since 1974, public and private enterprises have been able to 
obtain a permit from the Ministry of Trade allowing them to 
directly import and export goods without going through the 
public enterprise which holds the monopoly. A law passed 
February 11,1978, regulates the monopoly of foreign trade. 
This puts an end to a process which began in 1963 with the 
creation of the ONC (replaced in 1967 by the Algerian National 
Office of Commercialisation (ONACO)). 
Despite restrictions imposed by the monopolistic system, 
in practice, goods listed under some 600 tariff headings and 
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sub-headings included in the free list may be imported or 
exported freely. Furthermore, some goods are prohibited 
regardless of their nature because of their origin or their 
destination. In addition, some are prohibited because of 
their nature regardless of their origin or destination. Free 
and prohibited exports and imports, however, represent only a 
small proportion of total foreign trade. The bulk of exports 
and imports are only permitted within the framework of the 
annual import and export programmes. Required needs from 
abroad are determined by the plan. The annual export and 
import programmes consist of authorisations (permits) granted 
by the Ministry of Trade to public and private enterprises. 
These are three different total authorisations of imports 
(AGI) : the functioning AGI, the monopoly AGI and the 
investment AGI. The functioning AGI covers all the imported 
inputs needed for the normal functioning of a public enterpri- 
se. The monopoly AGI includes all imports required by private 
enterprises and consumers for which the public enterprise has 
the monopoly. The investment AGI covers all imports necessary 
for projects under construction by the public enterprise. A 
small number of restricted commodities, unless covered by an 
AGI, require an individual preliminary authorisation of import 
(API). Private firms have to apply to the public enterprise 
holding the monopoly for a specific import except when they 
are granted an authorisation for import. 
Since 1978, the foreign trade system has been mostly state 
controlled. Trade is conducted by national marketing 
boards 
or by state enterprises that hold 
the monopoly for the import 
and export of specific goods. 
Foreign trade is conducted with 
about 100 countries, of which 
half have signed commercial 
agreements with Algeria. Most of 
the agreements concern 
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parameters of trade and payment arrangements. 
3.4.2. Im ort policy 
Authorisations of import are only granted twice a year to 
public enterprises and once a year to private enterprises. 
Applications for the different AGI have to be made separately. 
Figure 3.1 indicates a simplified block diagram of the circuit 
involved in the attainment of an AGI. Based on the production 
plan, the needs of each individual plant and project are 
assessed. The request has to be made two months before the 
closing date of application and must be very detailed and 
specific. The requests for functioning AGI made by the 
various plants are then gathered and consolidated at the 
foreign trade department of the public enterprise before being 
submitted to the public enterprise Marketing Board. The 
request for a monopoly AGI includes all the requests made by 
the private and public enterprises while the investment AGI 
includes those made by different projects within the public 
enterprise. The combined requests for AGI are proposed to the 
supervisory ministry, which in turn presents them to the 
Ministry of Trade. When the AGI is granted, copies of notifi- 
cation of the AGI are sent to the respective public enterprise 
through its supervisory ministry and to the Algerian Foreign 
Bank (BEA). The BEA transmits the copies to the local banks. 
This operation takes about one month. It is only after the 
local bank has received the copies that guarantee of payment 
is given to the supplier. Regarding exports, the buyer's 
payment guarantee must be presented to the bank for security 
before the export is made. When an AGI is granted and the 
bank is notified, the choice of supplier is made by the public 
enterprise Marketing Board. The foreign trade department of 
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Figure 3.1 : Block diagram of an AGI. 
Source : Survey data. 
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Financial system 
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the public enterprise then orders the goods according to the 
choice made. Payment is made through the local bank. On 
arrival, the different concerned departments of the public or 
private plant are then notified to collect the imported goods. 
Before 1978, spare parts and components were ordered through 
SONACOME which had an absolute monopoly. This procedure 
rapidly gave rise to long delays in the attainment of ordered 
spare parts and components due to the inability of the 
SONACOME foreign trade department to cope with the large 
number of orders and, more particularly, with the large number 
of suppliers. Since 1978, public enterprises are authorised 
to import spare parts and components directly. Imports, howe- 
ver, must still be channeled through the AGI regulations and 
private firms still have to go through the monopoly holders. 
3.4.3. Customs policy 
In order to clear goods, custom duties and taxes must be 
paid by public and private enterprises. In 1979, three 
different tariffs were in practice: one for goods coming from 
countries that granted a favourable clause to Algeria, the 
; second one (a special tariff) applied 
to goods coming from 
countries or groups of countries that had correlative advan- 
tages, and the last one (higher than the first two) applied to 
countries which did not grant a favourable position 
to Algeria 
(47). In addition, different taxes applied to staple goods, 
secondary goods and luxury products. Preferential 
tariffs and 
tax procedures are still in practice. The clearance of goods 
is still subject to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures 
despite 
the creation of transit services specially created 
to deal 
with orders placed by public enterprises. 
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3.4.4. Exchange control 
Since October 1963, a unique though adjusted several 
times, exchange control has been in practice in Algeria. From 
April 1964 to December 1973, a fixed exchange rate with 
respect to the French franc was maintained, but since January 
1974, the value of the Algerian Dinar (AD) has been allowed to 
float against the major world currencies. The official rate 
of the AD per US$ is given in Table 3.1. In 1982, the AD was 
officially worth about 1.4 French francs (FF) (100FF=71.42 
AD). On the official market the AD is greatly overvalued. 
fact, on the black market 10 FF were equal to 20 AD and 
sometimes to 30 AD during the same period. 
3.4.5. Problems encountered public enterprises 
Although the monopoly of foreign trade has some 
advantages, the disadvantages cannot be ignored. Apart from 
In 
the restriction imposed by AGI, public enterprises are subject 
to the bureaucratic inefficiencies of a centralised system of 
imports. Application for licenses as well as for AGI are 
often subject to long delays mainly because the Ministry of 
; Trade processes the requests at fixed dates twice a year for 
the public sector and once a year for the private sector. The 
lag between the application for AGI and the actual attainment 
of AGI affects delivery and creates ruptures of stocks. This 
is further worsened by the inability of the Ministry of Trade 
to respect the fixed dates of allocation of AGI (January and 
July). For instance, in 1980 all public enterprises received 
the AGI in March although they were expected on the 1St of 
January. These procedures directly affect the process of 
production. The fixed amount of 
foreign currencies allocated 
to a public enterprise via the AGI 
depends on the extent to 
which the foreign trade 
department of the public enterprise 
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can convince the financial authorities. It also depends on 
available foreign currencies. Allocated AGI, therefore, are 
often less than requested AGI. This creates a shortage of 
inputs and a competitive situation between different plants 
since the total amount is a bulk amount. SONIC, for example, 
received only 55% of its requested functioning AGI in March, 
1980. This resulted in shortages of some imported inputs in 
the Mostaganem plant. This could have been avoided if the 
money allocated to other particular imports could have been 
used for this purpose. Unfortunately, this is not possible 
with the present policies because the money allocated to a 
particular import cannot be used for another import. There is 
no flexibility in the use of allocated foreign currencies. 
After facing burdensome administrative procedures to 
obtain the needed foreign currencies, it takes an additional 
month before the plant is able to use the allocated AGI; i. e., 
it takes one month for the notification copies to reach the 
local bank. This is especially crucial since most foreign 
suppliers require financial guarantees which are granted by 
the local bank only when the copies are received. Different 
plants and foreign trade department have to once again face 
bank control when the money is transferred. Full payment 
is 
required by the bank on order of the goods. In order 
to meet 
the payment, the plant or even the public enterprise often 
resorts to short term loans carrying a high 
interest rate. 
This procedure creates imbalances at the financial planning 
level and increases financial charges. 
Imports sometimes do not conform to the specifications of 
the stipulated request because the choice of supplier 
is made 
by the Marketing Board of the public enterprise. 
The quality 
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of the intermediate inputs is sometimes not adapted either. 
In addition, delays arise in negotiations of the orders with 
the supplier, its approval by the bank and finally in the 
delivery schedule because of the lack of infrastructure. 
Another problem is the slowness of the distribution network. 
Bulky foreign trade procedures also keep plants and public 
enterprises from taking full advantage of low price opportuni- 
ties when they occur, particularly for imports that are 
affected by seasonal prices. This inability means a higher 
cost to the economy. In order to prevent shortages of impor- 
ted inputs, some plants build up stocks to hedge against 
delays when money is allocated to them. This results in the 
locking up of capital in stocks, worsening the situation of 
other plants which may need imports urgently. Clearance of 
goods is another lengthy and bulky process. The customs 
administration procedure is time consuming and results in 
further delays. Such heavy administrative costs do not seem 
to be taken into consideration. 
As far as exports are concerned, their contribution to the 
-Algerian economy is quite poor (except hydrocarbons). Foreign 
trade department lacks the flexibility, incentives and skills 
necessary to promote exports though, at the present time, only 
very few public enterprises would be able to do so. Bank' 
procedures for exports are also very cumbersome. Public 
enterprise exports could grow with innovative and commercial 
dynamism. They could expand in existing export markets and 
break into new ones. 
Present foreign trade policies create shortages of 
imports 
in projects and plants and therefore 
have direct consequences 
on the utilisation of production capacities. 
This will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters. 
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3.5. Price policy 
One aspect of government policies which is related to the 
emergence of the Algerian public sector relates to price. In 
anv planned economy prices are fixed by the state, they are 
not regulated by the market as in a free market economy. In 
this section, we will first deal with actual price setting. 
In the second section, the main functions of prices in a 
planned economy are described and the predominant role played 
by prices in the Algerian economy is analysed. Price trends 
and }he causes of inflation are examined in the third section. 
Last, an evaluation of Algerian price policy is presented. 
3.5. l. Price setting in Algeria 
From the early stage of the post-independence period, the 
state has exercised tight control on most prices. The respon- 
sibility of price setting is shared by the Council of 
Ministries, the Ministry of Trade, the National Price 
Committee (PNC) and the Wali (local authority). At present, 
the essential features of this control are as follows: 
a) Prices of basic food products and services such as 
coffee, tea and cooking oil are fixed by the government. The 
list of these products is fixed by decree. The purpose of 
this procedure is to ensure price stability and price standar- 
dization across the country. In addition, this procedure 
is 
aimed at balancing the high prices of some products 
with that 
of others. For example, staple products are sold 
at a lower 
price than their actual value while other 
luxury products are 
r 
sold at a higher price than 
their actual value in order to 
make up for the eventual 
loss. 
b) Special or frozen prices for a range of products 
during a determined period 
is decided by the government inde- 
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pendently, to some extent, of their real costs. This allows 
different inputs to be sold at a "imilar price in both cities 
and inland areas (which are inaccessible). Subsidies may make 
up the difference between actual price and real cost. 
c) In order to carry out invcstment programmes, prices 
of inputs such as intermediate inputs or capital are worked 
out by the government. This procedure alleviates the effect 
of world inflation on the cost of projects. 
d) Control of trade margins is implemented for wholesale 
and retail prices. The objective of such a practice is to 
eliminate any notion of free price. All prices are subject to 
this procedure except those which-are determined by the 
government as described above. Profit margins, tax, and 
ceilings are used as means for fixing the prices of locally 
produced or imported goods. 
e) Control based on prior price registration is the most 
frequent kind of procedure. The price of any product other 
than those falling in the categories described above, must be 
registered with the price authorities which decide on the 
final price. If a proposed price is felt to be overvalued, 
the price authorities may fix a lower price than that 
proposed. 
It may be said that present Algerian price policies affect 
both locally produced and imported products. In addition, the 
managers of public or private enterprises are not free 
to 
increase or decrease the price of their products. The 
managers do play an important role 
in suggesting changes in 
prices to the price authorities., 
When the price of a product 
is not fixed, steady or special, producers can ask 
the price 
authorities for a price 
increase as soon as the production 
cost rises by more than 5%. 
The price authorities have 30 
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days to refuse the request for an increase. If, after the 30 
days, the price authorities have not vetoed the request for a 
price rise, the increase becomes effective. 
Production costs which are evaluated by the production or 
commercial plant for each product are proposed to the price 
authorities. Most production costs which are jointly 
determined are calculated approximately because of the lack of 
necessary data and means of analysis. When the price of a 
product is fixed, frozen or steady, the production cost 
evaluation allows the computation of the price itself and, 
more importantly, the calculation of subsidies to be 
distributed in order to cover the eventual difference between 
production cost and price. These subsidies are arbitrarily 
distributed leading to problems of treasury at the plant 
level. When the price of a product is not fixed, frozen or 
steady, it is only when production cost increases that 
managers can apply for a price increase. 
Different benefit margins and taxes are added to both 
locally produced outputs and imported products. For locally 
produced outputs as indicated in Figure 3.2: (a) A profit 
margin of 8% is added to the production cost when the product 
is sold to another plant in the same branch of industry. When 
the product is sold to another branch of industry, a turnover 
tax is added on top of the 8% profit margin. The turnover tax 
is calculated according to the specific rate published 
by the 
tax authorities. (b) The wholesale profit margin 
has been 
fixed at 20%. This margin is added to the 
industrial price. 
(c) The retail profit margin has been fixed at 30%. 
This 
margin is added to the wholesale price. 
Regarding the imported goods subject to monopoly, profit 
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Figure 3.2 : Different trade margins. 
Source : Regiemcntgt'-u dc: 
Dr v. Tet 
Ministry of Trade, Direction des Prix, Algiers, 
1976. 
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margins are calculated according to the destination of the 
products. As indicated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, a profit 
margin of 3% is fixed for imported goods sold to other public 
enterprises, while a margin of 10% is fixed for imported 
products sold to private wholesalers. A special margin of 30% 
is charged when the imported goods are sold directly to 
consumers and a special margin of 20% is charged when the 
imported product is sold directly to the users (industrial 
sector). All of these margins are added to the c. i. f. price 
of the imported good. When the imported product is sold 
directly to the consumer or user the special margins may be 
added to the enterprise cost which is calculated by adding 
transport charges to the c. i. f. price. 
3.5.2. Main functions of price 
In a planned economy prices have four main functions: 
allocation, control, measurement and income distribution. 
a. Allocation 
Prices generally reflect relative scarcity and may 
influence economic decisions. In a planned economy, 
administrative planning bears the primary responsibility for 
allocation, although prices play a limited role. Prices 
that 
are centrally determined and based on average 
branch costs do 
not totally reflect relative scarcities. 
b. Control 
Price policy is an important instrument. It 
is the most 
important means of control of production processes and of 
enterprise management. In both planned and 
free market econo- 
mies, profit mechanisms and profit variants can 
act as control 
devices. Profits do not play an allocative role, aithougn 
targets are given and controlled 
in value terms. Thus, in a 
planned economy prices are used 
to evaluate and control 
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performance at all levels. Value indicators are widely used 
to indicate deviations from planned activities. Control is 
mainly carried out through physical control and directives. 
c. Measurement 
This function is, in various aspects, similar to the 
control function. Prices are required to assess the results 
achieved in a given economy. For example, without prices one 
cannot determine at what rate the economy is growing and the 
trend followed by the capital/output ratio. 
d. Distribution of income 
Prices play an important role in determining the distri- 
bution of income. In addition to the centrally determined 
wage scale that directly affects the distribution of income, 
pricing authorities can influence the distribution of real 
income through retail prices. 
In Algeria the price system is formulated in an attempt to 
stimulate the economy in general and favour the development of 
some sectors in particular. A more egalitarian redistribution 
of incomes and participation in the financing of development 
through commercial taxes are also expected to be achieved. 
The main purposes of price policy are to prevent a rise in the 
cost of living of the poorest segment of the community and 
carry out the objectives established by development plans. 
Redistribution of income has been the predominant function of 
prices in the Algerian economy. 
3.5.3. Price trends and the causes of inflation 
During the period 1969-80, prices were subject to frequent 
increases. This is indicated in Tables 3.2,3.3,3.4 and 3.5 
which show changes in wholesale prices, consumer prices and 
general prices. Between 1970 and 1976, wholesale prices rose 
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Table 3.2: Wholesale price index of industrial production 
by branch of industry. Base 1969=100. 
Branch of industry Weight 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Energy & water 51.22 100 100 102.2 102.2 
Mines & quarrying 35.46 118 115.9 195.6 223.6 
Metal industries(l) 22.15 110.1 103.1 107.7 113.6 
Chemical & rubber 58.77 104.3 107.5 117.1 136.5 
Food industries 598.49 100.2 105.4 113.9 153.3 
Textiles industries 114.66 112.8 115.7 133.9 162.6 
Skin & hide industries 29.96 104.1 107.4 117.3 130.1 
Wood and paper 40.08 99.2 115.2 128.9 181.4 
Miscellaneous 4.61 4.6 105.6 139.9 158.1 
General Index(2) 1000 102.6 107.1 120 153.7 
1 Metal industries: Iron and Steel and metal, mechanical and 
electrical engineering. 
2 Total without hydrocarbons, steel and iron and metal 
engineering industries. 
Source: MPAT 1977 quoted in Le Cout de is Vie en Algerie 
depuis 1962 by Ali-Toudert A. (Economica, Paris, 1982) p 21. 
Table 3.3: Consumer price index. 
Base 1969=100. 
Years 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 19I 
Index 100 106 109 113 120 126 136 147 196 
Source: Ibid Table 3.2 p 28. 
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Table 3.4: Consumer price index by group. 
Groups weight 1969 1975 1978 
1 Food, drinks & tobacco 456.6 100 149.4 235.1 
2 Clothing & shoes 147.9 100 139.2 198.9 
3 Rent & charges 131.5 100 106.6 120.3 
4 Furniture 68.8 100 136.5 193.5 
5 Medical serv. & health 25 100 114.8 125.5 
6 Transport & communicat. 72.5 100 121.1 136.3 
7 Entertainment & leisure 43.2 100 117.9 203.1 
8 Other services 55.1 100 137.7 203.1 
Total 1000 100 136.4 195.9 
Source: Ibid Table 3.3. 
Table 3.5: Consumer and general price index and their 
annual rates of growth. Base 1974=100. 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
General price 115 127.7 141.2 159.4 195.9 
Consumer price(l) 118.5 132.7 155.5 173.7 190.5 
Annual percentage change 
General price 10 11 10.6 12.9 22.9 
Consumer price(l) 8.9 12 17.2 11.7 9.7 
(1) Greater Algiers area consumer price index only. 
Source: MPAT, Algiers, 1981. 
Table 3.6: Annual increase in consumer prices and 
in prices of imported goods price (in percentages). 
Years 1969-71 1972-75 1976-79 1980 
Consumer price(1) 4.6 5.8 12.4 9.6 
Import price index 6.3 13.5 8.8 7.7 
1 Consumer price for Greater Algiers only. 
Source: MPAT, Algiers, 1981. 
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at an average annual rate of 7.7% (48). The largest increase 
occurred after 1973 and affected different branches of 
industry unequally. For example, as illustrated in Table 3.2, 
in the mining and quarrying and the textiles and food 
industries wholesale prices were subject to a much higher 
increase than in energy and water. In some branches of 
industry wholesale prices were purposefully kept low and many 
industrial enterprises were operating under state subsidies. 
Similarly, for the 1969-78 period retail prices rose at an 
average annual rate of 6.7% (49). For instance, as indicated 
in Table 3.6, consumer prices for Greater Algiers rose 
steadily from 4.6% per annum during the 1969-71 period to 
12.4% per annum during the 1976-79 period. Table 3.4 
indicates that this rise did not affect the different groups 
to the same extent. It can be seen that rent and charges 
increased very slowly in contrast to the price of food and 
tobacco products which, together with entertainment and 
leisure retail prices, were subject to the highest increase. 
As shown in Table 3.5, the highest annual rate of growth for 
; consumer prices, 17.2%, was reached in 1978. In 1980, this 
rate decreased to 9.7%. The annual rate of growth of general 
prices increased steadily from 10% in 1976 to 22.9% in 1980. 
It should be noted that actual prices were often higher 
than official prices. Rates of growth are calculated using 
subsidized prices while many retail prices were higher than 
regulated prices. The difference between official and actual 
price is sometimes very large. For example, 
in 1977 the price 
of cement on the black market was five times the official 
price (50). The published figures underestimate 
the real 
price increases and should, therefore, 
be analysed with some 
reserve. 
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The main factors determining the price increases were 
manifold. The increase was due, in part, to the impact of 
international inflation reflected in the price rise of impor- 
ted goods and services and to the accelerated increase in the 
money supply and in claims on the Treasury (51). As shown in 
Table 3.6, the high prices of imported goods are reflected on 
domestic prices with a three year lag. In effect, when the 
rise in the consumer price index for Greater Algiers is 
compared with the rise in imported goods, Table 3.6 shows 
clearly that the initial jump in the rate of increase in the 
price of imported goods was followed automatically by a rise 
in the consumer price index. The increase in consumer prices 
during the 1976-79 period (12.4% per annum) reflected the 
increase in the imported price index during the period 1972- 
75. Similarly, the lower rate of increase in consumer prices 
recorded since 1979 (1980: 9.6%) corresponded to a lower rate 
of increase in the price of imported goods during the 1976-79 
period (8.. 8% per annum). In addition, high population growth 
tremendously increased the country's needs and consequently, 
demand which has a large effect on price. The creation of new 
jobs increased the bulk of wage earnings and consequently, 
money in circulation rose tremendously. The revenue increase, 
however, rose more rapidly than the production of goods, 
services and capital goods (52). Consequently, the large 
amount of money in circulation created an increase in the 
demand for staple products which accentuated the upward 
movement of domestic prices. 
The rate of inflation rose more rapidly in the late 1970's 
despite government success in combating price increases in 
certain areas. This high inflationary situation resulted 
in a 
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deterioration in the standard of living of the proportion of 
the population receiving a relatively fixed income. This 
situation was worsened by frequent shortages of staple 
products, favouring the development of a black market. The 
Algerian income distribution policy had relatively few succes- 
ses despite large efforts made by the government to stabilise 
the prices of staple products. Parallelling this, enormous 
and quick profits obtained through the black market were used 
to finance an overconsumption of luxury products. These 
lucrative savings were not reinvested in the national economy. 
As a consequence of the high inflationary situation, hardly 
any real saving was accomplished by the public sector except 
for the hydrocarbon sub-sector. 
3.5.4. An evaluation of Algerian price policy 
Prices are used by the planning authorities in decision- 
making related to capital formation and future production and 
to the current operations of existing enterprises. Studies 
based on existing prices are carried out in order to choose 
between different projects. Calculations of costs and 
benefits are often made from inadequate prices which do not 
indicate the real price of the resources involved. 
Consequently, the allocation of investment cannot be optimal. 
An alternative allocation using the same volume of resources 
may be a better choice. 
Prices used by the existing public enterprises do not 
reflect input scarcity; consequently, production costs are 
artificially low. Managers are not prompted 
to economise on 
the use of scarce inputs and to minimize production costs 
by 
increasing efficiency. When prices are distorted and the 
prices of factors of production are not scarcity 
prices, a 
combination of inputs that minimize costs 
for the enterprise 
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does not release resources to create output elsewhere. 
Fixed prices go very quickly out of date. They become 
inadequate and are not representative of the cost of different 
inputs especially when prices of imported inputs increase 
quickly. This procedure calls for frequent reassessment 
because of the rising costs in both the local and internatio- 
nal markets. As already indicated calculations of costs are 
only approximate (53). Thus, price rises are not always 
implemented on time. Such a price system results in extensive 
state subsidies. This situation does not encourage a reduc- 
tion of high production costs and fails to penalize high cost 
producers. Consumers, therefore, are not properly protected 
against high prices charged by inefficient public enterprises. 
The Algerian economy has been subject to growing 
inflationary pressures. These pressures were almost non- 
existent before the first four year plan (1970-73) but 
increased gradually each year until 1979 when the inflation 
rate began to decline. Inflation would have been higher if 
price control policies, which included the payment of subsi- 
dies for consumer staple products, had not been implemented by 
the government. This system had the effect of alleviating the 
impact of rising prices for imported goods, too. The present 
price system is not flexible and does not allow rapid and easy 
adjustment of prices in response to changing economic 
conditions. The major drawback of these policies 
is that 
there is no incentive to reduce high production costs by 
making better use of inputs. Consequently, enterprises are 
likely to be inefficient. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER FOUR : INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
Since president Boumediene came to power in 1965, a 
development strategy based on the "industrialising industries" 
theory has been adopted in Algeria. This strategy underlies 
the development plans implemented since then. As a result of 
large investments (53% of total investments since 1967), the 
public industrial sector has become more important (1). The 
Algerian industrial GDP has been growing at an average annual 
rate of about 10% for the past 12 years compared to the 7% 
average annual growth rate of GDP over the same period. In 
1980, the industrial sector contributed to 57% of the 
country's gross domestic product and accounted for no less 
than 24% of the total employed labour force. Despite rapid 
industrial growth, the industrial public sector is faced with 
a wide range of difficulties. 
To measure the performance of the Algerian public sector, 
capacity utilisation is calculated for Algerian public 
enterprises. In a labour surplus economy such as that of 
Algeria, the rate of growth of national output is given by: 
g=s/v 
where s is the proportion of national output which is saved 
and v the incremental capital/output ratio. It can be seen 
that for a fixed value of s, g increases as v decreases. v 
is 
therefore related to efficiency and is affected by the rate of 
capacity utilisation. Economic efficiency, and 
therefore the 
performance of the public industrial sector, 
depends on 
capacity utilisation. The efficiency at which 
the different 
raw materials, intermediate 
inputs, installed fixed capital 
and available labour force are used 
in the Algerian public 
industrial sector is an important factor 
in that it determines 
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industrial performance. Capacity relates to the degree at 
which resources are fully employed. An increase of capacity 
utilisation results in a higher level of output leading to a 
higher per capita income. It also affects the rate of growth 
of national output. This is because an inefficient use of the 
factors of production has adverse effects on the levels and 
rates of growth of industrial sector output and employment and 
generally detracts from the formation and building of a sound 
industrial programme. 
The inefficient use of the factors of production which 
results in underutilisation of production capacity will be 
subject to a detailed examination in the present study with 
empirical content being drawn from the specific conditions 
found in public enterprises studied during 1980-1981. If the 
empirical evidence obtained show that production capacity is 
not efficiently (fully) used, an increase in capacity 
utilisation will have a great effect on the level of income 
and rate of growth. Additional employment will also be 
provided by increasing the number of shifts over which capital 
; equipment is used. Thus, by using the production capacity 
which is left idle part of the time, the level of employment 
as well as the level of output may be increased. 
Capacity utilisation estimates and identification of the 
causes of inefficiency are the main objectives of 
this study. 
The identification of these causes of underutilisation and 
resulting inefficiency will allow policy makers 
to initiate 
corrective action and yield the 
type of policy needed to help 
solve the problems encountered 
in Algerian public industrial 
enterprises. In the Algerian case, 
it is far more important 
to find out why scarce capital 
is underutilised than to 
determine the precise degree of underutilisation. 
Some 
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suggestions regarding a more efficient use of scarce capital 
are made in the concluding chapter. 
In the first section of this chapter, the Algerian indus- 
trial public enterprise is analysed. The objectives set 
through the creation of public enterprises, the structure of 
organisation, decision making and the control of public enter- 
prises are examined. In the second section, the methodology, 
the survey and sample and the questionnaire used in this study 
are discussed. The common causes of inefficiency are 
described in the third section based on both public enterprise 
managers' views and opinions and analysis derived from the 
different case studies. 
4.1. Algerian public industrial enterprise 
One of the structural reforms undertaken by the state was 
the expansion of the state to the entire economy by the crea- 
tion of public enterprises in industry and services. Since 
the early 1970's, the public enterprise has been the chosen 
means to reach the ambitious objectives of rapid industriali- 
sation combined with an increase in the country's economic 
independence. During the early post-independence period, 
firms abandoned by the French settlers were organised in 
plants self-managed by workers. With the nationalisation of 
vital industries and the launching of development plans, 
the 
public enterprise structure emerged. Since then 
their numbers 
have rapidly increased resulting in a growing 
indust ia? 
public sector. The scope of activity of public enterprises 
has become exceedingly wide, reflecting the comprehensive 
involvement in national infrastructure, in commercial and 
industrial developments, in modernisation of agriculture and 
in regional and urban developments. The study of 
industrial 
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public enterprises having production as their major function 
and constituting the public industrial sector is the focus of 
this section. These enterprises' major function is produc- 
tion, but their activities extend to imports, supply, sales 
and, in a few cases, research, development and engineering. 
The public enterprise is created by presidential decree 
which defines its objectives, its privileges, its form of 
management and its relationship with various ministries. The 
public enterprise is defined as a corporate body and as a 
separate entity for legal matters which is able to enter into 
contracts and to acquire property. The public enterprise 
operates as an autonomous financial entity having its own bank 
account. Thus it is not subject to the national budget. 
Profit is not required as a condition for survival. Public 
enterprise employees are not civil servants. They are recrui- 
ted and paid under terms and conditions which are determined 
by the ministry for all the public enterprises under its 
supervision. In fact, only the managing directors, the 
divisional, functional and plant managers and the members of 
; the Board of Directors are appointed by the supervisory 
ministry. All the industrial public enterprises are wholly 
owned by the state in the majority of cases. A few plants are 
owned jointly by the state and private foreign firms on a 51%- 
49% basis, respectively. 
4. l. l. Creation of public enterprises 
There are numerous government objectives fulfilled by the 
creation of public enterprises. Public enterprises have aimed 
at securing state control of the commanding heights in the 
economy. By doing so, they ensure the expansion of the role 
of the state and put the power in the hands of the Government 
for matters of importance. The presence of a public sector, 
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therefore, allows the interference and manipulation (to a 
certain extent) of economic activities through different state 
policies. Other objectives are the injection of new invest- 
ment, the creation of new jobs and demand in order to ensure 
conditions for economic growth and investment. Public enter- 
prises also mobilise resources from the international 
financial market through bilateral and multilateral loans. 
Furthermore, they have provided the economy with infrastructu- 
ral support. They allow the restructuring of the allocation 
of resources in order to counter imbalances. One of their 
objectives has been to avoid the buildup of foreign or private 
capital interest. Public enterprises have, to that effect, 
been used as a means to nationalise foreign firms (e. g., oi? 
and gas in 1971) and to restrict the development of private 
Algerian firms to certain industrial branches only. Public 
enterprises have provided opportunities to build up entrepre- 
neurial and managerial skills that the Algerian population 
lacked at the time of independence. Besides, public 
enterprises set up an example for employment standards, labour 
relations and rewards of employees contracts. Public 
enterprises, therefore, have become instruments for securing 
desired social and political changes. 
4.1.2. Organisational structure of public enterprises 
The Algerian industrial organisation is comparable to 
product depai tmental isatic n in a great multiplan} c0 pcr aticcn . 
The organisational structure of the public industrial sector 
which consists of three ministries, 
is as described in part 
2.2.1.1. Each public enterprise is under the supervision of a 
particular ministry. The most commonly spread organisational 
structures among public enterprises are the 
divisionalised 
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structure based on a group of closely related products and the 
functional structure. The divisionalised structure is mainly 
found in large public enterprises such as SONATRACH, SONACOME, 
SNS and SNMC while the functional structure is found in medium 
and small public enterprises such as SONIC and SNIC. Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 give a broad outline of the two commonly found 
structures. 
In a divisionalised structure, the public enterprise is 
divided into different divisions. The different divisions are 
grouped under the head office. Each division is given control 
on the operating functions. Each division is a self-contained 
business with respect to purchasing, manufacturing and 
marketing activities. Each division is granted the necessary 
power to make the day-to-day decisions concerning its own 
operations. The division is organised into separate depart- 
ments which provide specialised contributions to all produced 
outputs. The manufacturing activity is divided into different 
plants or complexes. Each complex is divided into plants (or 
large workshops) grouping different manufacturing activities 
sand different departments into its remaining activities (for 
example, purchasing and marketing). In a functional 
structure, the public enterprise is divided into different 
departments which provide specialised contributions to the 
whole range of produced outputs. The manufacturing activity 
is divided into different plants. The plant is divided into 
different workshops for its manufacturing activities and 
different services for the remaining activities. 
The size and complexity of the managerial apparatus vary 
with the extent and nature of the public enterprise's 
operations. Some public enterprises have a few hundred 
workers, others have a few thousand employees. Some have ten 
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or more plants or complexes, others less. The two organisatio- 
nal structures are multi-level (tall) organisations. The 
average span of control is low because of the large number of 
levels (more than 7) from the chief executive to the lowest 
level. The hierarchy forms a formal chain of command. The 
principle of unity of command and the authority level 
principle, however, are subject to significant limitations. 
Hierarchical superiors in the supervisory ministry are liable 
to issue detailed orders and to exert control on every 
conceivable matter concerning the public enterprise. 
4.1.3. Decision maki 
In order to examine the decision making process in the 
public enterprise, we need to focus on particular types of 
decisions. Among the many which can be chosen, public 
enterprise decision making with regard to current input or 
output seems most appropriate for extensive treatment. 
Firstly, regarding outputs, several types of compulsory 
output targets are set by the plan. These are the aggregate 
values which include profits and sales and the major output 
targets in physical units. It should be noted that these 
targets are only defined after consultation with the concerned 
public enterprise. Thus, public enterprise' managers can 
influence the content of the plan concerning product assort- 
ments and in some cases actually determine 
the quantities and 
types of planned production through their 
initiatives and 
proposals. Accordingly, they may 
influence the types and 
related quantities of outputs and 
have an impact on aggregate 
output; cost, resource utilisation and various other 
plan 
indices and results. In fact, the diversity of assortments 
planned by the higher authorities 
depends chiefly on the 
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nature and extent of the public enterprise's product line. 
The destination of outputs in the local market is left to the 
public enterprise manager discretion. The destination of 
exports is also the enterprise manager's decision, made 
according to foreign trade policies (see part 3.4). Prices of 
exported goods are most of the time regulated by international 
market prices while the price of outputs in the local market 
is subject to Government policies (see part 3.5). 
Secondly, regarding input decisions, it is useful to 
separate the targets concerning compulsory wage payment of the 
labour force from those concerning the use of capital and 
material inputs. The public enterprise plays a minor role in 
the determination of the minimum wage which is decided by the 
state. The wage scale adopted by the ministry is enforced in 
supervised public enterprises. On the other hand, management 
has considerable independence regarding not only the classifi- 
cation of manpower according to occupations and professions 
but also the grading of personnel on the basis of skills, 
abilities and seniority. These decisions are often subject to 
approval by the personnel and training standing committee 
within the public enterprise or plant (see part 3.3). Thus, 
although basic rates and salary scales are established 
centrally, management influences the total enterprise payroll. 
Decisions concerning the selection of local material inputs 
is 
entirely up to the public enterprise and plant managers. 
The 
supply of local inputs 
is not regulated by government 
policies. Regulations on 
imports are imposed by the Central 
Government (see part 3.4). Thus, 
the public enterprise or 
plant managers have all 
the power regarding the supply of 
local inputs while foreign trade policies regulate 
imports. 
Last, it is the resource allocations rather 
than the market 
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Possibilities which influence the plant output and capacity. 
Total planned output is calculated from estimated physical 
production according to the expected plant capacity. 
Managers' estimates of plant capacity are based on contractor 
norms, Algerian conditions, the plan goals, the available 
resources and the need for proper balance and integration of 
interdependent production processes. Thus, decisions 
regarding the use of capital are left to the enterprise 
managers although decisions regarding the choice of outputs 
and the means of production fall within the competence of the 
planning authorities. 
Thirdly, the central authorities decide on any kind of 
investment (see part 3.1) . The enterprise managers have, 
therefore, no decision making power concerning, for example, 
the replacement of an old machine and extension or the 
building of a new project. Capital allocation is influenced 
by public enterprise managers when propositions for future 
investments are made to the MPAT. In fact, the enterprise 
managers prepare the overall draft plan, defend the planning 
proposals and implement planning decisions. 
The last element of decision making which presents some 
interest is the sharing of decisions within the public 
enterprise. Decision making power concerning the day-to-day 
management of the public enterprise is in the hands of the 
manag ing dii ectcr and the public enterprise' s Board of 
Directors. Decisions have to be made according to the 
policies and objectives defined 
by the supervisory ministry 
and the state. The managing 
director carries executive 
responsibilities similar to 
those of a public enterprise 
managing director in a free economy. The Board of Directors 
180 
outlines the framework of actions and establishes the general 
activity programmes of the public enterprise (sales, produc- 
tion and supply plans). The activities of the Board of 
Directors extend to decisions regarding the conditions of 
economic growth, to the extension of capital and to the propo- 
sition of plans for future investments. They decide on the 
organisational structure to be adopted and formulate the 
workers' status and wage scale projects. These long term 
decisions are then proposed to the supervisory ministry for 
approval. In addition, the Assembly of Public Enterprise 
Workers (AEW) advises the Board on most matters of importance. 
At the plant level, the day-to-day management is the responsi- 
bility of the manager. The Board and the Assembly of Plant 
Workers (APW) play a similar role and have identical decision 
making power to the Board of Directors and the Assembly of 
Public Enterprise Workers (AEW) at the plant level. 
Managers of public enterprises do not possess the ultimate 
authority. Their decisions are either subject to higher 
approval or can simply be rescinded by superior authorities. 
; In practice, managers significantly influence plans, 
operations and results of the public enterprise and plant. 
4.1.4. Control 
The nature of the industrial public sector and the 
objectives assigned by the industrialisation and development 
strategy led to the emergence of instruments of control of 
Algerian industrial public enterprises. Government means of 
controls are diverse. The type of control exercised on public 
enterprises is mainly financial. 
4.1.4.1. Financial control 
Financial control is exercised through the supervisory 
ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the banking system. 
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Day-to-day management is controlled by the supervisory 
ministry through its control of annual plan execution, finan- 
cial documents, annual reports of the public enterprise and 
recommendations and reports of the Assembly of Public Enter- 
prise and Plant Workers (AEW and APW). Balance sheets, the 
execution of financial accounts, the bookkeeping operation, 
budgets and wages are controlled by the Ministry of Finance. 
Financial controllers (3) within the public enterprise also 
check its financial situation. Written reports are sent by 
the controllers to the supervisory ministry and the Ministry 
of Finance. Furthermore, when credits is allocated, financial 
transactions are made and the production and financial plans 
approved, the public enterprise is controlled indirectly by 
the bank. The Assembly of Public Enterprise Workers (AEW) 
also exercises some control on the management according to the 
Socialist Management Code (see part 3.3). 
4.1.4.2. Other controls 
The enormous need for foreign exchange has necessitated 
the adoption of foreign control measures. Foreign trade regu- 
: lations require that import licenses or AGI must be obtained 
before goods can be imported (see part 3.4). These regula- 
tions were introduced to control the use of foreign exchange, 
as well as the volume, range and direction of trade. Public 
enterprise foreign trade is, therefore, controlled through 
these regulations (the Ministry of Trade, banks and customs). 
In addition, another principal means through which the 
government seeks to influence the behaviour and performance of 
public enterprises is price. The state controls public 
enterprise prices through price policies (see part 3.5). 
Other government policies also regulate wages, labour, to name 
only a few, and therefore control the major important matters 
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of the public enterprise. 
One can conclude by saying that there are a combination of 
government controls with day-to-day managerial autonomy. 
Government power on matters of importance is ensured through 
statutes, adopted policies and regulations. 
4.2. Theoretical background and data collection 
4.2.1. Methodology 
In this study the performance of a plant, public enter- 
prise or branch of industry is evaluated by an efficiency 
measurement with regard to the use of resources. By measuring 
capacity utilisation, the efficiency and performance of public 
enterprises will be assessed. Efficiency in this study means 
the way in which the main inputs entering the production 
process, such as raw materials, intermediate inputs, capital 
and labour, are used to produce output. We are interested in 
efficiency in physical terms (quantity and, to a certain 
extent, quality) not in profitability or in value added. This 
is because the physical volume of output depends on the physi- 
cal volume of resource inputs used in the production process 
and on the efficiency with which they are used (i. e., on their 
productivity). The economic efficiency and performance of the 
public enterprise depend on how its production capacity is 
utilised. Since Algeria is a capital-scarce economy, our 
attention will be focused on fixed capital utilisation. In 
addition, fixed capital utilisation figures are readily 
available. The inefficient utilisation of labour and of other 
inputs are obviously important but, as far as the Algerian 
case is concerned, their relevance is limited. For instance 
the inefficient use of labour has a minor effect on the 
Algerian economy because it is a labour-surplus economy. One 
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should note, however, that the inefficient use of skilled 
labour force, which is in short supply, is relevant to this 
study. Unfortunately, labour productivity figures are not 
available. 
Raw materials and intermediate inputs are not used 
efficiently when their consumption is higher than the norms 
given by the plant contractor. In principle, overconsumption 
of raw materials and intermediate inputs can be easily 
identified. In practice, however, figures are not always 
available and it is difficult to measure the inefficient use 
of these particular inputs. Since only a few figures are 
available, the analysis regarding overconsumption of raw 
materials and intermediate inputs is mainly based on the 
impressions of the managers interviewed. 
The measure of fixed capital utilisation is capacity 
utilisation, U, which was derived by Mcgraw-Hill for US 
manufacturing (4). Capacity utilisation is the ratio of the 
level of output actually produced, Q, to the capacity output 
of a plant, Q1, during the base period T: 
U=Q/ Q1 
When applied to US manufacturing, the capacity utilisation 
ratio U is based on two factors: Q and Ql. Q1 can be inter- 
preted in various ways and, therefore, different capacity 
utilisations can be calculated. Capacity utilisation U1 is 
calculated using Ql defined as an economic variable 
representing the planned level of output. Planned (and 
desired) capacity taken as full capacity is determined by the 
managers according to profitability and demand criteria. One 
should note that the ratio of planned to full capacity (i. e., 
that given by the contractor's norm) can be less than one. 
Despite some shortcomings in view of the availability of 
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data, the above method is felt first, to be less liable to 
erroneous results and misinterpretations than the electricity 
(5), the shift work (6), the Winston time (Ut and Uti)(7), and 
the Bautista, et. al. (8) measurement of capital utilisation 
which are generally used in developed countries but are not 
always applicable to developing countries (9). Second, the 
adopted method (survey) is the most hopeful of the approaches 
since the causes of underutilisation can be identified (10). 
In this study, capacity utilisation U1 is defined as the 
ratio of Q (actual output produced) to Qi (planned capacity 
output). Ql refers to full capacity jointly determined by 
plant and public enterprise managers in agreement with the 
various ministries. According to public enterprise managers, 
full capacity, Q1, is calculated by taking into account the 
full capacity advocated by the contractor's (or technical) 
norms, desired capacity utilisation, the experience of the 
past few years, and Algerian conditions. In fact, no informa- 
tion was given about the exact method used to deduce planned 
capacity output. It is presumed that each planned capacity 
output probably follows a different method since there is no 
. standard regarding 
this calculation. No clear notion of 
optimal production level enters the evaluation of planned 
capacity output. Neither is it based on factor demand since, 
in the vast majority of cases, demand is actually higher than 
planned capacity output 0 
The calculation of U1 (actual over planned capacity) 
relies entirely on planned capacity output. Consequently one 
may argue that conclusions derived from the analysis of U1, 
particularly when U1 is equal to one, may be subject to erro- 
neous results since the lack of a standard definition 
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regarding planned capacity output allows managers to respond 
according to their own subjective definitions of full 
capacity. Furthermore, the analysis may be limited because 
the number of hours the plant operates (number of shifts when 
fixed capital is used) varies according to the managers' 
preferences. Thus, the planned level of utilisation may still 
leave fixed capital idle for much of its available time in a 
resource-scarce Algerian economy. In view of these problems, 
two additional measures are needed in order to obtain a 
complementary basis for the analysis. 
The U2 measure provides one of this basis. U2 is defined 
as the ratio of planned capacity output to technical (norm) 
capacity output. The technical norm is based on the technolo- 
gical capacity of a given output production line supplied by 
the contractor assuming that working conditions comply with 
those specified by the contractor. These contractor specifi- 
cations are usually based on the figures for a similar plant 
in the contractor country of origin. The calculation of U2 
indicates by how much planned capacity is underestimated, 
-especially when Ul (actual over planned capacity) is equal to 
or higher than one. In general, technical capacity is higher 
than planned capacity. The analysis in this thesis is made 
taking into account the two measures (Ul & U2) simultaneously. 
The U3 measure provides the second basis. U3 is defined 
as the ratio of actual to the technical number of shifts (or 
time). U3 indicates the intensity with which the fixed 
capital is used. A value of U3 less than one means that the 
fixed capital is left idle part of the time. This is 
particularly relevant because Algeria is a labour-surplus and 
a capital-scarce economy. The analysis of capacity 
utilisation will take mainly into account U1 and U2 since U3 
186 
is not always available and reliable. 
Using the collected data, Ul, is calculated in all the 
plants and public enterprises surveyed for each major output, 
for each plant, for each public enterprise output (total 
plants producing the same product) and for each public enter- 
prise as a whole. U2 and U3 are also calculated whenever the 
figures are available. Full capacity utilisation is characte- 
rised by a value of U1, U2 and U3 equal to one. A value of 
U1, U2 and U3 less than one indicates underutilisation of 
fixed capital. If U2 and/or U3 are less than one, it can be 
concluded that planned capacity is underestimated and the 
fixed capital intensity is lower than the contractor norms. 
Since most of the plants are multiproduct plants, U1 for a 
plant is taken as the average value of the capacity utilisa- 
tion calculated for each output. Ul of a public enterprise is 
taken as the average value of U1 for each plant. The same 
considerations apply to U2 (planned over technical capacity) 
and U3 (actual over technical number of shifts (or time)) for 
the plant, for each public enterprise output and for the 
public enterprise as a whole. It should be mentioned that, in 
order to draw more accurate conclusions from the capacity 
utilisation measure, capacity utilisation should be weighted 
by invested capital. Unfortunately, values of invested 
capital were considered to be classified information and were 
not rºýade available. sagacity utilisation in the Algerian 
public enterprises surveyed was, therefore, not weighted by 
invested capital. 
Labour utilisation can be calculated through a productivi- 
ty measure. The productivity measure (output per worker or 
output per worker/hour) is compared to the norm. Since the 
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norms are not available for public enterprises surveyed, an 
analysis of labour productivity cannot be conducted. It 
should be mentioned that since the productivity ratio is 
inversely proportional to the number of workers given a level 
of output, overstaffing leads to low productivity. 
Conclusions can be drawn, therefore, with regard to labour 
utilisation (e. g., inefficient labour utilisation in 
overstaffed plants). Unfortunately, figures on overstaffing 
are not always available so that in this area as well the 
analysis will rely heavily on the managers' impressions. 
4.2.2. Survey and sample 
As in other developing countries there is a lack of data 
in Algeria. No official calculation of capacity utilisation 
by plant output, by plant and by public enterprise is made on 
a regular basis. Thus, in order to collect the data necessary 
for the completion of this study, a survey had to be 
undertaken at the plant and public enterprise levels. Many 
difficulties were encountered in the collection of the data. 
The public enterprise managers and the representatives from 
the various ministries interviewed were not always willing to 
pass on information which often was considered classified. 
The fact that the surveyed plants are widely spread throughout 
the Northern part of Algeria added to the difficulties. 
Choices had to be made among the existing public enterprises 
since it was not possible to analyse and discuss the data of 
the entire public industrial sector due to time limitations. 
The survey covers six major public enterprises representing a 
total of 171 plants and complexes. This work is concerned 
with the public industrial sector only so no private firms are 
included in the survey. 
Public enterprises were chosen based on several factors 
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which allowed for a representative view of the Algerian indus- 
trial public sector. These factors include the size or scale 
of the plant and public enterprise, the activity of the public 
enterprise, the amount of output produced, input origin, 
output destination, the age of the plant and the use of 
capital or labour intensive technology in the plant. Almost 
all the large public enterprises are included in the survey. 
The three ministries supervising the public industrial sector 
are represented in the survey. SONATRACH is under the super- 
vision of the Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons, SNS and 
SONACOME are under the supervision of the Ministry of Heavy 
Industries and SONIC, SNMC and SNIC are under the Ministry of 
Light Industries. SONATRACH, SNS and SONACOME are classified 
among the large public enterprises, SNMC is a medium sized 
public enterprise and SONIC and SNIC are small public enter- 
prises. All public enterprises included in the survey have a 
great economic impact on the Algerian economy. For instance, 
SONATRACH procures the bulk of the foreign financial resour- 
ces. All of the public enterprises chosen are industrialising 
industries on which the Algerian development strategy is 
based. Public enterprise outputs included in the survey are 
diversified as indicated in Table 4.1. As far as public 
enterprise supplies are concerned, some inputs are imported 
while others are supplied by the local market. There is, 
there ore, a representative sample of each group. The bulk of 
the outputs are destined for the local market, some as semi- 
finished outputs and others as finished outputs. Only a small 
proportion of national production is exported (crude oil, 
LNG). It can be said, in addition, that the sample is repre- 
sentative of the Algerian public industrial sector since most 
189 
of the public enterprises surveyed have pre-independence and 
post-independence plants, using either labour or capital 
intensive technology. These plants are small, medium and 
large scale plant employing more than 50 workers. 
Table 4.1: Major outputs of surveyed public enterprises. 
SONIC: pulp paper, printing and writing paper, cardboard and 
exercise-books. 
SONATRACH: crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical and plastic 
products, and fertiliser. 
SNIC: paint, varnish, soap, cosmetics, pottery and 
earthenware, glass and household cleaning products. 
SNMC: cement, lime, plaster, red products (bricks), ceramic 
tiles, ceramic sanitary fittings and cement asbestos. 
SNS: iron and steel, iron sheets, non-ferrous metals, metal 
products (seamless tubes, metallic containers , etc. ). 
SONACOME: agricultural machinery, tractors, machine tools, 
engines, lorries and buses. 
4.2.3. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed to collect data for 1980 
and/or 1981. Several personal follow-up visits were made to 
the plants and to the head office of surveyed public 
enterprises as well as to the various ministries. When it was 
not possible to visit the plants, information based on plant 
documents such as annual reports, balance sheets and budgets, 
to name a few, were collected from the head office or the 
supervisory ministry. All of the figures were given by the 
public santerprise managers. wherever necessary, the data so 
collected was supplemented by information obtained from 
published sources. A copy of the questionnaire is reproduced 
in Appendix D. 
During the interviews the first set of questions was asked 
in order to obtain general information about the surveyed 
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plant. Information was obtained relative to the type of 
output produced, plant size and the age of the plant, to name 
a few. Since information on invested capital was not availa- 
ble or was considered to be classified information, the size 
of the plant was estimated according to the size of the labour 
force of the plant. The second set of questions was associa- 
ted with the size, qualifications, function and productivity 
of the labour force, rates of absenteeism and labour turnover, 
the overstaffing rate and the number of shifts among others. 
The third set of questions was connected to the actual output 
and the planned and technical capacity output. These 
questions were not always answered mainly because some of the 
interviewees considered this information confidential. Those 
answers given without much hesitation were outputs actually 
produced and the planned capacity output. Contractor (or 
technical) capacity was not always available. No details on 
the precise method used to calculate planned capacity output 
was communicated. The managers were invited to describe 
different problems they encountered in the management of the 
yplant and the main causes of underutilisation and excess 
capacity. Questions on the actual number of shifts by output, 
the number of shifts recommended by the contractor, the number 
of working hours per day, per week and per shift were also 
asked. A different set of questions was related 
to the charac- 
teristics of different inputs and spare parts. The 
imported 
to total input ratio was not always available since 
it was not 
calculated in most cases. Questions about other 
inputs such 
as transport, infrastructure, maintenance and working capital 
were also part of the survey. Together with questions related 
to demand and sales revenue, those related to the demand 
for 
the different outputs were not always answered since demand 
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was only known in a few cases. Sales revenue figures were 
almost impossible to obtain because these were considered 
confidential. Information about such items as the distribu- 
tion process, authorised imports (AGI), price and customs 
policies were also collected. The answer regarding fixed 
prices was straightforward since prices are fixed by the 
state. The method used for the calculation of price was not 
precisely known, but the interviewees believed that the price 
of an output did not always cover the production cost. 
Questions on quality and control of outputs were included in 
the survey since they were thought to have an influence on the 
performance of the plants. Autonomy and the decision-making 
process, communication and organisational structure are 
thought to have a great influence on the performance of public 
enterprises and consequently, particular attention was paid to 
the collection of this information. Questions regarding 
incentives and wages were asked to find out if the plants and 
public enterprises operated on a common salary scale and if 
sufficient and realistic incentives were offered. 
At the public enterprise and plant levels, questions were 
asked to find out about the relationship between the head 
office and the plants. Interviews were arranged with the AEW 
and APW. Interviews were also conducted in various ministries 
to collect information relative to government policies that 
affect the performance of the various public enterprises and 
plants. 
192 
4.3. Common causes of inefficiency in Algerian public 
industrial enterprises 
Now that the methodology, the public enterprises included 
in the survey and the questionnaire have been presented, 
attention is focused on the reasons given for inefficient use 
of the different inputs. The different factors influencing 
the inefficient utilisation of production capacity are 
numerous. Only those which are thought to be the most impor- 
tant to Algerian public industrial enterprises will be 
discussed. In the first part, the economic organisational 
inefficiencies or X-inefficiency (11) within and outside the 
public enterprise are analysed. In the second part, supply 
conditions causing an inefficient use of raw materials, inter- 
mediate inputs, capital and labour are investigated. These 
include the shortages of raw materials and intermediate 
inputs, the shortages of transport means and infrastructure 
facilities, the lack of skilled labour and working capital 
provided by the local market and finally, the shortage of 
imported inputs. In the third part, allocative inefficiencies 
:; which are due to government policies related to the choice of 
technology, of outputs, of plant location and of price and 
wage systems, to name a few, are discussed. These are 
indirect factors inducing inefficiencies. In the fourth part, 
the causes of inefficiency due to insufficient demand are 
examined. 
4.3.1. Organisational factors 
Utilisation of inputs is related to economic organisation 
and environment (12). Conclusions drawn from a number of 
different case studies indicate that X-inefficiencies arise 
from various factors. These are, for instance, the relation- 
ship between the public enterprise (and plant) and the 
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government, the environment in which public enterprises 
operate and the bureaucratic administration. Among a large 
number of factors, only those which are considered most 
relevant are discussed in the following. 
Firstly, there are non-economic causes influencing capaci- 
ty utilisation such as social, cultural and institutional 
causes. The Algerian industrial sector has expanded only 
recently and as a consequence, the labour force with a predo- 
minantly agricultural background, is almost devoid of 
industrial habits and traditions (13). The lack of industrial 
habits is clearly illustrated by high rates of absenteeism and 
labour turnover which are of the order of 10% and 3%, respec- 
tively, in all the surveyed plants. The data collected 
indicate that rates of absenteeism and turnover depend on the 
age and the seniority of the labour force. The survey shows 
clearly that the rate of absenteeism is lower in plants 
located in small towns and cities than in plants located in 
large industrial centres. In addition, the rate of absen- 
teeism is lower but still quite high in the pre-independence 
plants as compared with post-independence plants. These high 
rates may be attributed to the lack of social infrastructure, 
labour transport, housing and health facilities. The lack of 
housing facilities, the poor means of transportation to and 
from the workers' residences and their personal security, as 
well as poor living conditions, are other reasons for the 
underutilisation of production capacity. These factors also 
lead to a lower number of shifts than that advocated by the 
contractor. In addition, increasing the number of shifts 
is 
constrained by the presence of female workers who, due to 
cultural considerations, cannot work during the night shift. 
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are characterised by incomplete production 
lines and are faced with high training costs and low 
productivity. 
Secondly the lack of manager and worker participation is 
mainly caused by an economic organisational structure which 
placed heavy emphasis on the public. sector. For instance, 
managers perceive that their decision making power is dimini- 
shed. No real incentives exist for workers and managers to 
improve the level of production and the overall situation of 
the plant and public enterprise (14). In addition, workers' 
and managers' initiative is not encouraged by the suffocating 
bureaucracy (15). The introduction of Socialist Management in 
1972 (see part 3.3) did not result in a net improvement in 
workers' participation. Workers' and managers' attitudes can 
be summarized by lack of interest, low morale, shortcomings at 
work and a lack of discipline as well as initiative. 
Thirdly, the cumbersome, demanding Algerian bureaucracy, a 
result of an adopted system with an emphasis on industrialisa- 
tion, has also had a great influence on capacity utilisation. 
The shortage of skilled labour has led to the appointment of 
civil servants to managerial positions. Thus, public enter- 
prises are run as if they were part of the administration, 
according to a rigid set of rules. The rigidity, the slowness 
of operations, the proliferation of paper work and the buck- 
passing all contribute to the cumbersome bureaucracy. This 
bureaucratic structure is also reinforced by overcentralised 
control, an organisation that is slow to react and the very 
strict interpretation of regulations (16). Information 
is not 
passed on to interested individuals or 
is lost in the organi- 
sational structure. This leads to an 
inefficient internal 
communication system since rules which fit 
the specific 
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activities of each public enterprise are rarely laid down. 
All of these factors point to the lack of autonomy and, 
consequently, high administrative costs and a lack of 
competent managers, since managerial ability and capacity are 
not developed and encouraged. All of these inefficiencies 
are the result of heavy bureaucratic controls. In particular 
they influence the participation and initiative of workers, 
communication and supply conditions. 
Finally, the imprecision of job descriptions combined with 
a lack of autonomy and responsible decision making caused by 
the lack of business practices, lead to a production of goods 
according to rules. The result is a minimisation of responsi- 
bility that reduces workers' accountability regarding produc- 
tivity. Consequently, the control procedure is inefficient 
and various inefficiencies are expected. The large number of 
administrative positions does not improve this situation, on 
the contrary it lowers the productivity of the public 
enterprise and increases its fixed charges. In addition, 
public enterprises encounter organisational problems due to 
their large size. The increase in investment, production and 
distribution activities over the past years has resulted in 
tendencies towards gigantism which may hinder efficient 
management. Public enterprises are generally 
involved in a 
large number of activities which may be very different 
in 
nature and complexity, making the management of 
these enter- 
prises very difficult and complex and adding 
to 
inefficiencies. The wide variety of outputs produced 
in each 
plant does not favour high productivity 
and can also lead to 
additional problems. 
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4.3.2. Shortages of ink 
The shortage of inputs is an obvious factor which affects 
the smooth operation of public enterprises. Difficult supply 
conditions are caused by 1) local shortages of some raw mate- 
rials and intermediate inputs; 2) insufficient transportation 
and infrastructure; 3) the lack of skilled workers; 4) the 
shortage of intermediate inputs and spare parts supplied by 
the international market; and 5) the lack of working capital. 
Firstly, almost all the plants belonging to the six public 
enterprises surveyed (and probably all the industrial enter- 
prises) are faced with supply difficulties of both raw 
materials and intermediate inputs even when the inputs are 
produced in the very vicinity of the plant. For example, when 
the conveyor belt of the Mefta cement plant (SNMC) broke down 
in 1976, the plant encountered problems in obtaining the 
various raw materials which were only a mile or two away. The 
supply of consumable inputs such as water and electricity (of 
different voltages) is particularly inadequate and unreliable 
especially in some regions of Algeria and/or when the demand 
=is high. The shortage of water is mainly due to the fact that 
Algeria is an arid country. The means to capture water also 
are inefficient and insufficient (17) and the distribution 
network is very old (18). Shortages of consumable inputs is 
often due to an unanticipated increase in demand. Scarcity of 
these inputs was not taken into account in the choice criteria 
of these plants. Moreover, the imbalance between planning and 
growth and he competitive situation between the agricultural 
and industrial sectors have further compounded the shortage of 
some of these inputs. The planning decision may also 
contribute to the shortage of these inputs. 
Secondly, almost all the plants have problems with the 
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collection of inputs and/or the removal of outputs. In 1980, 
for instance, 45.5% of the total transport capacity (lorries) 
in the light industries (40% of the total number of vehicles 
available), was not usable (19). Transport is inefficient 
because of the insufficient number of lorries in working order 
(which itself ifj the result of a shortage of skilled labour 
force and spare parts), an underdeveloped railway network 
combined with an erratic transport network, a shortage of 
storage facilities, and irregularities in the collection of 
supplies or the removal of output. The lack of organisation 
in the transport sector also influences the utilisation of 
inputs. Furthermore, in view of the increased number of ships 
end demand for shipping services, the port Infrastructure and 
services are insufficient. This often results in shortages of 
imported inputs and delays in deliveries of imported 
intermediate inputs and spare parts. 
Thirdly, it became evident from the interviews and 
SONATRACH study that all the plants and public enterprises 
surveyed and probably the entire public industrial sector were 
deeply affected by the lack of skilled labour force (20). The 
presence of foreign assistants and civil servants appointed to 
managerial and technical positions in various plants also 
supports this evidence. Plants are particularly affected by 
the lack of technicians and semi-skilled workers on the 
production lines and at the maintenance level. Shortage of 
skilled labour is also felt at the level of stock management, 
preventing the use of rigorous management methods. Public 
enterprises are deeply affected by the lack of qualified 
personnel, particularly at the managerial and technical 
levels. The lack of qualified personnel is also evident in 
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the different ministries and is particularly crucial at the 
planning level. Most public enterprises suffer from a lack of 
skilled workers and technical expertise which, in turn, result 
in organisational problems (see part 4.3.1) and eventually to 
operational inefficiencies. 
Fourthly, most public enterprises rely on the imports of 
some intermediate inputs and of at least 70% of their spare 
parts. Availability of these imports is subject to the 
rigidities of import regulations and bureaucratic procedures 
as discussed in part 3.4. (authorisation allocation and 
control of imports). In addition, customs policies are 
cumbersome, import planning at the enterprise level is often 
inadequate and, at the plant level, stock management is 
inefficient. Shortages of intermediate inputs and spare parts 
often leads to a halt in production and thus to 
underutilisation of capital and labour. 
Finally, all the plants surveyed are faced with 
insufficient working capital. This can partly be attributed 
to unadapted project financing procedures (see part 3.2) and 
inefficient subsidies distribution system. Furthermore, in 
order to avoid a shortage of imported inputs, plants hold 
large stocks that are financed by high interest loans. Plants 
often have difficulties recovering their sales revenue within 
the public sector. In addition, financial transactions 
between various plants or public enterprises are subject to 
the slowness of the banking system (21). The permanent cash 
deficit have generated exorbitant financial costs which have 
greatly hampered evaluation of the efficiency of 
the public 
enterprise and very seriously affected 
their management; in 
particular they have often nullified 
the effect of the 
incentives to increase labour productivity through 
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distribution of part of the profits to the employees and 
created shortages of inputs. 
4.3.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
Government policies have direct and indirect influences on 
the capacity utilisation of a plant, complex and public 
enterpris-e': 'T These policies relate to plant location, the 
origin of technology, scale, the level of integration, the 
techniques to be adopted for a new plant, wage and incentive 
policies, the price system and bank policies, import and 
customs policies (tariffs, taxes), tax and labour policies, 
and control. Only a few of the allocative inefficiencies that 
have a direct effect on capacity utilisation of public 
enterprises are discussed below. 
The final choice of plant location is made only after 
different proposed sites have been studied. Study of a site 
often does not take into account all the relevant factors. 
The study yields subjective results on which decisions are 
made. This practice does not allow for choice of the best. 
site but only of the best proposed location. The proposed 
sites often take social considerations into account such as 
the equitable distribution of jobs and regional equilibrium! 
Most of the time social considerations outweigh economic 
considerations and factors. Thus, capacity utilisation may 
drastically be affected by these procedures. 
The adoption of the most sophisticated technology 
is 
greatly encouraged and favoured by the government. 
The choice 
of technology, however, depends on 
its availability on the 
international market (22) and, consequently, does not take 
problems associated with production processes 
into account. 
The limited choice offered to managers often results 
in the 
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acquisition, rarely justified, of the most sophisticated 
technology. Products are thus made according to techniques 
rigidly determined by the developed countries. Imported 
technology, which was not originally conceived for Algerian 
conditions, does not offer a real guarantee of success when 
transferred. The numerous problems encountered at the plant 
level (breakdowns, failures, incompatibilities of production 
processes, different scales of workshops or machines in the 
same production lines and faulty machines) are often the 
result of this situation. 
The absence of standards and norms regarding the 
acquisition of equipment, which is the function assigned to 
INAPI, leads to stock management problems (spare parts, 
components and intermediate inputs) because of the large 
number of suppliers and origins. Furthermore, the high degree 
of integration advocated by the government leads to numerous 
problems. A highly integrated plant needs to be very large 
and involved in diversified activities. This often leads to 
the creation of gigantic plants which create management 
; (production and labour) and organisational problems. Some of 
these activities do not justify the acquisition of large-scale 
workshops which are left idle most of the time. As a result, 
there is an inefficient use of capital. 
The adoption of a turnkey contract or a product-in-hand 
contract (see Appendix C. 1) which are used, in the majority of 
cases, to build new plants, leads to an inefficient use of 
production capacity. Under these two contractual arrangements 
the Algerian labour force does not participate in the study 
and construction of projects. Thus, no experience 
is accumu- 
lated in these particular skills. In addition, these two 
forms of contract do not allow the best choice of technology 
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to be made since the contractor selects the technology without 
consulting the public enterprise' managers. Finally, the 
turnkey contract does not include the training of the work 
force (especially technicians for servicing and maintenance). 
Enterprise targets are set in quantitative terms. This 
practice 1ead5to poor quality outputs, waste of inputs and 
poor management. Managers do not possess the means and moti- 
vation to improve the situation. The poor quality of semi- 
finished outputs is especially important. Several plants and 
complexes encounter problems because the semi-finished outputs 
supplied by other plants do not meet the standards required by 
the production process. This practice does not encourage an 
efficie t 'utilisation of inputs. 
4.3.4. Demand conditions 
Deficiency of demand and excess capacity are only found in 
a few plants. Economies of scale and import of Western 
technology generally designed and developed to cater for 
larger markets (e. g., EEC or USA) than the Algerian local 
market are the main causes of excess capacity. This is the 
case for a few plants belonging to SONATRACH, SNMC and SONIC. 
In some cases, excess capacity may be the result of underuti- 
lisation due to a decline in the international demand (e. g., 
crude oil) which initially created existing production 
capacities. The absence of inter-agency coordination and 
.r 
wyoc result in excess capacity. Some goods coýu unicatic ma- 
are imported although they are locally produced, 
for instance, 
telephone cables produced by SONELEC, valves by SNMETAL and 
textiles by SONITEX. Most of the time plants 
involved in the 
production of these goods suffer 
from excess capacity. Excess 
capacity may also be created 
by an imbalance in the develop- 
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ment of different sectors. For example, the development of a 
few plants belonging to SNMC was not followed by the develop- 
inent of the housing and construction sector. This is also the 
case for some plants belonging to SONATRACH (petrochemicals) 
(23) and to SOGEDIA (food industries). Unbalanced development 
is aggravated by a deficient distribution network and an 
inadequate transportation system. With the rise in demand, 
excess capacity can be considered a transitory phenomenon. 
Underutilisation of production capacity encountered in 
plants and public enterprises is influenced directly by supply 
and demand conditions and indirectly by factors such as 
economic factors and allocative inefficiencies. The factors 
discussed above are the main determinants of capacity 
utilisation in Algerian public industrial enterprises. 
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CHAPTER FIVE _ SONIC PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
SONIC, which is involved in the production of pulp, 
wrapping, writing and printing paper, was founded on January 
23rd, 1968 following the nationalisation of three plants. 
Since then three other plants have been nationalised and five 
new plants have been built. This enterprise is under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Light Industries. Besides 
production, which is its main activity, SONIC also undertakes 
finance, management of personnel, supply, marketing and inter- 
national trade activities. In 1981, SONIC consisted of eleven 
plants in production and seven under construction. All SONIC 
plants are entirely owned by the state. SONIC's organisation 
is similar to the functional structure described in part 
4.1.2. Its objectives, managerial environment, authority, 
autonomy and control are also similar to those described in 
part 4.1. 
SONIC's development has not been as spectacular as that of 
SONATRACH or SNS, for instance. Its sales revenue, however, 
rose by a factor of 4.8 between 1973 and 1979, reaching 685.25 
million AD in 1979. In 1980 SONIC employed 5,890 workers, 
three times more than in 1973. In addition, between 1973 and 
1978, SONIC's fixed assets amounting to 1.22 billion AD, 
increased by a factor of 2.4 only reflecting the lack of 
investment made in this branch of industry (1). The slow 
development may be due to the nature of this branch of 
industry. SONIC plants are intensive users of water which is 
in short supply in most parts of Algeria (2). Other inputs 
such as wood and straw are not largely found either. In 
addition, it is well known that pulp and paper industry deve- 
lopment can only be achieved with a large amount of investment 
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which has not been the case with SONIC. Esparto (another 
input used in this branch of industry), on the other hand, is 
widely found in the Sahara (esparto forest: 3.5 million 
ha) (3), but obtaining an adequate supply is subject to many 
problems. As a result, SONIC's contribution to industrial 
sector value added was not very important. 
Its plants and their respective outputs follow: 
Plants in production: the Baba-Ali plant produces esparto 
pulp, printing and writing paper and chlorine; the El-Harrach, 
Saida and El-Arbaa plants produce ordinary paper bags; the 
Oued-Smar and Oran plants produce sack kraft paper; the El- 
Harrach plant produces wrapping, packaging paper and boards; 
the Mostaganem plant produces esparto pulp, printing and wri- 
ting paper (except newsprint) and chlorine. This plant also 
has a modern assembly shop for the transformation of printing 
and writing paper into exercise books; the Souk-Ahras plant 
produces household and sanitary paper; the Saida plant 
produces straw pulp and packaging boards and the Bordj-Bou- 
Arreridj plant produces sack kraft paper and folding cardboard 
-boxes. This plant also has a sophisticated printing workroom, 
a photo laboratory and some subsidiary equipment. Detailed 
figures for SONIC regarding the year of entry in production 
and production capacity by plant output are given in Table E. l 
in the Appendix E. 
Plants under construction: the Sedrata plant is planned to 
produce carbon paper, cigarette-paper and filters; 
the Sidi- 
Lakhdar plant is planned to produce scholastic goods such as 
copy-books and note-books; the Miliana plant 
is planned to 
produce sanitary paper; the El-kala plant 
is planned to 
produce sack kraft paper, wrapping paper and 
liner board and 
the Arbaa plant is planned to produce baby napkins, exercise 
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books, several types of scholastic paper supplies, envelopes, 
foil and wrapping and packaging papers. The Saida plant is 
planned to produce sack kraft paper and the Rachgoun plant is 
planned to produce fibrane and cellulosic films. The Sidi- 
Lakhdar, Miliana and El-Kala plants were planned to start 
producing in 1979 while the El-Kala plant was foreseen to 
begin production in 1981. All were still under construction 
in December 1981 due to problems encountered in the execution 
and implementation of the investments. 
In 1981, as indicated in Table E. 1 in the Appendix E, the 
pulp production capacity of SONIC was 106,000 tons a year, its 
printing paper capacity was 54,000 tons a year, its capacity 
of manufacture exercise books was 15,300 units a year, its 
wrapping paper capacity was 100,000 tons a year and its card- 
board capacity was 58,000 tons a year. The present production 
of pulp and paper does not meet local demand. On average, 33% 
of local demand is imported every year. SONIC monopolizes the 
production of pulp, cardboard and printing paper other than 
newsprint. The production of wrapping paper and exercise 
books is shared between a few private firms and SONIC. As far 
as international trade is concerned, SONIC holds the only 
monopoly on the import of semi-finished and finished 
cellulosic products with the exception of finished scholastic 
paper supplies such as writing paper, exercise books and 
looseleaf paper which are imported by either SNED or SNMGA. 
As illustrated in Table E. 1 in the Appendix E, SONIC 
plants can be divided into two different categories: 
the pre- 
independence plants and the post-independence plants. Pre- 
independence plants generally use a labour intensive 
technology. It is notable that one pre-independence plant, 
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namely the Baba-Ali plant, uses a more capital intensive 
technology than the other pre-independence plants although it 
was built in the 1950's. The post-independence plants built 
since the mid-1970's use a capital intensive technology. The 
choice of technology is somewhat dictated by the Algerian 
development strategy and to a greater extent by the availabi- 
lity of the technology on the international market. The 
technology used in the pre-independence plants comes mainly 
from France while that used in the post-independence plants 
comes from Great Britain and Italy (see Table E. 2 in the 
Appendix E). In this respect, the very difference between the 
technologies used raises different problems in SONIC's pre- 
and post-independence plants. Furthermore, all the pre- and 
post-independence plants are located in the Northern part of 
Algeria. 
The pre-independence plants are small scale plants, except 
for one which is medium scale, while the post-independence 
plants are medium and large scale. In fact, all of the pre- 
independence plants had been built for the satisfaction of 
-; domestic demand, with the exception of the Baba-Ali plant 
(medium scale) which exported part of its production. All of 
them adopted a technology that existed at the time. The post- 
independence plants were built in response to present and 
anticipated future demands and also according to the technolo- 
gy available on the international market. The technology used 
in the pre-independence plants was developed in countries 
where labour is relatively scarce, thus most of the 
innovations are labour saving. This means that, although the 
factor endowment in Algeria might dictate a labour intensive 
technology, a capital intensive technology is used in the 
post-independence plants. 
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As indicated in Table E. 1 in the Appendix E, about half 
the plants are multi-product plants and the remaining are 
mono-product plants. In addition, half of the multiproduct 
plants are highly integrated plants. Examples are the 
Mostaganem, Baba-Ali and Saida plants. These plants produce 
pulp paper as well as intermediate inputs used in the manufac- 
ture of their finished outputs from esparto and straw. The 
mono-product plants are less integrated since they do not 
produce their own intermediate inputs; they are either pro- 
duced within SONIC or obtained from the international market. 
30% of the plants worked with only one shift throughout 
the whole year, 20% worked with two shifts, 30% worked with 
three shifts and 20% with two or three shifts as illustrated 
in Table 5.1. Thus, a SONIC plant is used at an average of 16 
hours a day. The number of shifts in post-independence plants 
is at least two shifts and in most cases three shifts. In 
contrast, the number of shifts in pre-independence plants is 
one, with the exception of two plants (Baba-Ali: three shifts, 
and Oran: two shifts). In SONIC plants, the number of shifts, 
which is the number of hours the fixed capital is used during 
the day and year, is related to the level of integration and 
the age of the plant. The impact of the number of shifts on 
the utilisation of fixed capital in a plant will be discussed 
later. 
? QS? T ah la 5.1: Number of shifts in SONIC plants in. 
Hours of work per day Number of plants % of total plants 
83 30 
16 2 20 
24 3 30 
16 & 24 2 20 
Total number of plants 10 100 
Source: Table E. 1 in the Appendix E. 
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The adoption of one form of contracts or another for the 
construction of SONIC plants seems to have changed over the 
years. In fact, the decomposed contract was adopted between 
1962 and late 1972, the turnkey contract was adopted between 
1973 and 1976 and the product-in-hand contract has been 
adopted since 1977. It is interesting to note that so far no 
cost-plus-fee contract has been adopted by any SONIC plant. 
The description of each contract and the advantages and 
disadvantages of one contract with respect to the others are 
described in Appendix C. 1. The impact on plant operation 
resulting from the adoption of one contract or another will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The origin of the main inputs used by SONIC is illustrated 
in Table 5.2 which gives average figures only (4). The 
different inputs are either supplied by SONIC, or by the 
local or international markets (since the country of origin of 
the different inputs is of no relevance to this study, this 
aspect will not be analysed). The origin of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs depends on the output produced. For 
instance, all inputs which are used in the production of paper 
pulp are supplied almost completely by the local market while 
those used in the production of printing, writing and hard and 
soft papers are almost always imported. An 
interesting point 
to note is that both the non-integrated and 
the highly 
integrated plants rely on imported inputs. in fact, about 
two 
thirds of the pulp needed by the highly integrated plants 
is 
imported despite the fact that these plants are equipped with 
the necessary facilities to produce pulp. 
The non-integrated 
plants import between 50% and 
95% of their requirements of 
pulp and recycled paper and cardboard. 
The rest is supplied 
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Table 5.2 : Origin of SONIC inputs 
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Packaging products 677" 
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Paper pulp 667. 957. 
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Waste cardboard 
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by SONIC or locally. It should be pointed out that 95% of the 
pulp used in the production of hard and soft paper is 
imported, although 50% of the pulp requirement is supposed to 
be supplied by the Mostaganem plant. Recycled paper and 
cardboard are imported because the present local collection 
system is not organised efficiently. In addition, some of the 
intermediate inputs are imported because of problems encoun- 
tered in some plants. Furthermore, about two thirds of the 
chemical products used in SONIC plants and about 75% of the 
spare parts are imported. This reflects the low level of 
integration of the pulp and paper industry, chemical industry 
and capital goods industry. In fact, all the capital used in 
these plants was totally imported. In contrast, the labour 
force in SONIC is almost totally Algerian with only 0.3% of 
foreigners. As seen iz part 3.4, foreign trade procedures may 
have an important effect on the supply of imported inputs and 
spare parts in SONIC plants which depend largely on imports. 
The destination of the different outputs produced by SONIC 
is indicated in Table 5.3. SONIC produces semi-finished and 
-: finished outputs intended for the domestic market. SONIC is 
part of the consumer-oriented sector. Semi-finished outputs 
are transformed within SONIC plants and by the private sector 
into finished outputs. Finished outputs are then intended for 
intermediate or final use. Currently, SONIC production is 
absorbed totally by the local market. Initial plans, however, 
were for SONIC to export some of its finest quality paper. 
The Mostaganem plant, for example, was designed for this 
purpose (in fact, some of its outputs were exported 
between 
1973 and 1976). Exports were stopped for quantity and quality 
reasons. 
In order to give a complete profile of SONIC, the employed 
215 
Table 5.3 : Destination of SONIC outputs 
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labour force, its qualifications and the rates of labour 
turnover and absenteeism are given for each SONIC plant and 
for SONIC's head office whenever possible. Labour force, 
which is described in detail in Table 5.4, can be divided into 
three main categories: managers, technicians and supervisors 
and semi-skilled and unskilled workers (5). As indicated in 
Figure 5.1, in 1980 74% of the SONIC labour force were 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers, only 19% were technicians 
and supervisors and 6% were managers. The proportion of 
skilled labour was very low when compared to that of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. This can be summarized as one 
manager for every three technicians or supervisors and one 
technician or supervisor for every four semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers. At the total plant level, the ratio of 
managers was even lower; it amounted to only 3.8% of the total 
0 
labour force in the plants. Female participation was 
relatively low, only 7% of total labour force. Foreign 
manpower is insignificant, accounting for 5% of the total 
managers and 0.34% of the total labour force in SONIC. 
In post-independence plants, the percentage of skilled 
labour was higher than that of pre-independence plants. This 
was probably due to the use of more advanced technology and a 
higher level of integration in the more recent plants. It 
appears that some attention has been paid 
to labour force 
training in the new plants. Regarding the distribution of the 
skilled labour force between plants and 
head office, the most 
striking feature is that only 67.3% of 
total SONIC skilled 
labour force was working in the plants. In fact, 
less than 
half of the managers worked in the plants 
(see Figure 5.2). 
The other half worked at the SONIC head office. 
In addition, 
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Table 5.4: SONIC personnel in 1980 
Skill category managers Technicians/ Semi-skilled/ Total 
supervisors unskilled 
Plants (l) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Pulp and paper 
Mostaganem compl. 43 4.2 188 18.3 798 77.5 1,029 
-Administration 18 40 137 195 19 
-Production 14 95 378 487 47 
-Maintenance 11 53 283 347 33 
Hous. & sani. paper 
Souk Ahras plant 24 5.1 68 14.5 374 80.2 466 
-Administration 15 32 109 156 33.4 
-Production 4 22 216 242 52 
-Maintenance 5 14 49 68 14.6 
Wrapping & pack. b. 
El Harrach plant 24 3.4 107 15.2 572 81 703 
Wrapping & pack. p. 
board Saida plant 36 2.5 124 8.8 1,249 88.6 1,409 
Sack kraft paper 
Oued Smar plant 4 2.7 20 13.9 119 83 143 
Paper grocery bag 
Oran plant 3 2.6 8 5.6 78 91 86 
Pulp and paper 
Baba Ali plant 17 2.2 94 12.5 637 85 748 
Kraft paper 
El-Arba plant - - - - - - 30 
Kraft paper 
Ain El Hadjar P. - - - - - - 56 
Packaging board 
Bouarrerridj p. - - - - - - 412 
Total SONIC 
plants 119 3.8 830 16 4,020 80 5,037 85.5 
Distribution 12 5.4 52 23 157 71 221 3.7 
Head office 133 31.5 130 30.5 162 38 425 7.2 
; Others* 56 113 38 207 3.5 
Total SONIC 392 6.6 1,125 19 4,377 74.3 5,890 100 
-Female workers 19 112 289 420 7 
-Foreigners 19 1 0 20 0.34 
Labour turnover - - - - 3.2 
Absenteeism rate - - - - 7.1 
Source: Survey data. 
* Training and attached to other functions. 
1 Total by skill category in the plant, complex and Sonic as a 
whole. 
2% of the total by skill category or total in the plant, 
complex and SONIC as a whole. 
- Not available. 
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11.2% of the skilled workers were undergoing some sort of 
training or were attached to the Ministry of Light Industries 
although paid by SONIC. According to the SONIC managers, the 
rate of absenteeism and labour turnover are very high in all 
plants and head office. For example, in 1980 the rate of 
absenteeism reached 7.14% and the rate of turnover was 3.2% 
for SONIC as a whole. 
Now that the general profile of SONIC has been outlined, 
the remainder of the chapter will be concerned with the utili- 
sation of the different inputs. Based on the theoretical 
background exposed in Chapter Four, the utilisation of raw 
materials and intermediate inputs will first be analysed. 
Fixed capital utilisation will be estimated in the second 
section followed by labour utilisation. 
placed on fixed capital utilisation. 
5.1. Utilisation of inputs in SONIC 
More emphasis will be 
5.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
A comparison between the actual consumption of inputs and 
the contractor norm shows an overconsumption of these inputs. 
For instance, water is used inefficiently in all the SONIC 
plants and, in particular, in the Mostaganem plant. In 
the 
Mostaganem plant 487 cubic metres of water and 18 tons of 
steam are used to produce one ton of esparto pulp and of 
writing paper, respectively, whereas only 180 cubic metres and 
10 tons should be used, respectively, according to the norms. 
The scarcity of water in Algeria, as already 
discussed, makes 
the problem more acute (see part 4.3.2). Consequently, 
the 
inefficient use of water results in a smaller quantity of 
output produced than planned. 
The wasteful use of water 
combined with a shortage of water 
lead to the underutilisation 
of production capacity. 
220 
A comparison of the consumption of electricity with the 
contractor norms shows that this input is inefficiently used 
in almost all SONIC plants. This is correlated with the fact 
that most plants use the planned quantity of electricity but 
do not produce the planned quantity of outputs. The ineffi- 
cient use of electricity which is also in short supply 
prevents other plants or sectors of the economy from using it 
more efficiently. 
Finally the comparison of the actual consumption of 
chemicals with the contractor norms also shows an overconsump- 
tion of these inputs in almost all SONIC plants. For 
instance, according to Souk-Ahras plant managers, chemicals 
such as oil and aluminum sulfate are overconsumed. This oil 
overconsumption leads to the oiling up of the machines. 
Aluminum sulfate overconsumption results in the spread of a 
saponified substance over the entire production line. The 
overconsumption of these chemicals leads to recurrent 
stoppages, to an increase in maintenance frequency and the 
requirements of spare parts and therefore, to a longer idle 
time of the assembly line than those advocated by the 
contractor. This overconsumption results in the underutilisa- 
tion of these inputs. The inefficient use of these inputs has 
an effect on the capital and labour utilisation and results in 
a lower production of outputs than planned. 
5.1.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
As indicated in Chapter Four, U1 (actual over planned 
capacity), U2 (planned over technical capacity) and U3 
(actual 
over contractor number of shifts) are calculated 
for each 
SONIC plant output, for each SONIC plant, for each SONIC 
output and for SONIC as a whole for 1980 and 1981. 
As 
221 
indicated in Table E. 1 in the Appendix E regarding plant 
outputs for 1980 and 1981, the values of U1 ranged from 34% to 
274% and from 9% to 159% and those of U2 varied between 9% and 
100% and 36% and 107%, respectively. The highest rates of 
fixed capital utilisation by plant output, taking into account 
U1 and U2, were obtained for grocery bags in the Oran plant in 
1980 (104%, 98%) and for hard tissue paper in the Souk Ahras 
plant in 1981 (118%, 107%). The lowest rates of fixed capital 
utilisation by plant output were obtained for esparto pulp 
chlorine (126%, 15%) and soda (125%, 16%) in the 
Mostaganem plant for 1980 and for esparto pulp (38%, 36%) and 
brown paper (9.4%, 78%) in the Mostaganem and El-Harrach 
plants, respectively in 1981. 
As indicated in Table 5.5, the value of Ui calculated for 
1980 for each plant varied between 70% and 137.8%. In 
contrast, the range of U2 values was much larger, varying 
between 20% and 98%. In 1980 the lowest rates of fixed 
capital utilisation, derived from the value of Ul and U2, were 
recorded for the Mostaganem (137.8%, 20%) and El-Harrach (70%, 
l79%) plants. On the other hand, the highest rates of fixed 
capital utilisation were reached by the Oran grocery bag plant 
(104 , 98%) and the El-Arba 
kraft paper plant (103%, 93%). In 
1981 the values of U1 varied between 57% and 106%, a lower 
range of values than those for 1980. In addition, the calcu- 
lated value of U2 fluctuated between 41% and 101%, a narrower 
range of values than for 1980. Analysis of the 1981 values of 
Ul and U2 for the Mostaganem and El-Harrach plants again shows 
that these two plants recorded the lowest rates of fixed 
capital utilisation. On the other hand, the highest rates of 
fixed capital utilisation were recorded for the Oran and Oued 
Smar plants. For the period 1980 and 1981, an increase in the 
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Table 5.5: SONIC fixed capital utilisation 
in 1980 and 1981 (in percentages) 
SONIC complex/ 
plants Ul 
1980 
U2 U3 Ul 
1981 
U2 U3 
Pupl & paper 
Mostaganem complex 137.8 20 85.2 82.2 41 90.48 
Pulp & paper 
Baba Ali plant 80.7 83.75 100 82.75 79.25 100 
Household & sanit- 
ary paper Souk- 
Ahras plant 77.55 84.95 76.2 93.35 87 100 
Wrapping & packg. 
paper Saida plant 91.66 68.33 84.1 82.33 76.66 84.13 
Wrapping & packg. 
board El Harrach p. 70.7 79 100 57.4 
Packaging board 
Bouarrerridj plant 70.5 87.5 26.2 80 
Kraft paper 
El Arba plant 103 93 
Grocery paper bags 
Oran plant 104 98 
Sack kraft 
Oued Smar plant 99 91 
Recovery plant 94 80 
26.2 69 
100 106 
52.4 99 
100 77 
76.3 100 
83 26.2 
93 52.4 
101 100 
98 52.4 
96 100 
Total SONIC 92.88 78.5 75.03 82.90 83.11 80.56 
Source: Table E. 1 in the Appendix E. 
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value of U1 is always accompanied by a decrease in the value 
of U2 and vice versa. 
Regarding SONIC's outputs, the lowest rates of fixed 
capital utilisation were obtained for pulp, chlorine and soda 
for both years. The highest rate of fixed capital utilisation 
of a SONIC output was recorded for bags for the same period. 
For SONIC as a whole, fixed capital was inefficiently used (U1 
was 92.88% in 1980 and 82.90% in 1981, while U2 was 78.5% and 
83.11%, respectively). Pre-independence plants in general 
performed better than post-independence plants. From this, 
and information given earlier in the chapter, small and medium 
scale plants using labour intensive and French technology 
performed better than large scale plants using capital 
intensive and British or Italian technology. 
The ratio U3 (actual over technical number of shifts) has 
also been calculated for 1980 and 1981 for each plant. The 
only plants which recorded a value of U3 less than one were 
the Mostaganem, Saida, Oued Smar, El-Arba and Bouarrerridj 
plants (see Table 5.5). This rate appears to be related to 
:, the age of the plant, the presence of female workers in the 
production lines and the utilisation of production capacity of 
the earlier stage of production lines manufacturing the semi- 
finished outputs. U3 for Sonic as a whole reached 75% in 1980 
and 80.5% in 1981. 
5.1.3. Utilisation of labour 
The analysis of labour utilisation presents some difficul- 
ties because productivity norms are not available. As 
explained in Chapter Four, this analysis 
is based on overstaf- 
fing figures. Since the figures for only three SONIC plants 
are available (see Table 5.6), the analysis will be based on 
the SONIC managers' impressions. According to the SONIC 
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managers, the number of employed workers is higher than the 
norm in almost all the plants. Thus, it appears that in all 
SONIC plants labour is not used efficiently. The inefficient 
utilisation of fixed capital leads to the inefficient 
utilisation of labour since when machines are not running, 
workers are not producing. The underutilisation of one input, 
therefore, leads to the inefficient use of another input. In 
conclusion, SONIC plants which use raw materials, intermediate 
inputs, fixed capital and labour inefficiently are characteri- 
sed by underutilisation of their production capacities. 
Table 5.6: Rate of overstaffing in SONIC plants in 1980 
Plants Labour force Contractor Ratio of 
1980 norm overstaffing 
Mostaganem 1,029 960 7.2% 
El-Harrach 703 665 5.7% 
Saida 1,409 1,009 39.6% 
Source: Survey data. 
5.2. Common causes of inefficiency in SONIC 
The purpose of this part is to give evidence and discuss 
the causes of inefficiency common to all SONIC plants which 
lead to the underutilisation of inputs discussed above. In 
many plants it was not possible to isolate a single cause 
because the effect was often simultaneously produced by 
several factors. Thus, the different factors are discussed 
in 
general terms. In the first part, organisational factors are 
investigated. In the second part, shortages of different 
inputs are described. Allocative inefficiencies will be 
analysed in the third part followed by 
demand shortages in the 
last part. 
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5.2.1. Organisational factors 
The quality of inputs, especially in highly integrated 
plants and in plants producing intermediate inputs to be used 
by other public enterprises, has serious consequences on the 
level of outputs. This important factor is not, however, 
taken into account by SONIC's managers. The poor quality of 
raw materials and intermediate inputs leads to frequent break- 
downs and a waste of resources. At the Mostaganem plant, for 
example, variations in the thickness of the esparto fiber 
affects the cellulosic production line by causing it to stop 
production for several days and sometimes weeks. The impuri- 
ties contained in the esparto which block the feeder led, on 
several occasions, to the stoppage of the entire production 
line. The poor quality of the sulfuric acid supplied by a 
SONATRACH plant also led to stoppages (impurities blocked the 
conduit pipes and the exchangers). At the Souk-Ahras plant, 
the low quality of esparto pulp supplied by the Mostaganem 
plant resulted in severe damage of various machines. Imported 
pulp is generally of low quality as well, reflecting the 
attitude of the international trade department with respect to 
the quality factor. As a result apparatus are damaged, 
leading to recurrent maintenance and repairs and consequently, 
to fewer number of working hours than planned. 
Due to the out-dated and often worn out equipment in the 
pre-independence plants, the number of shifts cannot 
be 
increased in order to increase the efficiency of these plants. 
In addition, some post-independence workshops and plants 
technically equipped to work with three shifts work with only 
two shifts. For instance, the exercise 
books production line 
in the Mostaganem plant and the corrugated cardboard workshop 
in the wrapping and packaging plant 
in Saida cannot operate 
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with three shifts because of the shortage of semi-finished 
outputs. These are normally provided by production lines, 
that are at an earlier stage of the production process, which 
do not produce the necessary quantities of semi-finished 
outputs. This is often due to the fact that the production 
lines, that are at an earlier stage of the production process, 
are underutilised. Another reason for not having three shifts 
given by the managers of the El-Arba, Bouarrerridj and Oued- 
Smar plants, is the presence of a female labour force on the 
production lines, which due to social considerations, makes 
the night shift impossible. The lower number of shifts than 
advocated by the contractor norm has serious consequences 
since the Algerian economy is a capital-scarce economy and a 
labour-surplus economy. 
The rates of absenteeism and labour turnover in SONIC 
plants, as outlined earlier, are high. These are due to 
factors which have been discussed in detail in part 4.3.1. In 
addition to these problems, SONIC plants are faced with 
organisational problems resulting from bureaucratic 
administration, a lack of labour incentives which would raise 
productivity and the absence of industrial habits and 
experience (refer to part 4.3.1). 
5.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
5.2.2.1. Shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
The shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs are 
due to internal and external factors which are of a different 
nature for each input. The two main raw materials used 
in 
SONIC plants are esparto and straw. Esparto, which is used by 
the Mostaganem and Baba-Ali plants, is supplied locally as 
indicated in Table 5.2. In 1980, the Mostaganem plant recei- 
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ved only 18 tons of esparto per day instead of the 150 tons 
advocated by the contractor. The shortage of esparto is one 
of the main causes of underutilisation of capacity in the 
cotl. +. uloeic. production line (in 1981, U1 [actual over planned 
capacity] equalled 38% and U2 [planned over technical 
capacity] equalled 36%) at the Mostaganem plant. This, in 
turn, leads to the shortage of intermediate inputs (produced 
from esparto) and affects other production lines using these 
intermediate inputs in the plant. The shortage of esparto is 
not due to a lack of resources but to the lack of organisation 
of the branch and to the price of esparto. The low price of 
esparto fixed by the government does not encourage people to 
gather the esparto which grows naturally and cannot be 
gathered mechanically (at the present time). The supply of 
straw (used by the Saida plant, for instance) is also subject 
to irregularity and shortages. This shortage leads, in large 
part, to the underutilisation of the straw production line (in 
1981, U1= 71% and U2= 64%). Supply problems are mainly due to 
an inefficient system of collection and insufficient local 
. resources. 
The insufficient resources, in turn, may be 
attributed to the low price (fixed by the state) of straw. 
Its present price is so low that farmers do not see any 
advantages in selling it to SONIC Saida plant. 
SONIC plants also encountered problems with the supply of 
consumable inputs such as water and electricity of 
different 
voltages. In the pulp and paper 
industry, water is a very 
important input and SONIC plants are intensive users of water. 
In addition, water purity 
is also very important since it 
determines in part the quality of 
the output produced. As 
already discussed 
in Chapter One, Algeria is short of water. 
Almost all SONIC plants are affected 
by the shortage of water 
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but in different degrees depending on their geographical 
location. According to the managers, the plants which are 
most affected by the shortage of water are the Mostaganem and 
Souk-Ahras. plants. In 1980 the ratio of the number of days of 
stoppage due to the shortage of water to the total was 30% and 
10% for the two plants, respectively. The various causes of 
water shortages have already been described in part 4.3.2. 
There is no cheap solution to the shortage of water so in order 
to solve these problems, very large investments are needed. 
The erratic power supply of different voltages also causes 
problems in some SONIC plants. Power shortages, however, do 
not lead to problems as acute as those resulting from the 
shortage of water. These shortages account for 9% and 8% of 
the total number of days of stoppage at the Mostaganem (6) and 
Souk-Ahras plants, respectively. The available energy supply 
is often lower than that recommended by contractor norms. 
Voltage fluctuations lead to high rates of breakdowns and 
frequent power supply cuts lead to the rapid deterioration of 
production lines and the subsequent underutilisation of fixed 
capital. The final result is a loss of output. 
Shortages of intermediate inputs, such as pulp, chemical 
and spare parts supplied by the local market, are frequently 
experienced. For example, in 1980, as a result of shortages 
of chlorine produced at the Mostaganem plant and of caustic 
soda supplied by one of SONATFACH's plants, all of which are 
used in the production process of paper pulp, the cellulosic 
production line in the Mostaganem plant was not able 
to supply 
the production lines, that are at a later stage of the 
production process, with the necessary 
intermediate inputs. 
it was also unable to supply the Souk-Ahras plant with the 
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required proportion of pulp. Consequently, the production 
process at the Souk-Ahras plant was interrupted several times. 
The exercise books production line in the Mostaganem plant was 
also underutilised since only two shifts were used instead of 
the three advocated by the contractor. This underutilisation 
was the result of a shortage of printing and writing paper 
produced by production lines, that are at an earlier stage of 
the production process. In 1980, as well, an average of 75% 
of the total spare parts supplied by the local market was 
lacking in most SONIC plants. 
5.2.2.2. Shortages of transport and infrastructure 
facilities and working capital 
The shortage of means of transport and poor infrastructure 
are experienced by almost all SONIC plants. In 1980,50% of 
the SONIC transport facilities were not operational (7). The 
different causes are similar to those described in part 
4.3.2.2. SONIC working capital is also insufficient. In 
1978, for example, the working capital was -756.4 million AD. 
The cash flow for the same year was -113.3 million AD. The 
; working capital was negative because of high financial charges 
which accounted for 20% of the sales revenue and 12% of the 
total charges in 1978 (8). This resulted in problems similar 
to those discussed in Chapter Four. 
5.2.2.3. Shortages of skilled labour force 
According to the managers, the lack of skilled labour is 
felt acutely in all SONIC plants. This is confirmed by the 
proportion of skilled labour force which was analysed at the 
beginning of this chapter. The lack of qualified labour has 
had a greater impact on the post-independence plants than on 
the pre-independence plants (the former use modern, capital 
intensive technology as opposed to the latter, which use 
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traditional labour intensive technology). No figures are 
available to estimate the exact number of employees lacking in 
the different plants. In some plants, for example, the second 
or third shifts cannot be undertaken because of the lack of 
supervisors. In 1980, at the Mostaganem plant, only 46% of 
the total requests for maintenance (3,610 requests) were met. 
In addition, labour shortages are felt in the various 
positions discussed in part 4.3.2. 
5.2.2.4. Shortages of imported inputs and spare parts 
SONIC plants import about 95% of their intermediate inputs 
and 75% of their spare parts. Even in highly integrated 
plants such as the Mostaganem plant, which is supposed to 
produce all its intermediate inputs and supply about 50% of 
the paper pulp requirement of the Souk-Ahras plant, interme- 
diate inputs are imported. In fact, about 66% of the needed 
pulp was imported for the Mostaganem plant. These imports 
were planned in order to avoid the inefficient utilisation of 
the production lines, which use pulp as an intermediate input. 
The main reason for the low rate of fixed capital utilisation 
of the printing and writing paper production line 
in the 
Mostaganem plant was the shortage of imported long and short 
fiber pulp over a period of 104 days. The management 
estimated that 53% of the underutilisation of 
this production 
line was due to the shortage of imported 
inputs. At the El- 
Harrach plant, the main reason for the low rate of fixed 
capital utilisation was the shortage of 
imported kraft paper. 
This input was deficient for an overall period of 
four months 
resulting from five different stock ruptures. 
According to 
the managers, this provoked 10% of the total work stoppages 
in 
the hard tissue paper production line and 16% 
in the soft 
tissue paper production line in the Souk-Ahras plant. 
The 
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shortage of imported inputs is more acute in the non- 
integrated plants since they are more dependent on imports. 
The shortage of spare parts is difficult to estimate but it 
appears that this shortage affects the post-independence 
plants much more than the pre-independence plants. This is 
partly because the pre-independence plants use a less 
sophisticated technology than the post-independence plants. 
The shortage of imported inputs is due to reasons 
described in parts 3.4 and 4.3.2. In 1980 SONIC was only 
allocated 55% of the requested authorisation of imports which 
were necessary to fulfill its planned outputs. Consequently, 
some plants were not allocated the necessary funds for smooth 
running. In addition, the requested AGI was obtained at the 
end of March instead of the first of January. As a result, no 
imports of intermediate inputs or spare parts could be 
obtained for the first three months. The Mostaganem plant, 
for example, was only allowed to import 50 tons of iron 
chloride out of the 300 tons it required and, consequently, 
was short of this input for three months. 
5.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
The development of the pulp and paper industry was 
arbitrarily decided by the planning authorities without taking 
into account all of the relevant factors involved such as the 
supplies of water and esparto which are intensively used by 
the plants. The planning commission saw in the development of 
this branch of industry, a source of foreign currencies and a 
development of import substitution plants. In fact, according 
to the plan, the Mostaganem plant was intended to export 2/3 
of its finished output. Water shortages are so acute in all 
SONIC plants, however, that the development of the pulp and 
paper industry may not be the best possible choice for 
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Algeria. To alleviate the grave problems encountered by the 
Mostaganem plant resulting from the shortage of water, large 
investments had to be made. Despite these efforts, the lack 
of water is still acutely felt. In addition, the shortage of 
esparto is also a serious problem for this plant, as was 
discussed earlier. 
Geographical location is also another reason for the under- 
utilisation of production capacity in the Mostaganem, Souk- 
Ahras, Saida and El-Harrach plants. Relevant factors, such as 
water and storage space, were not considered to be important 
criteria of site selection by the planning commission. For 
instance, the Saida plant is subject to floods due to its 
proximity to the river. The Mostaganem plant would have 
encountered less problems if it had been located 50 km east of 
Mostaganem near the Chelif oued (river). External disecono- 
mies were not taken into consideration. Social considera- 
tions, such as the creation of jobs and regional equilibrium, 
outweighed economic factors. Water is very important to this 
industry and a large number of problems encountered by all the 
SONIC plants could have been avoided by a more judicious 
choice of geographical location of the plants. 
Choice of technique and contracts also influence capacity 
utilisation. For example, the post-independence plants have 
all experienced technical problems. These were often the 
result of inadequate imported technology responding to the 
Algerian environment as well as technical misconceptions. In 
a decomposed or turnkey contract, the contractor is required 
to deliver a plant in working order but not one that will 
necessarily produce output according to technical specifica- 
tions. In these contracts the contractor is not responsible 
for the training of the work force (see Appendix C. 1). For 
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instance, the Mostaganem plant (see Table E. 2 in the Appendix 
E) was built under decomposed and turnkey contracts. It 
encounters problems related to the technical design of some of 
its machines: the generator and auxiliary machines and equip- 
ments were under-scaled with respect to the rest of the 
production lines. Consequently, in the cellulosic production 
line, the production of pulp was only 2.75 tons/hour whereas 
the norm advocates 9 tons/hour. Similarly, the casing of the 
clutch and tank of the Saida plant were under-scaled. This 
plant also encountered problems due to straw dust in the 
processing operation. This led to more difficulties which 
were related to the lack of skilled labour force. 
5.2.4. Demand shortages 
Deficiency of demand for industrial outputs is only 
encountered by the Souk-Ahras plant. This plant, which was 
constructed to meet the requirements of anticipated future 
demand, suffers from excess capacity. Had the promotional 
networks been developed in order to adopt an aggressive 
attitude on the international market or production capacities 
:: been efficiently used, the excess production could have been 
exported. In any case, this situation can be considered 
transitory since local demand is expected to greatly increase 
in the near future. 
Table 5.7 summarizes the causes of underutilisation of 
capacity by SONIC plants. These indications are derived from 
the interviews. It can clearly be seen that the post-indepen- 
dence plants have a larger number of problems than the pre- 
independence plants. The number of shifts used is also 
related to the age of the plants. Social, cultural and 
institutional factors are also important causes of the 
underutilisation of inputs in all the plants. Organisational 
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Table 5.7 : The causes of inefficient utilisation of inputs 
in SONIC plants. 
SONIC complexes 
and plants 
Causes of ineffi- 
cient utilisation 
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ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS 
-Lack of organisation * * * * * * * * * * of work 
-Problems with WA * * 
-Age of the plant * * * * * * * 
Lack of industrial 
habits & traditions * * * * * * * * * * 
-High labour turnover 
High rate of absenteeism * * 
Female personnel 
Lack of quality 
Cumbersome bureaucracy * * * * 
SHORTAGES OF INPUTS 
-Local 
-Raw materials 
-Intermediate inputs * * * * * * 
-Electricity 
-Water * * * 
-Transport 
-Infrastructure 
-Skilled workers * * 
-Maintenance * * * * * * * * * * 
-Supervision 
-Management stock 
-Imported inputs & * * * * * * * * * * 
spare parts 
ALLOCATIVE INEFFICIENCIES 
-Choice of output * * * * 
-Choice of location * * 
* * 
-Import policies 
-Financial policies 
-Choice of techniques 
-Choice of contracts 
DEMAND SHORTAGES 
Source : Survey data. 
235 
problems are equally important in the post- and pre- 
independence plants. The post-independence plants, which rely 
heavily on imported inputs, are more concerned with the 
shortage of inputs obtained from the international market. 
The lack of skilled labour force is also more deeply felt in 
the post-independence plants. Government policies have had a 
greater impact on the post-independence plants than on the 
pre-independence plants (location, scale, level of integration 
and technology used). The post-independence plants are also 
more exposed to the inadequacies of foreign trade policies. 
Demand shortages are only felt in one plant, but this can be 
considered transitory. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SNMC PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
SNMC, which is involved in the production of construction 
materials, was created on the 20th of December, 1967 following 
the nationalisation of 25 plants. It is under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Light Industries. SNMC is a medium-sized 
public enterprise, which in 1980 consisted of 74 plants, 30 
distribution centres, 3 transport units and one engineering 
unit, totally owned by the state. SNMC has experienced rapid 
development and is still expanding (8 plants going on stream 
and 45 planned in the 1980-1984 five year development plan). 
These plants are widely spread throughout the Northern part of 
Algeria. In 1980, as a result of recent large investments, 
SNMC employed 25,416 workers, 2.3 times the number for 1973, 
and its sales revenue amounted to 2.4 billion AD, 5.2 times 
that of 1973 (1). In addition, between 1973 and 1980, its 
fixed assets increased by a factor of 7.66, amounting to 8.6 
billion AD in 1980. This development can only be expected in 
a developing country like Algeria which is undergoing an 
economic boom (see Chapter Two). SNMC is in charge of the 
production, distribution and a few engineering activities 
related to construction materials as well as planning, finance 
and management of the labour force of SNMC. Its activities 
also extend to international trade (mainly imports). SNMC is 
a divisionalised organisation similar to that described in 
Chapter Four (see Figure 6.1). Its objectives, decision 
making and control are comparable to those of other Algerian 
public enterprises (see Chapter Four). 
SNMC produces a variety of construction materials ranging 
from cement and cement asbestos to "red products"(i. e., red 
bricks and tiles), ceramic tiles and plastic products (for 
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SNMC General Managing Director 
Head office 
Cement division 
Plastic, gypsum and lime division 
Red products division 
Ceramic tile division 
Ceramic sanitary fitting division 
Granulated aggregate division 
Conglomerate division 
Cement asbestos division 
Plastic construction products division 
Distribution centres 
Figure 6.1 : SNMC organisational structure in 1980. 
Source : Survey data. 
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construction) (see Table F. 1 in the Appendix F). As indicated 
in Table F. 1, in 1980 SNMC's annual production capacity was 
8.3 million tons of cement, 1.89 million tons of red products, 
2.65 million units of ceramic tiles, 1.7 million units of 
ceramic sanitary fittings and 7.5 million tons of granulated 
aggregates. Furthermore, SNMC's annual production capacity of 
plastic products (tubes) was 164,400 tons, its annual capacity 
of plastic floor tiles was 1.6 million square metres, its 
annual capacity of conglomerates was 1.545 million tons 
(cement pipes, small beams and concrete blocks and bridges) 
and its annual capacity of tilling was 918,000 square metres. 
SNMC also had large plaster, gypsum, lime and asbestos cement 
capacities. Its production capacity by plant output and by 
plant is indicated in Table F. 1 in the Appendix F. 
SNMC is a larger public enterprise than SONIC (employing 
more workers and achieving a higher sales revenue). In addi- 
tion, SNMC has a much larger number of plants which produce a 
wider range of outputs and is more geographically dispersed 
than SONIC. Factors which account for its more diverse plant 
locations are that raw materials for the construction mate- 
rials industry can easily be found everywhere in the country, 
the transport cost of inputs and outputs is very high and the 
range of output is intended for far more geographically 
dispersed consumers than those of the pulp and paper branch. 
SNMC monopolizes only the production of cement, asbestos 
cement and ceramic sanitary fittings. The private sector in 
the construction materials branch consists of 779 private 
firms (see Chapter Two). The existence of a large private 
sector, involved in the production of output for which SNMC 
does not hold the monopoly, stimulates a competitive atmos- 
phere since local production for those outputs exceeds local 
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demand. SNMC holds the foreign trade monopoly in construction 
materials products. Despite the substantial growth experien- 
ced by SNMC and the private firms, a large volume of imports 
is still required to meet local demand. A portion of these 
imports supplement outputs produced by SNMC, while the 
remainder consist of products that are not manufactured by 
local firms (public and private), such as fire-bricks and 
fire-clay. On the other hand, exports are not developed and 
promoted. 
In terms of the local market situation, SNMC plants are 
faced with problems which are different from those of SONIC. 
In fact, as discussed in Chapter Five, SONIC holds the 
production monopoly in pulp, cardboard and printing paper 
other than newsprint. Local pulp and paper production does 
not exceed local demand. SONIC shares the local market with 
only a few private firms. SNMC, on the other hand, holds the 
monopoly in several types of construction materials and shares 
the local market with a large private sector for which local 
production is higher than local demand. 
As illustrated in Table F. 1 in the Appendix F, almost all 
the plants, except the conglomerate plants and the two gypsum 
and plaster plants, are monoproduct plants. This is due to 
the nature of the output produced. Moreover, all the plants, 
with the exception of the asbestos cement and plastic (for 
construction) plants, are highly integrated. The SNMC plants 
are highly integrated because of their technological 
production process. The cement asbestos and plastic plants 
are lee integrated because most of their 
inputs are supplied 
by other SNMC plants or by SONATRACH plants, respectively. 
SNNC is characterised by a larger number of monoproduct and 
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highly integrated plants than SONIC. SNMC is also more 
integrated than SONIC. 
Similar to SONIC, the SNMC plants can be divided into two 
categories: pre-independence and post-independence plants. 
More than 69% of SNMC plants were built after 1962 but, in 
fact, have been producing only since 1975. In comparison, 
only 45% of the SONIC plants were built after 1962. Also, 
pre-independence plants use traditional labour intensive 
technology and post-independence plants use capital intensive 
technology. Since the age of the plant is related to the 
choice of technology, one may say that SNMC uses mainly 
capital intensive technology (2) despite the large supply of 
human resources which would seem to dictate the use of labour 
intensive technology. The causes are similar to those 
described in Chapter Five. The techniques used in the 
production of construction materials are somewhat simpler than 
those used in the pulp and paper industry. Consequently, the 
SNMC plants are less subject to problems arising from 
technical constraints than the SONIC plants. The technology 
used in the post-independence cement or ceramic tiles plants, 
however, is as complex as that used in the post-independence 
pulp and paper plants. Thus, some similarities exist 
between 
SONIC and SNMC. As far as the use of traditional labour and 
capital intensive technology is concerned, 
the two public 
enterprises are faced with identical problems. 
Post- 
independence plants, as opposed to the small-scale pre- 
independence plants, are large-scale. In this respect, the 
SNMC situation is comparable to that of SONIC 
for the reasons 
already given in Chapter Five. 
In 1980, as indicated in Table 6.1, over 35% of 
the total 
SNNC plants operated with only one shift, 
46.5% operated with 
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two shifts and 18% operated with three shifts. On average, a 
SNMC plant operated 14.70 hours per day. An analysis of the 
data indicates that the number of shifts is related to the age 
of the plant and the nature of the output. This can be 
contrasted with the case of SONIC where the number of shifts 
is only related to the age of the plant. In addition, 
although the two public enterprises concerned have almost the 
same proportion of plants operating with one shift, SONIC has 
a higher proportion of plants operating with three shifts than 
SNMC does. 
Table 6.1: Number of shifts in SNMC plants in 1980 
Hours of work Number of Percentage 
per day plants of total plants 
8 25 33.8 
16 36 48.6 
24 13 17.6 
Total number 
of plants 74 100.0 
Source : Table F. l. in the Appendix F. 
The origin of the different inputs used by SNMC plants is 
indicated in Table 6.2. Most of the raw materials and inter- 
mediate inputs used in SNMC plants are either supplied within 
SNMC or by the local market. Only small quantities of 
chemicals and about 75% of the spare parts are imported. The 
ratio of imported to total spare parts is high because the 
entire capital stock is imported and the local 
industrial 
sector is not integrated. Meanwhile, the small proportion of 
imported inputs is due to the fact that SNMC uses raw 
materials and intermediate 
inputs that are locally abundant 
and/or produced. The degree of 
dependency vis-a-vis the 
imports of raw materials and intermediate 
inputs is much lower 
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Table 6.2 : Origin of SNHC inputs 
OUTPUTS 
INPUTS 
WITHIN SNMC 
Cement 
Gypsum 
Aggregate 
LOCAL MARKET 
Calcaleous materials 
Argillaceous materials 
Clay 
Asbestos fiber 
Kaolin E 
Silica 
z Sand 
`-4 PVC 
Stones 
y 
y y a 
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N 
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* * * 
* 
* dir 
* * * * 
* 
Alum powder * * 
M Carbonate powder 
Calcium mabre 
Lubricant * * 
H Electricity * * 
Water * * 
Other chemic. prod. * 
Colorants * 
Spare parts * * 
AG 
INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
Colorants Z 
Quartz 
Other chemic. prod. 
Pure argillaceous mat. 
* 
* 
* * * * * 
I ISpare parts 
IFIXED CAPITAL 
Foreign 
OUR Local 
* 
*** 
* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 
* 1* 1* 1* I* 1* 
100% imported 
0.2% 
99.87. 
* indicates the origin of the input without specifying the proportion. 
Source Survey data. 
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in SNMC plants than in SONIC plants. The SNMC plants are as 
dependent on imported spare parts as the SONIC plants. Such 
dependence does not lead, however, to a similar need for 
technical and maintenance staff. This may be attributed to 
the simpler technological process of production in the SNMC 
plants than in the SONIC plants. As far as capital goods and 
labour are concerned, SNMC plants import almost all of their 
capital goods and employ an insignificant proportion of 
foreign manpower, as in SONIC plants. 
SNMC outputs, as illustrated in Table 6.3, consist of 
semi-finished outputs used within SNMC and by private firms 
and finished outputs intended for an intermediate use. SNMC 
also is part of the consumer-oriented sector. The finished 
outputs are used for the construction industry (including 
housing), hydraulic and public works. Cement, gypsum and 
aggregates in particular, are used as semi-finished outputs 
within SNMC and by local private firms. Similar to SONIC 
outputs, SNMC outputs are intended to satisfy local demand. 
These outputs are oriented towards different sectors and uses: 
SNMC outputs are oriented mainly towards the industrial and 
social sectors for intermediate use and SONIC outputs mainly 
towards the consumer sector for final use. 
In 1980, SNMC had 26,000 workers -a much larger number 
than in SONIC. Table F. 1 in the Appendix F shows the number 
of workers by plant without giving details of 
their qualifica- 
tions since the distribution by skill category for each plant 
is unfortunately not available. Table 6.4 
indicates the total 
labour force working by group of similar products by skill 
category. In 1980, as 
indicated in Figure 6.2,5.8% of the 
SNMC labour force had the qualifications of managers, 
9.3% of 
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Table 6.3: Destination of SNMC outputs 
SECTORS DOMESTIC MARKET 
OF 
INTERMEDIATE USE 
UTILISATION 
SNMC e 
eo E 
. IJ "G U, 0 cc E v-4 y0 0 
U Q C/3 U Dc ". 4 
. r4 -r4 -v-1 $4 
41 0 v 
(a cc 0 
F 
OUTPUTS 4 A 9: 
00 .0 V ü 0 
3 3 0 41 OU pes,, s 
ä äi w 
Cement * * * * * * *ý1ý 
Plaster 
Gypsum * * 
Lime * * 
Red products * * 
Ceramic tiles * * 
Ceramic sanitary tiles * * 
Aggregates 
Cement bridge 
Concrete blocks 
ement pipes * * * * 
Small concrete beams 
ement asbestos 
Plastic tubes 
Plastic tile floor 
they plastic products * 
* indicates the destination of the outputs without specifying the proport- 
ion. 
1 Exceptional exports. 
Source : Survey data. 
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technicians and supervisors and as much as 84.8% of semi- 
skilled and unskilled workers (without any qualifications). 
Female participation and foreign manpower were as low as 4.7% 
and 0.2% of the total labour force, respectively. Foreign 
manpower, which mainly consisted of managers (73% of the total 
foreign manpower), amounted to 2.5% of the total SNMC managers. 
The percentage of skilled workers was particularly low in 
the SNMC plants since only 11.4% of the total labour force of 
the plants had the qualifications of managers (3.4%) or 
technicians and supervisors (8%). The cement, lime and 
plaster plants are better furnished with skilled workers than 
the other SNMC plants. The low ratios of skilled workers show 
the lack of a skilled labour force in SNMC in general and in 
the SNMC plants, in particular. As shown in Figure 6.3, only 
49% of the total skilled labour force worked at the plants, 
with 29% at the head office and the remaining 22% either at 
the marketing units, at the projects, undergoing some training 
or attached to the Ministry of Light Industries. In general, 
one would expect more of the skilled labour force deployed to 
; the management of the plants than to the head office as is the 
case in SNMC. SNMC as a whole is also characterised by a high 
rate of absenteeism, which amounted to 5.2% in 1980. In 
conclusion, the SNMC labour force is characterised by a small 
percentage of skilled workers in the SNMC plants, a large 
proportion of skilled workers at the head office compared to 
the plants and a high rate of absenteeism. 
In 1980, SNMC, with only 15.1% skilled workers, was in a 
less favourable situation than SONIC (see Figure 6.2). The 
proportion of skilled workers in the head office was higher in 
SNMC than in SONIC (see Figure 6.3). The reason lies in the 
fact that the number of technicians and supervisors in the 
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Figure 6.3 : Percentage of skilled labour force by function 
in SONIC and SNMC. 
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SONIC plants is twice as large as in the SNMC plants. Conse- 
quently, there is a higher percentage of skilled workers in 
the SONIC plants than in the SNMC plants. In addition, the 
two public enterprises are characterised by high rates of 
absenteeism, though it is slightly lower in SNMC. We now turn 
to the discussion of the utilisation of inputs in SNMC plants. 
6.1. Utilisation of inputs in SNMC 
6.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
It is difficult to assess whether locally supplied raw 
materials are inefficiently used since these are not in short 
supply and consequently do not affect the utilisation of 
production capacity. No data are recorded to compare to the 
norms. The inefficient use of these inputs, however, would 
have an effect on production cost if it was calculated (no 
calculation of production cost is carried out in any SNMC 
plants). Moreover, according to the managers, SNMC uses some 
of its intermediate inputs inefficiently. These are mainly 
electricity and chemical products. Electricity and some 
chemical products are considered to be overconsumed, since 
according to the quantities used, actual production should be 
higher. This is confirmed by the following examples: 
electricity is inefficiently used in all the red products, 
ceramic tile and ceramic sanitary tile plants because 
the 
ovens, which must be left on 24 hours per day, seven 
days per 
week, are only used 16 hours a day and five 
days a week 
(during two shifts). 
6.1.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
U1 (ratio of actual over planned capacity), U2 (ratio of 
planned over technical capacity) and 
U3 (ratio of actual over 
technical number of shifts) by plant output, by plant, 
by 
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SNMC's output and for SNMC as a whole are calculated as 
indicated in Chapter Four. These rates are calculated using 
the data given by the SNMC's managers (see Chapter Four). One 
supplementary clarification, however, has to be made 
concerning SNMC's planned outputs. According to the managers, 
the proposed planned outputs were calculated taking into 
account the technical norms given by the contractor, Algerian 
conditions and the conclusions of a World Bank study (3). 
These proposed planned outputs were also approved by the 
supervisory ministries. 
In 1980, as indicated in Table F. 1 in the Appendix F, U1 
by plant output varied between 22% and 126% while U2 ranged 
from 49% to 150%. Analysis of the value of U1 and U2 shows 
that the highest rates of fixed capital utilisation by plant 
output were obtained for plastic tubs in the Setif plastic tub 
plant, cement pipe in the Annaba conglomerates plant and red 
products in the Colonel Amirouch plant. The lowest rates of 
fixed capital utilisation were obtained for granulated 
aggregates in the Sidi Ali Benyoucef and El-Khroub plants. 
--Almost identical results were obtained for the rates of fixed 
capital utilisation by plant since most are monoproduct 
plants. U1 by plant varied between 22% and 114% while U2 was 
between 49% and 150%. The highest rates of fixed capital 
utilisation were obtained for the plastic tub plant of Setif, 
the Colonel Amirouch red products plant and the Oran 
conglomerates plant. The lowest rates of fixed capital 
utilisation were obtained for the granulated aggregates Sidi 
Ali Benyoucef and El-Khroub plants. 
As indicated in Table 6.5, U1 by SNMC's output varied 
between 43% and 93% while U2 ranged from 75% to 116%. The 
highest rates of fixed capital utilisation by SNMC's output 
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Table 6.5: Rates of fixed capital utilisation 
in various SNMC plants in 1980 (in percentage) 
Number Type of output Ul U2 U3 
of 
plants 
8 Cement 69.4 75.32 100 
Plaster 63.66 88.13 ) 
5) Gypsum 84 100 ) 85.24(1) 
Lime 78 88.8 ) 
27 red products 72.33 93.4 68.26 
3 Ceramic tiles 68.33 100 52.4 
3 Cera. sanit. fitting 62 96 52.4 
10 Granulated aggregates 43.5 82.3 48.34 
7 Conglomerates 80.46 99.75 68.37 
5 Cement asbestos 49.2 96.76 100 
3 Plastic products 69.33 116.66 26.2 
71 Total SNMC 66.67 91.97 69.35 
Source: Table F. 1 in the Appendix F. 
(1) U3 corresponds to the plaster, gypsum and lime. 
Table 6.6: Rates of fixed capital utilisation in SNMC post- 
and pre-independence plants in 1980 (in percentages) 
SNMC Outputs Post-independence Pre-independence 
plants plants 
U1 U2 Ul U2 
Cement 66.14 75.22 92.3 76 
Lime - - 78 88.8 
Plastic and gypsum 72.5 90 77.33 94.8 
Red products 69.22 90.44 78.55 99.34 
Ceramic tiles 68.33 100 - - 
Cer. ti. sani. fitting 62 96 - - 
Granulated aggregates 36 74.28 61 101.16 
Conglomerates 68.48 100 89.45 99.57 
Cement asbestos 45.66 100 55 92 
Plastic products 69.33 116.66 - - 
Total 61.97 89.63 76.52 96.91 
Source: Table F. 1 in the Appendix F. 
- not applicable. 
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were obtained for cement pipe and small beams, respectively. 
The lowest rate of fixed capital utilisation by SNMC's output 
was recorded for granulated aggregates. For SNMC, a low value 
of Ul generally corresponds to a low value of U2. Fixed 
capital is not efficiently utilised in SNMC as a whole. U1 
for SNMC as a whole was 66% and U2 was 92%. 
When the rates of fixed capital utilisation of pre- 
independence and post-independence plants are compared, 
several conclusions can be drawn. As indicated in Table 6.6, 
the pre-independence plants make better use of their fixed 
capital than the post-independence plants. Thus, according to 
the information given earlier in this chapter, plants using 
labour intensive technology were performing better than those 
using capital intensive technology. Furthermore, small and 
medium-scale plants were used more efficiently than large- 
scale-plants. It is also noteworthy that U2 in average is 
slightly higher for the pre-independence than for the post- 
independence plants. 
Another set of interesting conclusions is drawn when the 
grates of fixed capital utilisation of the post-independence 
plants are compared. The post-independence plants, which 
became operational after 1976, perform better than those which 
began producing between 1962 and 1975. For example, the Mefta 
cement plant (which started producing in 1975) performed 
better than the Benisaf cement plant (which started producing 
in 1979). From these facts, one can conclude that the newer 
the plant, the higher its rate of fixed capital utilisation. 
Location, the endowment of skilled workers and organisational 
factors have also had an influence on rates of fixed capital 
utilisation. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the 
differences in the rates of fixed capital utilisation among 
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plants in both red products and conglomerates divisions even 
though they were built during the same year and use an 
identical technology. In addition, three large-scale ceramic 
tile plants using similar capital intensive technology 
performed at different rates. Newer plants using capital 
intensive technology also performed at different rates. In 
this case one can argue, however, that the origin of the 
technology and the complexity of the production process may 
partly explain the difference in performance. In fact, the 
mastery of imported technology has a great influence on the 
rates of fixed capital utilisation. The scale of the adopted 
technology may also affect the rates of fixed capital 
utilisation due to the requirement of a large skilled labour 
force which is scarce in Algeria. 
Another interesting analysis is that of U2. U2 (ratio of 
planned over technical capacity) for the SNMC plants is high. 
In fact, as indicated in Tables 6.5 and F. 1 in the Appendix F, 
U2 is equal to one for about half of the plants. In 1980, for 
SNMC as a whole, U2 was equal to 92%. This ratio is higher 
than that for SONIC (U2= 78.5% in 1980 and 83% in 1981). One 
may expect U2 to increase with the age of the plant. A value 
of U2 less than one for the newly built plants 
is to be 
expected since these plants are not planned to produce at 
100% 
capacity when they start to be operational. It 
is more 
difficult to understand why the SNMC plants built earlier show 
lower values of U2 than the newer built plants. For example, 
in 1980 the H-Soud cement plant, operational since 1975, was 
planned to produce 72% of 
its technical norm, while the Saida 
cement plant, operational since 
1979, was planned to produce 
as much as 80% of 
its technical norm. In this particular 
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case, U2, which is influenced by the age of the plant, yields 
a value contrary to what is expected. Moreover, in some cases 
U2 is greater than one and, therefore, confirms the fact that 
planned outputs may be higher than the technical norm. 
The analysis of L73 (ratio of actual over technical number 
of shifts) indicates that SNMC fixed capital was left idle for 
almost one third of the time. Less than half of the plants 
worked with three shifts. In fact, U3 is less than one in all 
post-independence plants except the post-independence cement 
and cement asbestos plants. U3 is related to the age of the 
plant and correlated with the lack of skilled workers, the 
presence of female workers in the production lines and the 
nature of the output. 4 
A comparison of SNMC and SONIC fixed capital utilisation 
rates leads to: tie. conclusion that the SONIC fixed capital was 
more efficiently used than that of SNMC. In 1980, for 
example, Ul was 93% and 66% and U2 was 78% and 92%, in SONIC 
and SNMC, respectively. An analysis of U3 shows that the time 
utilisation of fixed capital is higher in SONIC (75%) than 
-SNMC (69%). 
6.1.3. Utilisation of labour 
As stressed in Chapter Four, it is difficult to accurately 
evaluate labour utilisation since only a few figures are 
available. In fact, the only figure available -the wage 
productivity ratio, which in 1980 was 92,539 AD compared to 
that given by the norm, 176,000 AD- shows an inefficient 
utilisation of labour. As in the SONIC Chapter, therefore, 
the present analysis is based on overstaffing figures. As 
indicated in Tafle V. l in the Appendix F, the actual figures 
for 1980 and the employment norm given by the contractor are 
available for each plant. A comparison of these 
figures shows 
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an overstaffing situation in almost all SNMC plants. The 
overstaffing ratios varied from one plant to another. The 
highest ratios of overstaffing, 96% and 89%, were obtained for 
the Batna no. 1 red products and A. E. Kebera cement plant, 
respectively. The overstaffing ratio calculated in Table 6.7 
show significant differences from one group of plants to 
another. The highest overstaffing ratio was obtained for the 
cement plants. These figures indicate clearly that labour is 
not used efficiently. One can conclude that SNMC plants are 
overstaffed because of governmental policies and social 
problems (see Chapter Four and Five for more details). 
According to the overstaffing ratios, the various factors 
influencing these ratios are correlated to geographical 
location. Analysis of the data clearly indicates that the 
various SNMC inputs are not efficiently used. 
Table 6.7: Rate of overstaffing 
in SNMC plants in 1980 
Total plants producing 
the same output. 
Ratio of over- 
staffing in % 
Cement plants 33.66 
Plaster, gypsum and lime plants 3.52 
Red products plants. 16.37 
Ceramic tile plants 21 
Ceramic tile sani. fitting plants 20.50 
Cement asbestos plants 6.9 
Plastic products plants 2.3 
Rate of absenteeism in SNMC (1) 11.22 
Source: Table F. l in the Appendix F. 
(1)The total is calculated from the figures given 
in Table 
F. 1. 
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6.2. Common causes of inefficiency in SNMC 
Now that the evidence regarding the underutilisation of 
the different inputs have been given, causes of inefficiency 
common to all SNMC plants are analysed. First, organisational 
factors will be discussed. Shortages of inputs will be 
described in the second section which will be followed by 
allocative inefficiencies. Demand shortages will be analysed 
in the fourth section. 
6.2.1. Organisational factors 
One of the obvious causes of underutilisation of inputs in 
SNMC is the high rate of absenteeism. In 1980, the rate of 
absenteeism for SNMC was 5.2%. An analysis of this ratio with 
respect to skill qualifications, shows that this ratio was 
higher for technicians and supervisors and semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers than for managers (see Table 6.8. ). The 
highest ratio was obtained for technicians and supervisors. 
According to SNMC managers, the rate of absenteeism is much 
higher during night shifts. This high rate of absenteeism is 
attributed to noneconomic causes (social, cultural and 
1institutional), as discussed earlier in chapter Four. 
Table 6.8: Rate of absenteeism in SNMC by 
employee skill categories for 1980 
Skill category Rate of absenteeism 
Managers 3.59 
Technicians and supervisors 5.76 
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 5.17 
Total SNMC 5.2 
Source: Survey data. 
In almost all SNMC plants and, in particular, in the 
cement plants, the major concern was the 
inefficient 
management of spare parts. The volume of spare parts 
is very 
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often enormous, especially in plants using capital intensive 
technology and those built by different contractors (as in 
decomposed contracts). Accurate records of the references for 
the different spare parts are often not kept. Spare parts are 
often left outdoors and are thus subject to severe damage. 
This is the result of a shortage of stocking areas, the lack 
of skilled workers and inefficient spare parts stock 
management. 
In addition to the organisational factors mentioned above, 
other factors already discussed in Chapter Four are also 
encountered in SNMC plants (e. g., bureaucratic administra- 
tion). In conclusion, SNMC and SONIC are faced with similar 
organisational problems leading to identical inefficiencies. 
6.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
6.2.2.1. Shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
The raw materials used in the production process in SNMC 
plants are supplied locally and are not subject to a lack of 
transport and road infrastructure since, in most cases, these 
plants are located in the vicinity of the supply point. Thus, 
in contrast to SONIC, SNMC does not suffer from a shortage of 
raw materials. Shortages of raw materials, however, sometimes 
occur due to difficulties in gaining access to these inputs, 
such as in the Hama Bouziane cement plant or due to the lack 
of, spare parts, as in the Meftah cement plant. 
SNMC pants also suffer from water shortages. The 
consequences, however, have minor effects when compared 
to the 
SONIC case since SNMC plants are not extensive users of water. 
In contrast, the shortage of electricity had drastic consequen- 
ces on the utilisation of 
inputs in SNMC plants. This is 
particularly true of plants which do not possess 
their own 
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electricity generator such as the ceramic tile plants of 
Rhemchi, El-Achour and Ibn-Ziad and the ceramic sanitary 
fitting plants of Tenes, El-Milia and Ghazaouet. Power supply 
cuts often led to several days of work stoppage because of the 
amount of time involved in maintaining the oven (e. g., 
cleaning) and in reaching the required temperature. Cement 
plants, which all own electricity generators, were much less 
affected by power cuts. Variations in electricity supply led 
to both an increase in capital goods maintenance and a decrea- 
se in their life expectancy. One can conclude, therefore, 
that similar to the SONIC case, shortages of electricity led 
to the underutilisation of fixed capital and labour in the 
SNMC plants. The extent of electricity shortages which resul- 
ted from reasons already discussed in the previous Chapter 
depends also on the geographical location of the plants. 
Plants also suffer from shortages of other inputs such as 
bags for cement packaging in all the cement plants or folding 
boxes for tile packaging in all the tile plants. These inputs 
are usually supplied by the SONIC plants which, from earlier 
discussion, are faced with inefficiencies that affect their 
production capacity. This fact stresses the importance of 
input utilisation in interactive sectors or branches of 
industry. 
6.2.2.2. Shortages of means of transport, infrastructure 
facilities and working capital 
Shortages of means of transportation and the nonexistence 
of an efficient distribution network have greater consequences 
for the SNMC plants than the SONIC plants. In 1980,26% (4) 
of the SNMC transport capacities were, on average, not opera- 
tional during the year due to the lack of maintenance and 
spare parts and their poor state 
(old age). The shortage of 
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transport is the result of insufficient capacity (i. e., rail- 
ways and lorries) which is correlated to the nature of the 
output transported. These outputs are heavy and, therefore, 
require large transport capacity. In addition, the actual 
transport capacities are worn out and have not been replaced 
due to the lack of funds. This situation is sometimes 
worsened by the geographical location of the plants. 
Consequently, some plants overstock outputs when there is a 
shortage of these outputs in other regions. The shortage of 
means of transport also results in shortages of imports with 
minor effects. The shortage of infrastructure facilities also 
deeply affects SNMC plants. For instance, the Saida cement 
plant has a lot of problems because of the shortage of social 
infrastructure in the area. 
The price of SNMC outputs increased on average by 26% 
between 1978 and 1979 and by 4.7% between 1979 and 1980. 
Despite this increase, production costs, which are subject to 
high personnel charges (36% of the sales revenue in 1978) and 
frequent increases of imported spare parts prices, are not 
covered. Subsidies are planned to be distributed to SNMC to 
alleviate 'its critical financial situation. Unfortunately, 
bureaucratic and organisational problems prevent the distribu- 
tion of these subsidies on time. Consequently, SNMC is faced 
with enormous financial difficulties which is clearly 
illustrated by a negative working capital and cash flow of 
385.81 million AD and 133.035 million AD in 1978 1 
respectively, and a bank overdraft of 1,850 million AD (5). 
SNMC was obliged to take recourse in short term loans carrying 
high financial charges which heightened its financial charges 
to 10% of its total charges in 1980. In addition, almost all 
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the newly built plants encountered financial difficulties 
since they were expected to begin repaying their credit 
although they were not fully operational. Insufficient 
working capital leads to inefficiencies which, in turn, may 
cause underutilisation of inputs (see part 4.3.2). 
6.2.2.3. Shortages of skilled labour 
According to its managers, SNMC is also faced with a lack 
of skilled workers, particularly in plants using capital 
intensive technology. A few foreigners (technical assistants) 
are hired to make up for the lack of Algerian skilled labour 
(2.5% of the total managers). This shortage is confirmed by 
the figures discussed earlier in this chapter. The lack of 
skilled labour is particularly acute in the maintenance, 
technical and managerial positions at the plant level. SNMC 
experiences the same problems in this area as SONIC and the 
consequences are identical to those described in Chapter Four. 
6.2.2.4. Shortages of imported inputs 
According to SNMC managers, the shortage of imported 
inputs was one of the important causes of underutilisation of 
-inputs. Such a shortage especially concerned the spare parts 
of machinery and means of transport. The rigidity of import 
regulations also affects the supply of imported spare parts. 
For example, when the conveyor belt of the Mefta cement plant 
broke down in 1976, it took several months to get the 
necessary AGI and once the conveyor belt arrived at the port, 
it took several weeks for it to clear customs. In the 
meantime, the plant was struggling to transport the necessary 
raw materials by any means possible to keep the plant working. 
The managers also reported that imported spare parts were 
often rusted, lost (empty boxes were delivered) and sometimes 
arrived without their reference numbers. In 1980, the AGI for 
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the first semester was allocated three months later than the 
presumed date just as in SONIC. The shortage of spare parts 
is due to reasons mentioned above and leads to underutilisa- 
tion of inputs as already discussed. The shortage of imported 
spare parts has effects similar to those of the SONIC plants, 
but the shortage of imported raw materials and intermediate 
inputs has only a minor effect on SNMC as the degree of 
dependency on imported inputs (other than capital goods) is 
lower in SNMC plants than in SONIC plants. 
6.2.2.5. Shortages of stocking areas 
Stocking areas are insufficient to efficiently stock all 
the spare parts and outputs in almost all SNMC plants. In 
addition, the present stocking areas are insufficient to 
prevent stock ruptures of output during the maintenance period 
(SNMC plants are often stopped for a whole month for 
maintenance). For instance, in 1980, the cement safety stock 
consisted of only 7 days' production for the entire number of 
cement plants during the maintenance period (one month). Such 
situations lead to shortages and a climate of insecurity that 
gives rise to black market activities. The lack of stocking 
areas is often due to space restrictions resulting from the 
inappropriate geographical location of the plant. Most SNMC 
plants have excess capacity and one may argue that available 
stockage areas would produce an incentive for using such 
excess capacity (this inefficiency will be discussed later in 
this chapter in more detail). 
6.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
As explained under investment policy, the decision 
regarding the location of a plant is taken by the planning 
committee. A large number of SNMC plants encounter problems 
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because of their location. For instance, the Hama Bouziane 
cement plant is faced with raw materials supply problems. The 
Saida cement plant also has problems because of the inadequate 
infrastructure around the plant. The Saida industrial zone 
is, in addition, located in an area which is subject to 
frequent flooding (see previous chapter). Another example is 
the greater concentration of cement plants in the Western part 
of the country, although the demand for cement is greater in 
the Eastern part. This leads to overstocking and demand 
shortages in the West and cement shortages in the East. The 
overstocking of cement is also caused by a deficient transpor- 
tation network and a shortage of means of transport. In an 
attempt to alleviate this situation, the overstocked cement 
was shipped in bulk to the Eastern regions. The cost of 
transport was so high that the cost of cement produced by SNMC 
was twice as expensive as imported cement. Moreover, a number 
of plants were located in small villages away from the large 
urban and industrial centres in response to the regional 
imbalance. These plants were faced with a lack of both 
: skilled and unskilled workers. In fact, workers have to 
travel from the large cities to the villages to work. The 
lack of adequate housing for workers means that workers get to 
the plant already tired after a one or two hour journey. This 
problem is considered transitory as people are expected to 
move to the area where they work. Unfortunately, the building 
process appears to be inefficient in solving this problem. No 
housing have yet been built in these villages to accommodate 
all these workers and their families. Although some of 
these 
problems may be transitory, some of them could 
have been 
avoided if the right choice of location was made and 
the 
development of the expected and/or complementory sector 
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achieved. 
Production stoppages sometimes occurred because of defects 
in technical design. The Mefta cement plant, for example, had 
to shut down for two months in 1976 to prevent further 
pollution problems (i. e., cement dust from a faulty filter). 
The filter had to be redesigned by the Japanese contractor, a 
process which took several months. 
presents problems. 
6.2.4. Demand shortages 
The new design still 
Some SNMC plants have been built in anticipation of future 
demand because of the advantages arising from economies of 
scale and available technology. Technology is bought on the 
international market where only a restricted choice is 
available. The plants, which have an excess capacity, produce 
ceramic sanitary fittings, aggregates, floor coverings (6) and 
cement asbestos. In addition, deficient demand also occurred 
because of sectoral development imbalances. This is the case 
of the housing programs and some SNMC constructed plants. 
These plants were built to produce construction materials 
which corresponded to planned construction programs. Implemen- 
tation of the construction programs achieved only about one 
quarter of their planned objectives. Consequently, the newly 
constructed plants do not have potential users. Excess 
capacity also arises in plants producing new products which 
are unknown by potential consumers. A good example is the 
construction plastic product plants. This may be attributed 
to the lack of an advertising campaign which would present the 
new products to the general public. SNMC also has more plants 
which have excess capacity than SONIC (it has only one). 
Demand shortages and excess capacity can be considered 
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transitory since they are expected to disappear when local 
demand increases. The outputs can also be easily stocked 
provided stocking capacities exist (because of the nature of 
the output). Exports could also be promoted to neighbouring 
countries. 
Except for demand shortages, which are a transitory 
concern, one can conclude that SNMC and SONIC encounter 
similar inefficiencies leading to an underutilisation of raw 
material, intermediate inputs, fixed capital and labour. 
These include organisational inefficiencies, shortages of 
inputs and allocative inefficiencies, all of which are 
integral to the Algerian economy. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : SNIC PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
SNIC, which is in charge of the production of light 
chemicals, was founded on the 14th of December, 1967. On the 
25th of July, 1973, its activity was extended to the glass 
industry after the public enterprise of the glass industry 
(SNIV) was dissolved and its patrimony transferred to SNIC 
(1). SNIC, like SONIC and SNMC, is under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Light Industries and is mainly oriented 
towards the production of consumer goods. SNIC's development 
has not been as rapid as that of SNMC but it has been more 
rapid than that of SONIC. In 1980, SNIC consisted of sixteen 
plants in production and thirty plants under construction, all 
totally owned by the state. Of the., sixteen plants in 
production, ten plants were built before independence while 
the other six were built after 1972. Between 1973 and 1979, 
SNIC sales revenue increased by a factor of 4.15 to 0.92 
billion AD (2). In 1980, SNIC employed about 8,600 workers, 
only 1.57 times more than in 1973. SNIC's sales revenue and 
labour force are slightly larger than those of SONIC, but much 
lower than those of SNMC. SNIC development was made possible 
by a few investments made in this branch (see Chapter Two). 
The different plants are all located in the Northern part of 
the country with most of them concentrated in the central part 
of Algeria (i. e., two thirds of the plants are located in 
Algiers, Rouiba and Lakhdaria). 
SNIC's plants-in production and under construction and 
their respective outputs are shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, 
respectively. The work on the plants under construction has 
been delayed since half of them were planned to start between 
1978 and 1979 but did not do so due to numerous problems (see 
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Table 7.1: SNIC plants and respective outputs in 1980 
Plants in production/ Year of Unit Production 1980 
outputs entry Techni. plann ed actual 
Paint sector Tons 73,441 81,615 82,444 
-The Oued-Smar paint p. Nat. Tons 25,831 26,763 25 727 -Building paint Tons - 15,506 
, 1 
paint Tons - 4,947 4,249 
-Auto. body paint Tons - 2,720 1 850 
-Varnish Tons - 1,147 
, 
942 
-Solvent Tons - 2,443 2,382 
-PVC Tons - 4,592 3,847 
-Glue Tons - 902 529 
-The Lakhdaria paint p. 1975 Tons 23,859 23,928 25,194 
-Building paint Tons - 18,860 21,242 
-Industrial paint Tons - 2,575 1,874 
-Auto. body paint Tons - 1,. 270 1,250 
-Varnish Tons - 293 86 
-Solvent Tons - 930 777 
-The Cheraga paint plant Nat. Tons 13,714 13,852 15,595 
-Building paint Tons - 13,852 15,595 
-The Oran paint plant Nat. Tons 10,037 11,578 11,752 
-building paint Tons - 11,468 11,685 
-solvent Tons - 110 67 
Large consumption sector 
-Household cleaning prod. 103 AD - 46,996 37,004 
-The Lakhdaria h. cl. p. p. 1979 " "- 31,930 28,911 
-The Hussain-Dey h. c. p. p. Nat. " "- 11,427 7, f 285 
-The Oran h. cl. p. plant Nat. " "- 3,639 808 
-The detergent plants Tons 51,845 56,000 33,750 
-The Rouiba plant 1980 - - - 
-The Reghaia plant Nat. - - - 
For both plants 
-"Isis" detergent Tons - 49,850 29,949 
-"Teldj" detergent Tons - 3,450 3,099 
-"Nadal' scourer powder - 2,700 702 
-The Guelma earthenware p. 1972 Tons 3,100 3,100 2,430 
-The Rouiba blade plant Nat. *103 U 84,296 80,775 80,322 
-The Belcourt cosmetic p. Nat. 103 AD - 77,833 68,277 
-Shampo of to - 21,565 17,997 
-Alcohol for perfums it to - 34,017 38,740 
-Sundry items of of - 22,251 11,540 
-The Algiers insecticides p- Tons - 73,600 61,888 
(Table continues on the following page. ) 
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Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Plants in production/ Year of Unit Production 1980 
outputs entry Techni. planned actual 
Glass and maize sector 
-The glass plant of Oran 1962 Tons 92,060 58,777 36,791 
-Hollow glass 1962* Tons 76,800 44,480 26,995 
-Bottle Tons - 38,075 25,291 
-Case-bottle Tons - 0 239 
-Tumbler Tons - 6,305 1,392 
-Crystal glass Tons - 51 73 
-Flat glass 1976/77Tons 15,260 14,297 9,796 
-3 mm Tons - 6,156 2,569 
-4 mm Tons - 2,564 5,876 
-6 mm Tons - 1,540 1,353 
-Polished glass Tons - 4,037 0 
-The Thenia mirror plant 1977 m2 578,000 549,216 218,781 
-Cutting up & shaping it 462,830 166,524 
-Silvering of 95,451 52,257 
-The Maghnia maize plant 1980 Tons 65,100 32,550 15,027 
-Starch Tons - 7,800 3,347 
-Glucose Tons - 10,500 5,083 
-White & wellow dextrin Tons 0 935 
-Germ-oil Tons - 750 96 
-Glutin Tons - 1,800 368 
-Breeding food Tons - 6,000 2,706 
-cracked maize Tons - 4,500 2,178 
-Maize germs Tons - - 308 
Source: Table G. 1 in the Appendix G. 
* Extended. 
U Unit. 
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Chapter Three). In 1980, the SNIC annual paint production 
capacity was 73,000 tons, its glassware products capacity was 
92,000 tons, its detergent capacity was 52,000 tons and its 
earthenware products capacity was 3,100 tons. Details of 
output capacities and the year of entry in production are 
given for each SNIC plant in Table 7.1. 
SNIC, like SNMC, is a divisionalized organisation consis- 
ting of three different sectors: the paint sector, the glass 
and maize sector and the large consumption products sector 
(see Figure 7.1). Each sector is headed by a managing 
director. This organisational structure was intended for use 
during the transitional period prior to the general reorgani- 
sation of SNIC. SNIC objectives, functions, authority and 
managerial environment are very similar to those of SONIC and 
SNMC, which have already been described in Chapter Four. 
SNIC, which produces about the same number of outputs as 
SONIC, possesses a slightly higher number of plants than 
SONIC. A comparison between these two public enterprises 
shows that SNIC and SONIC have experienced relatively similar 
. development. 
As opposed to SONIC, however, SNIC still 
receives large investments, which are indicated by the number 
of plants under construction (30 in SNIC compared to 7 in 
SONIC). The similarities between SNIC and SONIC extend to the 
geographical location of their respective plants. Some 
similarities between SNIC and SNMC can also be found. For 
instance, the number of outputs each produces is about the 
same and in both cases the plants are located 
in the northern 
part of Algeria. SNIC, however, 
is a smaller public 
enterprise than SNMC (SNIC has only one 
fifth the number of 
SNMC plants). 
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SNIC Managing Director 
Head office 
Paint sector 
U-me vuea mar paint plant 1 
[The Lakhdaria paint plant 
[The Cheraga paint plant 
The Oran paint plant 
Glass and maize sector 
{The Oran glass plant 
The Thenia mirror plant 
The Maehnia maize plant 
O sage consumption sector 
IThe Lakhdaria household clean. p. pl 
The Hussain Dey household c lea. p. 
[The Oran household cleaning prod. p 
The Guelma earthenware plant 
I The Algiers cosmetic plant 
The Rouiba blade plant 
IThe Rouiba detergent plant 
The Re haia detergent plant 
The Algiers insecticide plan 
Distribution units 
Figure 7.1 : SNIC organisational structure in 1980. 
Source : Survey data. 
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Table 7.2: SNIC's plants under construction and 
their respective outputs in 1980 
Plant / location outputs 
Ain-Temouchent Detergent 
Sour-El-Ghozlane Detergent 
Chelghoum-Laid Detergent 
Sig Paint 
Souk-Ahras Paint 
Saida Household cleaning products 
Saida Abrasives 
El-Aouinet Household cleaning products 
Menaceur Glassware products 
El-Aouina Glassware products 
Bougara Glassware products 
Maghnia Earthenware products 
Mila (two) Earthenware products 
Lakhdaria (five) Ink, varnish, 
synthetic glue, solvent and 
household cleaning products 
Akbou Tints 
El-Oued Blades 
Ouadhia Cosmetic products 
Other plants Special light chemicals 
A research centre 
Source: Survey data. 
In SNIC as in SONIC and SNMC, one can differentiate 
between pre- and post-independence plants. The latter were 
built after 1972 with the implementation of the various 
development plans while the former were built prior to 1962 
and subsequently nationalised. There is evidence that the 
pre-independence plants use a traditional labour intensive 
technology as opposed to the post-independence plants which 
use a capital intensive technology. The reasons for these 
differences have already been discussed in Chapter Five. The 
adopted technology has also had, in SNIC's case, an influence 
on plant scale and consequently, the scale of the pre- and 
post-independence plants is different. The former are small 
and medium-scale while the latter are large-scale. The rela- 
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tionship between choice of technology and plant size was 
already discussed in Chapter Five. With regard to the use of 
capital intensive technology in large-scale plants and tradi- 
tional labour intensive technology in small or medium-scale 
plants (post- and pre-independence plants, respectively), SNIC 
and SONIC face similar problems. 
All SNIC plants, with the exception of the Rouiba blade 
plant, are multiproduct plants. SNIC's plants are also highly 
integrated. The latter characteristic may be attributed to 
-the relatively straightforward production processes used in 
the light chemical industries. The level of integration is 
very high in some plants since these plants manufacture their 
own packaging products (e. g., detergent plants). In this 
respect, SNIC's plants and SNIC as a whole are comparable to 
SNMC's plants and SNMC as a whole, respectively. 
Similar to the construction materials branch, the light 
chemical branch is characterised by a large private sector. 
In fact, SNIC only contributes about half of the local produc- 
tion in the light chemical industries. SNIC monopolizes the 
; production of earthenware products, blades, maize, mirrors, 
hollow and flat glass, and powder detergents (not liquid). 
This situation is in contrast with that of SONIC but is 
comparable to that of SNMC. One common point is that these 
three public enterprises hold the absolute monopoly regarding 
international trade in their respective branches. Imports, 
rather than exports, are important activities of these 
three 
public enterprises. 
As seen in Chapter Two, the light chemical branch is 
characterised by a large private sector. In 
1978, for 
example, 303 firms belonged 
to private investors with one 
employing more than 500 workers 
(3). The private firms are 
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mainly involved in the production of household cleaning 
products such as bleaching liquid (52% of total local produc- 
tion), washing soda (86% of local production), the total 
production of liquid detergent, paint and cosmetic products. 
The development of the light chemical branch was left inten- 
tionally to the private sector. Some investments considered 
vital, however, were made by the public sector through SNIC. 
The development of private firms in this branch is 
different from that in the pulp and paper branch, for example. 
This reflects, to some extent, different attitudes of the 
government with regard to the existence and development of a 
private sector in these two branches of industry. The 
different approaches arise as well from the fact that develop- 
ment of the light chemical branch, as opposed to that of the 
pulp and paper branch, does not require large investments. In 
addition, the production processes in the light chemical 
industry, similar to those in the construction materials 
industry, seem to be technologically easier to master than 
those in the pulp and paper industry. This is confirmed to a 
certain extent by the fact that 80% of the private light 
chemical firms employed less than 20 workers (4). In view of 
what has been said earlier, some similarities exist between 
the development of the construction materials and the light 
chemical private firms. The importance of the private sector 
in the light chemical branch, however, does not lead to fierce 
competition between public and private sectors. This is due 
to the fact that the nature of the outputs produced and the 
local market situation in the two branches are different. The 
SNIC local market situation is somewhat comparable to that of 
SONIC but different from that of SNMC. 
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The number of shifts in SNIC plants is given in Table 7.3. 
In 1980, over 37.5% (6 plants) of the plants operated with 
only one shift, 12.5% with two shifts and 25% with three 
shitts. On average, a SNIC plant operates for 12 hours per 
day (one and one half shifts). The average operating time for 
pre- and post-independence plants is 17.3 and 12.3 hours per 
day, respectively. From this, it appears that the number of 
shifts of a SNIC plant is related to the age of the plant. 
This conclusion is similar to that drawn for SONIC, but 
contrasts with that of SNMC where the number of shifts is 
related to not only the age of the plant but also the nature 
of the output produced. 
Table 7.3: Number of shifts in SNIC plants in 1980 
Hours of Number Number Percentage Pre-ind. Post-ind. 
work of of of total plants plants 
per day shifts plants plants (1) (2) (1) (2) 
8 1 6 37.5 5 31.25 1 6.25 
11 1.37 1 0.6 1 6.25 - - 
12 1.5 2 12.5 1 6.25 1 6.25 
16 2 2 12.5 1 6.25 1 6.25 
16-24 2-3 1 0.6 - - 1 6.25 
24 3 4 25 2 12.5 2 12.5 
Total 16 100 10 6 
Source: Table G. 1 in the Appendix G. 
1 Number of plants 
2 percentage of total plants 
- Not applicable 
The origin of the different main inputs used by SNIC is 
shown in Table 7.4. Most of the raw materials and interme- 
diate inputs are available either from the local market or 
within SNIC. Only a small proportion of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs, mainly chemicals, are imported. In 
contrast, a large proportion of the spare parts used 
by SNIC 
is imported, just as for SONIC and SNMC. This tends to occur 
Table 7.4 : Origin of SNIC inputs 
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WITHIN SNIC 
Glass bottles * * 
Solvent 
Alcohol * 
Packaging products * * * 
LOCAL MARKET 
Silica 100% 
Water 1007. 1007. 100% 100% 1007 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Electricity 1007. 1007. 100% 1007 1007 100% 100% 1007, 100% 1007. 
Clay * 
Barita sulphate * * 
Cans * 
Ethylene * 
Marbre powder * 
z Chlorine 
Henne grass * 
Lime * 
H Cardboard * * 
Hydrochlor. acid 
g Plastic bottles * * * 
H Spare parts * * * * * * * * * * 
z H 
INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
Sodium sulphate 
Alum * * 
Dolomite * 
Carbonate of soda * 
Thin special iron 
sheets 
Lithopone 
Titanium oxide * 
Marbre powder 
"Nansa & oleum" 
Feldspar 
Spare parts * * * * 
Total imports Abo ut 2 0% 
FIXED CAPITAL 1007. imported 
Foreign 0.23% 
LABOU 
Local 99.77% 
* indicates the origin of the input without specifying the proportion. 
because fixed capital is imported and local firms are not 
geared for the production of these particular inputs. The 
SNIC labour force is mainly Algerian, with the foreign labour 
force representing only about 0.2% of the total SNIC labour 
force. On the other hand, fixed capital was totally imported. 
The degree of dependency on the requisite imported inputs is 
similar to that for SNMC but lower than that for SONIC. 
The destination of SNIC outputs, as indicated in Table 
7.5, is oriented mainly towards the domestic market. SNIC 
outputs consist principally of finished outputs and a few 
semi-finished outputs used directly by consumers and the 
industrial sector. SNIC is, in fact, specialised in the 
consumer sector with a relatively small proportion of its 
output oriented toward the industrial sector, in particular, 
paint,, "solvent and bottles. The destination of SNIC outputs 
is more like that of SONIC than that of SNMC. As indicated 
earlier, no SNIC outputs are exported. In fact, some 
products, especially detergent and soap, are imported in order 
to keep pace with local demand. Local supply falls short of 
demand due to the lack of price competitiveness with regard to 
the international market and insufficient domestic production. 
The SNIC labour force, which is shown in Table 7.6 and 
Figure 7.2, can be divided into three main categories: 
managers, technicians and supervisors, and semi-skilled 
and 
unskilled workers. In 1980,80 per cent of 
the total SNIC 
labour force consisted of semi-skilled or unskilled workers, 
16.1% were technicians or supervisors and 3.9% were managers. 
Female labour force participation was low, accounting 
for only 
8.1% of the total labour force. As mentioned earlier, 
foreign 
labour force participation was not very 
important, amounting 
to only 0.2% of total SNIC labour force and 
1.4% of total SNIC 
Table 7.5 : Destination of SNIC outputs 
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Building paint 
Industrial paint * * * * * 
Auto body paint * * 
Varnish * * 
Solvent * * * * * 
Clue * * * * * * * * * 
Powder detergent 100% 
Bleaching water * 1007 
Cresyl 1007. 
Washing soda 100% 
Disinfectant products 100% 
Powder scourer 1007. 
Shampoo 100% 
Henne 100% 
Alcohol (perfums) 
Hygienic products 1007. 
Tooth-paste 1007. 
Talc 100% 
Cosmetic products 100% 
Blades 1007. 
Mirror 10074 
Glass window 100% 
Bottle * * * 
Tumber 1007. 
Crystal glass 1007. 
Earthenware 1007. 
Starch * * 
Glucose ýc 
Dextrin * 
Germ-oil 
Breeding food 
Cracked maize 
Maize germ 
Packaging products 1*1* 
* indicates the destination of the output without specifying the proportion. 
Source: Survey data. 
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managers. Figures concerning labour force qualifications in 
the various plants indicate that some of the plants greatly 
suffer from the lack of skilled workers. This is the case, 
for example, of the blade plant of Rouiba which had only 24 
per cent of its work force qualified as technicians and 
supervisors and none qualified as managers. The glass plant 
of Oran was faced with a similar situation since only 1% of 
the total labour force of the plant were qualified as 
managers. An interesting finding along these same lines is 
that there appears to be no correlation between the proportion 
of skilled workers employed in a given plant and the type of 
technology employed by that plant (either labour intensive or 
capital intensive). 
The proportion of skilled workers in SNIC plants was lower 
than for SNIC as a whole, since only 1.7% of the total labour 
force in the plants were managers and 13.3% were technicians 
and supervisors. The proportion of managers at the head 
office and projects was 11.9% and that at the distribution 
units, 11%. As indicated in Figure 7.3,46% of the the total 
managers were employed in the head office, 23% in the projects 
and only 27% in the different plants. Of the technicians and 
supervisors employed by SNIC, only half worked in plants while 
20 per cent worked in the head office. 
In 1980, SNIC plants were characterised by a high rate of 
absenteeism, amounting to 4.92% for SNIC as a whole 
(see Table 
7.6). Within SNIC, this rate varied between 2.17% and 7.9%. 
A comparison between the rates of absenteeism 
for the 
different plants indicates that this rate was higher 
in plants 
located around Algiers and in the Eastern regions 
than those 
around Oran. In contrast 
to the high rate of absenteeism in 
O 
co 
ON 
C 
C, 
C 
C 
0 
Ly 
U 
N 
'. O 
ti 
h- 
r- , oc 
4- O) %O (D U1 N IO -1 1A Co 1` ýO t 41 NC LP1 O'. CO N V'% LA - It Uli Ul% N 
4+ -- (0 (DZ f- 1` ýt ýt ýO itt 1ft V1 fV ýt 1ý ýt l! ý l! t 
im > V- 
O 
PMtiM M1-Ntnýt (> -- '- M- a+ Co 10 %0 Co - Oý MN.. O 1n O. ON O'. Ov . tM -. t - -. t -M, - Co NNN H 
f- ti MI LA 2" 
-+ N Co CO Co CO Co Co Co N- 00 0" Co Co 
N 
y 
N ^ 
ýt OOp. CO O '0O 
Nto %0 P '-'- 
O'. f- 
E 
C '- 
ýO'. '. -t tNM 
M%0 - (>N 
M- N q- 
LAM 
CO 
N 00'! 
O- N 
Z0v 
(flu) 
C L. M P- F- Co F- F- 
t0 0 . .. p 
" tAN ýt'ON. 0 F- '0 LA tor- " M-tN V "ý v ýýr- r-ýe- (V Ný1A 9-w- 
"- 
C L 
L Gl OCO CO 0 PM OCD -tF-0 CO MI f- 
0 O. - F- LA LAM f-MinM M LA LA MM GJ 7v - 
H U) 
fl. l-_ ßt%0- In -4 
f/1 
% ýNNN ýCM MCl VJ 
N 
p) v 
l0 
C 
CD In F- QIA '0-* C) (D . t'-0 -. t MM 
grrree r- 
v" is 
0 CL CL 
ý. 
a 
4-0 L0 
4-0 .- 
it 
y+ 
Lý 
D) QQUtcL C) 
o c(Oa-C C)LEC) " CJ ä0N Of 'ß - 0. _ 
ýq 
4-1 Cl Uf 'a t >. iJ L . - 
(D äWc CD 4-+ o CD G1 L Vl L 
CD Caß .0 0to 
U) - 
) (a E 
U\ Vf L. 
"C CD f0 NLC .a CD 
4a 0-0 mW 'a 
C .CCLt. - ""- "- C vl -+ CSC= 
it) ýWLt 
C) 00W37L. <0 
In dQJ0u cc cc Q CC JS00HX 
979 
C 
N- 
V r- 
> J 
a mo NNN ýt ý .. ýy 
++ OJ 
C 
2Y ýE 2! ' L 
p . M N a N-N P 
Ni Ö tp + E 
O . Iý 
- 
(D Ir N (> 
- Oý a, a C y 
00 0 't 'O O ßt 0 0 C GJ 0 
c0 " -ý (n oý L. c7 aý 0. m 
OO C) U 
r O "" C) .cLL "-" 
W% Co L 41 2N 
f+` Cl, 
C <0 C 
LA Co 01 Oý 
C 
a+ CO 
-2 
LO " 
" 
-'t 
ti 
O. LA M 00 Of C 
>7UO of C 
ýO. _ 0 «+ O) 41 ýc JC C) "- LOC a+ C 
x 
fý a+ aö 
v 
c Z 
w- N %0 "" 4-+ JO C) y C) Mr e- 0 a+ V .. - CJ .ý 
in O' in N ýp r f- 10 4- v- ya CO 
ýNOO -t O 
NN L- 
7 O_ 7L -0 4-4 CO 2 4 
- 0) 
E 
C) 
ýt O" ýt CD C c0 J000 
M C7O 
N CD d cm >" v- G) 
LdLLU 
4' 0L. 
in ýO PM P- Co t LA 8 0 y- y 
" in N -t - ) a) 0G 0 
Ni J +J (9 (0 
" E to OCUJ 
L 077 L U) 41 JLJ Co CD 
a+ a+ 0 O J- co cý C) 0J 
y L ý0 J vc CO caLa, 
L 41 > 0 a-xC 0- -0 L a+ 7 CO CJ Cý L C) L CO 4+ ++ (0 
C 4.1 CO C) G) C >LLNCJ 
C) Oy "- C L L3C7 3>, N t0 - 
0 ".. . "- C. ) CD 7 7 0) c0 Of C .OLJ (9 
41 73 aý J CD V V) .-L G) V a> 
(A 4 w0`4-LJ CD 
-2 ' - 4' 
Co C CO U) C v- w 4+ CD v- U 
O0 C) ++ O1 OO NO C) L 4J O "-+ +-0 
yj CD .,. y J VLL CO OZO 
", a+ C o1 C to N N G7 L º- N ý- aF ?2 U) Z 
e0 O 
NL QQU O O t0 c0 O 
= G. C. F- U- CC (C Cl) 19 #ýN 
V 
1-4 
z N 
Cl) 
pC 
z 
z 0 
H 
V 
x 
Ls. 
H 
övä 
H 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
PERCENTAGE 
Figure 7.2 : Percentage of labour force by skill category in SNIC. 
Source : Table 7.5. 
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SNIC as a whole, the rate of labour turnover of the total 
labour force was only 0.08%. 
The SNIC labour force is as important as that of SONIC but 
much less important than that of SN4C. As indicated in Figure 
7.4, the proportion of skilled workers in SNIC is lower than 
for SONIC but higher than for SNMC. With respect to the 
proportion of their skilled labour force working in plants as 
compared with the head office, the three public enterprises 
concerned face similar situations. The skilled labour force 
is concentrated at the head office. SNIC is characterised by 
a lower rate of absenteeism than SONIC or SNMC (4.92%, 7.14% 
and 5.2%, respectively). Similarly, the rate of turnover of 
the labour force for SNIC is lower than that for SONIC. This 
rate shows a certain stability and lack of mobility of the 
SNIC labour force which may be explained by the high average cost 
and seniority of the SNIC labour force in contrast to that of 
SONIC. The low labour turnover has an effect on the training 
cost, the experience gain, the morale of the labour force and 
finally, on labour productivity. 
Now that the general profile of SNIC has been drawn, the 
following will concentrate on the analysis of the utilisation 
of different inputs. Subsequently, the main causes of 
underutilisation of the different inputs will be investigated. 
7. I. Utilisation of inputs in SNIC 
7.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
According to SNIC's managers, the different plants do not 
make inefficient use of raw materials and intermediate 
inputs. 
The available figures do not show overconsumption of these 
inputs when compared to norms in the different plants, with 
the exception of the Oran glass plant. In the Oran glass 
plant, the proportion of broken glass 
is higher than that 
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Figure 7.4 : Percentage of skilled labour force in SNIC, 
SONIC and SNMC for 1980. 
Sources : Tables 5.4,6.4 and 7.5. 
specified by the norm and the quality of the outputs is not up 
to the standard given by the norm. In addition, the actual 
quantities of consumable inputs used, such as water and elec- 
tricity, are higher than the norms. Raw materials and 
intermediate inputs such as sand and chemical products, on the 
other hand, are not overconsumed, since they can be used 
again. In glass processing in particular, outputs which are 
not up to the quality standard can be reprocessed. Similar to 
the SNMC case, no other evidence of overconsumption of raw 
materials and intermediate inputs can be found. 
7.1.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
1980 figures for U1 (ratio of actual over planned- 
capacity), U2 (ratio of planned over technical capacity) and 
U3 (ratio of actual over technical nuit-Lber of shifts) have been 
calculated for each plant's outputs (whenever possible), for 
each plant, for each SNIC output and for SNIC as a whole. As 
indicated in Table G. 1 in the Appendix G, U1 by plant output 
ranges from 0% to 229%. The lowest and highest values of U1 
(0% and 229%) were recorded for polished glass (5) and 4mm 
flat glass, respectively, at the Oran glass plant (6). As 
indicated in Table 7.7, the value of U1 and U2 for each plant 
varied between 22% and 112% and between 50% and 115%, respec- 
tively. The maize plant of Maghnia recorded the lowest rate 
of capacity utilisation (U1=36%, U2=50%) while the paint plant 
of Cheraga was characterised by the highest rate of capacity 
utilisation (U1=112%, U2=101%). The value of Ui and U2 for 
SNIC output varied between 36% and 99% and between 50% and 
108%, respectively. The lowest rate of capacity utilisation 
was recorded for SNIC maize output (U1=36%, U2=50%) while SNIC 
blade output corresponded to the highest rate of capacity 
utilisation (U1=99%, U2=95%). Consequently, for SNIC as a 
whole, fixed capital was inefficiently used (U1= 72.5%, U2= 
95%) . 
Table 7.8 indicates that, the rate of fixed capital 
utilisation is higher in the pre-independence than in the 
post-independence plants. The rate of fixed capital utilisa- 
tion in SNIC is, therefore, correlated to the age of the 
plant. None of the figures indicated a direct relationship 
between the proportion of skilled workers in a plant and its 
rate of fixed capital utilisation. Similarly, there is no 
obvious relationship between the scale of a plant and its rate 
of fixed capital utilisation. 
The calculated values of U3 (ratio of actual over 
technical number of shifts) indicate that fixed capital is not 
used for all the available time. The fixed capital in SNIC 
plants is used only three quarters of the time (see Table 
7.7). During the remaining time, fixed capital is left idle. 
U3 is lower in the paint sector than in the other two sectors. 
U3 is also lower in the post-independence plants than in the 
pre-independence plants. 
SNIC fixed capital is used at a similar rate than that of 
SONIC but more efficiently than that of SNMC. The comparison 
of U3 shows, that the time utilisation of fixed capital was 
higher in SONIC and SNIC (in that order) than SNMC. 
7.1.3. Utilisation of labour 
In view of the unavailability of certain data, the only 
way to assess labour utilisation is to analyse overstaffing 
rates (as in SONIC and SNMC). According to SNIC's managers 
and to the few available figures, SNIC plants are overstaffed. 
The maize plant of Maghnia, for example, shows an overstaffing 
rate of 16% and the Oran glass plant a rate of 20%. 
According 
Table 7.7: SNIC plants' fixed capital utilisation in 1980 
(in percentages) 
SNIC plants U1 U2 U3 
Paint sector 88.91 104.75 72.07 
-Paint plant of Oued-smar 83.14 103 35.89 
-Paint plant of Lakhdaria 79 100 52.40 
-Paint plant of Cheraga 112 101 100 
-Paint plant of Oran 81.5 115 100 
Large consumption prod. sect. 70.96 - 78.57 
Household cleaning products 59 - 92.06 
-House. cl. p. of Lakhdaria 91 - 76.20 
-House. cl. p. of Hussain dey 64 - 100 
-House. cl. p. of Oran 22 - 100 
Detergent products 58.66 108 100 
-Detergent plants of Rouiba 
and Reghaia 58.66 108 100 
Earthenware plant of Guelma 78 100 39.30 
Insecticide plant 84 - 100 
Blade plant of Rouiba 99 95 52.40 
Cosmetic plant of Algiers 83.33 88 39.30 
Glass and maize sector 55.42 73.61 75.40 
-Mirror plant of Thenia 46 95 26.20 
-Glass plant of Oran 84.28 75.85 100 
-Maize plant of Maghnia 36 50 100 
Total SNIC 72.53 94.90(1) 76.35 
Source: Table G. 1 in the Appendix G. 
- Not available 
(1) Calculated from the available figures only. 
Table 7.8: Average fixed capital utilisation in SNIC p 
and post-independence plants by sector in 1980 
(in percentages) 
Plants Pre-independence Post-independence 
U1 U2 U1 U2 
Paint sector 92.21 106 79 100 
Large consumption prod. sect. 68.49 - 75.88 - 
Glass and Maize plants 84.28 75.85 41 72.5 
Total 
Source: Table 7.7. 
77.18 98.46(l) 77.72 81.6,6(1) 
- not available 
ý1) Calculated from the available figures only. 
to the Oran glass plant's managers, only 70% of the employed 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour force would be sufficient to 
produce the planned production. These two figures give some 
indication on the overstaffing situation encountered in SNiC 
plants. Such a situation clearly indicates that SNIC, like 
SONIC and SNMC, also uses its labour force inefficiently. One 
interesting conclusion is the difference in the rate of 
absenteeism in the pre- and post-independence plants. The 
former has a lower rate of absenteeism compared to the latter. 
This indicates the direct relation that exists between the age 
of the labour force and the rate of absenteeism. 
Given the lower rate of absenteeism, labour turnover and 
overstaffing in SNIC plants and in SNIC as a whole, one may 
conclude that the labour is used more eteiciently in SNIC than 
in SONIC and SNMC. This situation has obvious effects on 
productivity rates. The higher labour utilisation may be the 
result of actions taken following technical and organisational 
recommendations made by two consultancy firms (MCKENSEY and 
INPED) (7) . 
In conclusion, it appears that in SNIC, as in SONIC and 
SNMC, inputs such as raw materials, intermediate inputs, fixed 
capital and labour are not used efficiently. Now that 
evidence has been given on the underutilisation of inputs in 
SNIC, which influences the overall performance of each plant 
as well as SNIC as a whole, the different causes of 
inefficiency are investigated. 
7.2. Common causes of inefficiency in SNIC 
7.2.1. Organisational factors 
Although the rate of absenteeism and labour turnover were 
lower in SNIC than in SONIC or SNMC, SNIC is also faced with 
social constraints. As a consequence of the high rate of 
absenteeism, the SNIC production lines could not operate 
efficiently, in other words, machines were often idle. Its 
low labour turnover rate in contrast to SONIC, however, does 
not give rise to inefficiencies. Organisational inefficien- 
cies were mainly due to the shortage of social infrastructure 
(labour transport and housing facilities for example), 
inappropriate wage and incentive systems and inefficient 
personnel management methods. Overstaffing was due mainly to 
the implementation of social and governmental objectives. 
Pre-independence plants suffer from the old age of their 
machines which, in most cases, were acquired before indepen- 
dence. Spare parts for these machines are difficult to 
obtain. This, combined with their frequent maintenance, 
result in repeated stoppages of the. production lines. Another 
consequence is the reduced number of. shifts which prevents an 
efficient use of fixed capital. In addition, some post- 
independence plants technically equipped to operate with three 
shifts, worked with one or one and one half shifts, 
specifically, the Thenia mirror and the Lakhdaria paint 
plants. These plants were using their fixed capital 
inefficiently mainly because of organisational problems 
(i. e., the presence of a female labour force). 
In addition to these problems, organisational problems 
similar to those mentioned in Chapter Four, such as the 
effects of cumbersome administrative control and government 
policies, also lead to organisational inefficiencies 
in SNIC. 
7.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
7.2.2.1. Shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
The supply of raw materials is not subject to problems in 
SNIC. The reason is because raw materials are obtained 
"r 
locally and are not in short supply in the local market. 
Shortages, however, sometimes occur either as a result of 
insufficient means of transport which lead to delays in 
deliveries and/or because of inefficiencies encountered in the 
supplier plant. The Lakhdaria household cleaning products 
plant, for instance, was short of hydrochloric acid, soda and 
folding boxes due to delays in delivery and/or underutilisa- 
tion of inputs in the Baba Ali and Saida SONIC plants. 
Shortages of water and electricity of different voltages 
are encountered in all SNIC plants but their effect is felt to 
be less important than that in the SONIC plants. The Oran 
glass and Guelma earthenware plants, however, suffer greatly 
from reductions in voltage and shortages of electricity 
supply, resulting in an inefficient one of their furnaces. 
7.2.2.2. Shortages of transport, infrastructure and working 
capital 
All the plants suffer from deficient means of transport 
necessary to collect inputs and deliver outputs. In 1980, for 
example, 26% of the SNIC transport capacity was unusable (8). 
Besides the problem of transport, SNIC lacked the infrastruc- 
ture facilities such as ports, roads and housing. This 
resulted in delays in deliveries of imported goods and may 
lead, more importantly in the long term, to social problems. 
Reasons for the shortage of means of transport and 
infrastructure facilities are similar to those already 
described in Chapter Four. 
Despite its indirect contributions, the price system has a 
large influence on overall efficiency. The prices of most of 
the outputs sold by SNIC, (which represent part of the staple 
products) had been frozen for several years. The actual price 
did not even cover production cost. For example, the price of 
')Q-7 
detergent amounted to only half the production cost. SNIC 
received hardly any subsidies to make up for the loss. 
Consequently, several plants were in serious financial diffi- 
culties lacking the required working capital. The required 
cash-flow has to be borrowed at a high interest rate, 
burdening the already shaken financial situation. As already 
stressed, plant managers do not have any real incentive to 
decrease production cost and, as explained in Chapter Four, 
this has a direct effect on the utilisation of the different 
inputs. 
7.2.2.3. Shortages of skilled labour 
According to SNIC's managers, the lack of skilled labour in 
plants was also deeply felt. The positions which suffer from 
the lack of a skilled labour force are the technical an, to a 
lesser extent, the managerial positions (see Chapter Four). 
The inefficient use of fixed capital is also the result of the 
lack of a skilled work force. For instance, due to the lack 
of supervisory and technical back up, the Thenia mirror and 
Guelma earthenware plants which were built to operate with 
three shifts, work with less than one and one half shifts. 
Despite this situation, the foreign labour force was insigni- 
ficant, amounting to 0.2% of the total SNIC labour force and 
1.5% of total SNIC managers. The problems resulting from the 
lack of a skilled labour force were more important in the SNIC 
plants than in the SONIC plants because the proportion of 
total skilled workers and the ratio of skilled workers in 
plants were lower in the case of SNIC than in that of SONIC. 
The reasons for such shortages have already been discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
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7.2.2.4. Shortages of imported inputs 
In addition to these shortages, SNIC also suffers from 
shortages of imported inputs, primarily feldspar (an interme- 
diate input used in the glass industry) and spare parts. in 
1980, SNIC's AGI was delivered at the end of March, resulting 
in delays of deliveries and, eventually production stoppages. 
Delays and work stoppages in SNIC are due to the same causes 
and lead to the same inefficiencies as those encountered in 
SONIC. 
7.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
Allocative inefficiencies are encountered in almost all 
plants. For instance, the Oran glass plant is faced with 
technical constraints due to the characteristics of the 
production process. In -summer 1981, one of the furnaces which 
had a life expectancy of 3 to 4 years had to be rebuilt. The 
inadequate import and customs procedures, together with the 
lack of a skilled labour force, led to long delays in the 
construction and operation of the furnace. In fact, it took 6 
months for the furnace to be operational. The two detergent 
plants were also faced with technical constraints because the 
management did not master the sophisticated technology. These 
inefficiencies occurred mainly as a result of the inexperience 
of the Algerian skilled labour force and government policies. 
SNIC also encountered other problems related to government 
policies. These were mainly the result of inappropriate wage 
and incentive systems. 
7.2.4. Demand shortages 
The only excess capacity encountered in any SNIC plants 
occurred due to seasonal variations in the demand for paint. 
The demand for building paint, for example, increases greatly . 11 
during spring and summer. The paint plants which are equipped 
9R q 
with the necessary capacity to handle these seasonal orders 
suffer from excess capacity in winter. The excess capacity, 
however, is not severe since some of the equipment is used to 
produce other outputs that use a similar capital stock. 
Except for this almost insignificant excess capacity, SNIC 
plants are not faced with deTnand. shortages. 
The main causes of underutilisation of the different 
inputs in SONIC, SNMC and SNIC are quite similar, to a certain 
extent. Organisational factors, shortages of inputs and 
allocative inefficiencies are present in the three public 
enterprises studied up to now. SNIC, on the other hand, is 
not faced with demand shortages except in its paint plants 
while SONIC and SNMC in particular, encountered large 
inefficiencies due to demand shortages. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: SONATRACH PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
Hydrocarbons have played an increasingly dominant role in 
Algeria's economy since the early 1960's (see parts 1.4 and 
2.2.2.1. ). SONATRACH, which was created on the 31st of Decem- 
ber, 1963, is the only public enterprise in charge of the 
production, transport and commercialisation of hydrocarbons. 
SONATRACH is one of two public enterprises under the Ministry 
of Energy and Hydrocarbons (1). The nationalisation of 
existing petroleum companies combined with the construction of 
new plants have contributed to the tremendous expansion that 
SONATRACH has experienced. SONATRACH is now one of the 
largest public enterprises in Algeria, contributing, in 1980, 
98% of total export revenues (i. e., most of its production is 
exported) and 63% of total tax revenues (the greatest share of 
which is petroleum taxes) (2). Its main exports are crude 
oil, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and petroleum products (such as motorfuel, gasoil and 
kerosene). SONATRACH's exports constitute the country's main 
source of foreign exchange. In addition, its potential export 
earnings represent security for the overseas loans which make 
the execution of economic development plans possible. 
SONATRACH received one of the largest shares of public invest- 
ment partly because the depth of petroleum sheets and natural 
gas layers and the transport from the remote extraction fields 
to ports required larger investments than in the average oil 
producing country. As a result, in 1980, SONATRACH sales 
revenue were 53.5 billion AD, 24 times that of 7.970, and its 
labour force was about 94,000 workers. SONATRACH is at the 
centre of the Algerian economy and plays a driving role in 
economic development. It is the perfect example of an 
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industrialising industry. 
In 1963, SONATRACH was in charge of the transport and 
commercialisation of hydrocarbons. At that time, SONATRACH 
assets consisted of only the 800 km pipeline joining Haoud- 
Hamra-Arzew actually built by SONATRACH. From the time 
President Boumediene came to power in 1965, the concern of the 
Algerian authorities has been to establish state control over 
oil and gas resources. The SONATRACH contribution to this 
sub-sector has become gradually more important. Between 1967- 
68, the government bought all existing local means of 
transport (distribution, stockage and transport) of all 
foreign companies (including BP, ESSO, MOBIL, SHELL, BERYL and 
TOTAL (3)) and put SONATRACH in charge of their management. 
Early on, the Algerian government showed its intention to 
participate in the exploitation of hydrocarbons. This put an 
end to the system of concessions (payment of royalties) which 
was an international practice at the time. In fact, in July 
1965 SONATRACH signed a cooperation contract with ELF in which 
each party held 50% of the shares. A contract was also signed 
between SONATRACH and GETTY Petroleum Company in 1968 on a 51- 
49% basis, respectively (4). 
By 1971, natural gas was totally controlled by SONATRACH, 
reducing foreign companies' participation to the mere role of 
industrial operators. On the 24th of February, 1971, the 
hydrocarbon sub-sector experienced its most important modifi- 
cation. The nationalisation of crude oil fields and 
concessions were undertaken as a chief strategy. In contrast 
to SONATRACH's other activities, substantial foreign capital 
is involved in the extraction of crude oil. The participation 
of foreign companies averages about 20% of total Algerian 
crude oil production. In every case, however, SONATRACH 
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participation is at least 51%. The nationalisation process of 
foreign-owned production capacity was progressive. By 1980, 
with the exception of the Hassi Messaoud refinery of which 
SONATRACH held only a 51% share, all the plants were totally 
owned by the state and controlled by SONATRACH. Since 1976, 
the transport of hydrocarbons and main and secondary pipelines 
have been totally controlled and owned by the state. This 
includes not only the injection, reinjection, separation, 
treatment and pumping units but also the petrol stations. 
Exploration, however, is controlled by foreign firms with 
SONATRACH as a partner. Such cooperation between foreign 
firms and SONATRACH, regarding exploration, is felt to be the 
only way to retain control while attracting foreign capital 
and know-how. 
SONATRACH is a divisionalised organisation similar to that 
described in Chapter Four. It is composed of four divisions 
and a head office as described in Figure 8.1. The current 
organisation into four divisions was necessitated by the 
nature of SONATRACH's activities. Its objectives, functions, 
managerial environment and authority as well as autonomy are 
similar to all other public enterprises described 
in Chapter 
Four. Since 1980, there has been a project to restructure 
SONATRACH into 13 different public enterprises (see Appendix 
B. 2). 
SONATRACH is in charge of the exploration, production, 
pipeline transport and distribution of 
hydrocarbons, as well 
as international trade. Following 
large investments, which 
amounted to more than 47% of 
total public industrial invest- 
ment during the 1967-79 period 
(see part 2.1), SONATRACH 
acquired large production capacities 
which are characterised 
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SONATRACH Managing Director 
Hydrocarbons division 
I Exploration department 
j Production department 
nsport deDar 
Commercialisation division 
ommercia sat on o 
EGZ: Gas export 
J ECC: Crude oil & refined I 
j pro- ducts exports 
EP: Cotmegcialisftion of fertili sers p ytosan tars Dro ucts 
Industrial zone 
I Skikda 
Hassi-Messaoud 
Hassi-RMel 
PGR division 
iLiquifying sector 
Refinery sector 
rPetrochemical sector 
SONATRACH Head office 
Department of personnel 
Department of organisation & planning 
Department of finance 
Department of general means 
Department of welfare activities. 
Figure 8.1 : SONATRACH organisational structure in 1980. 
Source : Survey data. 
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by capital intensive and, therefore, financially demanding 
technology. In contrast to the petroleum industry in develop- 
ed countries, SONATRACH does not produce a very wide range of 
products. As illustrated in Table 8.1, the refining and 
processing capacity for hydrocarbon resources are substantial. 
In 1982, the refining capacity was 23.5 million tons per annum 
while the liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity was 47 million 
cubic metres. The refinery and LNG plants produce crude oil, 
natural gas, LNG, LPG, condensates, motorfuel, lubricants and 
bitumen. In addition to its refining and liquefying 
capacities, SONATRACH is in charge of several petrochemical 
and fertiliser plants. In 1980, some SONATRACH plants and 
complexes were involved in the production of methanol, 
ethylene, chloride, resin, plastic polymers (polyethylene, 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC)), low density polyvinyl (Pebd), 
plastic products such as pipes, bags, pens and films and 
nitrate and phosphatic fertilisers (ammonia, amonitrate, urea, 
nitric acid, TSP and NPK). 
Substantial investments have been made for the installa- 
tion of separation, treatment, injection, reinjection and 
pumping capacities for the production and transport of crude 
oil and natural gas. SONATRACH is also in charge of an exten- 
sive pipeline-network which conveys crude oil and natural gas 
to processing and refining centres, as seen in Figure 2.7. In 
1980, existing crude oil lines had the capacity to transport 
81 to 97.8 million tons per annum to the sea, condensate lines 
had the capacity to transport 20 million tons and natural gas 
lines 39 billion cubic metres (5). In addition, a gas line 
linking the Hassi-Rmel field with Mazzara Del Vallo in Sicily 
was opened in 1982 with a capacity of 12.5 billion cubic 
metres. Transport of crude oil, LNG and petroleum products, 
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which involves several specialised methanol and crude oil 
carriers, is carried out by the state shipping company, CNAN. 
SONATRACH, with the construction of several plants and pipe- 
lines, continues to expand. 
SONATRACH is a much larger public enterprise than SONIC, 
SNMC or SNIC, employing a larger labour force and contributing 
to both higher value added and tax revenue. The range of 
products commercialised by SONATRACH is more varied than that 
produced by SONIC, for instance. Dissimilarities between 
these two public enterprises extend to their development. As 
seen in Chapter Two, SONATRACH, in contrast to SONIC, has 
received the largest share of industrial investments and 
consequently has experienced faster development. Furthermore, 
while the future development of SONIC seems bleak, SONATRACH 
still benefits from large investments used in the transforma- 
tion of final outputs. The objective is to make SONATRACH a 
more integrated enterprise, comparable to SNMC. 
Most SONATRACH manufacturing plants are located on the 
coast, but most of the intergas and interpetroleum units are 
located in southern Algeria near the oil and gas fields and 
along the pipelines. In terms of location, SONATRACH 
is an 
exception. The location of its plants on the coast was 
dictated by the destination of outputs since a large part of 
its production is exported. The petrochemical and 
fertiliser 
plants are also located on the coast 
to be near their supplier 
and, to some extent, because part of 
their output is intended 
for export. The plastic plants are located 
throughout 
northern Algeria. Their 
location, like that of SONIC, SNMC 
and SNIC, has been dictated 
by policies advocating regional 
development equilibrium and an equitable share of 
jobs among 
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the different regions. 
As can be seen from Table 8.1, most of the plants are 
multiproduct plants, specialised in the production of interre- 
lated outputs. This occurs because of the nature of the 
inputs and the technology involved. SONATRACH as a whole is 
rapidly becoming a highly integrated enterprise. This does 
not automatically mean that all the plants are highly inte- 
grated (e. g., the plastic plants are not highly integrated). 
SONATRACH, however, is not as vertically integrated as the 
petrochemical industry in developed countries. The fact that 
SONATRACH still exports large quantities of crude oil instead 
of the finished outputs which are produced from crude oil is 
evidence of this. SONATRACH also imports light petroleum 
products and exports heavy petroleum products, further corro- 
boration of the lack of high integration. Light products are 
currently not produced at all by SONATRACH refineries. In 
conclusion, SONATRACH's integration level is comparable to 
that of SONIC, SNMC or SNIC public enterprises. Regarding the 
level of integration of the different plants, SONATRACH's 
plants compares very well with SNNC's plants. 
As shown in Table 8.1, SONATRACH's plants are relatively 
recent and use sophisticated capital intensive technology. 
The technology used is entirely imported since the material 
and human capacities required to develop it do not exist at 
the national level. Such capacities not only consist of the 
skills involved in the implementation of projects (design, 
construction and setting up, knowledge of the technological 
process, maintenance, and repairs and operation of equipments 
or industrial complexes) but also includes the intergas and 
interpetroleum projects' definitions, technological-economic 
studies of reliability and technical assistance for the reso- 
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Table 8.1: SONATRACH (1) plants and their respective outputs in 1980 
SONATRACH Year of Unit Production 1980 
Plants/outputs entry Technical planned actual 
LNG plants 
Arzew LNG no. 1 1978 103m 3 10,500 ) 17,531 ) 5,081 
Arzew LNG no. 2 1979 it 10,500 )) 
-LPG T ým 3 17,980 17,980 Arzew LNG no. ýI 1964 10 2P400 2,718.6 2,338 
Skikda LNG no. 1 1972 103m3 16,500 
-LNG "3 - 14,444 5,200 
-LPG 103 tins 556 355-84 
Total LNG output 103m 52,100 34,693 12j636 
Total LPG output 10 tons 
_ 
574 375 
Refineries 
Arzew RA no. 1 1972 103tons 2,500 
-LPG it 105.4 89.6 
-Motorfuel " 21458 21451 
-Lubricant tons 60,600 77,650 ) 52,800 
-Conditionnement ) 
of lubricant it 16 000 ) 
-Road bitumen 101,310 
, 
1129000 ) 59,000 
-Oxide bitumen "3 20,130 20,000 ) 
Algiers RA 1964 10 tons 2,700 
-LPG it g o. 4 80.5 
-Motorfuel It 
_ 2 618 487 2 
Skikda RA 1976 103 tons - 15,000 
, , 
-LPG it - 558 0 
-Motorfuel is - 14,007 5,603 
-Road bitumen it 120 ) 110 ) 3 
-Oxide bitumen It 3 
25 )) 
Hassi Messaoud RA 1974 tons 10 1,000 
-LPG tons - 6,550 1,965 
-Separation unit " - 166,600 149,980 
-Motorfuel 10 tons - 
653 503 
In Amenas RA 
-Motorfuel " 300 
181 60 
Ar z ew RA no. 2 
-Separation unit " 1,000 99 .9 
6146.6 
Fertiliser plants 
Arzew nitrate 
fertiliser no. 1 1970/71 
-Ammoniac 1971 103 
Tons 330 -0 
-Ammonitrate 1971 " it 
165 165 33 
-Urea 1970 
" it 132 -0 
-Nitrate acid 1970 
132 -0 
Arzew nitrate 
fertiliser no. 2 
-Ammoni trat e - -0 
Annaba nitrate 
1981 163 tons 550 - fertiliser 
-Ammonitrat e 
-Ammoniac 
Annaba phosphatic 
fertiliser 1970 103tons 350 -- 
-TSP 
it it 290.4 300 19.8 
-NP K 
it it 603.9 314.8 157.4 
(Table continues on the following page. ) 
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Table 8.1. (Continued) 
SONATRACH Year of Unit Production 1980 
Plants/outputs entry Technical planned actual 
Petrochemical plants 
Arzew petrochemical 
-Methanol 1974 103 tons 115 100 49 
-Resin 1976 14 13.8 4 
Skikda petrochemic. 1975 
-Ethylene 1978 all " 120 118.8 26 
-PVC 1976 it " 35 34.9 15 
-Pebd "" 48 0 
-Chlorine "" 36 - 0 
Plastic plants 
-Algiers plants 103 tons 30 30 
17.4 
-Setif plants. 1973 it 26.7 
1.17 0.7 
-El Asnam plants 1981 if 18.6 - - 
-Dra Elmizen s. g. p. 1981 it 1 - - 
-Medea films plant 1981 to 
2 
_ 
Source: Table H. 1 in the Appendix H. 
1 Without interpetroleum and intergas units. 
In reweval process. 
- Not available or applicable. 
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lution of technological problems. The different plants are 
all medium or large-scale. One of the main reasons is that 
this industry is developed by multinational corporations and, 
therefore, built to satisfy an enormous demand such as that of 
the EEC, US or USSR markets. Furthermore, almost all the 
plants, as indicated in Table H. 1 in the Appendix H, operate 
for 330 days per year with the remaining days of the year for 
maintenance stoppages. The only two plants working 250 days 
per year are the plastic plants of Setif. 
SONATRACH, like SONIC, has the monopoly of all hydrocarbon 
production with the exception of plastic goods production and 
totally controls the international trade of hydrocarbon 
products. As mentioned above, exporting is one of the main 
functions of SONATRACH. In 1980, for example, 82% of the 
production of crude oil (and condensates) and 75% of the 
production of natural gas were exported (6). This is in 
contrast to the SONIC, SNMC and SNIC cases. SONATRACH does 
not face local private competition. Imports still made up for 
the lack of local production. 
The degree of dependency on imported inputs is shown in 
Table 8.2, which lists input origins. As indicated, almost 
all inputs, except for a few consumable imported inputs and 
the majority of spare parts, are supplied within SONATRACH and 
by the local market. Unfortunately, in view of the lack of 
some figures, determination of all the ratios was not 
possible. Similar to the cases of SONIC, SNMC and SNIC, 
the 
large proportion of imported spare parts can be explained by 
the fact that the totality of SONATRACH's fixed capital 
is 
imported. This indicates a high degree of dependency vis-a- 
vis foreign suppliers of spare parts. 
As far as the 
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Table 8.2 : Origin of SONATRACH inputs 
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Crude oil 
Crude gas 
Compressed air 
Pression 
Liquified oil 
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w 
E-4 
Petrochemical prod. 
M 
Urea 
LOCAL MARKET 
Ammonia 
º-+ Phosphate 
Water * * * * * * * ýr 
Q Electricity * * ýr * * * * ýt 
W Gas bottle 
a Cans ýt 
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Ew+ INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
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Atmospheric residue ýE 
Sulphuric acid(1) 
Sulphur 
Potassium sulphur 
Ammoniac (1) 
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Urea Melamine) ' 
FIXED CAPITAL 1007, imported 
Foreign 67. 
OUR LAB 
Local 947. 
* indicates that a certain amount is supplied within SONATRACH, within the 
local market and from the international market without specifying the 
amount which is not available. The table gives only the origin of the 
main inputs as the list will be too long to state them all. 
I Exceptional imports due to technical contraints. 
Source : Survey data. 301 
importation of capital goods is concerned, the situation is 
common to all the public enterprises reviewed here. The 
foreign labour force, in contrast to SONIC, SNMC and SNIC, 
represents a substantial fraction of the total labour force in 
SONATRACH. This will be discussed in detail later. 
The different outputs produced by SONATRACH plants consist 
of raw materials, semi-finished outputs and finished outputs 
destined for use within SONATRACH, by the industrial sector 
and by consumers, as shown in Table 8.3. A large proportion 
o the production of hydrocarbon outputs is destined for the 
international market. Only a small amount goes to the local 
market for intermediate and final use. In 1980,75% of the 
natural gas production and 82% of the crude oil production (7) 
(and condensates) were exported. In addition, about 37% of 
the production of liquefied petroleum gas and 43% of the 
production of petroleum products such as motorfuel, naphtha, 
lubricants, gasoil, fuel oil and kerosene were exported (8).. 
Exports of ammonia, which started in 1980, have since stopped 
because of technical problems (which will be seen later). 
. Fertilisers are exclusively produced 
for intermediate use in 
the domestic market although part of the production was 
supposed to be exported. No exports of fertiliser are made 
because of technical problems experienced in the plants. 
Petrochemicals are used as intermediate inputs within 
SONATRACH and by the private sector and as finished outputs 
for final use. Part of the methanol production was exported 
in 1979 but the increasing local demand (the opening of new 
plants which use methanol as an intermediate 
input, for 
example) put an end to these exports. 
As indicated in Table 8.4, the nature of exported outputs 
have changed over the years. In the late 1960's, SONATRACH's 
302 
Table 8.3 : Destination of SONATRACH outputs 
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LPG * * 37 
Propane * * * Butane * * * Crude oil 
Condensate 82 
Residual fuel oil * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 86 
Gas diesel oil * * 25 
Kerosene * 66 
Q Motoroil * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 17 
Lubricant * 
z Naphtha * * 
Q High quality oil * 
H Grease * * * * * * * * * * * * 
0 Natural gas * * 
Bitumen * * 
LNG 99.5 
Nitrate fert.: 
Ammonia * * 
Ammonitrate 
Urea 
Nitrate acid * w Phosphatic fert.: 
º-+ TSP 
NPK 
oýc OAP 
NP 
ti. PVC 
Ethylene 
w Pebd * 
U Methanol * 
04 Resin w Chlorine * * 
Schoolar goods 
Polystylene 
Furniture 
Leaves 
Tubs 
Films * * * * 
Bags 
* PackagiTig p -, 3d. * * 
states that the output is destined to one of the intermediate or final 
use; no figure is available to give the percentages. 
Source : Survey data. 
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exports consisted of only crude oil and natural gas; in addi- 
tion now, SONATRACH exports an increasing proportion of 
refined products. The decrease in the production of crude oil 
was made up for, in terms of foreign currency earnings, by the 
export of refined products and condensates. Between 1979 and 
1980, the quantity of exported refined products doubled. It 
should be stressed, however, that crude oil is still the 
dominant export. In 1979, Algerian crude oil was mainly 
exported to the USA, France, GDR and Italy. Natural gas was 
mainly exported to the USA, France and Spain (9). The desti- 
nations of these exports have changed dramatically since then 
with the decrease in crude oil exports and the cancellation of 
the El-Paso contract (USA) regarding the export of LNG. In 
1980, LNG was exported mainly to France, West Germany, Italy 
and Spain. With respect to the destination of the outputs, 
therefore, SONATRACH differs considerably from SONIC, SNMC or 
SNIC. In contrast to these public enterprises, exporting is a 
major activity of SONATRACH. As far as the domestic market 
is 
concerned, SONATRACH is oriented towards the production of 
outputs for both intermediate and final use, while SONIC and 
SNIC outputs are oriented towards the production of outputs 
for final use only and SNMC outputs for intermediate use only. 
International trade has become increasingly competitive 
due to the discovery and exploitation of new oil fields (in 
Mexico and the North Sea, for example), the development of new 
sources of energy (such as nuclear energy) and 
the more 
efficient use of oil 
in developed countries. Given this 
situation, Algeria, an 
OPEC member, has aligned its oil price 
with the internationally agreed 
OPEC price. According to 
United Nations statistics, 
the per barrel price of crude 
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Table 8.4: SONATRACH exports from 1970 to 1980 
Thousands of tons 1970 1973 1977 1979 1980 
Crude oil 45,070 47,400 48,036 49,013 37,956 
Natural gas 1,587 2,522 4,221 12,256 6,623 
Refined products 490 2,397 1,368 3,235 7,078 
-diesel 133 501 41 351 1,896 
-fuel-oil 157 1,089 720 1,468 2,551 
-naphtha 69 400 300 727 1,785 
Million dinars 
Crude oil 3,288 5,675 22,342 30,824 41,048 
Natural gas 144 192 672 2,210 3,774 
Refined products 73 429 609 2,909 7,561 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons. 
Table 8.5: Average price of crude oil, LNG and 
LPG per annum for selected years 
Years Crude oil LPG LNG 
US $/barrel $/Ton $/thousand BTU(1) 
1971 2.72 28.74 0.35 
1973 - 31.57 0.35 
1976 12.85 125.00 0.85 
1977 14.30 125.00 1.13 
1978 14.25 -- 
1979 14.81 -- 
1980 30 (2) -- 
1981 40 -- 
Sources: Unitcd Nations 1980 Yearbook of World Energy 
Statistics and Attal, A. A.: Financing Economic Development 
in 
Algeria 1967-77, op cit. 
1 BTU stands for British thermis units. 
2A surcharge of US$ 3 was charged by Algeria 
for oil 
exploration expenses. 
- Figures not available. 
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petroleum, as shown in Table 8.5, increased steadily from US$ 
2.72 in 1970 to US$ 40 in 1980. It has since then decreased 
to around US$ 30 in 1983. Similarly, the price of LPG 
increased rapidly by a factor of 4.35 between 1971 and 1977. 
LNG is another important component of SONATRACH activities and 
particular attention has been paid to its production ever 
since SONATRACH took control of the hydrocarbon sub-sector. 
The LNG price, which is not fixed by OPEC and thus is subject 
to international market fluctuations, remained unchanged for a 
number of years because of the strong competition from crude 
oil. Since the increase in the price of crude oil, LNG has 
attracted considerable attention and its price has been 
constantly reevaluated. From 1971 to 1977, for example, its 
price increased from $ 0.35 to $ 11.30 per thousand BTU. This 
price, which is indirectly influenced by OPEC agreements, will 
probably continue to rise in the near future. SONATRACH is 
faced with a unique situation in the sense that the prices of 
its different exported outputs, which are subject to 
international conjuncture, are governed by different factors. 
SONATRACH's labour force increased steadily from 10,100 
workers in 1970 to 94,698 workers in 1980 (see Table 8.6). 
The actual labour force, inclusive of only the productive 
plants, is illustrated in Table 8.7. The labour force can be 
divided into three different categories according to level of 
qualifications: managers, technicians and supervisors, and 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers (see Figure 8.2). In 1980, 
70% of the labour force was composed of semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers and 30% of technicians, supervisors and 
managers. For an industry which uses sophisticated 
technology, the proportion of skilled workers is low. The 
ratio of skilled workers employed by SONATRACH plants is lower 
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than that for the public enterprise plants analysed earlier. 
The lack of a skilled labour force in SONATRACH is clearly 
outlined in Table 8.8. In 1980,30% of the skilled workers 
were underqualified for the jobs to which they were appointed. 
All the plants suffered from a lack of skilled workers. The 
petrochemical plants were particularly affected and 
experienced the highest shortage: 65% of the workers were 
underskilled for their positions. 
The highest proportion of managers is found in the Arzew 
LNG no. 2 plant, comprising a record 29% of its labour force 
in the plant. This in turn, gave rise to a high 8% ratio of 
managers to total labour force in the liquefied natural gas 
group. The technicians and supervisors ratio in the Arzew LNG 
plant no. 2 is also high, consisting of 40% of the total 
labour force in the plant. These ratios are probably to be 
expected in such a branch of industry. Such figures are, 
however, only reported for a few plants. Another example of 
high managerial ratios is the Hassi Messaoud refinery with a 
13% ratio of-managers to the total labour force, 73% techni- 
cians and supervisors and only 13% semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. This example is, however, not representative of the 
group of refineries as only 4.4% of the labour force in the 
refineries are managers. The lowest ratios of managers 
encountered in SONATRACH plants were 3.5% and 4% in the ferti- 
liser and plastic plants, respectively. A similarly low rate 
was recorded for the petrochemical plants, 4.7%. Overall LNG 
plants are best provided with skilled workers when compared to 
the other SONATRACH plants. The lack of a skilled labour 
force is more dramatic in SONATRACH than in the other public 
enterprises reviewed so far because of the technical 
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Table 8.6: Total labour force in SONATRACH in 1980 
Skill category Algerian Foreigners Total 
workers (1) (2) (3) % 
Managers 7,937 
Technit. & supervi. 18989 
Total skilled workers 
Semi-skilled and un- 
skilled workers 
Temporary workers 
Total SONATRACH 
Source: Survey data. 
26,926 1,234 
54,654 
11,345 
30.3 
54,654 57.7 
11,345 12.0 
94,698 100.0 
1 Technical assistance 
2 Contractuals 
3 Total. 
Table 8.8: Competence of the labour force 
in SONATRACH in 1980 
Group of plants produc- Competence 
ing the same outputs Adequate Inferior Superior 
. Head office of the 
production department, rein- 
jectionNnraintenance, separ- 70% 20% 10% 
ration, GNL and GPL conden- 
sate. 
Liquified natural gas 73% 21% 6% 
Motorfuel 73% 26% 1% 
Nitrate fertiliser 80% 19% 1% 
Phosphatic fertiliser 70% 30% 0% 
Petrochemicals 35% 65% 0% 
Plastic 63% 30% 6% 
Percentage of the total 66.3% 30.2% 3.5% 
Source: Survey data. 
539 1,773 28,699 
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sophistication involved in the production process. 
In 1980, the rate of absenteeism for SONATRACH as a whole 
was 6.57%, representing 43,294 days of work, while the rate of 
labour turnover was 11%. According to SONATRACH managers, the 
rates of absenteeism and labour turnover in the plants are 
high. For example, the rate of labour turnover was 15% at the 
Arzew refinery and LNG no. 1 and no. 2 complexes and 13% at 
all other SONATRACH plants and complexes in Arzew (10). These 
rates are comparable to those for SONIC and SNMC. These high 
rates reflect the difficult working conditions in the southern 
Algeria and the low salaries offered to these workers compared 
to those in other public enterprises (except in the South). 
The foreign technical assistance in SONATRACH plants is much 
higher than that for SONIC, SNMC and SNIC, accounting for 6% 
of the total labour force in 1980 and 6.2% of the total 
SONATRACH managers, technicians and supervisors. 
An interesting conclusion can be drawn from a comparison 
between the ratios of qualified workers in SONATRACH and 
SONIC. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, the proportion of 
skilled and unskilled workers for each category 
in the two 
public enterprises are very similar despite differences 
in 
capital intensity and level of technology used. 
Furthermore, 
the importance of foreign assistance in SONATRACH 
is much 
higher than in SONIC or SNMC, as it reached 6.2%, 0.34% and 
0.2% of the total skilled workers, respectively. 
We now turn to the discussion of input utilisation 
in 
SONATRACH plants. In a second section, the main causes of 
inefficiency in SONATRACH plants will be investigated. 
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Table 8.7: Labour force in SONATRACH plants in 1980 
Skill category 
plants 
Managers 
(1) (2) 
Technic. / 
supervis. 
(1) (2) 
Semi-skil. / Total 
unskilled (3) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Production head 
office div, interga s 
& petroleum 
units 900 9.8 2,090 23 6,119 67 9 109 
-Foreigners , 
Separation p. 8 2 112 28 2 179 70 
373 
399 
4 
-Foreigners 
LNG p. 
3 0.7 
-Arzew LNG no-1 56 5 281 29 611 65 948 
-Arzew LNG no. 2 62 29 92 43 59 27 213 
-Arzew LNG no-3 36 7.6 133 28 305 64 474 
-Skikda LNG no-1 51 5.3 113 12 785 83 949 
Total LNG p. 205 8 619 24 1,760 68 2,584 
-Foreigners 608 23 
Refineries (RA) 
-Arzew RA no. 1 59 4.5 227 17 1,017 78 1,303 55 
-Algiers RA 32 5.3 103 17 464 77 599 65 
-Skikda RA no. 1 41 4.2 122 12 791 83 954 
-Hassi Messaoud RA 6 13 33 73 6 13 45 
-In Amenas RA 5 5.3 35 37 54 57 94 
Total RA 151 4.4 632 18 2,611 77 3,394 
-Foreigners 92 2.7 
Fertiliser plants 
-Arzew CEA 49 3.5 359 26 983 70 1,391 91 
-Annaba CEP 53 3.2 253 15 1,336 82 1,624 94 
Total fertili. P. 102 3.3 612 20 2,319 77 3,015 
-Foreigners 6 
Petrochemical pl. 
-Arzew CP no-1 42 6.7 168 27 412 66 622 55 
-Skikda CP no-1 47 3.8 268 21 925 74 1,240 40 
Total petrochemic. 89 4.9 436 23 1,337 72 1,862 
-Foreigners 474 25 
Plastic plants 
-Algiers pl. no-1 15 3 88 18 374 78 477 
-Algiers pl. no. 2 13 2.8 68 15 370 82 451 
-Setif pl. no-1 46 5 67 8 741 87 854 
-Dra Elmizan s. g. 5 2.3 36 17 171 81 212 
-Laminated plast. p 4 2.3 23 13 144 84 171 
-Plas. leaves p. 5 3.8 28 21 97 75 130 
-Plas. firms p. 5 8.4 5 8 49 83 59 
Total plastic p. 93 3.9 315 13 1,946 82 2,364 
-Foreigners 15 0.6 
Tota. l (4) 1,540 6.8 4,704 21 16,092 72 22,328 
-Foreigners ------1,468 6 
Source: Survey data. 
1 Total by skill category in the SONATRACH plants only. 
2% of the total labour force by skill category or origin in 
the plants (s) . 
3 Rate of overstaffing. 
4 Total SONATRACH labour force within SONATRACH plants only. 
- Not available. 
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Technicians & 
led workers. 
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8.1. Utilisation of inputs in SONATRACH 
8.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
In SONATRACH plants, the underutilisation of raw materials 
and intermediate inputs is difficult to detect. Norms are not 
available and overconsumption has no effect on the utilisation 
of other inputs. In addition, these inputs are not scarce. 
In the future, as hydrocarbon reserves drain, the underutili- 
sation of inputs is expected to become evident. At present, 
however, it can only be argued that raw materials are not 
being used inefficiently in SONATRACH plants. According to 
SONATRACH managers, on the other hand, chemicals and interme- 
diate inputs are not used efficiently. Overconsumption has an 
effect on the utilisation of fixed capital and on prodh, ction 
cost since less outputs are produced. The level of 
overconsumption is similar to that encountered in SNMC but is 
much lower than that for SONIC. 
8.1.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
As discussed in Chapter Four, U1 (ratio of actual over 
planned output), U2 (ratio of planned over technical capacity) 
and U3 (ratio of actual over technical time utilisation of 
fixed capital) are calculated by plant output, by plant, by 
SONATRACH output and for SONATRACH as a whole (without taking 
the interpetroleum and intergas plants and transport capaci- 
ties into account), as shown in Tables H. 1 in the Appendix H 
and 8.9. As indicated in Table H. 1, U1 (for the figures 
available) by plant output ranged from 0% to 100% while U2 
varied between 4.3% and 129%. The lowest rate of fixed 
capital utilisation (for the available figures), taking both 
U1 and U2 into account, was recorded for the plastic output 
(60%, 4.3%) in the plastic plant of Setif. The highest rate 
of fixed capital utilisation was recorded for LNG (86%, 100%) 
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in the Arzew LNG no. 4 plant. As illustrated in Table 8.9, 
the value of Ul and U2 for each SONATRACH plant varied between 
5% and 92% and between 4.3% and 100%, respectively. The El 
Asnam plastic plant recorded the lowest fixed capital utilisa- 
tion (60%, 4.3%) while the Arzew LNG no. 4 plant reached the 
highest rate of fixed capacity utilisation (86%, 100%). By 
SONATRACH output, the lowest rate of fixed capital utilisation 
was obtained for NPK (fertiliser) output (50%, 35%) while the 
highest rate of fixed capital utilisation was recorded for 
lubricant output (68%, 129%). SONATRA. CH as a whole (without 
the interpetroleum and intergas plants and transport 
capacities) was inefficient in the utilisation of its fixed 
capital (U1= 50.04% and U2= 60.26%). 
In conclusion, as indicated in Table H. 1, rates of fixed 
capital utilisation are higher in the SONATRACH plants 
producing LNG and petroleum products (in refineries) than in 
those producing fertiliser, petrochemical and plastic. 
products. The rate of utilisation of fixed capital is related 
to the nature of the output produced and to the year of entry 
in production. The more recently built plants performed at a 
lower rate than those built earlier. In addition, large scale 
plants performed at a lower rate than small or medium scale 
plants. The proportion of skilled workers in a plant also 
influenced the rate of utilisation of fixed capital in 
SONATRACH plants. 
U3 is calculated by plant output, by plant and for 
SONATRACH as a whole. In 1980, the actual time utilisation of 
fixed capital was lower than the technical norm. U3 (for the 
available figures) amounted to 82.35%. The highest U3 was 
obtained for the Setif plastic plants which operated as 
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Table 8.9: SONATRACH plants' fixed capital 
utilisation in 1980 
Plants Year of entry U1 U2 U3 
in production in percentage 
Arzew LNG no. 1 1978 29 83 84 
Arzew LNG no. 2 1979 64.5 83(1) 84 
Arzew LNG no. 4 (Camel) 1964 86 100 84 
Skikda LNG no. 1 1972 50 90 84 
Total LNG plants 57.37 89 84 
Arzew refinery no. 1 
Algiers refinery 
Skikda refinery no. 1 
Hassi Messaoud refinery 
Arzew refinery no. 2 
In Amenas refinery 
1972 69.78 - 
1964 92 - 
1976 11.35 - 
1974 45.66 - 
65 99 
33 60 
Total refineries 52.79 -- 
Arzew nitrate ferti. no. 1 1970/1 5-- 
Arzew nitrate ferti. no. 2 Nat. - -" - 
Annaba nitrate ferti. 1981 --- 
Annaba phosphatic ferti. 1970 28.3 69 93 
Total fertiliser plants 16.65 -- 
Arzew petrochemical p. 1974/6 39 92.75 - 
Skikda petrochemical p. 1975/8 16.25 66 42 
Total petrochemical plants 27.7 79.37 - 
Algiers plastic plants(2) 58 100 94.5 
Setif plastic plants(5) From 1973 60 4.3 100 
El Asnam plastic p. (4) From 1981 -- 60 
Total plastic plants(1) 59.42 31.64 
84.45 
Total SONATRACH (1)(2) 50.04 60.26 
82.35 
Source: Table H. 1 in the Appendix H. 
1 Calculated from the available figures. 
2 Without intergas and petroleum units as well as pipelines. 
- Not available. 
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planned. The LNG plants worked at 84% of their technical 
norm. The lowest U3,42%, was recorded by the Skikda petro- 
chemical plant. SONATRACH (from the available figures) used 
its capacities over four fifths of the time. This ratio is 
probably one of the best rates among the Algerian public 
enterprises reviewed. These figures confirm that fixed 
capital is not used as intensively as it should be in all 
SONATRACH plants, with the exception of the Setif plastic 
plants. 
The inefficient utilisation of fixed capital in EONATRACH 
(U1=50%, U2=60%) is more significant than in SONIC (83%, 83%), 
SNIC (72%, 95%) or SNMC (66%, 92%). The time utilisation of 
fixed capital, however, is lower in SONIC (80%), SNIC ("'6%) 
and SNMC (69%) than in SONATRACH (82%). 
8.1.3. Utilisation of labour 
Just as in SONIC, SNMC and SNIC, the only available 
measure of the utilisation of labour is the overstaffing rate. 
According to SONATRACH managers, considering the shortage of 
available data in Table 8.7, plants are overstaffed. For 
. example, the overstaffing rate amounted 
to 92% in the fertili- 
ser plants, 60% in the Arzew no. 1 plant and Algiers refinery 
and 47% in the petrochemical plants. Given these figures, 
together with the evidence given by the managers, it appears 
that labour is not used as efficiently as it should be (11). 
8.2. Common causes of inefficiency in SONATRACH 
Now that the underutilisation of the different inputs in 
SONATRACH plants has been discussed, the various causes of 
inefficiency are analysed in more detail with specific 
examples. There are several reasons for the underutilisation 
of inputs in SONATRACH plants. The main causes associated 
with the underutilisation of the different 
inputs, as 
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perceived by the managers and from the analysis, follow. 
8.2.1. Organisational factors 
According to SONATRACH's managers and evidence presented 
in previous sections, the rates of absenteeism (6.5% for 
SONATRACH as a whole in 1981) and labour turnover (11% in 
1981) are high in all plants. The rate of labour turnover is 
especially high among technical personnel. In 1980, for 
example, 85 instrumentalists resigned at the Skikda refinery. 
The Arzew LNG plant experienced a similar situation, where 14 
out of 15 instrumentalists 'trained by SONATRACH left in 1980. 
As a result, maintenance work cannot be conducted properly and 
machines cannot be maintained and repaired regularly. These 
high labour turnover ratios preclude the accumulation of 
experience on the part of employees and do not favour the 
offering of incentives to improve the situation. High rates 
of absenteeism and turnover are partly due to the low salaries 
offered by SONATRACH when compared to the other public 
enterprises. In addition, they are also caused by 
insufficient social infrastructure such as housing, transport 
and canteens. According 1. o studies carried out by SONATRACH, 
for example, 1,450 rooms and-, -horses are needed to accommodate 
workers (and their families) employed in the 
injection plants 
(south). Regarding the transport of personnel, the LNG plants 
are 12 vehicles short to ensure adequate transportation. 
In most SONATRACH plants the quality of 
intermediate 
inputs and outputs is up tc international standards. There 
are exceptions, however. Fertiliser, petrochemical and 
plastic plants have some problems with 
the quality of their 
intermediate inputs as well as their outputs. SONIC's plants, 
as discussed earlier, encountered problems with 
the 
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intermediate inputs supplied by the Arzew or Skikda 
petrochemical plants. These intermediate inputs are produced 
within SONATRACH or are imported. Low quality intermediate 
inputs has led to stoppages of production processes, more 
frequent maintenance requirements and deterioration of the 
machinery, all of which has greatly affected the utilisation 
of fixed capital and labour. 
The overstaffing experienced in SONATRACH is partly due to 
the adoption of the "learning by doing" method where the 
positicn oa foreign technical assistant is duplicated. T: a 
very large size of SONATRACH as well as the diversification of 
its production also create problems. Given that SONATRACH is 
responsible for the exploitation, production, transport and. 
-commercialisation of crude oil, LNG, natural gas and petroleum 
products as well as housing, transport, training and welfare 
services of the workers has resulted in tendencies towards 
gigantism and diversification that is contrary to efficient 
management. SONATRACH's involvement in a large number of 
activities of different nature and complexity make its manage- 
ment very complex. According to the managers, the promotional 
process in SONATRACH plants is also inefficient. Combined 
with this, both incentives and interest are lacking on the 
part of the management (12) as well as an absence of human 
resource policy (13) and norms. Finally SONATRACH plants 
encounter problems due to a cumbersome bureaucracy and the 
lack of an efficient economic organisation (14) with clearly 
defined objectives, positions and procedures. 
8.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
8.2.2.1. Shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
Most of the raw materials used by SONATRACH are obtained 
locally and are not in short supply, with the exception of a 
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few cases. For example, shortages of supplies such as natural 
gas at the LNG plants of Arzew no. 2 and Skikda and crude oil 
at the Arzew no. 1 refineries (for the production of motorfuel 
and bitumen) have occurred. Shortages of intermediate inputs, 
however, are frequent in a number of plants such as the refi- 
neries and the plastic, petrochemical and fertiliser plants. 
For example, . tile refineries ran short of chemicals 
packaging goods products necessary for the production and 
conditioning of lubricants. Shortages of intermedi:: t& : inputs 
were caused by the underutilisation of production ca'a,, ity in 
the extraction, injection, pumping and reinjection units as 
well as in petrochemical plants and refineries. 
she supply of water and electricity of different voltages 
(which, as discussed earlier, are in short supply) is, in this 
case as well, unreliable and inadequate. These shortages 
create needs for more frequent maintenance and repair duties 
and, therefore, more frequent work stoppages than r iaý :; gated. 
Fertiliser plants are the most severely affected by these 
shortages (15). The shortage of raw materials and 
diatc: _.. nputs affects SONATRACH in a degree similar to 
but to a greater extent than SNMC or SNIC. This i ý^fl. iv due 
to the nature of the technology used and to the fact that 
these shortages affect almost all SONATRACH plants. 
8.2.2.2. Shortages of transport and infrastructure 
"I °'^}" usi rn road and ra i1 as. means of 11VOL. VGL %-. LL%. plant- ý.. y 
transport suffered from the lack of adequate systemv. The 
Algiers and Setif plastic plants, in particular, were greatly 
affected by the lack of transport facilities. Similarly, all 
the refineries, particularly the Hassi Messaoud and In Amenas 
refineries, encountered problems inherent to the shortage of 
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adequate transport, such as obtaining supplies of chemical and 
packaging goods and collecting finished outputs. The fertili- 
ser plants of Annaba and Arzew were also faced with problems 
regarding the supply of inputs and removal of outputs. Plants 
using pipelines and ship carriers to supply their inputs or to 
remove their outputs, with the exception of the occasional 
loss of transport mainly due to breakdowns at the injection 
plants, were affected to a much lesser degree than plants 
using more conventional transport. Shortages of raw 
materials, consumable and intermediate inputs as well as the 
inadequate removal of outputs occurred because of insufficient 
and worn out means of transport within or outside SONATRACH. 
Shortages of infrastructure and, in particular, port 
infrastructure, which leads to inefficient removal of outputs, 
affected the Skikda liquefied natural gas plants and the Arzew 
refinery. These shortages resulted in underutilisation of 
inputs since the plants had to slow down production. 
8.2.2.3. Shortages of skilled labour 
From the discussion in the first part of this chapter, 
SONATRACH lacks skilled workers (30% of its labour force was 
underqualified). Table 8.10 illustrates the lack of skilled 
workers by plant. Despite the presence of a large proportion 
of foreign technical assistants, 2.2% of the total labour 
force and 6.2% of the total skilled labour force in SONATRACH, 
the lack of skilled workers is still acutely felt. The lack 
of a skilled labour force, as discussed earlier, was particu- 
larly important at most plastic plants, the Annaba and Skikda 
fertiliser plants, the Skikda refinery, the Arzew separation 
unit and the LNG Arzew no. 4 plant. According to the 
managers, an extra 948 skilled workers are required to meet 
the technical norms. The lack of skilled workers has serious 
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consequences on the levels of maintenance and repair of 
production capacities, especially since SONATRACH employs a 
type of technology which is both capital intensive and sophis- 
ticated. As a result, inefficiencies occurred at the 
technical level. The lack of skilled workers also has 
dramatic consequences on input utilisation. 
Table 8.10: The estimated lack of skilled 
labour force by SONATRACH plant in 1980 
SONATRACH plants Managers Technicians Total 
and 
supervisors 
LNG of Arzew 4 7 54 61 
LNG of Arzew 1 21 102 122 
LNG of Arzew 2 - 9 9 
LNG of Skikda 1 4 12 16 
Algiers refinery 7 3 10 
Arzew 1 refinery - - - Skikda 1 refinery 18 157 175 
Hassi Messaoud refinery 4 3 7 
In Amenas refinery 5 - 5 
Annaba fertiliser plant 6 57 63 
Arzew fertiliser plant 1 8 9 
Skikda fertiliser plant 12 46 58 
Arzew petrochemical plant - 2 2 
Arzew separation unit 36 133 169 
Plastic plants 32 209 241 
Total 153 795 948 
Source: Survey data. 
The lack of a skilled labour force, which is much more 
important in SONATRACH than in SONIC, SNMC or SNIC, may be 
attributed to the use of its more capital intensive and 
sophisticated technology. This is confirmed by the presence 
of a much higher proportion of foreign skilled workers: 2.2% 
of the total employed labour force in SONATRACH as opposed to 
0.2% to 0.4% in SONIC, SNMC and SNIC. 
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8.2.2.4. Shortages of imported spare parts and inputs 
Almost all plants are faced with shortages of imported 
spare parts and inputs. Among those suffering most from the 
lack of spare parts are the fertiliser plants and the Skikda 
and Hassi Messaoud refineries. Calculations obtained from 
these plant managers give an idea of the actual length of 
time needed to obtain the required imported spare parts. In 
almost all plants, it takes an average of 13 months for a 
spare part to be delivered; if the item is not available in 
the suppliers' stock and has to be specially made following 
the order, an average of 16.5 to 21 months is needed. 
These shortages are the result of several factors. 
Cumbersome administrative and governmental procedures play an 
important part. In addition, the planned requirements of 
imported spare parts and inputs are not always respected by 
the department of international trade. In 1979, for instance, 
the Annaba fertiliser plant received only a fifth of the 
15,000 tons of sulphuric acid requested. The department of 
international trade decided to import only 3,000 tons of 
sulphuric acid for the whole year. According to the AGI 
allocated, this decision did not take into account the actual 
requirements of the plant. Consequently, underutilisation of 
fixed capital and labour occurred in the various workshops 
using sulphuric acid as an intermediate input. The shortage 
of imported spare parts is related to the length of delivery 
time and inefficient stock management. The long delivery time 
required may be attributed to the fact that spare parts, which 
often consist of an entire piece of machinery, are not stocked 
by the suppliers. Furthermore, some plants have problems with 
their suppliers because of unpaid bills. Finally, according 
to Algerian import regulations, any order exceeding 200,000 AD 
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must be submitted to the supervisory ministry for approval. 
In 1980, according to SONATRACH managers, 566 orders, which 
constituted one third of all imported orders, had to be submi- 
tted to the supervisory ministry for approval (one order 
amounted to an average of 6,000,000 AD). This time-consuming 
procedure contributed to the absence of some imported inputs. 
All of these problems together led to higher inefficiencies 
relative to the lack of imported spare parts in SONATRACH as 
compared with SONIC, SNMC or SNIC. 
8.2.2.5. Shortages of stocking areas 
The stocking facilities for inputs and outputs are 
insufficient in the Algiers and Skikda refineries and all 
fertiliser plants. They are nonexistent in the Arzew no. 2 
refinery and Setif plastic plants. The nonexistent (or insuf- 
ficient) stocking facilities do not allow plants to secure a 
given amount of inputs or to stock outputs in periods of low 
demand. Such problems are, in fact, caused by the special 
nature, characteristics and seasonal fluctuations of the 
outputs in these plants. The shortage of inputs 
may, in some cases, be attributed to the lack of stocking 
facilities. This in turn leads to underutilisation of the 
various inputs. 
8.2.2.6. Shortages of working capital 
The price of some of SONATRACH's outputs, such as fertili- 
sers (considered to be first necessity products), are 
frozen. 
These products are supposed to be subsidized by the 
government: In-1980, for example, the selling price of 
fertilisers, which had remained unchanged since 1974, covered, 
on average, only 40% of 
its production cost. As discussed 
earlier, the system of subsidies 
is inadequate. The poor 
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system of fertiliser subsidies resulted in an unsuitable 
financial structure and eventually, a lack of working capital. 
Moreover, the price of output includes the state tax, which 
amounts to 90% of the total price. The remaining 10% does not 
cover production costs. Given the fact that the tax must, in 
most cases, be paid before receiving payment from the client, 
SONATRACH encounters financial difficulties. This situation 
indirectly affected the inefficient utilisation of various 
inputs in the different plants. 
8.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
The hydrocarbon branch of industry, which has been develo- 
ped only recently, makes use of new technological advances 
which often have not proved their reliability. Consequently, 
this sector might expect to be faced with a variety of techni- 
cal problems and difficulties which may lead to inefficient 
use of its production capacities. Such is the case, for 
instance, of the Arzew no. 1 refinery and all the LNG, petro- 
chemical (turbo-machines) and plastic plants. In addition, 
some plants are faced with stoppages or inefficiencies due to 
the misconception of a machine or production line. The Arzew 
and Skikda LNG plants and refineries and the Hassi Rmel gas 
reinjection unit are typical examples of this state of 
affairs. At Arzew, the steam processor of the LNG plant and 
various machines in the urea production line of the fertiliser 
plant are underscaled, resulting in frequent work stoppages. 
In addition, the separation processes at the Arzew refinery 
are inadequate, placing the quality of the outputs 
in jeopardy. 
In some cases, such as the Skikda refinery, problems are 
so serious that the rise in production anticipated and 
advocated by the contractor cannot 
be achieved. Another 
problem, associated with the sophistication of 
the technology, 
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is mastery of its use. This problem was encountered within 
the sulphuric acid section of the Annaba fertiliser plant and 
resulted in irreparable damage to the acid production line. 
Up to 1979, no decision regarding the replacement of the 
damaged sulphuric acid production line had been made, despite 
the fact that no sulphuric acid had been produced since 1975 
(the date of the inauguration of the plant). 
The necessity to select equipment which enabled the 
product to be competitive (in the case of LNG) as well as 
satisfy both the domestic and international markets (in the 
case of fertiliser) led to the adoption of a substantial 
production capacity. Since this necessitated special equip- 
ment and prototypes, for which it was difficult to estimate 
performance, a number of problems were encountered. The main- 
tenance of such equipment often requires a permanent body of 
foreign expertise, raising the high degree of foreign 
dependence as well as the output production cost in this 
branch of industry. The available technology is also often 
best suited for the production of outputs which have 
specifications in accordance with international or the country 
of origin's demand. Such technology may not be adequate in 
the Algerian context and the lack of normalisation and 
coordination in the acquisition of such production lines may 
result in the unnecessary accumulation of capital goods. The 
lack of coordination between the project and operating sector 
leads to the incompatibility between the techniques used in 
the production process and the basic product, as was the case 
for resin, mentioned above. 
In addition, SONATRACH encountered other problems related 
to government policies, the present educational system, 
import 
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and customs procedures, the inappropriate price system and 
absence of clear careers and promotion plans. 
8.2.4. Demand shortages 
8.2.4.1. Cutback on oil outputs resulting from the end 
crisis 
In relation to the world energy crisis, the Algerian 
government imposed a cutback in the production of crude oil. 
This fall in production was intentional in order to maintain 
the international price of oil determined by OPEC (this also 
resulted in slower exhaustion of Algerian crude oil reserves). 
In 1982, the Algerian quota was reduced from 740,000 to 
650,000 barrels per day. This excludes the production of 
condensates which exceeded 200,000 barrels per day. In fact, 
the production of crude oil for 1982 was only 560,000 barrels 
per day, well below the planned target (16). In contrast to 
exported petroleum products, amounting to 440,000 barrels per 
day (a figure which has doubled since 1980), crude oil exports 
have decreased (17). Following this drop in production, 
excess capacity occurred in interpetroleum plants such as 
pumping stations and separation units. The drop in production 
also had an impact on the utilisation of pipelines and ship 
carriers. 
8.2.4.2. Cancellation of contracts 
The Algerian government cancelled the El-Paso gas contract 
which was originally signed for a 25 year period. The 
contents of this contract included the export of 11 billion 
cubic metres of natural gas per annum. In relation to this 
contract, LNG plants and pipelines were built and ship 
carriers were bought in order to begin exporting in 1978. 
Following the cancellation of the El-Paso contract in 1980, 
excess capacity occurred at the LNG plants, intergas plants 
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(extraction, separation, injection, reinjection and pumping 
units) and in pipelines and ship carriers, since all were 
acquired to fulfill the export requirements of this specific 
contract. These excess capacities, which were caused by 
commercial constraints, are considered transitory since the 
Algerian and French governments reached an agreement on the 
price of gas in January 1982 and new contracts were signed and 
approved with other countries, such as West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Greece (18). Since 1982, in fact, no 
excess capacity has been reported at the LNG and intergas 
plants or at the pipeline and ship levels. 
8.2.4.3. Demand deficiencies 
Demand deficiencies occurred primarily because plants were 
built larger than immediate demand warranted due to advantages 
arising from economies of scale and the anticipation of future 
demand. The choice of scale was also influenced by the 
technology available on the international market. Excess 
capacity exists in the fertiliser plant, for example, since 
only 1/3 of the present capacity would have been enough to 
satisfy local demand. No exporting is allowed since a clause 
in the contract prevents the plant from exporting for at least 
a period of 10 years. A second reason for demand deficiency 
was the inefficient distribution system of fertiliser and 
petrochemical products mainly in central and western Algeria 
where shortages were recorded. A third reason is that the 
industry as a whole is relatively vertically integrated but 
not horizontally integrated. Such is the case of the petro- 
chemical and plastic plants. For instance, the polyethylene 
plant was completed 2 years before the ethylene plant although 
the latter was supposed to use the output of the former (19). 
326 
Consequently, for two years the polyethylene plant's capacity 
was underutilised. In other cases, plants built to provide 
intermediate inputs for specific plants, which are either 
still under construction, in the planning stage or have been 
cancelled due to lack of financial resources, also suffer from 
an inefficient use of their inputs. 
Excess capacity encountered in a number of plants is 
considered transitory since demand is expected to increase 
with the construction of new plants or the signing of new 
contracts. This is not the case, however, for the fertiliser 
plant, crude oil transport and interpetroleum units. 
Concerning demand shortages, the situation in SONATRACH 
presents some similarities with that of SNMC (domestic 
demand), however, SONATRACH encounters additional commercial 
constraints due to the energy crisis (international demand). 
In conclusion, the causes of inefficiency in SONIC, SNMC, 
SNIC and SONATRACH are somewhat similar, however, in SONATRACH 
plants, inefficient input utilisation is mainly due to 
organisational factors, shortages of imported inputs and spare 
parts, technical inefficiencies and international commercial 
constraints. 
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CHAPTER NINE : SNS PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
SNS, created on the 3rd of September, 1964, is under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Heavy Industries. The 
functions assigned to SNS are in accordance with the national 
development plan based on Destanne De Bernis' "industrialising 
industry" strategy (1). Since its creation, SNS has been the 
main instrument for state intervention in ferrous and non- 
ferrous metallurgy as well as in the manufacturing of semi- 
finished and finished ferrous and non-ferrous products. SNS 
development has been sustained by the need for its outputs 
created by the various activities undertaken in all other 
sectors of the Algerian economy. The activities, which SNS 
encompasses, involve numerous technological stages. For 
instance, metal cannot be used directly as it leaves the 
steelmill. It must undergo a series of transformations in 
order to obtain its desired shape. 
Like almost all state-owned enterprises in Algeria, SNS is 
responsible for all activities related to its outputs. SNS is 
responsible for: (1) production activities and commerce 
(import, market development and distribution); (2) management 
of existing production capacities as well as the creation of 
new ones according to economic policies (planning 
investiga- 
tion, establishment and commissioning of new plants, 
for 
example); and (3) the employment of personnel as well as 
the 
training of new personnel in all positions and 
specialisations. 
Starting from an almost non-existent steel 
industry, which 
consisted of only a 
few plants under construction at the El- 
Hadjar complex (2), SNS, 
in 1981, was comprised of 37 plants 
totally owned by the state 
(see Table 9.1). Five other plants 
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Table 9.1: SNS plants and their respective outputs in 1980 
SNS plants Year of Unit Production 1981 
entry Technical Planned Actual 
El Hadjar complex 
-Cast iron no. 1 &2p. 
-Coke 1980 Tons 19230,000 318,977 4499035 
-Conglomerate 1980 103 tons 2,300 29216.3 1,509 
-Liquid cast iron 1969/81 "" 1,760 1,236.3 897.1 
-Oxygen steelmill no. 1 1972 
-Liquid steel Tons 12400,000 686,605 4189205 
Blooms Tons 1,300,000 184,800 418,205 
-Oxygen steelmill no. 2 1981 
-Liquid steel Tons 700,000 268,958 41,859 
-Billettes Tons 600,000 227,513 41,859 
-Electrical steelmill 1975 
-Liquid steel Tons 180,000 97,82-9 72,704 
-Iron ingot Tons 123,000 80,523 69,704 
-Hot rolling mill 1972* Tons 1,330,000 5469699 3'1,919 
-Coils Tons - 510,715 320,289 
-Thick iron sheet Tons - 35,984 11,630 
-Cold rolling mill 1974 Tons 750,000 187,115 180,288 
-Iron sheets Tons - 100,429 ) 
-Galvanised iron sheet Tons - 86,686 ) 180,288 
-Wire & round mill 1978 Tons 540,000 512v230 392,482 
-Rim for wire drauwing Tons - 
82,817 ) 
-Rim for round Tons - 230,955 
) 238,300 
-Rounds in bars Tons - 1987458 
154,182 
-Seamless tubes mill 1977 Tons 70,000 
46,738 40,461 
-Cast Tons - 
37,241 ) 
-Pipelines Tons - 
9,497 ) 40,461 
-Welded tubes mil 1 1969 
-Welded tubes 
Tons 1007000 51,833 63,987 
Transformation group 
Tubes and flat 
products division 
-Reghaia big tubes p. 
Nat. Tons 100,000 56,177 54,208 
-Tube & welded tube 
Tons - 22,890 21,154 
-Coated tube 
Tons - 33,287 33,094 
-Reghaia small tube p. 
Nat. Tons 
) 
35,000 33,903 
499 24 
30,078 
21 354 
-Gas tube 
Tons 
Tons ) 000 35 
, 
9,404 
, 8,724 
-Thin tube , 
-Reghaia cold steelmill 
1975 Tons 
T 
- 
000 130 
181,193 
622 119 
1442179 
921622 
-Thin iron sheet 
ons 
Tons 
, 
- 
, 
1,891 2,055 
-Welded tube Tons 93,000 60,070 49,502 
-Sundry items 
-Ghardaia spiral 
tube 1977 
-Welded iron tube 
Tons 
(Table continues on the following page. 
) 
110,000 103,615 68,714 
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Table 9.1. (Continued) 
SNS plants Year of Unit Production 1981 
ntry T-chnical Planned Actual 
Long products division 
-Oran steelmill Nat. Tons 110,000 104,303 94,287 
-Iron ingot Tons 31,500 29,303 24,998 
-Round Tons 80,000 67,000 61,240 
-Welded wire mesh Tons 10,000 8,000 8,049 
-Oued Smar electrode p. Nat. 
-Electrode Tons 300,000 99,960 609 613 
-Sig nail plant 1979 Tons 27,120 26,792 17,980 
-Wire drawing Tons 13,000 149491 8,925 
-Nail Tons 15,000 12,210 8,925 
-Clip Tons 22000 131 130 
-Annaba welded wire 
mesh & metal is beam p. 1979 
-Welded wire mesh Tons 14,000 12,063 129002 
-Metallic beam Tons 12,000 12,407 992 
-Nail Tons - 1,013 750 
-Reghaia welded wire 
mesh & metallic beam p. 1979 
-Metal is beam Tons 69000 4,78F 19017 
-Welded wire mesh Tons 20,000 9,934 92800 
-El Eulma electrode p. 1979 
-Electrode Tons 260,000 1009000 59,422 
-Extruded wire Tons 32,000 27,255 20,371 
Metallic contains divis ion 
-Kouba packaging plant Nat. Tons 509239 33,683 32,189 
-Barrel Tons 6,135 1,519 1,736 
-Preserve can Tons 36,000 
25,232 23,622 
-Gas bottle Tons 
8,104 6,932 61831 
Unit - 649,600 568,339 
-Arzew packaging plant 1976 
-Packaging containers Tons 19,169 
%886 9,623 
-Kouba aluminum plant 
Nat. Tons 4,434 29453 1,987 
-Kitchen utensile 
Tons 924 876 
-Other goods 
Tons 4,434 1,529 1,111 
-Batna packaging plant 1979 
-Gas bottle 
Tons 10,611 97774 9,689 
Unit - 7739600 705,359 
-Mascara packaging pla. 
1980 
ions `-I2 ' `° -Small gas bottle Unit 000 000 5 
, 620,000 240,500 
-Other items , , 
(Table continues on the following page. 
) 
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Table 9.1. (Continued) 
SNS plants Year of Unit Production 1981 
entry Technical Planned Actual 
Salvage division 
-Central salvage plant Nat. Tons - 291,265 2889682 
-East savage plant Nat. Tons - 60,306 61,933 
-West salvage plant Nat. Tons - 37,843 27,786 
Non ferrous transfor- 
mation group 
-Ghazaout zinc electro- 
lysis plant 1975 Tons 150,350 85,091 80j824 
-Zinc ingot Tons 40,150 33,000 35,696 
-Cadmium Tons 200 91 
85 
-Sulphur acid Tons 909000 50,000 43,372 
-Zamac Tons 20,000 21000 19671 
-Prosider p. 
-Cold rolled flat iron Tons - 
4,375 3,700 
-Various products Tons - 3,893 
3,600 
Industrial gas group Nat. 
By outputs 
-Acetylene 103 m3 
2,704 1,327 1,799 
-Oxygen " it 18,720 
4,760 4,507 
-Liquid oxygen It 
" HL 15,193 11,040 6,534 
-Nitrous oxide Tons 103 m3 
360 
192 12 
120 
154 
111 
252 
-Nitrogen gas 
-Liquid nitrogen 
HL 
, 
229311 17,958 202942 
-Hydrogen 
103 m3 280 77 70 
-Carbon dioxide 
Tons 
10 m3 
489800 4,956 
68 
5,644 
60 
-Argon 
-Liquid argon 
103 L 194 120 67 
-Compressed air 
10 m3 18 
Source: Table J. 1 in the Appendix J. 
* Extended. 
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were on stream and a few more under construction or in the 
planning stage. SNS inherited one steelmill (Acilor (3)) and 
ten metallurgy plants (4). The former produces iron ingots, 
rounds and welded wire mesh, while the latter produce tubes, 
electrodes, metal packaging products, aluminum kitchen 
utensils and industrial gases, to name only a few. SNS also 
inherited three metal salvage plants. The pre-independence 
plants were progressively nationalised between 1968 and 1974. 
Several other plants were built as part of the implementation 
of various development plans, such as the El-Hadjar complex, 
which has become one of the country's major industrial centres 
mainly geared to the production of flat products. 
Subsequently, in 1981, SNS had grown into an organisation 
employing about 40,000 workers, 2.8 times the number in 1973. 
Between 1973 and 1978, SNS sales revenue grew by a factor of 
3.4 to 3.68 billion AD and its fixed assets grew by a factor 
of 4.3 to 13.66 billion AD (5). 
As illustrated in Table 9.1, SNS annual cast iron capacity 
is 1.76 million tons and its annual steel capacity is 2.3 
million tons. The first stage rolling mill production 
capacity is 2.28 million tons: 1.33 million tons for the hot 
rolling mill and 0.75 million tons for the cold rolling mill. 
Second stage facilities are involved in the manufacture of a 
whole range of finished products such as seamless tubes, wire 
and round products, welded wire mesh, gas bottles and black 
and white metal packaging products. The annual capacities of 
these outputs by plant are given in detail in Table 9.1. 
Despite the substantial development experienced by this sec- 
tor, SNS does not produce large quantities of iron and steel 
products to satisfy local market demand. In 1980, Algeria 
had 
to import about 75% of its steel and iron needs (6). 
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SNS is a divisionalised organisation (see Chapter Four). 
As indicated in Figure 9.1, SNS is made up of five different 
groups. The first group is the El-Hadjar complex, comprised 
of 12 plants involved in the transformation of iron and in 
first and second stage manufacturing. Included in this 
complex are one coking plant, two cast iron mills, three steel 
making mills, one hot and one cold rolling mill, one wire and 
round mill, one seamless tube mill, one welded tube mill and 
one galvanised tube workshop. Next, the transformation group 
consists of four divisions. The first, the long products 
division, is a regrouping of the plants producing welded wire 
mesh, electrodes, light metallic beams and nails. The second 
division, flat and tube products, is comprised of plants 
producing welded gas and coated tubes. The third division is 
the metallic containers division which consists of plants 
manufacturing gas bottles, various metal packaging containers 
and aluminum kitchen utensils. Finally, the fourth division 
is salvage, a regrouping of the plants specialised in metal 
scraps and salvage. The three remaining groups are the non 
ferrous transformation group (one plant producing zinc), the 
industrial gas group (five plants producing various gases) and 
the commercial group which is in charge of the distribution of 
local outputs and the importation of inputs and finished 
products for which SNS retains the monopoly. Each group has 
its own head office. The training centres and the equipment 
and promotion departments are managed by the SNS head office. 
The organisational structure of SNS is neither divisionalised 
solely by products nor by regions nor by functions but is a 
mixture of the three. The El-Hadjar complex, which comprises 
about one third of the SNS plants, prompted the formation of 
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SNS General Managing Director 
The El-Hadjar group 
e transformation group 
The long products division 
The flat & tube products division 
The metallic containers division 
The metal salvage division 
The non ferrous transformation group 
The industrial gas group 
The commercial group 
Figure 9.1 : SNS organisational structure in 1980. 
Source : Survey data. 
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the El-Hadjar group. Similarly, the commercial group is the 
outgrowth of the enormous imports (75% of the local demand) 
for which SNS is responsible. The organisational structure of 
SNS is characterised by different problems which will be 
discussed later. Since 1981, SNS has been in the process of 
being restructured into sixteen different public enterprises 
(see Appendix B. 2). 
All SNS plants except the flat steel and industrial gas 
plants of Ghardaia and Ouargla, respectively, are situated in 
the northern part of Algeria. The reasons for the geographi- 
cal imbalance between the south and the north are mainly due 
to natural resources (water) and climatic constraints. In 
addition, most SNS plants are concentrated in the north-east 
(the El-Hadjar complex) in Annaba. This is due to their 
proximity to the Ouenza iron ore mine which is located about 
200 km south of Annaba. Prior to 1964, the entire production 
of the Ouenza mine was exported but, since then, the 
increasing activities of the El-Hadjar complex have required a 
larger proportion of the Ouenza mine production, reaching 36% 
In 1978. This complex is expected to use the entire iron ore 
production of the Ouenza mine by 1999. 
SNS, with the largest industrial complex in Algeria, is 
the second largest public enterprise after SONATRACH as a 
result of the large investment share received by this branch 
of industry. The range of outputs produced by SNS is wider 
than that of SONIC or SNIC, for example. With respect to its 
organisational structure, SNS is grossly comparable to SNMC. 
In addition, the concentration of the different plants and 
complexes in the northern region is similar to all public 
enterprises reviewed so far. 
As mentioned earlier, SNS has grown into a large public 
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enterprise. By 1981, SNS owned 14 pre-independence and 23 
post-independence plants. All pre-independence plants produ- 
cing finished steel products use French steel technology (see 
Table J. 2 in the Appendix J). The only pre-independence steel 
processing plant is the steelmill of Oran which uses French 
technology as well (Martin's furnace). The latter plant is 
also supplied with ingots and blooms which are either imported 
or produced at the El-Hadjar complex. The post-independence 
plants involved in first stage iron and steel processing use 
technology imported mainly from the USSR, France, GFR and 
Italy; plants producing semi-finished outputs use technology 
from the USSR, Italy, Great Britain and GFR; and plants 
manufacturing finished outputs a technology from France, GFR, 
Austria and England. In addition, the three salvage plants, 
nationalised in 1968, use French technology. Two principal 
channels of production (the classical process based on the 
reduction of coke or direct reduction by natural gas) are used 
by SNS plants and complexes and., particularly, by the El- 
Hadjar complex. 
Regarding the scale of the different SNS plants, the pre- 
independence plants can be classified as small or medium-scale 
plants and the post-independence plants as large-scale plants. 
This breakdown is attributed both to factors concerning the 
availability of the technology (as pointed out in the SONIC 
Chapter) and to the origin of the technology. For example, 
West German technology is associated with medium scale plants 
while Russian technology is associated with large scale 
plants. A similar situation exists in all of the public 
enterprises reviewed this far. 
SNS plants can be divided into monoproduct and multipro- 
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duct plants specialised in the production of cast iron and 
steel, in the manufacturing of semi-finished and finished 
ferrous products and in the processing of non ferrous and 
industrial gas products. As indicated in Table 9.1, only 
21.6% (eight plants, of which three were built before indepen- 
dence) of the plants are monoproduct plants while the 
remaining 78.4% are multiproduct plants. In the public 
enterprises studied so far ( see previous chapters), 
multiproduct plants are generally highly integrated. In SNS, 
however, this implication is not always true, with the 
exception of the El-Hadjar complex which is highly integrated. 
The different multiproduct and monoproduct plants cannot be 
regarded as highly integrated. 
As in all public enterprises in Algeria, SNS holds a 
monopoly in international trade regarding any products 
entering its sphere of activities. Since SNS imports large 
quantities of non-ferrous products such as aluminum, zinc and 
copper as well as ferrous semi-finished and finished products 
such as cast iron, long and flat products, gas bottles and 
seamless products all of which are destined to both SNS plants 
and other public and private enterprises, its international 
trade activity is very important. This situation is common to 
all public enterprises investigated. On the other hand, 
export activity has not been developed except when exports 
were used as a partial repayment of credit or in the case of 
excess supply at an early stage of production. The few 
products (copper, zinc and special cast iron) which are 
presently exported are only exported because they cannot be 
used or processed in Algeria. The low level of development of 
export activity compared to SONATRACH is mostly due to the 
fact that domestic production is insufficient. The lack of 
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price competition and promotionnal and service facilities, 
however, do not favour an increase in the activity of this 
branch of international trade at the present time. 
Locally, the production of semi-finished ferrous products 
and non-ferrous semi-finished and finished outputs is 
monopolized by SNS. The production of finished metal 
products, which is shared with private firms producing mainly 
metal kitchen utensils, is not the monopoly of SNS. The 
participation of the private sector is, however, minimal and 
consequently SNS does not encounter fierce local competition. 
Such a situation implies that this branch of industry is still 
underdeveloped. 
The degree of dependency on imported inputs can be deduced 
from Table 9.2, which shows the origin of the main inputs. In 
1978,176 million AD worth of spare parts were imported. This 
constituted about 35% of the SNS imports, including capital 
goods, which were part of the investment plan (7) for that 
year. The high figure comes from the fact that the entire 
stock of capital goods is imported. Table 9.2 indicates that 
almost all the necessary raw materials, with the exception of 
the entire supply of coal and part of the coke and fine coke, 
are provided by the local market. In fact, the coking plant, 
which started production in 1980, should supply almost all the 
coke needed in the future. Fine coke, however, will still be 
imported. Coal used in the coking plant is imported because 
of the prohibitive price of transport within Algeria (the only 
coal mine in operation is located in the southwest). White 
iron, zinc and aluminum are also imported due to their 
scarcity in the local market. A large proportion of interme- 
diate inputs is provided by the local market or produced 
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within SNS. Some semi-finished and intermediate inputs such 
as steel and iron coils, billets and ingots are also imported 
to make up for insufficient local production. The dependence 
on imported inputs in SNS is comparable to that of SONIC. 
The destination of the various SNS outputs is indicated in 
Table 9.3. The different outputs consist of semi-finished and 
finished goods intended mainly for the local market. The 
semi-finished outputs are used equally by SNS and other 
branches of industry such as the metal equipment, electrical, 
electronic and mechanical engineering industries. For 
example, in 1978, half of the 1.75 million tons of semi- 
finished outputs were used within SNS. Finished outputs are 
used by the agricultural, hydraulic and industrial sectors and 
the health services (industrial gases). The only output 
directly used by consumers is also produced by the private 
sector (kitchen utensils). SNS is oriented towards the 
production of semi-finished and finished outputs for interme- 
diary use (modified or not) due to the nature and the level of 
integration of this branch of industry. The production of 
consumer goods is not part of the principal SNS activities. 
As already discussed, exports involve only a few products such 
as special cast iron, heavy and thin iron sheets, industrial 
gas (liquified nitrogen) and scraps from salvage plants which 
do not have any use in Algeria. 
The SNS labour force is described in Tables 9.4 and J. 3 in 
the Appendix J. Similar to other enterprises, the SNS labour 
force can be divided into three categories: managers, 
technicians and supervisors and semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. As indicated in Figure 9.2, in 1980 only 5% of the 
total labour force were managers, 13% were technicians or 
supervisors and 78% were semi-skilled or unskilled workers. 
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More than half of the workers in the third category are 
unskilled workers. In the El-Hadjar complex, for example, out 
of 57% of the labour force who were semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers, 60% were unskilled workers (34% of the total labour 
force). The percentage of skilled workers, which was low for 
SNS as a whole, was low as well for each SNS plant. Taking 
the El-Hadjar complex example once more, only 15% of the total 
labour force were managers, technicians and supervisors. The 
latter figure is very representative of the lack of skilled 
workers throughout SNS since nearly half of the total SNS 
labour force is employed in this complex. A similar situation 
was encountered in the metallic containers, zinc electrolysis, 
salvage and tubes and transformation of flat products 
divisions where only 14.5%, 15%, 8.3% and 19% of the workers 
were qualified as managers and technicians or supervisors, 
respectively. The lack of skilled workers at the division 
level is reflected by the lack of a skilled labour force at 
the plant level. The figure given would be even lower if only 
the number of workers in the plants were considered (61.6% of 
the total SNS skilled workers). The number of skilled workers 
is not related to the scale or age of the plant but to the 
location of the plants. The plants located on the coast and 
in large cities showed a higher percentage of skilled workers 
than those located in small town and inland areas. 
The foreign labour force employed by SNS amounted to only 
0.5% of the total labour force. It accounted, however, for 
8.6% of the total SNS managers. According to SNS managers, 
the rate of absenteeism and labour turnover are high 
in all 
the plants and especially in plants located in large cities. 
No figures are available to clearly support these statements, 
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Table 9.4: SNS personnel in 1980 
Skill category Managers Technicians/ Semi-skilled/ Total 
supervisors unskilled 
Groups and head 
office (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (3) 
El Had jar complex 533 3 2,339 12 149685 80 18,166 46.7 
Transformation gr. 274 3.2 1v022 11.9 7,287 84.9 8,583 22.1 
-Long products div. 85 3.7 250 11 19895 83 29267 5.8 
-Tubes & flat 
products division 102 4 367 15 1,972 80 21451 6.3 
-Metallic containers 
division 73 2.5 33 6 11.5 2,505 85 2,915 7.5 
-Salvage division 14 1.4 69 6.9 915 91 998 2.5 
Non-ferrous transform 
ation group 24 3 104 12 692 84 820 2.2 
Industrial gas group 22 2.8 151 19 612 78 785 2 
Total SNS plants 853 3 3,616 12.7 23,276 81.9 28,402 73.1 
Distribution group 74 4.4 170 9.6 1,526 86 1,770 4.5 
Head office 483 25 423 22 848 43 1,956 5 
Project 444 7.8 901 16 4,284 75 5,676 15 
Promotion division 40 54 307 401 1 
Training centres 72 116 165 353 0.9 
Total SNS 2,017 5 5,335 13 30,573 79 38,839 100 
-Foreigners 174 
8.6 7 16 197 0.5 
Source: Table J. 3 in the Appendix J. 
1 Total by skill category in the complex, division, group, head office 
& 
SNS as a whole. 
2% of total labour force by skill category in the complex, 
division, 
group, head office & SNS as a whole. 
3% of total managers, technicians & supervisors, semi-skilled 
& 
unskilled workers in the complex, division, group and 
head office. 
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Figure 9.2 : Percentage of labour force by skill category 
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except for the rate of absenteeism at the El-Hadjar complex, 
which amounted to 25% (8). 
As indicated in Figure 9.2, SONIC is better provided with 
skilled workers than SNS (24% of the SONIC labour force are 
managers, technicians and supervisors compared to only 18% for 
SNS). This difference is further accentuated by the fact that 
a larger proportion of the skilled labour force was working in 
SONIC plants than SNS plants (see Figure 9.3). The lack of 
skilled workers affects SNS to a greater extent than SONIC. 
9.1. Utilisation of inputs 
9.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
There is no real evidence, based on the contractor's 
norms, to show that raw materials and intermediate inputs are 
used inefficiently. The fact that blast furnaces are in 
continuous operation yet produce only about 70% of their 
planned production (6) implies, however, that electricity and 
natural gas are not used efficiently. In addition, according 
to SNS's managers, the proportion of scrap is higher than that 
advocated by the contractor. Despite the fact that scrap is 
usually recycled, this also tends to indicate that raw 
materials and intermediate inputs are not utilised efficient- 
ly. Underutilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
results in underutilisation of fixed capital and labour and 
vice versa, and in drops in production and increases in 
production costs. It is very difficult to assess with 
precision the extent of this overconsumption of these 
inputs, 
however, one can conclude that it is similar to that 
encountered in SNMC or SONATRACH. 
9.1.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
Following the definitions given in Chapter Four, U1 (ratio 
of actual over planned capacity) and U2 
(ratio of planned over 
346 
technical capacity) have been calculated for SNS. The results 
for 1981 are given in Tables J. 1 in the Appendix j, 9.5 and 
9.6. These rates are calculated for each plant output, for 
each SNS plant, for each SNS group and for SNS as a whole. As 
indicated in Table J. 1, which gives plant output rates of 
fixed capital utilisation, U1 varied between 15% and 277% and 
U2 ranged from 1.26% to 111%. The highest rate of fixed 
capital utilisation by plant output, taking both U1 and U2 
into account, was obtained for welded wire mesh (100%, 94%) at 
the Oran steelmill. The lowest rates of capacity utilisation 
were recorded for small gas bottles (34%, 14%) and liquid 
steel (15%, 38.4%) at the packaging plant of Mascara and the 
oxygen steelmaking plant no. 2, respectively. 
The value of Ul calculated for each SNS plant in 1981 
ranged from 16.5% to 168.5% while the value of U2 varied 
between 13% and 97% (see Table 9.5). The highest rates of 
fixed capital utilisation, when U1 and U2 are simultaneously 
analysed, were obtained for the packaging plant of Batna (98%, 
92%) and for the small tube plant of Reghaia (89.5%, 97%). 
The lowest rates of fixed capital utilisation were recorded 
for the packaging plant of Mascara (36.5%, 13%) and the elec- 
trode plant of Oued Smar (69%, 23.2%). Given the available 
figures, the transformation group (81.35%, 65.89%), and by the 
El-Hadjar complex group (89.46%, 53.71%), performed better 
than the other groups. The lowest rates of fixed capital 
utilisation was recorded by the industrial gas group (90.18%, 
40%). Analysing the fixed capital utilisation rates obtained 
for SNS as a whole, it appears that fixed capital was 
inefficiently used (U1= 85.6% and U2= 57.69%). 
According to Table 9.6, the pre-independence plants 
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Table 9.5: SNS plants' fixed capital utilisation in 1980 
SNS complexes/ Year of Ul U2 
plants entry (in percentage) 
El-Hadjar complex 89.46 53.71 
-Liquid cast iron 1969 
no. 1& no. 2 plants 1981 93.66 64 
-Oxygen steel making no. 1 1972 168.5 31.5 
-Oxygen steel making no. 2 1981 16.5 38 
-Electrical steel making 1975 80 59.5 
-Hot rolling mill (LAC) 1972 ext 60.7 41 
-Cold rolling mill (LAF) 1974 96 25 
-Wire and rounds mill 1978 76.6 94.8 
-Seamless tubes mill 1977 86 67 
-Welded tube mill 1969 123 52 
Transformation group 81.35 65.89(1) 
Tubes & flat products div. 85 81.41 
-Reghaia big tube p. Nat. 95.5 56.17 
-Reghaia small tube p. Nat. 89.5 96.86 
-Reghaia cold steelmill 1975 89 78.5 
-Ghardaia spiral tube p. 1977 66 94 
Long products division 72.72 65.29 
-Oran steelmill Nat. 93 85.58 
-Oued Smar electrode p. Nat. 69 23.2 
-Sig nail plant 1979 77.66 66.16 
-Annaba welded wire mesh 
& metallic beams plant 1979 71.66 94.5(1) 
-Reghaia welded wire mesh 
& metallic beam plant 1979 60 65 
-El Eulma electrode plant 1979 65 57.33 
Metallic containers div 83.23 54.2 
-Kouba packaging plant Nat. 101.66 60 
-Arzew packaging plant 1976 97 51 
-Kouba aluminum plant Nat. 83 55 
-Batna packaging plant 1979 98 92 
-Mascara packaging plant 1980 36.5 13 
Salvage plants 90.66 
-Centre salvage plant Nat. 99 
-East salvage plant Nat. 101 
-West salvage plant Nat. 72 
Non-ferrous transfor- 
mation group 90.81 48(1) 
-Ghazaouet zinc 
electrolysis 1975 92.13 48 
-Prosider East plant 
89.5 - 
Industrial gas group Nat. 91.81 40(1) 
Total SNS (1) 85.61 57.69(l) 
Source: Table J. 1 in the Appendix J. 
1 Calculated from the figures available. 
- Figure not available. 
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performed more efficiently than the post-independence plants. 
This is true, for instance, in the case of the transformation 
plants, built before and after independence. The evidence 
suggests that transformation plants which use labour intensive 
technology performed better than plants in the first and 
second stages of production which use capital intensive 
technology. Furthermore, the scale and origin of the 
technology used directly influence the utilisation of capacity 
since some technologies are more efficient than others. For 
example, Japanese technology is thought to be the most 
efficient technology in the world (9). In addition, utilisa- 
tion of fixed capital is also influenced by the level of 
mastery of imported technology. In conclusion, the scale, 
age, origin and mastery of technology all were major 
influences on the utilisation of fixed capital in the 
different plants in SNS. 
Table 9.6; Rates of fixed capital utilisation in SNS pre- 
and post-independence plants in 1980 (in percentages) 
Group and divisions pre-independence post-independen. 
plants plants 
U1 U2 U1 U2 
The El-Hadjar complex -- 89.46 53.71 
The transformation group 89.29 62.80 73.42 68.25 
-The tube and flat pro. div. 92.5 76.51 77.50 87.68 
-The long products div. 81 54.39 68.58 70.74 
-The metalli. container div. 92.33 57.5 77.16 52.00 
-The recovery div. 90.66 ... - - 
The non-ferrous transforma- 
tion group - - 90.81 48(1) 
The industrial gas group 90.18 40(1) - - 
Total SNS (1) 89.60 54.65 82.71 59.39 
Source: Table 9.5. 
(1) Calculated from the figures available. 
- Not applicable. 
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Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the 
analysis of U2. Some of the low values of U2 can be explained 
by the fact that this branch of industry requires a particu- 
larly long gestation time. For example, it takes about eight 
months for a black furnace to reach its required temperature. 
The low values of U2 for the cold rolling mill (25%), the 
oxygen steel making plant no. 1 (31.5%), the hot rolling mill 
(41%), the welded tube mill (52%) and the electrical steel 
making plant (59.5%) in the El-Hadjar complex cannot be 
explained in such terms, however, considering that these 
plants were built before 1976. 
The extent of inefficient utilisation of fixed capital in 
SNS is higher than that encountered in SONIC, SNIC and SNMC. 
Comparing SONATRACH and SNS, it appears that SNS fixed capital 
is used more efficiently. In fact, excess capacity, which is 
one of the main causes of underutilisation of capacity in 
SONATRACH, is not encountered in SNS. On the other hand, the 
consequences of such underutilisation in term of poor 
performance are similar in the five public enterprises 
investigated so far. 
9.1.3. Utilisation of labour 
Again, labour utilisation is measured through overstaffing 
rates since no other figures are available. According to 
SNS's managers, overstaffing is common to all the different 
plants, reaching a ratio of 20 to 25% for SNS as a whole. 
Labour is, therefore, not utilised efficiently. In addition, 
rates of absenteeism and labour turnover were lower 
in the 
pre-independence plants than in the post-independence plants. 
The labour force was probably more efficiently used in the 
former than in the latter. High labour costs, which amounted 
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to 25% of sales revenue in 1978 (10), lead to high production 
costs and low productivity and, eventually, to poor 
performance in SNS plants and in SNS as a whole. The extent 
of the underutilisation of labour, although difficult to 
assess with precision, is considered to be similar to that of 
the other public enterprises studied. 
9.2. Common causes of inefficiency in SNS 
Now that the general profile of SNS and evidence on the 
underutilisation of raw materials and intermediate inputs, 
capital and labour has been given, an analysis of the causes 
of inefficiency is presented. 
9.2.1. Organisational factors 
Inexperience, working conditions encountered in the iron 
and steel industry and, more importantly the lack of housing 
are among the main organisational factors affecting efficiency 
in SNS. For example, 28.8% of the El-Hadjar complex workers, 
who lived in shanty towns around Annaba, urgently needed 
housing (11). Moreover, of the remaining personnel working at 
the complex, 31% lived in only one room accommodation and the 
-same proportion lived in two rooms (12). Under these stre- 
nuous conditions workers, particularly those working the night 
shift, can be expected to seek opportunities to improve their 
life style. Lack of housing is one of the major reasons for 
the high rate of labour turnover, which was 25% in 1980 (13). 
The large size and diversity of activities of the El- 
Hadjar complex were dictated by the goal of reaching a high 
level of integration. Instead, they resulted in increasing 
management complexity and inefficient utilisation of 
fixed 
capital and labour. A typical example, at the El-hadjar 
complex, is the use of only 20 to 25% of the production 
capacity of its own power plant. Furthermore, 
the complex, 
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which accounts for about half of the total SNS labour force, 
employs more than 18,000 workers and consequently had to 
satisfy their enormous needs for food, housing and transport, 
to name only few. Also a result of the large size of the 
complex, investments in all sorts of activities (such as the 
production of electricity, medicine, housing and welfare 
services) which could have been left to local subcontractors 
or to the state had to be made. 
The lack of quality control in some plants gave rise to 
organisational inefficiencies. For example, the electrode 
plant of El-Eulma, which lacked the necessary labour force to 
carry out rigorous control of its outputs, could not sell its 
production to SONELEC and TELECOM which argued that the 
outputs were not up to the standard. Ironically, despite a 
large existing demand, the El-Eulma plant outputs could not be 
sold on the domestic market. As mentioned earlier, higher 
scrap quantities than those advocated by the contractor 
characterised most SNS plants. Higher scrap quantities, which 
are mainly attributed to the low quality of intermediate 
inputs produced by SNS, lead to input underutilisation since 
more inputs are needed to produce the planned outputs. 
As discussed above, inherent to this branch of industry is 
a particularly long output gestation time (14). For example, 
it takes about eight months for a blast furnace to reach the 
required temperature. Consequently, during the first years of 
production, the various plants are expected to show 
low values 
of U2 (planned over technical capacity). This 
is the case in 
the newly built SNS plants. 
Besides these problems, SNS is also confronted with 
problems such as a cumbersome bureaucracy resulting 
from the 
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system itself, an inappropriate incentive and wage system, 
complex recruitment procedures, an inefficient promotion 
system (17), inefficient management of the spare parts stock 
and dilapidated equipment. 
9.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
9.2.2.1. Shortages of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
The Shortage of raw materials such as iron ore, which is 
supplied locally and is not in short supply, does not occur. 
In this respect, SNS is comparable to SONATRACH. Water and 
electricity supplies, on the other hand, are not adequate and 
reliable. Electricity is an important input which is used in 
the steel making mills and as a source of energy in all the 
other different first stage and transformation plants. Plants 
which are not equipped with their own power plant suffer 
greatly from this shortage. The lack of water, a very 
important input used in cooling down outputs, can also result 
in serious inefficiencies. 
Supplies of intermediate inputs supplied by the local 
market or SNS are subject to several problems. For example, 
in order to reduce the need to import coke, the El-Hadjar 
complex built a coking plant requiring coal which, for reasons 
discussed earlier, is also imported and thus subject to supply 
problems. This, in turn, may affect other plants or 
industrial sectors. For example, the steelmill of Oran was 
short of blooms and billettes and the large and small tubes 
plant of Reghaia was short of iron coils and thick and thin 
sheets, both plants being supplied by the El-Hadjar complex. 
In other instances, inefficiencies arising 
in other branches 
of industry may affect SNS plants. For example, 
the nail 
plant of Sig lacked the necessary packaging container supplied 
by SONIC. Such shortages seriously affect the utilisation of 
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fixed capital and labour within and outside SNS plants. They 
are the result of a lack of transport and infrastructure, 
underutilisation of inputs (supplier plants), lack of respect 
for delivery plans, technical constraints and lack of a 
skilled labour force. 
9.2.2.2. Shortages of transport and infrastructure 
facilities 
Railways and lorries are the most commonly used means of 
transport in SNS. This is because the inputs and outputs 
transported are heavy, voluminous and require large means of 
transport, similar to SNMC. Almost all plants complained 
about the shortage of these means of transport. The El-Hadjar 
complex, for example, had problems with its railway switching. 
Not enough trains were available to transport its inputs (raw 
materials, intermediate inputs and labour) and outputs. In 
fact, an estimated 8% of lost planned production resulted from 
the lack of worker transport alone. This corresponds to 45 
minutes per day. Another example is the welded wire plant of 
Reghaia which encountered problems with the transport of its 
inputs and outputs (the closest railway was about six 
kilometres away). All SNS plants experienced difficulty in 
delivering outputs due to the lack of transport facilities. 
Inevitably this resulted in interruptions of production since 
the stocking areas were insufficient to stock the undelivered 
outputs. 
Transport shortages are due to the nature and characteris- 
tics of the transported products, the dispersion of the 
different plants (which are obliged to carry the 
intermediate 
inputs or outputs), the old age of the different transport 
means, the imbalanced development of planned objectives 
and 
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the lack of financial means. The effects of shortages of 
means of transport and infrastructure were similar between SNS 
and SNMC, but had a far greater impact on SNS than on SONIC. 
9.2.2.3. Shortages of skilled workers 
As seen earlier, SNS is faced with an important shortage 
of skilled workers which leads to serious inefficiencies and 
emphasizes its dependency on foreign technical assistance. 
For instance, the nail plant of Sig had to considerably reduce 
production for six months due to breakdowns of the automatic 
packaging machine for which there was an inadequate supply of 
maintenance workers. The lack of skilled workers is partly 
the result of the relatively recent entry of this branch of 
industry into the Algerian economy. In fact, in 1969,90% of 
the total labour force of the El-Hadjar complex had no 
previous experience in the steel and iron industry (16). The 
lack of skilled workers is also due to certain governmental 
restrictions on the training of the work force, imposed for 
financial reasons. At the Oran steelmill, for instance, the 
number of maintenance workers trained was only half that 
required resulting in serious maintenance problems. This 
situation is worsened by the difficult living conditions 
encountered in some remote regions of Algeria where plants are 
located and by the housing crisis in general. For instance, 
the El-Eulma plant, which currently employs only one quarter 
of the maintenance workers it requires, lost part of these 
workers to other public enterprises offering better 
conditions. Foreign assistants, employed to make up for this 
lack of skilled workers, represented 8.6% of the total 
managers in SNS. In addition, in 1979 the expenses or 
foreign 
assistance for the El-Hadjar complex alone amounted to 170 
million AD (17). The lack of skilled workers is more 
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significant and has far more serious effects on the efficient 
use of inputs in SNS than in any of the other public 
enterprises studied in this thesis. 
9.2.2.4. Shortages of imported inputs and spare parts 
The shortage of imported inputs and spare parts is 
considered by the managers to be one of the most important 
reasons for the non-realisation of planned production. Due to 
the large proportion of imported intermediate inputs, these 
shortages cause important inefficiencies. For example, the 
Oran steelmill imports about 50% of its required inputs 
(blooms and billettes) although all of its inputs are supposed 
to be supplied by the El-Hadjar complex. The El-Hadjar 
complex, in turn, imports its requirements of fine coke, coal, 
some intermediate inputs and almost all of its spare parts. 
It overstocks coal because of shortages encountered in 
previous years. The extent of the dependence on imported 
inputs is similar for all SNS plants and leads to similar 
inefficiencies. Shortages of imported inputs or spare parts 
are mainly due to cumbersome import and customs policies, 
described in Chapter Three. The shortage of intermediate 
inputs and spare parts is as important in SNS as in SONIC and 
results in similar underutilisation of fixed capital and 
labour in the two public enterprises. 
9.2.2.5. Shortages of stocking areas 
The shortage of stocking areas leads to serious ineffi- 
ciencies in SNS since inputs and outputs, which are voluminous 
most of the time, must be stocked in covered areas 
to prevent 
them from rusting. The Oran steelmill encountered a serious 
lack of stocking areas, especially in the stocking of 
imported 
inputs. As mentioned earlier, the lack of stocking areas was 
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worsened by the shortage of transport. One important reason 
for the transport shortage is that plants are not allowed to 
sell directly to their customers who would probably remove the 
goods much quicker than the distribution centre. 
9.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
9.2.3.1. Limited technical choice 
The choice of technology is generally dictated by cost 
considerations, optimal allocation of resources, technical 
specifications and mastering of the means of production. 
These choices, which require rigorous appreciation of the 
constraints faced by each branch considered, raise the 
question of the degrees of freedom offered to a nation in the 
choice of its principal production channels (a classical 
process based on the reduction of coke or direct reduction by 
natural gas). Fabrication processes, within a principal 
production channel (ingot or continuous casting), raise the 
same question. The first choice concerning principal 
production channels is mainly dictated by the will to develop 
natural resources (Ouenza mine). The second choice regarding 
. the fabrication processes within a principal production 
channel, which supposedly offers a wider margin of manoeuvre, 
might be restricted by the marketing tendency towards interna- 
tionalisation at the production and marketing levels of this 
branch of industry. This tendency, which is relatively 
restricted at the upstream level of the branch (coking plant 
and blast furnace, for example, for the classical process) 
where production processes which are highly automated are 
common and are ruled by strict and rigid parameters (tempera- 
ture and pressure, for example), becomes more significant at 
the downstream level of the branch (steel processing), which 
offers the widest possibilities of choice, given a sufficient 
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level of skill of the work force. In conclusion, the choice 
of technology, which has direct implications for increases in 
the production rate, the utilisation of different inputs and, 
consequently, on the efficiency of a plant, is relatively 
restricted (18). 
9.2.3.2. The choice of sign contracts 
As indicated in Table J. 2 in the Appendix J, several forms 
of contracts of different origins have been adopted by SNS to 
build its various plants and complexes. The contracts are of 
different types: equipment supply, supply and setting up of 
equipment, decomposed and turnkey contracts. It should be 
pointed out that none of these contracts take responsibility 
for the training of the labour force. Thus, it is the respon- 
sability of SNS to independently insure that its workers get 
some training. Finding a firm (generally foreign) that uses 
the same type of machinery and which accepts responsibility 
for the training of the workers is a difficult and expensive 
task. Training expenses are the responsibility of SNS which 
encounters enormous difficulties in raising the necessary 
funds. The decisions of how much, where and when have to be 
agreed to by the Ministry of Heavy Industries, which very 
often cuts the proposed number of training programmes 
in half 
(see part 9.2.2.3). The choice of contract adopted 
by SNS 
influences the number of trained workers and consequently 
contributes indirectly to the underutilisation of 
inputs in 
SNS plants. 
9.2.3.3. Diversity of suppliers and equipment 
Following government policies which advocated the diversi- 
fication of suppliers in order to decrease dependency on a 
given technology, SNS 
invested in a number of different 
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technologies from different countries (see Table J. 2 in the 
Appendix J). The adoption of these different techniques and 
technologies, which are quite often incompatible (different 
standards), resulted in an inefficient use of production 
capacities. This was worsened by the misleading recommenda- 
tions made by international engineering consultancy firms, the 
lack of control and coordination supposed to be achieved by 
the INAPI and the lack of experience of the skilled Algerian 
labour force. 
9.2.4. Demand shortages 
Demand shortages occur firstly in plants such as the 
welded wires plant of Reghaia and the electrode plant of El- 
Eulma which were built in anticipation of future demand. 
Secondly, the deficiency of demand was due to problems of 
distribution which resulted from the imbalanced development 
between the building sector and the steel industry, the latter 
having undergone a more rapid development than the former. In 
addition, deficient retail distribution and transport systems 
led to overstocks in some regions although other regions 
lacked the outputs. Thirdly, shortages of demand were also 
due to the lack of control and coordination of the Algerian 
authorities which did not encourage foreign contractors to buy 
their required materials and equipment from Algeria when 
applicable. Finally, demand shortages also occurred because 
of the lack of quality of the output (the case of the 
electrode plant of El-Eulma). 
As in SNMC, demand shortages are only transitory and do 
not present an insoluble inefficiency since 
demand is expected 
to rise. As a result, inputs will be used more efficiently 
in 
plants experiencing these deficiencies. Presently, no output 
which rusts easily is stocked for future demand. 
Such excess 
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capacity, however, probably cannot be exported due to the lack 
of price competitiveness. 
In conclusion, the causes contributing to the inefficient 
utilisation of the raw materials, intermediate inputs, fixed 
capital and labour observed in SNS , despite presenting some 
characteristics specific to this branch of industry, are very 
similar to those observed in the other public enterprises 
studied. 
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CHAPTER TEN: SONACOME PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
SONACOME, at the time of its establishment on the 9th of 
August, 1967, was only involved in the import and marketing of 
mechanical construction goods. Since then, the construction 
of five complexes and twelve plants totally owned by the state 
(1) has made SONACOME one of the largest public enterprises in 
Algeria and considerably increased its activitites. SONACOME, 
which is a medium-sized public enterprise, is under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Heavy Industries (2). In 1978, 
SONACOME's fixed capital was 5.56 billion AD, 5.6 times as 
much as in 1973 and its sales revenue were 4.75 billion AD, 3 
times as much as in 1973 (3). By 1980, its labour force had 
risen to 40,000 workers, almost 4 times that of 1973. 
SONACOME is an industrialising industry, similar to SONATRACH 
and SNS and was created to meet the satisfaction of local needs 
SONACOME is responsible for two principal activities: an 
industrial activity, which is defined in terms of the 
development of the Algerian mechanical engineering industries, 
and a commercial activity, which is an outgrowth of an import 
monopoly in mechanical products. SONACOME activities also 
extend to the finance, planning, personnel and building and 
implementation of projects within these two activities. 
Commercial activity in SONACOME, which is very'important, will 
not be considered in this chapter since the main interest of 
this study is the performance of the production plants only. 
Following the massive investments received by SONACOME 
(see Chapter Two), five complexes and one plant as part of the 
first three-year development plan and six additional plants as 
part of the next two four-year development plans were built. 
In 1981, SONACOME consisted of seventeen complexes and plants, 
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five of which were nationalised between 1973 and 1974. 
SONACOME also owns twenty five commercial vehicle units and 
four customs and transport units. SONACOME is still expanding 
with five complexes and plants going on stream in 1981 and 10 
under construction or in the process of being built. Despite 
this rapid and substantial expansion, SONACOME production does 
not meet the requirements of local demand. As a result, 82% 
of the industrial vehicles were imported in 1979 (4). 
In 1981, as indicated in Figure 10.1, SONACOME was a 
divisionalised organisation similar in structure to SONATRACH. 
SONACOME comprises five divisions as well as its staff and 
lines. Each of the five divisions is independently controlled 
by a managing director and has its own administrative depar- 
tments. In 1982, SONACOME underwent a major reorganisation, 
similar to all of the other public enterprises. This reorga- 
nisation forsaw the division of SONACOME into five different 
public enterprises (see Appendix C. 2) corresponding to the 
structural divisions illustrated in Figure 10.1. The 
objectives, functions, managerial environment, authority and 
autonomy within SONACOME are similar to those of all Algerian 
public enterprises (see Chapter Four). 
Regarding SONACOME's production capacity in 1981, vehicle 
capacity was 7,125 vehicles per year (6,425 lorries weighing 
between 5 and 35 tons and 700 buses with seating capacities 
between 49 and 100 persons), machine tool capacity was 1,200 
units, engine capacity was 10,500 units 
(2 to 8 cylinders 
diesel ranging from 25 to 240 HP) and tractor capacity was 
6,500 units (between 35 and 75 HP). In addition, 
the cycle 
capacity of SONACOME was 71,000 units per year and 
the nut, 
bolt and screw cutting capacity was 8,360 
tons per year. 
Table 10.1 shows the different complexes and plants and 
their 
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SONACOME Managing Director 
The industrial vehicles division 
The industrial equipment division 
The agricultural materials division 
The sectoral promotion division 
The marketing division 
The staff and lines 
Figure 10.1 : SONACOME organisational structure in 1980. 
Source : Survey data. 
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Table 10.1: SCNAOJNE ocrnplexes and plants in 
operatic i and their respective outputs in 1981 
SOMCD''E canplexes and plants Rate of Year of Unit Production 
/outputs integra- entry Technical P lamed Actial 
ticn product. 
Industrial vehicle division 
-The Rouiba industrial vehicle c. 70% 1974 
-Bus and coach Unit 1,000 645 577 
-Cory Unit 8,000 6,425 5,625 
-The Hassein Dey equipnent vehicle p. 70% Nat. 
Vehicle body F ct. Unit 2,500 1,840 2,557 
-The Rouiba equipment vehicle p. 70% 1979 Unit 10,000 8,725 6,845 
-EquipTmt fcr vehicles Unit - 7,220 5,724 
Industrial vowing Unit - 150 0 
-Semi-vowing Unit - 1,055 946 
one carrier Unit - 300 175 
Agricultural naehinery division 
-The Constantine engine & tractor c. 58/16% 1972 
-Wheel tractor Unit 5,000 5,500 4,379 
-Catepi l ar tractor Unit 1,000 0 0 
Total tractor Unit 6,000 5,500 4,379 
-Chain engine Unit 9,500 9,500 7,051 
-V-engine Unit 1,000 0 0 
Total engLne Unit 10,500 9,500 7,051 
-The Bel Abes agricultural material c. 70/100% 1976 Unit 20,500 10,653* 
8,160* 
-Ewvester-thresher Unit 550 550 355 
-Col lector gatherer press Unit 2,000 
2,000 1,539 
-Lißt plots Unit - 
753 640 
-Various plough 
Unit 3,900 750 463 
-Rake 
Unit - 2,500 1,711 
-Universal reaper 
Unit - 2,500 1,871 
-Disk-harrow-loo litres- 
Unit 1400 400 440 
-Portable ramp 
Unit 400 400 440 
-B ling engine 
Unit - 400 287 
p Unit - 
400 414 
-Seed-lip 
Unit - 150,000 814,000 
Unit - 30,000 9,619 
The Raxiba agricultural machinery p. Nat. Unit 18,000 
12,570 17,5! 0, 
Vowing Unit - 1,600 2,570 
-Tunk 
Unit - 1,900 2,183 
-Agricultural nachine°y 
Unit - 6,300 8,614 
-P i -i 
Unit - 2,770 4,162 
(Table continues cn the follaaing e. ) 
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Table 10.1. (Continued) 
SONAOJNE amplexes and plants 
/outputs 
Rate of Year of Unit Production 
inte ra- eltrv Technical P lamed Actual 
ticni DrOdUCt. 
Industrial ep4rnent division 
-The Ccnstaritine machine tool p. ALMJ- 70% 
Turning lathe 
-Milling machine 
-Sharer 
-Drri l ling machine 
-Grinding lathe 
-hatenirag machine 
-Saw 
-The Berrouag is purnp and valve p. 85% 
-Cast iron 
-Valve and , 
juzcticn 
-The Ain Gussara shall vowing D. 70% 
-Small vowing 
-The Oran snel ting plant 
-Cast ire 
-Special cast iron 
-Sundry items 
-Boiler work 
-The E l-Harradl melting plant 
-Cast iron 
-Sari-vowing 
-The Bakari pump p. 
-Hcrizontal pxm 
Vertical pinn 
Sectcral trcxnoticn divisicn 
The Guelu cycle c. 64 /82 
-Engine for motcrcycle 
64% 
, -Cycle 
-Motocycle 74, 
-The Airmara soooD and crane p. 
60% 
-Scoop 
C - rm 
-The E l-Kerira nut, bolt and screw p. 
92/100 
-Nut and screw 
100% 
-Brass founding and finishing 
92% 
-The Oued-Rhiou nut, bolt and screw D. 
9e /100% 
-Nut and screw 
100% 
-Brass founding and finishing 
9 
-The Cha°aga nut, bolt and screw P. 
100% 
-Nut, bolt and screw 
Total SCNACD E 70% 
1975 Unit 1,700 500 317 
Unit - 50 23 
Unit - 20 0 
Unit - 70 0 
Unit - 70 70 
Unit - 15 2 
Unit - 110 90 
Unit - 165 132 
1975 Tcns 13,500 10,388 7,129 
Tons 9.500 7,166 4.763 
Tcns 4,000 3,212 2,366 
1980 
Unit 3,000 3,000 1,830 
Nat. 
Tcns 6,000 6,000 4,050 
Tons 1.000 1.000 776 
Unit - 90,750 81,884 
Unit - 69,300 65,3614 
Nat. 
Tors 6,000 5,437 5,400 
Unit - 31 30 
Nat. Unit 6,000 5.850 4.511 
Unit - 5,350 3,928 
Unit - 500 583 
1973 
1980 
1978 
1978 
19'77 
Unit 6.000 6,000 6,029 
Unit 25,000 20,000 20,500 
Unit 40.000 37.000 87.395 
Unit 700 295 285 
Unit 300 64 3 
Tcns 4,400 2,800 1,789 
Tons 1,234 660 368 
Tors 4,950 2,250 1.110 
Tcm 1,234 601 287 
Tans 1,980 1,810 878 
Source: Table K1 in the Appendix K. 
Figres caculated wutnot taking into account tine seed-iin and ai i vu4jUw. 
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respective capacities and outputs which were in operation in 
1981. The plants and complexes going on stream, their 
respective output capacity and year of entry in production are 
shown in Table 10.2. All the complexes and plants going on 
stream were having some problems since they were suppose to 
start production between 1980 and 1981. 
As shown in Table 10.1, all SONACOME complexes and plants 
are multiproduct complexes and plants. All of them operate 
with two shifts and close 30 days annually for maintenance 
work except the nut, bolt and screw plants which use only one 
shift (see Table 10.3). SONACOME complexes and plants produce 
a wide variety of outputs which range from buses and lorries 
to agricultural machinery and apparatus. All plants, similar 
to most public enterprises, are located in the northern 
regions of Algeria with a denser concentration in the centre 
(Algiers area) and in the east (Constantine area). 
Comparisons between the public enterprises studied 
indicate that as far as size, number of products, and plants 
and development trends are concerned, SONACOME shows greater 
similarity to SONATRACH, SNS and SNMC than SONIC or SNIC. In 
fact, SONACOME is the third largest public enterprise in 
Algeria and, like SONATRACH and SNS, received a large share of 
industrial investment. As a result, large complexes and 
plants, and numerous jobs were created. 
As indicated in Table 10.1, the different complexes and 
plants are integrated at a rate ranging 
from 70% to 100%. The 
rate of integration is higher 
in complexes and plants 
specialised in the production of 
intermediate inputs and/or 
finished outputs. The level of 
integration of SONACOME as a 
whole is estimated to 
be about 70%. This rate is among the 
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highest encountered in Algeria and even among Western 
countries in this particular branch of industry. A high level 
of integration is difficult to attain in this branch of 
industry and in fact may lead to the inefficient use of fixed 
capital due to economies of scale. Only the intermediate 
inputs which are not produced in the plants are imported. The 
level of integration is comparable in both pre- and post- 
independence SONACOME's plants. Comparing SONACOME with other 
selected public enterprises, on the whole it is more 
integrated than SONATRACH and SNS. 
Table 10.2: SONACOME complexes and plants under 
construction and their respective outputs in 1981 
Complex, plant Capacity Year of 
entry in 
and outputs production 
-The GS Rouiba smelting p. 10,000 tons 1981 
-The Ain Smara compressor-roller c. 
-Compressor roller 4,000 units 1981 
-The Bouchetif industrial equipment 
and vehicle c. 25,000 units 198 0-81 
-semi-vowing, engine vowing 
and tunks 
-The Tizi-Ouzou cutlery p. 26, 000,000 units 1981 
-Spoon, knife and folk 
-The Oued Hamimine small vowing p. 3,000 units 1981 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 10.3: Number of shifts in SONACOME 
complexes and plants in 1981 
Number Number Percentage Pre-indepen. Post-indepen. 
of shifts of plants of total (1) 
(2) (1) (2) 
lx 8h 3 17.6 ... ... 3 
25 
2x 8h 14 82.3 5 100 9 75 
3x 8h 
0 0 
es ..... 000.. 
Total 17 100 5 100 12 
100 
Source: Table K. 1. in the Appendix K. 
1 number of plants 
2 Percentage of pre- or post-independence plants. 
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Following the example of the other public enterprises 
studied, SONACOME complexes and plants can be divided into two 
categories: pre-independence and post-independence complexes 
and plants. Although five post-independence plants were 
nationalised, the creation of SONACOME was not the result of 
massive nationalisation of an existing sub-sector. The number 
of post-independence complexes and plants is much larger 
(70.6%) than the pre-independence plants. It is tempting to 
state that the post-independence complexes and plants use 
modern capital intensive technology as opposed to the pre- 
independence plants which use traditional labour intensive 
technology. A comparison of the technologies used by SONACOME 
and the Western motor industry (which is highly automated), 
however, indicates that SONACOME uses labour intensive 
technology. Despite this, some plants, like the nut, bolt and 
screw plants, use highly automated technology. In this 
particular branch of industry, the use of labour intensive 
technology is not incompatible with the use of modern 
technology. The post-independence complexes and plants use 
modern technology while the pre-independence plants use more 
traditional labour intensive technology. The use of 
traditional and modern labour technology has created different 
problems in SONACOME complexes and plants. 
The differences between the pre- and post-independence 
complexes and plants extend to their scale, similar to SONIC 
and for the same reasons (see Chapter Five). The pre-indepen- 
dence plants are small and medium-scale and the post- 
independence complexes and plants are large-scale. It should 
be pointed out that currently the mechanical engineering 
industry and, in particular, the motor industry are dominated 
by multinational firms which tend to use large-scale technology. 
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SONACOME holds the local market monopoly on both the 
production and international trade of mechanical construction 
engineering products. Since 1978, however, the international 
trade monopoly has been restricted to imports of mechanical 
engineering products used only by SONACOME complexes and 
plants and by the private sector. The other public 
enterprises directly import their mechanical engineering 
product requirements, especially spare parts (see Chapter 
Three). As indicated earlier, importing is an important 
activity of SONACOME. Its main imports consist of cars, 
lorries, machine tools and spare parts (industrial and 
commercial). For instance, SONACOME will import 500,000 
lorries from France as part of the gas contract signed between 
Algeria and France. On the other hand, exports are not 
developed at all. In contrast to SNMC, for example, SONACOME 
does not encounter any competition from the almost nonexistent 
Algerian private sector. 
Regarding the level of integration within SONACOME, Table 
10.4 shows that 30% of its inputs are imported and the 
remaining 70% are produced locally. Most of the locally- 
produced intermediate inputs are produced within the plant. 
The rest is supplied either by other SONACOME plants or by 
SNS. SNS supplies SONACOME plants with basic intermediate 
inputs such as iron sheets, cast iron and a few other interme- 
diate inputs. In 1980, the foreign technical labour force in 
SONACOME amounted to 54 people, which represented only 0.13% 
of the total labour force and 0.8% of the total skilled 
labour 
force. The foreign dependency of SONACOME, therefore, extends 
only to the supply of 30% of 
its intermediate inputs, its 
spare parts and its capital stock since 
fixed capital is 
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Table 10.4: Origin of SONACOME inputs 
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WITHIN SONACOME 
Moulded cast iron * * 
and steel 
Brakes 
Gear box 
Hand drill 
Engine shaft 
Engine * * * 
Z, Body built parts * * * * * * * 
Nut & bolt * * * * * * * 
ä 
LOCAL MARKET 
H Cast iron z 
Steel 
A 
Iron sheets * * * * * * * * * 
a Water & electricity * 
W 
INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
3 Special cast iron * 
Special steel * 
I 
Intermediate inputs 307 307 307 307 J 307 
Spare parts 99% imp orte d 
FIXED CAPITAL 1007. imported 
Foreign 0.137. 
LABOUR 
Local 99 a" 
* indicates the origin of the input without specifying the exact proportion. 
Source: Survey data. 
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entirely imported. 
The degree of dependency vis-a-vis foreign inputs is 
probably higher than in SNMC, SNIC or SONATRACH but slightly 
lower than SONIC or SNS. It is important to stress, however, 
that in view of the low level of development of the Algerian 
industrial sector, the degree of foreign dependency shown by 
this branch of industry, which depends on a wide variety of 
intermediate inputs, is not surprising. The extent of foreign 
dependency on fixed capital and the labour work force is 
similar in all the public enterprises studied with the 
exception of SONATRACH which shows greater dependence on 
foreign technical assistance. 
SONACOME complexes and plants can be divided into three 
different categories. The first category specialises in the 
production of intermediate outputs only used within SONACOME, 
like the Rouiba vehicle body plant; the second category 
specialises in the production of finished products intended 
for the local market, such as the Rouiba lorry and bus complex 
or the Constantine machine tool plant; and the third category 
specialises in the production of intermediate and finished 
outputs for use within the plant or SONACOME and intended for 
the local market, such as the Constantine engine and tractor 
complex. Table 10.5 indicates the destination of these 
various outputs. For example, all agricultural materials and 
machinery, tractors and harvester-threshers are destined 
for 
the local agricultural sector while engines are solely used by 
SONACOME. The range of outputs produced, despite the fact 
that a few outputs, such as buses and screws are used 
directly 
by the consumer, is mainly oriented towards the satisfaction 
of industrial and agricultural needs. 
All SONACOME outputs 
are produced for intermediate use on 
the local market. As 
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Table 10.5 : Destination of SONACOME outputs 
Source : Survey data. 
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* indicates the destination of the output without specifying 
the proportion. 
mentioned earlier, export activity is not developed. SONACOME 
is comparable to SNMC and SNS as far as the destination of 
outputs is concerned. 
The SONACOME labour force, which is shown in Table 10.6, 
can be divided into three different categories: managers, 
technicians or supervisors and semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. In 1980,73% of the total labour force was composed 
of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, 14% were technicians or 
supervisors and only 2.6% were managers (see Figure 10.2). 
The proportion of the SONACOME labour force, which is skilled, 
is very low reflecting the lack of skilled workers in the 
different complexes and plants. For instance, the percentages 
of skilled workers at the El-harrach and Rouiba smelting 
plants were 8.8% and 9.3% of the total labour force, 
respectively. The Oued Rhiou and El-Khebira nut, bolt and 
screw plants were also characterised by a low proportion of 
skilled workers, amounting to 10.7% and 11.3%, respectively. 
The highest ratios were 22.7% and 25% at the Tiaret vehicle 
body complex and the Berrouaghia pump plant, respectively. A 
detailed analysis of the percentage of skilled workers by 
plant indicates that the complexes and plants built under a 
product-in-hand contract were better equiped with skilled 
workers than the others. Most likely, this occurs because the 
training of the labour force is the responsibility of the 
contractor in such types of contract (see Appendix C. 1). 
According to SONACOME managers, all plants and complexes 
were affected by high rates of absenteeism (for example, 12% 
in the industrial vehicles division in 1980). These rates are 
comparable to those encountered in other public enterprises. 
The rate of labour turnover was also high in all complexes and 
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Figure 10.2 : Percentage of labour force by skill category 
in SONACOME, SNIC and SNS. 
Sources : Tables 10.5,7.5 and 9.4. 
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Figure 10.3 : Percentage of skilled labour force by function 
in SONACOME, SONIC and SNIC. 
Sources : Tables 10.5,5.4 & 7.5. 
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plants (0.54% in the industrial vehicles division in 1980). 
Labour turnover rates were much higher in the complexes and 
plants located in the central regions than those located in 
the east or west. The high rates in the- central region may be 
related to the greater opportunities of obtaining training and 
consequently finding another job and to the average age of the 
workers, 24 years. Foreign technical assistance, as mentioned 
above, is insignificant (0.13% of the total labour force). 
As indicated in Figure 10.3, the proportion of skilled 
workers was much lower in SONACOME than in SNIC or SNS (16.6%, 
19.2% and 20%, respectively). This can be explained by the 
fact that a large proportion of workers were undergoing 
training (6.8% of the total labour force) and that labour 
intensive technology is used in SONACOME. Another interesting 
finding is the smaller proportion of skilled workers in the 
administrative departments of the different divisions of 
SONACOME than in SONIC or SNIC (10.4%, 17.3% and 44.1%, 
respectively). The proportion of skilled workers in the 
SONACOME complexes and plants (62.2%) was higher than that in 
the SNIC plants (46.3%) but lower than that encountered in the 
SONIC plants (67.3%). In addition, the administrative depart- 
ments in the complexes and plants show a high proportion of 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. For example, at the 
Rouiba industrial vehicles plant, 27.5-%' of the total labour 
force working in the administrative departments consisted of 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Finally, 
the proportion 
of the SONACOME labour force, which 
is foreign, is lower than 
that of SONIC (0.4%). 
we now turn to a discussion of the utilisation of 
the 
different inputs in SONACOME complexes and plants. Common 
causes of inefficiency 
in SONACOME complexes and plants are 
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investigated in a second section. 
10.1. Utilisation of inputs in SONACOME 
10.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate ink 
The vast majority of inputs used by SONACOME are interme- 
diate inputs. Hardly any raw materials are used. My field 
study indicates that, except for a few cases, intermediate 
inputs are not used efficiently by the various SONACOME 
complexes and plants. The amount of intermediate inputs used 
is usually higher than that advocated by the contractors' 
norms. For example, at The Rouiba complexes, intermediate 
inputs which are stocked outdoors are inefficiently used. 
These intermediate inputs, which typically are perishable, 
deteriorate, leading to overconsumption of these inputs. 
10.1.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
Based on what has been said earlier., U1 (ratio of actual 
over planned output), U2 (ratio of planned over technical 
output) and U3 (ratio of actual over technical number of 
shifts) have been calculated, whenever possible, for each 
plant output, for each complex or plant, for each division and 
for SONACOME as a whole. In 1981 as indicated in Table K. l, 
U1 by plant output ranged from 0% to 160% and U2 varied 
between 21% and 110%. The highest rates of fixed capital 
utilisation, when taking both U1 and U2 into account, were 
obtained for the 100 litres disk-harrow (110%, 100%) and 
portable ramp (110%, 100%) both in the agricultural machinery 
complex of Bel Abes. The lowest rate of fixed capital utili- 
sation was recorded for the crane 
(4.6%, 21%) in the scoop and 
crane complex of Ainsmara. U1 and U2 
by plant ranged from 
48% to 148.5% and 29.4% to 100%, respectively (see Table 
10.7). The highest rate of fixed capital utilisation was 
obtained for the pump plant of Baraki 
(101%, 97.5%) and the 
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Table 10.7: SONACOME complexes and plants' rates 
of fixed capital utilisation in 1981 (in percentages) 
50NACOME plants and complexes U1 U2 U3 
The industrial vehicles division 93.66 78.3(1) 52.4 
_The 
industrial vehicle c. of Rouiba 86.5 74 52.4 
_The 
equipment vehicle p. of H Dey 138 73.6 52.4 
_The 
equipment Rouiba plant 56.5 87.25 52.4 
The agricultural machinery division 100 70.93 52.4 
-The Constantine engine & tractor c. 76.5 91 52.4 
-The Bel Abes agricult. machinery c. 75 52(2) 52.4 
-The Rouiba agricult. machinery p. 148.5 69.8 52.4 
The industrial equipment division 76.25 76.1(1) 52.4 
-The machine tool p. of Constantine 45.75 29.4 52.4 
-The pump and valve p. of Berrouaghia 68.5 77.5 52.4 
-The small vowing p. of Ain-Ouassara 61 100 52.4 
-The smelting plant of Oran 82.5 - 52.4 
-The pump plant of Baraki 101.25 97.5(2) 52.4 
-The smelting plant of El-Harrach 98.5 - 52.4 
The sectoral promotion division 61.3 63.73 36.68 
-The cycle complex of Guelma 101 90.66 52.4 
-The scoop and cran c. of Ainsmara 50.5 31.5 52.4 
-The nut, bolt and scr ew (NBS) cutting 
plant of El-Kebira 59 58.5 26.2 
-The NBS cutting p. of Oued Rhiou 48 47 26.2 
-The NBS cutting p. of Cheraga 48 91 26.2 
Total SONACOME (1) 79.11 71.93 47.77 
Source: Table K. 1 in the Appendix K. 
1 Figures calculated from the available figures. 
2 Figures calculated by dividing the total planned output by 
the total technical output. 
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lowest rate for the machine tool plant of Constantine (45.75%, 
29.4%) . 
Regarding divisions, the highest rate of fixed capital 
utilisation was recorded for the industrial vehicles division 
(93.66%, 78.28%), while the sectoral promotion division 
experienced the lowest rate (61.3%, 63.73%). In view of these 
low figures, it is not surprising to find that fixed capital 
in SONACOME as a whole is not used efficiently (U1= 79.11% and 
U2= 71.93% (for the figures available)). 
Comparing the rates of fixed capital utilisation obtained 
for the different complexes and plants, it appears that the 
plants and complexes built in the late 1970's performed better 
than those built in the 1980's. This may be attributed mainly 
to experience gained over the period. No relationship appears 
to exist between the proportion of skilled labour force and 
the rate of fixed capital utilisation. 
An analysis of U3 indicates that, in all the complexes and 
plants, fixed capital is left idle at least one third of the 
time. U3 for SONACOME as a whole was 47.77%. All complexes 
and plants operated with two shifts, with the exception of the 
nut, bolt and screw plants which operated with only one shift. 
This is particularly surprising considering the enormous local 
demand and that the return on investment in such an industry, 
which makes use of labour intensive technology, can only be 
achieved through intensified use of the expensive fixed 
capital. 
SONACOME's fixed capital is used at a higher rate than SNS 
and SONATRACH but lower than that of SONIC, SNIC or SNMC. The 
rime utilisation of fixed capital in SONACOME, nowever, is the 
lowest. 
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10-1.3-Utilisation of labour 
Labour utilisation rates are again evaluated from over- 
staffing data as no other figures are available. According to 
the managers and the few figures available, overstaffing rates 
were high in all plants and complexes. For example, high 
rates ranging from 20% to 42% were obtained for the industrial 
vehicles complex of Rouiba, the pump and valve plant of 
Berrouaghia and the agricultural machinery complex of Bel 
Abes. The rate was much lower in the nut, bolt and screw 
plant of Cheraga and the engine and tractor complex of 
Constantine (2% to 5%). According to SONACOME managers, high 
overstaffing rates were recorded for semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers and for workers employed in administrative 
departments, in particular. 
From the data discussed above, it can be concluded that 
the different inputs are not used efficiently. This study now 
turns to an investigation of the reasons for such 
inefficiencies and an analysis of their common causes. 
10.2. Common causes of inefficiency in SONACOME 
10.2.1. Organisational factors 
The enormous number of intermediate inputs and spare parts 
required for this industry leads to inefficiencies in stock 
management. For example, the industrial vehicles complex of 
Rouiba has to manage 2,638 different intermediate inputs for 
the assembling of only one type of lorry. These intermediate 
inputs, which can vary greatly in size, require extremely 
efficient stock management methods. Such methods are not 
employed and consequently, management of this enormous number 
of intermediate inputs is very inefficient. Stock management 
is inefficient due to the lack of a skilled labour force, the 
shortage of space and lack of an efficient organisation within 
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the complex or plant. Imported intermediate inputs are, in 
addition, in short supply most of the time. In order to 
prevent these shortages, the various complexes and plants 
overstock different imported intermediate inputs, a situation 
which lead to inefficient utilisation of inputs. 
Another cause of inefficiency is due to the lack of 
control and coordination. This is well examplified by the 
valve and pump plant of Berrouaghia which stopped production 
because of abnormally high stocks of outputs. The lack of 
knowledge of real consumer demand led to this situation. The 
Berrouaghia plant, which produces two different types of pump, 
overproduced one type at the expense of the other despite the 
Zack of demand for this product. In order to make up for the 
shortage in the second type of pump, the SONACOME head office 
imported it without consulting the plant, which had already 
readjusted its planning programme and greatly increased 
production of the pump in question. Moreover, no incentive is 
given to foreign contractors to buy local products when 
possible, another factor contributing to the inefficient 
utilisation of fixed capital. The above case illustrates the 
inefficiencies which result from a cumbersome, bureaucratic 
administration. 
Labour was inefficiently used in all plants where over- 
staffing prevailed. The inefficient utilisation of labour 
resulted in high unit labour costs and low labour productivi- 
ty. In 1978, for example, labour costs accounted for 13% of 
the SONACOME sales revenue (5). High rates of absenteeism and 
labour turnover, mainly due to shortages of social infrastruc- 
ture such as housing and transport, led to an inefficient 
incentive system which influenced the rate of productivity of 
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the workers in general. At the same time, the poorly 
organised financial system in SONACOME, which led to a 
difficult financial situation and the lack of profit, also 
contributed to an inefficient incentive system. According to 
the Socialist Management's Charter, profits are to be distri- 
buted among workers; a lack of profits inhibits a favourable 
climate for higher productivity. The main consequence of the 
above organisational factors, which are common to all of the 
public enterprises studied, is the poor performance of 
SONACOME complexes and plants and consequently, of SONACOME as 
a whole. 
Besides these organisational causes of inefficiency, which 
are to a certain extent specific to SONACOME, inefficiencies 
resulting from inappropriate wage and incentive systems, a 
cumbersome bureaucracy, rigid bureaucratic controls and pro- 
blems related to government policies such as customs, banking 
and import policies, are common to all public enterprises. 
10.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
10.2.2.1. Shortages of intermediate inputs 
Shortages of intermediate inputs such as steel, cast iron 
and heavy iron sheets supplied by SNS or other inputs supplied 
within SONACOME, were encountered in all SONACOME complexes 
and plants. For example, the Rouiba industrial vehicles 
complex, the Bel Abes agricultural machinery complex and the 
nut, bolt and screw plants were short of intermediate inputs 
supplied by the local market or produced within SONACOME. 
These shortages were caused by delays in delivery, lack of 
infrastructure and storage facilities and underutilisation of 
inputs in the suppliers' plants (or complexes), within and/or 
outside of SONACOME. Shortages of water and electricity 
supplies added to these problems. For instance, frequent 
383 
`.. 
voltage fluctuations led to high rates of machinery breakdowns 
and consequently, to more strenuous maintenance duties and 
frequent production stoppages. 
10.2.2.2. Lack of infrastructure facilities 
The lack of port infrastructure and the poverty of the 
road network resulted in shortages of imported intermediate 
inputs and spare parts. Aside from this, the lack of housing 
facilities around complexes and plants was responsible for the 
high rates of absenteeism and labour turnover observed in all 
plants. As a result of these shortages, which were common to 
all complexes and plants, the different inputs were 
underutilised. 
10.2.2.3. Shortages of skilled labour force 
As seen earlier, the shortage of skilled labour affected 
some complexes and plants more deeply than others. Labour 
shortages were particularly consequential at the smelting 
plants of Rouiba and El Harrach, the pump and valve plant of 
Berrouaghia, all the nut, bolt and screw plants and the 
vehicle body plant of Rouiba. The other SONACOME complexes 
and plants, though lacking a skilled labour force, were 
affected to a much lower extent. The foremen, maintenance and 
stock management positions were particularly affected by the 
lack of skilled workers. Among the many reasons for the lack 
of a skilled labour force, the main one is the actual training 
system which proved very inefficient. This training system, 
however, has started to improve lately. Secondly, government 
policies, which influenced the location of the complexes and 
plants, were responsible for not attracting the necessary 
skilled labour force to the deprived regions. Thirdly, lack 
of social infrastructure acted to increase these difficulties. 
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A reduction in the number of shifts operating in complexes and 
plants (one or two instead of three) is the direct consequence 
of this lack of skilled workers. 
10.2.2.4. Lack of imported intermediate inputs 
In this particular industry, about 30% of the intermediate 
inputs and the bulk of spare parts are imported, therefore, 
shortages of imported intermediate inputs and spare parts 
tremendously affects the utilisation of fixed capital and 
labour. The following is a case in point. In order to make 
up for the low production rate at the harvester-thresher 
production line (complex of Bel Abes), the head office signed 
an import contract with a German firm for delivery of 1,100 
harvester-threshers. For unknown reasons this foreign firm, 
which supplied 30% of the intermediate inputs to the Bel Abes 
complex, stopped delivery. Consequently, the affected 
production line was threatened with closure due to a shortage 
of imports. Most SONACOME plants and complexes suffered from 
shortages of intermediate inputs and spare parts. Reasons for 
these shortages which are attributed to government policies 
and inefficiencies have already been discussed in the previous 
chapters. 
10.2.2.5. Shortages of storage facilities 
Underutilisation of production capacity also occurred in 
the industrial vehicle complex of Rouiba due to inefficient 
stocking methods. These problems, connected to the enormous 
number of intermediate inputs used for the assembling of 
lorries and buses, arose from a lack of space and building 
facilities. This led to inefficient management of the stock 
and deterioration of the intermediate inputs and spare parts 
when stocked outdoors. 
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10.2.2.6. Shortages of working capital 
According to government policies, the price of outputs had 
been frozen. None of these fixed output prices, however, meet 
production costs. For example, the production cost of a 
tractor is twice as high as its actual selling price and the 
retail price of an agricultural machine covers only two fifths 
of its production cost. In order to make up for the 
difference, the complexes and plants receive subsidies granted 
by the state. The system of subsidies, however, is very 
inefficient and serious financial difficulties are a common 
problem to all SONACOME complexes and plants. For instance, 
in 1978, SONACOME working capital and cash flow were negative 
and amounted to 337.09 million and 110 million AD, respective- 
ly. The resultant financial difficulties obliged the various 
plants to resort to bank loans which carry enormous financial 
charges. In fact, these financial charges represented 11% of 
the sales revenue and 9% of the total charges in SONACOME for 
1978 (6). This lack of profit, as mentioned earlier, does not 
encourage workers to increase productivity. In conclusion, 
the shortage of working capital had an indirect effect on the 
utilisation of the various inputs. 
10.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
With respect to inefficiencies due to the choice of 
assorted inputs, the only evidence comes from the engine and 
tractor complex of Constantine. This plant was built to 
produce two types of engines and two types of tractors; 
currently, however, only one type of engine and one type of 
tractor are produced. The second type of engine was supposed 
to be used in the second type of tractor and in heavy 
machinery. The production of heavy machinery was planned for 
future development. According to SONACOME managers, the 
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reasons for not producing these outputs were that the second 
type of tractor was not adapted to Algerian conditions and 
that the labour force was not trained in the assembly of these 
outputs which were considered complex. As a result, most of 
the machinery, which was imported and bought at a high price 
from a German firm (Diag), was left idle all the time. The 
invested capital was used very inefficiently. The 
inappropriate choice of assorted outputs was made by the 
planning commission, following political considerations, and 
the SONACOME Board of Directors, who are to blame for agreeing 
with their suggestion. 
SONACOME has also encountered problems resulting from 
technical inefficiencies. In 1978 for example, the agricultu- 
ral machinery complex of Bel Abes stopped production for three 
months because of serious technical failures. The gear box, 
which should be produced by the complex, is still imported. 
In conclusion, the common causes of underutilisation of 
raw materials, intermediate inputs, fixed capital and labour 
in all SONACOME complexes and plants are roughly identical to 
those described for the other public enterprises analysed in 
this thesis. These include organisational inefficiencies, 
shortages of inputs and allocative inefficiencies. Shortages 
of demand, in contrast to SONATRACH or SNMC, have not been 
observed in any SONACOME complexes or plants. 
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PART THREE 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS: A COMPARISON OF 
THE ALGERIAN, TURKISH AND EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
Now that the main problems encountered by the Algerian 
public industrial sector have been identified, a comparison 
with other public industrial sectors may prove informative. 
The comparison of economic systems in general, may enrich the 
understanding and sharpen the merits or demerits of the 
systems and lead to suggestions of organisational and opera- 
tional changes which would improve the performance of the 
system. In turn, interesting conclusions may arise concerning 
the different problems encountered in an industrial public 
sector which may lead to the identification of adequate solu- 
tions to alleviate, if not eliminate, inefficiencies in the 
Algerian case. 
The choice of the countries compared was directed by the 
need to find economic systems which are as similar as possible 
to the Algerian economic system. Turkey and Egypt were chosen 
because their respective economies were dominated by a large 
public sector. The aim of the comparison is to draw some 
parallels regarding inefficiencies encountered by the respec- 
tive public industrial sectors. When comparing the Algerian, 
Turkish and Egyptian economic systems, the main focus of 
concern and interest will be each of their industrialisation 
efforts from which emerged a preeminent industrial public 
sector dominated by centralised planning, state control and 
significant state intervention. The period 
in question, which 
started in the 1960's in Turkey and Egypt, ended around 
1974. 
Since then, the two countries have adopted completely 
different development policies. Egypt, for example, opted for 
the opening and liberalisation of its economic system 
based on 
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foreign investment and its domestic public sector. The data 
used in the comparison correspond to the 1978-81 period for 
Algeria and to the 1971-74 period for Turkey and Egypt. 
An economic system, as defined by Borstein (1), evolves 
according to rules and orders and the interaction of organisa- 
tions of participants engaged in production, distribution and 
use of goods and services. In comparing the Algerian, Turkish 
and Egyptian economic systems, of primary interest are the 
forces influencing and determining the character of the 
economic systems, the nature and. extent of state intervention 
in daily economic operation and finally, the overall 
performance of the economic systems. Each of these three 
aspects will be discussed in some detail for each economic 
system (when information is available) and will then be 
compared from one system to another. 
11.1. Forces influencing the Algerian, Turkish and Egyptian 
economic systems 
In the investigation of the forces influencing the 
economic system and determining its character, three 
categories will be discussed: features of the economy, social 
and cultural factors and economic performance. For the period 
reviewed here, the three countries were characterised by a 
centralised system and underwent an intensive phase of 
economic development. This is clear from such evidence as the 
socialisation of the means of production, the sharp increase 
in the rate of investment, rapid structural changes and chan- 
ges in the distribution of income. Resource allocation was 
dominated by physical planning and administrative rationing. 
The main features of the Algerian, Turkish and Egyptian 
economies are summarized in Tables 11.1 and 11.2. The rate of 
population growth was higher in Algeria than in Turkey or 
390 
L- 
Table 11.1: Population, GNP at market price 
& GNP per capita in Algeria, Turkey and Egypt 
(mid 1974,1978 and 1979) 
Coun- Population mid GNP at market price GNP per capita 
try (000) US $ Million us $ 
1974 1978 1979p 1974 1978 1979p 1974 1978 1979p 
(1)15,215 17,635 18,235 11,100 25,730 28,940 730 1,450 1,580 
(2)39,167 43,144 44,260 29,460 53,890 58,760 750 1,250 1,330 
(3)36,350 39,855 44,855 10,210 16,890 18,600 280 420 460 
(1) Algeria 
(2) Turkey 
(3) Egypt 
P: preliminary. 
Sources: 1976 and 1980 World Bank Atlas, U. N. 
Table 11.2: Labour force and unemployment 
in Algeria, Turkey and Egypt 
Algeria-1980 Turkey-1975 Egypt-1972 
Population 19,875,000 40,196,670 34,323,000 
Labour force 3,860,000 14,300,000 9,471,100 
Immigrant 417,000 350,000 
Labour force as % of 
the population 20% 40.7% 27.6% 
Employment 2,830,000 8,749,819(1) 8,816,600 
Unemployment 670,000 116,770 654,500 
Unemployed as % of the 
total labour force 19% 1.3% 6.9% 
Sources: 1974,1978,1980 & 1982 I. L. O. Yearbooks of Labour 
Statistics. In addition, for Algeria refer to 
Chapter One and Two and for Turkey to: Statistical 
Yearbook of Turkey 1979, Prime Ministry, State 
Institute of Statistics, Turkey. 
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Egypt: 3.5%, 2.6% and 2.4% per annum, respectively (2). Popu- 
lation pressures, labour force availability and unemployment 
pressures were different in the three countries. Unemployment 
was more widespread in Algeria (19%) than in Turkey or Egypt 
(1.3% and 6.9%, respectively). The percentage of the popula- 
tion living in rural areas amounted to 57%, 62% and 58%, 
respectively (3). The population per hectare on arable land 
and land under permanent crops was higher in Egypt than in 
Algeria and Turkey. These figures were 0.0785 ha per 
inhabitant in Egypt, 0.4136 ha in Algeria and 0.7206 ha in 
Turkey (4). The rate of adult illiteracy was lower in Turkey 
than in Algeria and Egypt as it reached 39.8%, 59.9% and 
61.8%, respectively (5). 
Algeria recorded an average rate of growth of GNP in real 
terms of 2.6%, Turkey, 4.3%, and Egypt, 1% (6). As indicated 
in Table 11.1, GNP per capita in current terms was higher in 
Algeria than in the two other countries. This can be attri- 
buted to the oil price increase which contributed about 95% of 
Algeria's total foreign exchange resources. The longer 
industrial experience in Turkey and Egypt resulted in higher 
ratios of skilled to total labour force which, in turn, 
influenced productivity and the rate of growth in real terms. 
The share of GDP obtained from primary, secondary and 
tertiary activities shows that Algeria depended mainly on the 
industrial sector while Turkey and Egypt depended on 
agriculture and services. Algeria depended more heavily on 
the hydrocarbon sub-sector since the manufacturing sub-sector 
represented less than 25% of the total industrial contribution 
to GDP. Manufacturing activities were much more developed in 
Turkey and Egypt than in Algeria. This is confirmed by the 
figures given in Table 11.3. 
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Table 11.3: The contribution to GDP in Algeria, 
Turkey and Egypt (in percentages) 
Sector of activities Algeria 1980 Turkey 1973 Egypt 1973 
Current prices Factor cost Factor cost 
Agriculture 6.3% 26% 29% 
Industry 45.1% 23% 19% 
-Hydrocarbons 32.5% 
-Manufacturing 11.1% 21% 16% 
Construction 12 % 6% 3% 
Services 21.7% 20% 13% 
Others 14.9% 21% 24% 
Total 100.0% 100% 100% 
Sources: United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1975 and Table 
A. 5 in the Appendix A. 
A complete description of the Algerian economic system and 
its features was presented in the first chapters of this 
thesis and will not be repeated here. Turkey, in comparison 
to Algeria, benefits from a temperate climate, a strategic 
location (near the Middle Eastern Oil transit lines) and 
substantial agricultural wealth. Similar to Algeria, it is 
endowed with minerals. During the 1970's, Turkey promoted an 
especially good relationship with both Eastern Europe and the 
EEC and benefited from important sources of foreign currency 
and special foreign financial assistance (7). Turkey has 
considerable resources such as coal, iron ore, chrome, copper, 
petroleum, sulfur, cotton, wool and agricultural products. 
Its industry is geared to the production of steel, petroleum, 
petrochemicals and fertiliser products, hard and liquid coal, 
carbon and paper, woolen and cotton products, cement and 
chemicals and is substantially characterised by engineering 
(trucks, heavy mechanical equipment, tractor, diesel engines) 
and food and sugar industries. 
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Egypt is a medium-sized country with 97% desert land (8). 
The richness of Egyptian resources comes mainly from the 
alluvial soil of the Nile Valley and Delta. Agriculture has 
remained the main source of economic wealth (9). The Egyptian 
economy is relatively well endowed with natural resources, 
particularly minerals. These include not only oil, natural 
gas, iron ore, phosphate, salt, limestone and manganese but 
also long-staple cotton and sugar cane. Iron ore and petro- 
leum have provided backward linkages to two small industrial 
sectors of the economy: steel and petroleum refining (10). 
Egypt's mineral wealth is concentrated in a narrow but 
valuable range of commodities. Mineral resources offered the 
possibility for primary industrial development, which could 
later extend to engineering, food and more sophisticated 
fields. The domestic market in both Turkey and Egypt was 
large enough to support the development of many industries. 
A comparison of the resource endowments among the three 
countries shows some similarities regarding natural and 
material resources. Algerian resources, such as oil and gas, 
are easy to market. In contrast, Turkish and Egyptian 
resources are used to produce primary products and commodities 
which are difficult to market at reasonable prices in view of 
the international competition. This gives Algeria a 
privileged position when it comes to borrowing from the 
international institutions and leads to fewer balance of 
payments difficulties. 
Tables 11.4 and 11.5, which focus mainly on the role and 
control of the state, summarize the similarities and 
differen- 
ces between the three countries. 
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Table 11.4 : Similarities among Algeria, 
Turkey and Egypt 
Centralised and controlled economy 
Industries based on public ownership 
Nationalisation, control of money 
and financial structure 
Domestic private sector practically nonexistent, 
distrusted, incapable of raising rate of growth 
and standard of living and willing to invest only 
in high profit and low risk activities 
Foreign investors not permitted to invest 
Rapid industrialisation based on the development 
of heavy industries 
Creation of a public sector 
Private sector development in the light industrial 
sector 
National integrated planning instead of 
unorganised & individual laissez faire 
Implementation of development plans 
Almost all large and medium scale industries owned 
by the state 
Development based on industrial development and 
rapid industrialisation 
Export of labour provided a source of foreign 
exchange 
Sources: Walstedt, B.: State Manufacturing Enterprises in a 
Mixed Economy: The Turkish Case (Johns Hopkins Uni. 
Press, England, 1981); Mabro, R. and Radwan, S.: The 
Industrialisation of Egypt 1939-1973 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, England, 1976) and survey data. 
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Table 11.5: Differences among Algeria, Turkey and Egypt 
Algeria Turkey Egypt 
Economy Socialist Mixed (1) Socialist 
Administrative system Inherited from Bureaucratic Different 
the French different from that 
system from that of Algeria 
of Algeria 
Ideology Nationalism Different 
diversification 
Sources of foreign Oil and gas Primary commodities 
currency 
Foreign currency Quite manage- Put a brake on their 
pressure able development 
Percentage of GDP 60% in 21% in 12.3% in 
invested 1978 1972 1973 
Industrial experience None Long 
Skilled labour force Lack Available 
Foreign participation Insignificant Important 
1 Comment by Ibrihim Ongut quoted by Walstedt, B.: State 
Manufacturing Enterprises in a Mixed Economy: The Turkish 
Case, op cit, p 87. 
Sources: Similar to Table 11.4. 
11.2. The nature and operation of the Algerian, Turkish and 
Egyptian economic systems 
11.2.1. The institutions 
Turkey, Egypt and Algeria had similar social structures 
based on the preference of a ruling group who was not selected 
through an electoral process. The community's preference with 
regard to the composition of output or the distribution of 
income, however, held very little weight since the major 
decisions concerning the economy were made by the ruling 
group. These decisions were expressed more precisely in 
specific economic policies and, in quantitative terms, as 
targets. 
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There were two variants of ownership that existed side by 
side in the industrial sectors: public and private. In 
Turkey, the public sector was mainly developed in industries 
such as the steel, petroleum, petrochemical, fertiliser, pulp 
and paper, cement, textiles, sugar and engineering industries 
(trucks, heavy mechanical equipment, tractors and diesel 
engines). The private sector, on the other hand, flourished 
in light industries (food, light engineering and cement 
industries). In 1972, the Turkish industrial sector generated 
23.43% of total value added. The share of public enterprise 
manufacturing VA was 47.3% of total manufacturing VA while its 
manufacturing employment was 37.4% of total manufacturing 
labour force (11). Large public enterprises constituted the 
public sector. In 1972, for example, 14 public enterprises 
accounted for 96% of the activity of the manufacturing and 
mining sectors (12). 
In Egypt, the ownership structure was also dominated by 
public assets. The private sector was virtually excluded from 
all important activities. It was in control of small establi- 
shments in only five minor industries -leather, furniture, 
wool, wearing apparel and printing. Since 1967, however, this 
sector has developed links with the public sector in the form 
of inter-industrial integration through subcontracts. None- 
theless, public firms assumed almost complete control of the 
modern sector of the economy. The domination of the public 
sector varied between industries: 100% in petroleum; 97% in 
electrical machinery; 96% in basic metals, tobacco and 
textiles; 95% in paper, rubber and chemicals; and 16% in 
printing. The public sector generated 64% of total manufactu- 
ring value added and employed 60% of non-agricultural labour 
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force or 30% of total working population (13). The public 
sector controlled almost all the modern, heavy and 
manufacturing sub-sector. 
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the 
comparison of the institutions in the three countries. The 
public sector was very important in all three countries. The 
VA generated by the Algerian public sector, comparable to that 
generated by the Egyptian public sector, was slightly higher 
than that generated by the Turkish public sector. The 
development of similar heavy capital goods and intermediate 
goods industries was the basis for industrialisation in all 
three countries. 
Similarities and differences can also be drawn with 
respect to the organisation, administration and management of 
public enterprises. The public industrial organisation in the 
three countries is shown in Table 11.6. In Turkey, the public 
enterprise is very much like a holding company in which its 
objectives are controlled by Parliament and, ultimately, by 
the people. The organisational structure found in Egypt was 
very much like that found in Eastern Europe. State firms are 
incorporated into the state apparatus. The General 
Organisations are semi-autonomous bodies responsible to the 
Ministry of Industry. 
The public enterprises in the three countries were 
administered by their relevant ministries rather than 
by a 
state industrial holding. They were managed by a Board of 
Directors who made all the day-to-day decisions concerning the 
running of the company. The members of the Board of 
Directors 
were appointed by higher authorities and consisted mainly of 
civil servants. Important decisions, however, were made 
by or 
referred to the higher echelon while directives, guidelines 
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and other instruments of control were relayed down the struc- 
ture, from the ministry via the head office to the firm. 
Companies saw their initiative limited by regulations. On 
pricing, investment and personnel policies for example, the 
Council of Ministers acted as an overall Board of Directors 
for the state enterprises. The entrepreneurial function was 
usurped by the Ministry of Planning rather than left to the 
enterprise board. Public enterprises must operate within a 
framework of administered prices, stringent controls over all 
foreign exchange transactions, labour regulations and planned 
investment. They must also refer to higher authorities on 
most matters concerning their plans for the future. In 
conclusion, the institutions which existed in the three 
countries were very similar. Algerian public enterprises, 
however, closely resembled those found in a centrally planned 
economy like the USSR, for example. 
Table 11.6: Organisational structure of the industrial 
public sector in Algeria, Turkey and Egypt. 
ALGERIA TURKEY EGYPT 
Council of Council of 
ministries ministries 
Corresponding Corresponding Ministry of 
ministry ministry industry 
Public enterprise State enterprise 9 General 
organisations 
Managing Director 
Chairman of the 
Board 
Board 
Head office 
Plants 
Board 
Managing director 
Chairman of the 
Board 
Board 
Plants 294 companies 
Board 
Sources: Walstedt, B.: State Manufacturing Enterprises in a 
Mixed Economy, op cit.; Mabro, R. and Radwan, S.: The 
Industrialisation in Egypt 1939-1973, op cit. and survey data. 
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11.2.2. The instruments 
Table 11.7 indicates the state instruments which are 
similar in the three countries. Industrial investment 
continues to be a public sector responsibility with projects 
initiated either by the relevant organisation or the ministry. 
Investment was incorporated into an annual or multiyear plan. 
Implementation depended on the availability of foreign 
exchange, offers of project aid and other conditions. In the 
three countries, fiscal instruments were used, including tax 
subsidies and payment transfers. Monetary instruments, which 
involved changes in interest rates, reserve ratios, credit 
rationing and government lending and borrowing were also 
utilised in the three countries. Alteration of the exchange 
rate was another instrument. Among direct controls were 
production assignments, production tariffs, quota restric- 
tions, the fixing of prices and wages and allocation of 
foreign exchange for imports. In conclusion, it appears that 
Turkey and Egypt used monetary instruments to drive economic 
activities towards the achievement of social goals, while 
administrative instruments were used in Algeria. This is most 
likely due to the more important role assigned to banks in 
Turkey and Egypt. 
11.3. Performance of the Algerian, Turkish and Egyptian 
economic systems 
To complete the comparison of the three countries and to 
assess the performance of their public industrial enterprises, 
the utilisation of the different inputs of the public indus- 
trial enterprises in the Algerian, Turkish and Egyptian (14) 
economic systems is analysed based on the methodology 
described in Chapter Four. Common causes of underutilisation 
of inputs in the three countries will be investigated in a 
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second section. 
Table 11.7: Similar government instruments 
in Algeria, Turkey and Egypt 
Government instruments 
Administrative control 
Fixation of prices 
Fixation of wages 
Distribution of income 
Labour legislation 
Regulation of imports, import licenses and allocation 
of foreign exchange for imports, among others 
Regulation of investments: for example, choice of 
technology, choice of produced outputs, location of 
plants and scale 
Levels of protection: foreign exchange, prohibition 
of certain imports, protection tariffs and quota 
restrictions 
Monetary instruments: such as interest rates, reserve 
ratios, credit rationing, government lending and 
borrowing and exchange rates 
Fiscal instruments: taxes, subsidies, transfer 
payments and tax exemptions among others 
Sources: Walstedt, B.: State Manufacturing Enterprises in a 
Mixed Economy, op cit.; Mabro, R. and Radwan, S.: The 
Industrialisation in Egypt 1939-1973, op cit. and Chapter 
Three. 
11.3.1. Utilisation of inputs in the three countries 
11.3.1.1. Utilisation of raw materials and intermediate 
inputs 
As recorded in Chapters Five through Ten, Algerian public 
enterprises utilised their raw materials and intermediate 
inputs inefficiently. There is some evidence that chemicals 
were also used inefficiently in Turkish public corporations. 
No evidence, on the other hand, exists to support that these 
inputs were inefficiently used in Egyptian public enterprises. 
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11.3.2.2. Utilisation of fixed capital 
The Algerian public enterprises studied recorded an under- 
Utilisation of fixed capital for almost all complexes and 
plants (92% of the plants and complexes surveyed). Among 
Turkish corporations, only the cement corporation and the 
sawmills (for which figures are available) showed underutili- 
sation of their fixed capital (in 1973, U1 was 87.85% and 88%, 
respectively (15)). In addition, refineries also 
underutilised their capacities. No other data exists to 
support the hypothesis that Turkish public enterprises used 
their fixed capital inefficiently. 
With respect to Egyptian public enterprises, some 
fragmentary data exist on the manufacturing sub-sector which 
can act as a basis for an Algerian and Egyptian comparison. 
These figures, available for 1963 only, are restricted to a 
few branches of the manufacturing sub-sector. As indicated in 
Table 11.8,60% of the plants surveyed underutilised their 
capacities: 42% recorded a range of underutilisation between 
2% and 33% with the remaining 68% between 3% and 80%. The 
food, cotton ginning, cement, tobacco and match plants 
underutilised their capacity at a lower rate than the light 
chemical, cotton textiles and paper plants (see Table 11.9). 
In the latter, however, the degree of underutilisation was 
relatively small and was limited to a few plants. In Egypt, 
the underutilisation of production capacity was greater 
in 
small than in large plants. There was no correlation 
between 
the degree of utilisation and the nature of the industry (16). 
It appears that underutilisation of fixed capital occurred 
in all three countries compared. The rate of underutilisation 
of fixed capital is higher 
in Algerian public enterprises than 
in Egyptian firms. Some similarities also exist between the 
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Table 11.8: Fixed capital underutilisation 
in Algeria and Egypt (1) 
Activities Algeria (2) 1980-81 Egypt (3) 1963 
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) 
Dehydrated vegetables 4 4 17-33 
Cottonseed oil and soap 13 13 3-80 
Rice mills 7 6 9-50 
Tobacco 5 4) 5-20 
20-33 
Cotton ginning 17 13 5-60 
Cotton textiles 28 12 2-13 
Paper 3 0 
Pulp & paper 10 9 1-42.6 
Printing 9 1 20 
Hydrocarbons 22 22 8-95 
Fertilisers(nitrate) 3 1 28 
Light chemicals 16 15 1-78 
Pharmaceutical 10 4) 9-23 
) 23-50 
Matches 3 2 13-17 
Cement 4 4 11-50 
Construction materials 71 67 4-78 
Steel and iron products 35 31 1-83.5 
Mechanical engineering 17 13 1.5-52 
Total 171 157 106 64 
Sources: Mabro, R. and Radwan, S.: The industrialisation of 
Egypt 1939-1973, op cit. p 158 and survey data. 
1 The basis for the calculation of the rate of utilisation of 
fixed capital for the two countries is different. 
2 These figures are the U1 (ratio of actual over planned 
outputs) calculation which takes into account only public 
industrial enterprises. 
3 The figures concerned all Egyptian enterprises. The private 
sector contribution, however, was insignificant in almost 
all the branches of industry. 
4 Number of firms or plants. 
5 Number of plants with underutilisation of capacity. 
6 Percentage range of underutilisation. 
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Table 11.9: Ranking* of branches of industry 
by degree of fixed capital underutilisation 
in Algeria and Egypt 
ALGERIA 1980-81 (1) EGYPT 1963 
1 Light chemicals 1 Printing 
2 Pulp and paper 2 Paper 
3 Construction materials 3 Petroleum 
4 Mechanical engineering 4 Textiles 
5 Iron and steel 5 Transport equipment 
6 Hydrocarbons 6 Engineering and metallic 
products. 
7 Glass 
8 Basic metals 
9 Wood and furniture 
10 Chemicals 
11 Food, beverages & tobacco 
12 Building materials 
13 Electrical machinery and 
appliances. 
Sources: Mabro, R. and Radwan, S.: The industrialisation of 
Egypt 1939-1973, op cit. p 160 and Table 11.8. 
* From lowest to highest. 
1 For the available figures only taking into account of both 
U1 and U2. 
branches of industry in these two countries. For example, the 
pulp and paper industry shows one of the highest rates of 
fixed capital utilisation in both countries. The 
similarities, however, do not extend to the hydrocarbon, 
materials construction and light chemical branches which show 
very different rates of fixed capital utilisation from one 
country to the other. 
11.3.1.3. Utilisation of labour 
According to available figures, overstaffing occurred in 
Egyptian (17), Turkish (18) and Algerian public enterprises. 
No other evidence was found to support the statement that 
labour was inefficiently utilised in plants. 
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11.3.2. Common causes of inefficiency in Algeria, Turkey 
and Egypt 
In the following, common causes of inefficiency that led 
to underutilisation of inputs in public enterprises and 
corporations in the three countries are presented. 
11.3.2.1. Organisational factors 
The economic organisation of the industrial public sector 
led to inefficiencies. The relationship of the firm to the 
state, as opposed to that of an autonomous unit accountable 
for economic results, was comparable to that of a state 
department. This relationship incorporated public enterprises 
into the state apparatus. Managers were considered to be 
civil servants who were expected to take full responsibility 
for public enterprise operation. Public enterprises were, 
therefore, run as if they were part of the administration, 
according to rules. All important decisions were either made 
by or referred to higher level of hierarchical echelons while 
directives and guidelines were relayed down the structure from 
the ministries via the public enterprise's head office to the 
plants (Algeria and Turkey) or via the organisation to the 
firms (Egypt). This economic organisation, which allowed 
ministries and head office of public enterprises to interfere 
in short, medium and long term management decisions, led to a 
total lack of autonomy of the plant. Consequently, it 
restricted the freedom of managers and limited their decision- 
making power. For example, decisions regarding the possible 
investment of profits were centralised at the Ministry of 
Planning level. Public enterprise managers were merely 
restricted to consuitative role (i. e. suggestions arid 
submission of projects) in matters of this nature. The prices 
of goods were also fixed and administered by other state 
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agencies. This organisational structure failed to provide 
firms or plants with an efficient system of incentives to 
improve productivity. 
There also existed an overlapping of support and an 
insufficient shifting of priorities. Direction and 
coordination (19) at the top level and coordination among 
public enterprises and between ministries and public enter- 
prises were inadequate. These problems were mainly due to 
imprecise (or nonexistent) policies and work objectives. The 
frequent replacement of top level administrators did not 
favour the building of an experienced administration. The 
business knowledge of civil servants and politicians occupying 
high positions in public enterprises was often questionable. 
Furthermore, the three systems were ruled by bureaucratic 
systems (20), which were characterised by lack of autonomy, 
lack of motivation, an excessive multiplication of activities 
under one roof and long delays before important decisions 
could be reached. Activities were not linked by a clear 
economic and managerial rationale. This resulted in high 
administrative costs. 
As already mentioned, the public sector in Algeria, due to 
the lack of social infrastructure (transport, housing, 
personnel security), is faced with high labour turnover and 
absenteeism rates, high social costs and lack of workers' 
participation. These obviously were factors accounting for 
low productivity. No evidence of such problems was found in 
either Turkey or Egypt. This may be attributed to the 
relatively longer period of industrial experience that these 
two countries possessed and the greater availability of social 
infrastructure. On the other hand, wage and incentive systems 
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were inefficient in all three countries (21). Wage policies 
were not based on worker productivity and adjusted to the 
production level. 
The economic organisation and environment in which public 
enterprises operated created inefficiencies due to gaps in job 
responsibilities, friction among workers, duplication and 
insufficient coordination of efforts and communication. This 
environment did not favour efficient decisions-making. 
Consequently, underutilisation of inputs occurred in the three 
countries' public industrial sectors. 
11.3.2.2. Shortages of inputs 
As mentioned earlier, shortages of local raw materials and 
intermediate inputs occurred in all Algerian public enter- 
prises. Turkish public enterprises, on the other hand, did 
not have such problems with the exception of one public 
enterprise (a shortage of wood (22)). In the Egyptian firms, 
only plants using natural gas and scrap metal experienced 
shortages of these inputs (23). Shortages of means of 
transport and infrastructure facilities were evident only in 
Turkish and Algerian public enterprises. 
According to the available evidence, the shortage of a 
skilled labour force affected all three countries. The extent 
to which the public sector was hurt by this, however, differed 
considerably from country to country. The effect that the 
shortage of this particular input had on the performance of 
the public sector was minor in Egypt, mild in Turkey but, as 
reviewed in the previous chapters, very important in Algeria. 
In Egypt only the Ministry of Planning suffered from this 
shortage. In Turkey, public enterprises lacked knowledgeable 
professionals with economic and commercial expertise which 
left the door open to political considerations in the appoint- 
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ment of persons to managerial positions (24). Labour 
shortages in Turkey were related to the utilisation of capital 
intensive technology and the existence of a large private 
sector which was in constant competition for the available 
skilled labour force. 
Public enterprises in the three countries were not 
provided with sufficient working capital (25). This was 
attributed to the fact that financing of plant did not include 
investment, such as that required for the training of workers 
and the development of necessary environmental infrastructure, 
and was often left as the plant's responsibility. In 
addition, the distribution of subsidies was inadequate. This 
led to considerable increases in financial charges through 
extensive borrowing which enabled public enterprises to make 
up for the lack of working capital. 
Foreign trade was a state administered and controlled 
activity in Algeria and Egypt. As a result, public 
enterprises were subject to the bureaucratic inefficiencies of 
a centralised system of import procurements which often led to 
shortages of imported inputs in the two countries. In 
addition, input shortages were often the result of barter 
deals, linking imports required by the plants to the main 
exports of the economy. Imported goods, under such 
circumstances, usually did not conform to the specifications 
and norms stipulated by the plant contractor. A shortage of 
foreign exchange also led to shortages of imported inputs 
(26). Delays in obtaining important imports resulted in the 
idling of production capacity and to costly building-up of 
precautionary inventories. The consequences of such 
procedures were bottlenecks in production and lack of 
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optimisation of import timing to take advantage of seasonal 
price patterns. Cumbersome customs policies also influenced 
the shortage of imported inputs. In Egypt, 40 to 60 per cent 
of the firms suffered from the shortage of imported inputs. 
This shortage was the major cause of underutilisation of 
inputs in Egypt and Algeria. There was no evidence to believe 
that Turkish public enterprises suffered from a lack of 
imported inputs. 
11.3.2.3. Allocative inefficiencies 
Inappropriate choice of output often led to inefficiencies 
related to investment criteria and method of project appraisal 
in all three countries. The system put sectoral planning into 
the hands of departments unequipped to study projects. 
Priorities were often not properly defined and the methods 
used were extremely crude (27). The degree of competence and 
the procedures used in project selection were, therefore, 
questionable. For instance, a project was often approved 
according to some crude calculations of value added per unit 
of capital invested, potential foreign currency savings and 
some crude estimates of employment effects. As a result, 
plans included a number of noneconomic projects. For obvious 
reasons, production capacity was underutilised. For example, 
in Egypt the decision to invest in a jet fighter plant and not 
to renovate textile plants and/or invest in construction 
materials plants, much needed industries, was questionable. 
Another example was the decision to develop a pulp and paper 
industry in Algeria which needs a large amount of water that 
is not available. 
giant location rarely took into account the effect that it 
would have on the utilisation of inputs. For example, 
Egyptian dairy products factories were located in places where 
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they could not easily be supplied with milk. Similar cases, 
as mentioned earlier, were experienced in Algeria. No 
evidence of such inefficiency existed for Turkish public 
enterprises (29). 
The large scale of the production capacity resulted in 
underutilisation of inputs, too. In Egypt and Algeria for 
example, the scale of production capacity in the food 
industries was far too large with respect to the availability 
of natural resources (raw materials). 
11.3.2.4. Demand shortages 
In the three countries, plants were built larger than 
necessary to satisfy actual demand. This was mainly due to 
economies of scale and the availability of technology on the 
international market (30). The public organisations 
responsible for foreign trade found difficulties in breaking 
into export markets (31). They also lacked the necessary 
incentives and skills to promote exports. In addition, the 
high production cost of outputs kept these countries' products 
from being competitive on the international market. For these 
reasons, despite being faced with excess capacities, plants 
could not export. 
11.4. Conclusions 
To summarize, for the period reviewed, the Algerian, 
Turkish and Egyptian economic systems were all dominated by a 
public sector characterised by centralised planning, direct 
control and significant intervention of the state. The three 
countries had considerable natural resources which offered the 
possibility for industrial development. All were under an 
intensive phase of economic growth where the development of 
similar heavy capital goods and intermediate goods industries 
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was the basis for industrialisation. Public enterprises were 
founded to sustain economic development in all three 
countries. The contribution of the public industrial sector 
to total industrial value added was significant in Algeria, 
Egypt and Turkey, in that order. Similar instruments were 
used to control the economy although monetary instruments were 
used in Turkey and Egypt while administrative instruments were 
used in Algeria. 
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn with respect to 
the performance of the public industrial sector in the three 
countries. First, the raw materials, intermediate inputs, 
fixed capital and labour were underutilised. Second, the 
underutilisation of inputs was lower in the Turkish and 
Egyptian industrial public sectors (in that order) than that 
of Algeria. This was attributed to the greater industrial 
experience of the former two countries. In the third place, 
the existence of a relatively large, competitive private 
sector and an effective distribution system of subsidies' 
accounted for the higher utilisation of production capacity 
shown by the Turkish public sector. It should be stressed, 
however, that despite these differences in the level of 
utilisation of inputs, the three countries were afflicted by 
very similar causes of inefficiency, namely organisational 
factors, shortages of inputs, allocative inefficiencies and 
shortages of demand. The fact that some causes of 
inefficiency encountered in the Algerian public sector were 
not experienced by both the Turkish and Egyptian 
industrial 
sectors should not detract from the more 
interesting point 
that some inefficiencies encountered by the industrial public 
sectors of the three countries are intrinsic and 
inherent to a 
country's economic organisation. In that respect, 
the 
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Egyptian and Turkish systems, which showed persistent 
inefficiencies, are typical examples which clearly indicate 
the direction to be taken to alleviate, if not eliminate, 
inefficiencies encountered by Algerian public enterprises, 
specifically, a change in certain government policies. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The principal aim of this work has been to assess the 
performance of public industrial enterprises in Algeria and 
identify the main causes of inefficiency by focusing on 
capacity utilisation as a measure of efficiency which influen- 
ces the levels of industrial output and employment. The 
aggregative analysis at the plant level was based on empirical 
evidence obtained from six of the most representative public 
enterprises in the Algerian public industrial sector. This 
chapter proposes to synthesize the main conclusions that have 
emerged and suggest some requirements and proposals for policy 
on this subject. 
Algeria has been characterised, since independence, by the 
will to achieve a level of economic development comparable to 
that of some Western developed countries. In order to achieve 
this level of development, the Algerian government set objec- 
tives which were to be realised by the state through the 
"industrialising industry" strategy. Algeria's choice of 
development strategy, which focuses on the industrial sector 
as opposed to the agricultural sector, has been strongly 
influenced by the nature of its resource endowment (e. g., oil 
and gas). To that effect, the proceeds of oil and gas exports 
have been used to expand the country's industrial base, 
develop agriculture and strengthen the economic and social 
infrastructure. Growth in investment and structural reforms 
have been accompanied by the centralisation of decision-making 
in regard to the formulation and implementation of development 
plans. The outcome of the above policies has 
been the 
emergence of a strong public industrial sector. 
Encouraging results regarding growth, investment, savings, 
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employment, education, regional development and income distri- 
bution were achieved during the last decade. The period 
spanning 1969 to 1979 saw a 7% growth in GDP in real terms. 
During the same period, the share of total investment at 
current prices averaged 39% of GDP per year. During the 
period 1969-80 more than 1.4 million non-agricultural jobs 
were created and enrollments in schools and universities rose 
sharply. The repartition of investment carried out in the 
industrial sector can be deduced from the share of value added 
recorded by the different branches of industry. The largest 
contribution to the industrial VA comes from the hydrocarbon 
sub-sector (45% in real prices in 1978) followed by the iron 
and steel, mechanical and electrical engineering and 
construction materials industries. 
Despite these remarkable results, the industrial sector is 
faced with a wide variety of difficulties. Some of these 
difficulties have arisen from the imbalances created by the 
rapid growth of the industrial sector (e. g., social infras- 
tructure and training). In order to assess the consequences 
of these difficulties on the performance of this sector and 
identify the causes of inefficiency, a representative sample 
of public industrial enterprises has been studied. 
Although the public enterprises studied show some peculia- 
rities, they are characterised by a large number of common 
features. These enterprises, which are either heavy 
industries producing durable capital goods or consumer goods 
industries, are all industrialising industries of medium or 
large size playing an important role in Algerian development. 
With the exception of SONATRACH (hydrocarbons), which is 
geared for export, all the public enterprises are import 
substitution industries and produce outputs destined for the 
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domestic market. Most of the plants belonging to these enter- 
prises were built during the post-independence period and use 
capital intensive technology imported from different 
countries. These plants, which are large in scale, are mainly 
located in the northern part of Algeria. Despite the fact 
that some plants show a high rate of integration (70%), the 
level of integration of public enterprises and the Algerian 
public industrial sector in general is not very high. Raw 
materials and labour are almost totally supplied by the local 
market although some public enterprises employ a significant 
proportion of foreign labour. On the other hand, intermediate 
inputs, capital and spare parts are almost totally imported. 
The public enterprises studied, which do not encounter fierce 
competition from the underdeveloped private sector and thus 
occupy a monopolistic position regarding national production, 
are very rarely faced with lack of local demand. 
An efficiency measure has been adopted to evaluate the 
performance of the six public enterprises selected. What is 
meant by efficiency is how inputs (raw materials, intermediate 
inputs, fixed capital and labour) are utilised with respect to 
outputs. To that effect, raw materials and intermediate 
inputs, fixed capital and labour utilisations have been 
evaluated for each plant output, for every plant and public 
enterprise. Since Algeria is a capital-scarce economy, 
emphasize has been placed on the measurement of fixed capital 
utilisation through the calculation of Ul (ratio of actual 
over planned output), U2 (ratio of planned over 
technical 
output) and U3 (ratio of actual over technical number of 
shifts or time utilisation). 
This investigation led to the conclusion that inputs were 
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inefficiently used in all public enterprises studied and, by 
and large in the Algerian public industrial sector. According 
mainly to evidence given by the plant managers, raw materials 
and intermediate inputs were inefficiently used in the vast 
majority of plants surveyed. The extent of this underutilisa- 
tion was particularly large in SONIC (pulp and paper industry) 
and SONACOME (mechanical engineering industry) plants. 
As summarized in Figure 12.1, it was also found that fixed 
capital was underutilised in the various public enterprises 
studied, reflecting different rates of fixed capital utilisa- 
tion within plants. The average rate of fixed capital 
utilisation of the six public enterprises studied was 72.81% 
and 76.64% for U1 and U2, respectively. In addition, fixed 
capital was used for less than three quarters of the available 
time (U3= 71.27%). The rest of the time it remained idle. 
Simultaneous analysis of U1 and U2 shows that fixed capital 
was used most efficiently in SONIC and SNIC and least 
efficiently in SONATRACH (hydrocarbon industry). The calcula- 
tion of U3 indicates that the actual number of shifts (or 
time) during which fixed capital was used compared to the 
technical norm was highest in SONATRACH and lowest in 
SONACOME. Similarly, based on information given by the plant 
managers, it has been deduced that labour was underutilised in 
all plants showing overstaffing. It is important to point out 
that overstaffing, although it infringes on the performance of 
the enterprise, was necessary in Algeria, which was 
characterised by a high rate of unemployment. 
The level of capacity utilisation was chosen as a 
measuring instrument given the critical need to identify the 
major causes of underutilisation of the different inputs. 
With respect to this, the study of the six public industrial 
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enterprises has shed some light on these causes in the 
Algerian context. The causes of inefficiency which follow, 
can then be summarized into four main categories: 
1) Organisational causes are related to the economic 
organisation and environment in which public enterprises 
operate. They are mainly due to noneconomic factors (social, 
cultural and institutional), the relationship of the public 
enterprise to the government, cumbersome bureaucracy and the 
diversification and large size of the plants and public 
enterprises. 
2) Shortages of inputs from the local and international 
markets also affected the utilisation of fixed capital and 
labour. Almost all the plants surveyed were faced with diffi- 
culties in obtaining supplies of both raw materials and 
intermediate inputs provided by the local market. In 
addition, supplies of water and electricity were particularly 
inadequate and unreliable. Plants also encountered problems 
with the collection of inputs and/or removal of outputs, 
reflecting the shortage of means of transport and infrastruc- 
ture facilities. More importantly, the lack of a skilled 
labour force, strongly affected all the plants particularly 
the technical and supervisory positions on the production 
lines and in the maintenance area. Similarly, the shortage of 
imported inputs was one of the major causes of the inefficient 
utilisation of inputs. This resulted from the rigidity of 
import regulations, bureaucratic procedures and cumbersome 
financial, customs and control policies. Finally insufficient 
working capital resulting from inappropriate project financing 
procedures and inefficient subsidy distribution systems was 
also a factor influencing the smooth operation of the plants. 
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3) Allocative inefficiencies arose from inappropriate 
government policies in the areas of plant location, adopted 
technology and level of integration of the plant or complex. 
4) Finally, demand shortages, only experienced by a few 
plants, were mainly due to a decline in international demand 
(e. g., crude oil) or the adoption of large scale plants in 
anticipation of future demand and existent technology. 
The underutilisation of inputs in Algerian public enterprises 
is influenced directly by supply and demand conditions and 
indirectly by economic organisation, environment and 
government policies. 
From the results of this empirical study, it appears that 
the entire public industrial sector is faced with underutili- 
sation of the different inputs for reasons similar to those 
deduced for the individual public enterprises studied. This 
is corroborated by the fact that identical problems are 
observed in countries such as Turkey and Egypt, which have 
economic structures similar to Algeria. It is notable that 
several of the problems encountered are also observed in the 
public enterprises in some highly developed countries (1). 
The overall conclusion emerging from the description and 
findings of the public enterprises is that capacity 
utilisation does not reach its desired level. The 
alleviation, if not elimination, of inefficiencies surrounding 
the use of raw materials, intermediate inputs, fixed capital 
and labour would lead to a significant increase in output, 
employment and, eventually, to the achievement of higher rates 
of capacity utilisation and economic growth. 
On the basis of the identified causes of inefficiency, 
some general suggestions regarding increases in output and 
employment as well as efficiency in the different public 
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enterprises may be proposed. Although many of the parameters 
that will allow plants to achieve higher input utilisation are 
obtained implicitly from the causes themselves, some additio- 
nal comments are called for. Certain constraints may be more 
pervasive and require long term policies while others may be 
easy to solve. The policy recommendations which follow can be 
divided into four categories: organisational factors, supply 
bottlenecks, government policies and external markets. 
1) Organisational factors 
A considerable gain in efficiency would be achieved if 
public enterprises were encouraged to operate on a commercial 
rather than bureaucratic basis. Greater emphasis would be 
placed on profit as a criterion of performance. This could 
only be accomplished if economic decisions were clearly 
separated from business planning and operations. This in fact 
suggests restructuring the present Algerian industrial organi- 
sation and defining clearly the public enterprise objectives 
(2). Ideally a system that holds management accountable for 
results while giving it the autonomy to achieve them is 
desirable. This would imply a transfer of supervisory 
functions from the ministry to the public enterprise head 
office, concentration of corporate management in a limited 
number of plants and strengthening of the managing director 
position at these plants or complexes. The public enterprise 
head office would be the top administrative organ for plants 
engaged in similar types of economic activities while acting, 
at the same time, as a link with the highest authorities. 
Experience shows, however, that structural changes only 
are not sufficient to alter the underlying balance of power. 
A beneficial impact may only be expected if some additional 
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reforms are also undertaken. The most important reforms would 
be to require public enterprises to pay for the opportunity 
cost of their capital, end their monopoly position resulting 
in the use of market prices (this implies that prices are 
correct and not distorted), the use of shadow prices to 
calculate the economic rate of return and account for public 
profit. This would greatly promote the idea of holding 
managers accountable for results by encouraging them to 
maximize profit. A criterion on which they could be judged. 
The reorganisation, which is currently underway, does not 
aim at defining clearly the public enterprise objectives and 
does not favour the operation of public enterprises on 
commercial rather than bureaucratic principles. These policy 
recommendations would provide stronger administration at the 
level of plant management, effective coordination and 
cooperation between plants and public enterprises and an 
efficient incentive system. 
In addition, adequate studies should be carried out to 
solve organisational inefficiencies such as the condition and 
the organisation of production and workers. These studies 
would provide an efficient technical layout, workers 
management, control system, cost accounting, working methods, 
maintenance and handling systems (3). 
2) Supply bottlenecks 
Supplies of local raw materials and intermediate inputs 
are assumed to be adequate. In this study, however, 
it has 
been shown that unreliable and insufficient supplies of these 
inputs are encountered in a large number of public enter- 
prises. For example, the shortage of esperto grass combined 
with its poor quality was one of the major problems 
encountered in one of the SONIC (pulp and paper) plants. 
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Recommendations to improve this situation take us beyond the 
field of industry to that of agriculture and forestry (better 
organisation of the sector, price related to its real cost and 
an improvement in the system of collecting raw materials and 
intermediate inputs). 
Shortages of electricity and water could only be 
alleviated and eventually eliminated by adopting more rational 
and realistic policies. The ultimate solution would lie in 
the improvement of common supplies of electricity and water 
from SONELGAS and the water authorities and not with reducing 
the dependence on these inputs by installing standby 
generators in complexes and plants. 
Improvement of transport and infrastructure facilities 
could only be carried out successfully through general 
planning and measures that reduce port and airport congestion 
and decrease administrative delays, damage and loss. This 
would obviously imply large expenditures on public works of 
all kinds: roads, railways, bridges, dams, airports and ports. 
Equally great is the need for large scale social expenditures, 
particularly in the form of housing. 
The shortage of a skilled labour force, which 
necessitates a long term programme, could be solved by two 
complementary policy recommendations. The first improvement 
may be made by reallocating managers from the head office of 
public enterprises to the plants where they could monitor 
public enterprise performance directly. A second 
recommendation would be to initiate training programmes at the 
technical level, organise vocational training courses for 
young workers and adopt a more appropriate educational system 
than the one in practice (long run). These measures should 
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not prevent the government from adopting incentives to attract 
skilled workers in small towns as well. 
Improving the availability of imported goods could be 
achieved by liberalising the policies on imported raw mate- 
rials, intermediate inputs and spare parts or by reducing 
foreign trade procedures. Special funds could be made 
available on a yearly basis for urgent unplanned imports. 
More efficient banking and customs controls in relation to 
import policy will improve the situation greatly. 
Finally, the lack of working capital would not be a 
problem if credit was made available on time and subsidies 
were efficiently distributed to plants. This would lead to 
the realisation of profits and, therefore, its distribution to 
labour force as advocated by the Socialist Management's 
Charter (see Chapter Four), and eventually to a more efficient 
incentive system. Infrastructure expenditures should be taken 
charge of by the state in order to reduce the plant's 
financial burden. 
3) Government policies 
Problems related to allocative inefficiencies (location, 
product, level of integration and techniques) are more 
difficult to solve. Some, however, could be improved through 
large financial outlays. This could be done, for example, by 
renovating part of the machinery, building additional 
workshops to correct imbalances in capital equipment or 
expanding storage capacities for inputs and outputs. 
The 
government should guarantee supplies of raw materials, elec- 
tricity, water and labour training, liberalise import, 
customs, banking and control policies and take charge of 
the 
expenditures on infrastructure 
facilities. There is a serious 
need for a more equitable 
income policy in order to decrease 
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the high rate of labour turnover. A more efficient system of 
distribution of subsidies would greatly improve the financial 
situation of a number of public enterprises. Increasing the 
number of shifts in existing plants would permit an increase 
in industrial output and reduction of disguised employment. 
Improvements could be achieved at the investment planning 
level (selection, financing and execution) by the development 
of national design and execution capabilities, the adoption of 
more advanced methods of preparing investment projects and the 
adoption of more appropriate credit reimbursement terms, to 
name only a few. 
4) External markets 
Local demand could be boosted if the attitudes of 
t 
managers were more market-oriented. This is particularly 
relevant for new products. The international market could 
also be used to stimulate demand by setting up more aggressive 
and organised marketing services to compensate for the low 
domestic demand. Growth of demand. is also linked to develop- 
ment in other plants or sectors. The development of the 
hydrocarbon industrial sub-sector, for example, as a whole 
would permit an increase in semi-finished and finished exports 
which would make up for the excess capacity that presently 
exists in SONATRACH plants. In SNMC (construction materials), 
such development is the result of an ambitious housing 
programme (which, in fact, is urgently required) which would 
be resolved by an efficient housing programme and aggressive 
export promotion to neighbouring countries. 
The suggestions, which are very broad recommendations, are 
derived from the problems encountered. They, therefore, offer 
a valuable area for future research of a detailed nature. 
426 
References 
1 For example, English or French public enterprises. See 
Pryde, R.: The Nationalised Industries: Policies and 
Performance since 1968 (Martin Roberson, Oxford, England, 
1981) . 
2 This is confirmed by the article by Shirley, M. M.: Managing 
State-Owned Enterprises, World Bank Staff Working Papers, 
No. 577, Management and Development series No. 4, The World 
Bank, Washington, D. C., USA. 
3 These actions were also carried out in countries like 
Egypt, Pakistan and India after the I. L. O. expert 
recommendations. See I. L. O. Productivity Missions to 
Underdeveloped Countries: I and II, International Labour 
Review, Vol. 76, July and August 1957, pp 1-29 and 139-166, 
respectively. 
427 
12 ^ . 09 u: s? NN O 10 U) U). - - LAU) N- CD 
N O" V1 s$ O O' O 'O Ni ON V1 Ni N O. ýt 
.tNN - 
Co 
N 
f- M 
000'00"- MN- stN -t (VtnCN-U)U) V1 ý7 
v O ('JLAQ -. t N r-MIýNNýf11l1 O' Oý N c, NN 
f"" '^ N 
C0 
NCD r-r-- 1OMi-NO CD O"rNMI No O'cm -t 
U Uzt u10 ý7ý '0 Ni N OMB-MNfýýl1 M 
I 
(0 LA NN LA 
lt 
O: NI` NAOýOý ýOMMN'OýON 19 
2 NM%t . - r,: N ONO"(VNLAui N Co -O NN LA 
O' 
t ^ OO'"- ýttif`CD V1 fV M0' . -N- Vº, 119 ý C ý; -«j . U) Nu fV ON't NNOO. t M M 
A 
E 
0 Q -t LA CO NNN Co Co OM O-N(>10 
N 
M 
> I`N-YO r-O. 1`M r4 (V-4'LA 
10 NN cu 
"^ O ti 
C NO' O' P OM CD ml 'OEMI 
I 
Ni 
N 
ti v Oý'LACD MýON r f'f-1A -t O' t! 1 NN r O -' M N 
L .0 fV 
^ NNO'ý u N-. -*-- u1 ýtp"IAMýt0Ni N 'p 
C v Ln -tOO MN-MN N to N-NN1O'O" O l0 r -rN r 
4-+ r 
+-+ C 
0 E CD Ne r4 NO'MO Co -- NO"Mýt O' Ni 
U a. + M . 
NM C00 0 N- N . - NM qtr M001n O LIN 
N M 
4) > 
E C M 
1` 
tu ^ 00MNM NMOO N tl1OM000'' IA 
L O N 
I 
0) 0 N- v NiLAU)0 M Ni N(JLA (V MO. N- 
O 41 NN 
L 0 
0. a+ 
U) O'LA-4- OOLri in 0. vl OWN 
ti 
0 
03 v I-- "p00 't%OM Vl NNLA ýýTýP f_ C! ý-' -! -N tV 
'p O 
G) t0 
10 G) ^ u'1M N V IA( 4 Co CD OO0OCM ýN. -- 
d L v 01ýýl1 Mfg. -.! NON. M0N- P 
Ql N '- LANN 
d 
p. 
(13 10 LA 
/% "0- 1! 1 N-000ý V1ýt MK1M 
Q in 10 c> t; . , MO"O S , ON# LALn t O- 
O fýNit 
dl ý 
Ö ý 
^ O. P O'r- .O CO o0Ni a0O. O 
r,: Mm; O'. inO. LA M. M'-M00'- O'. 
r e- V1 NN 
rn N 
Qf Nd 
tLL-L 
N 
Vl CO ++ C/ O) 
w7 4/ 3ULC# 
oiJ iG LUL 4J 
"C 
"L "- C) a+ U ".. ++ 
+ý L vn 7 co C q1 7 Cl) Of 41 .0C (LL 7CCC 2- 
.2 
L- 4ý 
0 
y7 
aE 
41 
vº U7 7ý oö 10 
C Co ca NU 
ýp .ý a+ L a+ W ++ wCC> 
-- rn ý" (O rn Luc0mC 77CLU (0 of C_ E of .. 
7 ý0 u" 41 O v- C 
f0 L 
ýn C 
"- LNL. 7" fA OL 10 U 
LLO 7-0 CCL. COC C) Uu Cu 
>. rn "ý D ! -. co "- 7 Cu 7Oc7 of 4J M....... 
Co 
-- w0wx 
>O- 
C 
EO 
a+ 
ýn aJ 4) cu 
>> 
C 
> 
4J 9- CG i 
CO Ql d u) 
NEL 
aý Vn ofQ m L 
CJ U> (O "L 
>C 
ilfl 
a fC 
C 0) -. (L) - 41 
MO M0 > Ow 
a+ -" LdC N 
U 
ýNMT Ln%0 
CL 0 
00 ti 
ti 
'0 o% 
a 
C 
C 
U C) 
o 
L 
I tu t U 
U) w- C cu OO 
. .Z 
41 
O C c0 
N G1 U 
" 
+ýI Cý C 
O L 
s. ý 
7 
++ 
19 U 
.9 3"C C 
O 
+/1 
U -+ 
W j 
C +ý -' O UU I 
(9 C 
m 
L C) 
7 O 
0I co 
N 
d +ý of O 
C1 OO 
t U". -v- 
U V) 
N O 
<o c 
lp L 
JI O) 
O -+ LO- 
CL U0 
U - 
c i a, C 
o 0) it U) _i449 49 
428 
I 
o4 
Co N o. 
0 
4J U 
4) 
N 
aJ 
C 
N 
E 
ti 
a, 
C 
U 
N 
N 
w` 
Co 
W 
L 
Co 
1 
cu 
O1 
0 
L 
/2 
y 
0 a 
'I- 0 
C o_ 
J 
E 
L. C 
1O cl 
a+ 
AU 
DL C) 
OL 
.)O -L U 
m 
ic mc 
C- ^0 
Lr 
7 Of (O 
OC 
aý c0 
L> 
4d 
N 
o, 
r- vl OP 
vO- 
Z- 
to 
Iý I L 
Co 
EC° 
CL 
c 
a 
rn 
Co 
«s f2 o" 
O Co PM Lm DN-0CD CD 10 ýp '0 
O O1OpýDLAu OOVl 00 
IM 
Lt LA CO OOr-NfNCO -NN 
't Lr%" t l, % NuY -uN- M .i 
CD 000000000 0 0 0 000000000 0 0 O u1-CD TCD 0' CD (D r'J in '0 M -t r4) Ni Ni N N O 
'0 PNN r-- Ni CM 0t N O 
4 
0°11, - 0 -4 v, o" -0 ICJ U'% r- 
f, - N00ý D O, N 
%ONONOO -It M LA Um 10 
111NN cm NýtPO NM 
Lf% 
U'% 01x0. 
ýýýppp 
AMM MAO N 
Co PM NM 
T" CM 
'- 
-! 
NO`NN 
rr {rs 
O 01! 10.0-0v-O. O - t! 1 
O -t0. JN '0N'tMý M 
ICD 
-tNýM001! 1O. tf1F- f- f- 
N ýMN - MM0 MM2 
O 000000000 O O 
O l! 1 O -2 00 UM CO ýf 1ý M 
r4 C: ) gn M N 
Cm N V1 'tCo M 
M N O" 
Cl) N 
O v 
V) GJ V) 
L d) L Q) L 
ar "r > >O 
7 G1 U C ++ a-+ 
L L O 
t n a+ 
C L 
C ++ 4-" ca 
, 4- 0 Co 0 
06 0 
1 
Co C L- 4) 
O ) Da O a + L C 
" Cm 4) 4) - 41 0 C ca B 4-0 
C 0 _ 
i7> G a+ a + C CD 
L a+ O LOU 0 L 
m oö E7 v1"- " a+ U D U) 
0. 
E L. C +-+ ý ul 
O V) UL to ar "- (D t0 c0 
L> 0 "ý Q) LCCN MU "ý L e0 
c0 CL4.. 7 (0 OC 77 U v- +-+ 
: C) "- D) CD OLUO O 'O OC 0 __ Q3 F- i- WU =W N- F 
429 
aý v (o 
N 
4) 
N 
a 
t0 
L 
1-I 
CA 
U 
G) 
4) 
N 
CU 
3 
CU 
L 
U) 
4-i 
LIii 
W 
CU O 
CLU 
aI C 
C uý 
C 
t0 C C! 
, 
v- C) U 
Ot7 
VL 
iý +-1 
Ld V) 
4. + L CU 
U) f0 L 
ý- N 
C Oý CL 
ti -7 
x Ol 4+ 
-UU 
a co C0 
U N- O CU 
L Oý UL 
W 4- 
0C 
N-N "- 
C 
rn 
L- 
0 
m 
L 
y 
N 
NO 
4. UQ 
U "- 
L 'F 
ao 
L 4-+ Cl) 
ac c a> o UL "ý 
44 D- 
CO L) -- 
äv 
f4 
O 
M 
N 
- 
LA Ir- Qc 
D Ln 'o o0 
O. O 
O 
aö 
a 
r 
ti 
Co ti 
r 
U1 
fý M 
ti Ln 
O' M 
'O 
co 
U 
LA 
If' 
O 
ti ti 
U 10 
r- P 
ti 
O- 
OOO 
C) 00 
Ors 
Ki 
I- 
O NO Oý 
Iýr%0 
Nt MN 
s 
10 MO 
Co VIN M 
, l1MO 
OCo I` 
MOO 
LA Co N 
10 -. t r-_ V1 M%0 
L 
N Co Co 
Co NM 
r- C: ) 
'7 M 
N IN LAP 
Co lcm M f- 
N v, %PCD 
ti 3 
N 1O 
N 
ti 
P 
r 
r ýp rý 
co 
LA 
31 
N ýt 
ti 
of 
N- 0. i° 
<ý `tN 
ý 
Oý ýO o0 
'O N'-M, 
NN 
00 in 00 -t 
Nt c3, Ob 
N'MN 
SN q- M 
N1M 
r' 1 '! 00 Co 
Ilt O NPýN NN L. (D 
C 
33 
Loa 
L 
t0 iº 
Gº C D) 
LQL 
C) 
ý+ L ca c 
t0 N 
U 0) 
VOCL 
L. (D 
L 'a cC 
0) A a+ 
Qxx0 
0 
O 
CIO 
r 
o' 
co N 
O' 
0 
'O 
0 
No 
Lr% 
U, 
o, 
ti N 
ti 
I" 
c9 
N 
O 
N 
1f1 
ti 
Co 
O 
t 
c9 
S 
10 
M 
Mf 
Co 
ti 
N 
rn C 
,L 
J 
iJ 
U 
C 
x 
0o0000 
n LnCD ooo v cli 00 %0 o +1 NOMPN 
1tv '_ N 
CD 0000 
C) CD 0000 
CD LAO'MI OýM 
,OM CO 00 -4 ý 
h ýt Nrr 
- CO -t 
OON O'&t 
- %O 
ni 
JNN 
ýt 0i LIN ýt 0i 
co NOýNf-_ 
0ý ON O -It O 
t 1ý 00 in I- P 
Nýý 
LPNN-, t 
ýO I 
Co 4t %O 
N 'r 
I O OO ýp OM 
N %0 %0N CD C> 
ýO f-ýO'O'Ch 
-MLn 
rr 
CO ýO M fý u1 0' 
Co LA ýN CO u'% 
to r41 
to 
r 
O in M in 
r T-- 
co MMN '- N 
c OOflO" M fl 
V) C) Ö 3 & 
Lt Ln N 
fý '00100'0 
LA LANr P' 
M co Mco Nýt 
O %0 Mti ýtCo 
c9 Mud 1ýO; O 
Co ý ýýt Mf- 
r- 
r 
1O M I` NM 
N f-NLAM1(1 
10 
O 'O O *t 
O COCm Ocm M 
't BOOM 
M- P- CD 
tnNtn -M 
U) O 
UL /C 
U-. U .ý 
(0 L L 
U +ý 41 
O "ý t0 a ý C cý 7 
t 9 E 
o23L O 
U -' oö G) ä 
OEU -N U ý0 
L "- (0 4) 7 CL 
4) IL) 
N G! 0) X 
0u 
C to 
tL U) 0 C. ) H L) X 
4 30 
o ItI- 
O ". o 
N 1- 
V1 M 
Co 
OO 
OO 
N In 
N 
In 0% 
f. - M 
MO 
MO 
N- N 
NN 
M .0 
OM 
OM 
1/n 
0% t 
"0 N 
I 
M 
M to 
M ýt 
N 
f- M 
'0 -! 
OO 
-t O 
LA O 
M 
O V1 
ý! M 
O 0% 
tn 
. - 
0% `t 
PP 
in O 
N1 fV 
N Co 
O' 
N Co 
O O' 
O: P 
N 'O 
NN 
N Oý 
M `O 
IN O 
N1 00 
4J 
c 
o 
U CO 
7 a+ 
LO 
4. ' 4. ' 
y 
C 
O7 
U (1) 
OOO iO 
O: OO 
Mr O LA 
00-%0 V1 
LAO co M 
r- M 
OOOO 
%OOIf c; 
NA V1CM -t 
N '. OMl 
Ln IA ti Co 
00 00 O ". O 
ti 
a 1n 
N 
(Ni %0 -t 
N 
fý MNN 
N 0p0. Lr% . 
0pp 
Oý 
M2 
,; Co t ti 
O f; MO 
OM 1/1 
It MMO 
NN r- 
MtýM - 
MCO CO P 
ON VN Co 
Co MM 
CO M li .O 
N1l1M r 
Lr% 
NN, - LA 
Co L Co 
V1« 0 -t 
N ýt MO 
OO 
NN'! 
10 P I! % 
PIN". CO 
ALAN P 
-t P .- 1-t 
PMPN 
f' .-MM 
1NM1 N 
ýVN NP 
PP fý '. O 
In M 1- 
M00-t "O 
ý1N CO 
NOM 
M«O .-O. 
p NN 
00 
.-N 1- 
M "- PM 
: nP N t- 
iC MN 
C cn V) 
OCG! > 
O_ uL 
v 
c0 a+ > ryl 
-0 G) 
t0 Lj 
F- il HO V) 
NO 
NO 
CD C> 
C) C> 
MM 
N 1ý 
N tý1 
0 
r 
r 00 
aý 
oa 
oý 
.. r Co 
00 
PO 
OIn N1l1 
ýs 'o 
1ýO 
MO 
-IT A 
N l4! 
NO It 
Mo 
eM 
1! 1 N 
L 
It 
N O' 
O ti 
MM 
00 N 
co 
S 
ýt O 
CO N 
N 
O: P 
Ol fs 
ýO o0 
NO 
co ýt 
N 
ON 
co N 
Ln LA 
O« IN 
N 
tiý 
ti 
.. v 
.. aj i 
Q 
7 
L 
iJ 
EQ O 
N r- IM 
NM u1 
MM %0 
c L! 1 14, 
M me- u'1 
rr 
OOO 
OOO 
10 r- Ile) 
Oý QO a0 
1` NO 
O-N 
Ir 
Cý 00 1l 
ON Ni 
ONN 
CO oý CD O 
Oý to .t 
NM '0 
V1 Oý It 
N00 
I,, - co 
0' -O 
MM Ln 
fýN O' 
O f- f. - 
NO '0 
P-7 
It '- NO 
C 
c %0 %0 
NT UN 
M ýt 
NM 
fýýt N 
Ln 
O 
NM 
M 10 P 
if O 1! i 
O -t t - 
Ni Ni 
C9 N 
11- Ln M 
LO 
10 MO 
fV Ni 
N'0 2 
00 1; N 
IV O' N 
NP 
rM ýt 
NN 
NM 
ON fV 
N 00 O 
N -T 
N fV 
M 1! 1 1 00 
't C3 
S Lr% O 
00 N 
fV 
N 
U 
ULU 
a 
ý+ V) 4+ 
NN 
C: 41 
41 
uu U) 7L ul 7 
Ö0>0 -9 
LLOLL 
cý a co cý a 
C 
C 
m 
ä 
w O 
>" 
L 
4-. 
N 
E 
U 
L 
7 
O 
N 
a, 
U 
Q! 
N 
ý-. 
C 
E 
L 
C) 
J 
O 
Q) 
C 
73 
U 
x 
W 
L 
a 
c 
L 
L 
U 
a 
cI 
o .. 
-C "4-+ Q) 
3U 
OL 
L. 
rn 
wC 
O 
v 
4) 
4J 
L 
C, 
O) 
co 
L 
C) 
i 
Cl 
<0 
h- 
cý o 
10 Co o, or- 
rý o tiCo 
o- ON 
tiCo 
rP 
O- P 
r_ Co 
U O_ 
O- P 
e- e- 
N 
01 O1 
rr 
sLn titi 
as 
ra 
TA 
r c> 
-N 
rP 
-r 
LA LM 
N N MN 
NMN 
D M 
uI p .Mä 
N NMNN 
CO 
I `ý MN 
Lr% CO (D t 1 N M LA N 
'D 
M N .pM 
10 N fam. '; MMMN 
a 00 M 
LA II MM 
N -M 
ýO c9 
1- M O'N-N 
r- N 
ti ti Ifº 
O (- ONI- 
J -- 
N I-tr N 
LA P Oý 
N(M. -4 
N to t! 1 N rý 
v1 M '0 0N 
ý1 " e-- rN 
Lr% v, Co N 00 Co 
! - 
0 Mi U3 
ýO N 
ýt NM-N 
Irý 3 19 
M '0 Vn '0 0 N 't -ý 
Oý OP 
Co O .t Co O 
.t O> -M 
In e- CO N OO 
10 
r- ý P 00 "O O` O, 
ýr 
ý I 
U 
L 
a 
U p) 
ccc 
+1 CO 
Ul GJ L. - g) L 7 a+ 
F L ß+ (1 a -' L U <0 L 
41 04- 4ý 
V) U Vi L7N 
Z -0 ( 
0 L- 0O sc 
L O) C L) 
ti 
M 
C6 
ir 
'0 
co 
P 
M 
N 
N- 
r- 
r- 
ti 
,o 
ti 
Co N 
a) 
u 
C) 
U) 
Ki 
a 
0) 
co 
ýi 
U 
L 
O 
N 
431 
I 
U 
"L 
Q 
C 
L 
L 
v 
C 
0) 
L 
O 
c0 
L 
O 
U 
GJ 
N 
O 
a, 
0) co 
4J c 
U 
L 
G) 
co 
'0 o F- w P 1T 
ti c9 
01 O 
ý- N 
N 
Co ý9 
ti 
OO 
eý O 
Nt O MN co %o 1-- M No. It P- 1 
O 
N 
I- M MONO M ýt ý7 M ýO M 
it N 
MN M Vl f` %000 Nr co M fý 1`001! 1 
't CD 
r4 
O N NOCVa-O M O; "t 
't N 
O'-: N CV N OOO'. - M N M ýt 
CO CD . - O M N0'-- N M 11 - tr N - lr1 . -- N 
Co 
%0 ti 
ti o Co Oý ºn to Oý Lo ID MN l> N CO N IO 00 ºlý 
Co rar-MN a-- NO 10 M- r- 
M O% in uN 
V'% rN 
L f" r -- 7 00 M I- N NCO II- I OO M 'O fý 
NOS N MON '-O fV f- P cCj MrrL! 1 - (V 
oý 
"o 
`Q CO ISO -ON e- NOO N 
ti 
O' N 
Lf% 
r 
ti 
o- 
r 
1! 1 rho Oý P 0i NO 
to OPNN '- NOO 
o4. V. ' 
't (; 0 
LII fV 
f- "Co Co 
LA Co 'O L! 1 ýt Co Co 't f- M 'O -M Oý M 
M f- a0 fV -: M O- r O 1! 1 LAfý 00 
-t r N 
LA 
ä 
CO P- M M t Co ,M M 
c> O` ýt O NO - - - N ýt - CO O M M 
N CO LA 
Oý LA r l! 1 f` ýt 
Nä 
t Co N- to 
4 O (> O- .t -t N-MO . -- - O LA O% O. - N ý-- r - M ý.., M 
r-_ LA 10 
O M 1! 1 M 'M r- 00 
U 
ýt fV LA N 1` NO %O 
N O PM O- ý -t M-NO- 0' 00 in F- 0: N 
M M 
M 
O V 1 LA N N O LA fý I- ýt O ýO 't M 1l_ 
- O -t0- M t N. - NO . - P CO LA P- N CM r r M r M 
ON 
n L U ý 
«c M 4ý (0 
L 
- U C (0 L -0 
C O > ý+ l0 t a+ 
_ L L 
U ++ (ý 
oö '- f0 
J O 
E 
- 
.0 
7 
of LTA 
0) 
C 
0 CD C 
NLOO C 
A 
L 
U C) 
U 
Vf 
O Cm - G) U .' cd "- 4) 0 +r äJ U t. 
Co 
7 C! (A C 0 0 V 7 L Et ,ß ul c G a. a-+ > a 
D 
J L CD C 
f0 C) 
+1 
U 
L (0 Cl 7 -. L L CL 
U L 4) L 
. U-. > O ýp C) 
7 OCL -p aý UE ++ v1 U +ý uJ Gý L 
-+ U L ". - C) - 
7 O GO 0 GW XC (0 Cl) -" C II 0) -" in - "- 0 5m C O a+ tNO "- C t0 CD Co L c0 1-+ L . >. 4-' l9 ii- C/) 0) U h- U :t 0 4j . LL is : -+ 0 Q xx0 X .... UI 0I I- I- 0 0 ý H 
432 
M 
N 
-92 Co 
ýi 
V 
0 N 
I 
IM% 
Co ti 
P 
c `° 
4-0 
c 0 U 
4- 
0 
c 
0 
E 
00 
O 
ti 
P 
4- 
L- 
0 
GJ 
7 
N 
-Cpl 
l0 
l0 
t0 
"L 
O N CO 0 CO %0 O Co Co f` 
to 
_ Nit vii %O 
`-P Ö 
O. LA 
N M 
N 
N 1- MN N S '0 %0 
P 
LA M 
O 
00 
Q 
(> C: ) LA r4 CM P- em (D 
O 1LAM 
Ö'7M%0 
P 
- 
M 
Co LA 
N LA LA 
Ö 
' LA ýt 
P r '0 O ONM V1 M 
ýt NM 
D 
%4 NN 
ti ý P LA 
NNN P O 
2 
N 
l/1 M 
N NLA 
V1 ý 
f- ONP 
CD 10 Nt ýO ýt 
M Lr% CO 
VN ý 
Ö i fý Co e M Co(> 
N Nr 
P 
. - 
v i 
P P- 
Lr% 
N M V1 M 
ý! M 
º/1 V1 r' 
f ý 
M v1 t- 
es 
ý O N 
CO P M p . 
Öti N 
CM 
O M mit 
NO 
N 
M P %0 M 
- r 
p ýt M 
I- 
Ln 2P (D (> cy 
CM 
- (Z) cm 10 -t 
00 NN 
%0CD 
PLnPLr% LA 
O 
O 
O 
CO 
'1 -! 
ýn 
f 
a0 
ý 
r- N 00 O N fý Co 
P M N 
ti MP -V1Npp 2 Co It r4 . - 0 M 
ý! 
3 NM 
`OM 
C (, i, 
LA 3NN ýt fý %0 
O 
2 
M 
2 
If1 N Ä 
M vi 
Co 
LA 2 %0 (3 Off. t000 
2 0 0 
ý 'Y ýO 0p 4 u1 N to M V1 N M 1n Io- M V1 
Nr 
N- f- -! N 0% 
M N 
PO N Lr% 
gy 
O I- VN 2 
M Mý1CM ý . p 
M tý 
ti 
M 
Ln Pý p NM Ln 1! % Q iý r 
O 
_ 
ýt 
N 0 p ÖM 
(> 
N Co i Lr% M (> 't 
(` r r 1! ý ý1 N V1 
N 
M IMP [ý 10 ýt l- 
LA P- (D n 
CO N u'º ýt 
MN st ti N M 
Ö 
Co 
N OMO \! 
LA CD Co LA N N 
fý 
0 
yý ýt fý O 1` 
0 0 
NN 
O Mc: 
> mi 
- 
c> 
ä 
Ö 
ä 
Ö M 
M 
P 
ýO Ln M N Co N 
N N 
Co 
Ö 
mi 
M %0 ÜMS 
p Co O !2 
CO 
r 
M O 
P to t 10 
ý ý N N 
r- , 1` V1 P Co Co ý7 N e-- .3 O 00 
P 
"' M 
N 
ýp O -t OO 
ýO NMON 
M O -t 
ýt 
r 
P 
M 
M 
M 
M 
ý-- 
M 
N 
N 
+ý L 
d 0 
" 
Co 
C ql 
0 -p 4-4) 3 O " " C) L -p 00 (0 L. C 0 . Ü 
C O " ý' 
C GJ 3 
O 
8 4) 
C 
i G 
1 
7 
, 
- 
a) - 4 
0 
2 s 0 
W GJ C) O 41 ZU C) .l "- 
a 
d 
W 
U " K» aö \L w- -Vu 0 O LC " +ý \ "ý "- vl a+ 0) O - -. O E O C C L 0 
+C + u LX C3 E .a" 
C 
a + + 4 4. ' ý" c0 ""- L qý O mf dL 7L 0 N 0 0 = 3x "-" EU<'-U N7 U Q. F- t-. 
433 
U) 
v 
4J 
ai 
rn C 
C 
C 
ýo 
CL 
0 
"L 
41 
% vý 
C_ C 
1 
ä aß 
r 
a. + 0 
aý 
ý. L 
L /p 
41 
NN 
"- G! 
CL 
Z 01 
w 
(U o 
u Co 
L 0% 
0 
N# 
Table A. 7 : Evolution of petroleum revenues 
compared to total revenues 
(Billions of AD) 
Years Total Petroleum Petroleum revenues 
revenues revenues as % of total 
revenues 
1967 4.025 0.88 21.8 
1968 4.567 1.134 24.8 
1969 5.689 1.32 23.2 
1970 6.306 1.35 21.4 
1971 6.919 1.648 23.8 
1972 6.178 3.278 53.05 
1973 11.067 4.114 37.17 
1974 23.438 13.399 57.16 
1975 25.093 13.462 53.6 
1976 26.215 14.237 54.3 
1977 33.479 18.019 53.8 
1978 36.782 17.365 47.2 
Sources: Several Annuaires Statistiques de L'Algerie (1970, 
1974,1976 and 1979), op cit.; La Synthese du Bilan Economique 
et Social de la Decennie 1967-78, op cit. and 1982 
Internationnal Financial Statistics Yearbook, U. N. 
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APPENDIX B. 1.: Algerian private firms in 1962 
The different private firms that existed in 1962 in the 
iron and steel, metal, mechanical and electrical industries 
were : Acilor -producing steel and coils; ENCN -boiler work 
and tubes; UMA -agricultural materials; Renault and Berlier - 
assembly of cars; Durafour -metallic frames; SNLTF -railway 
materials; Altemel, Cablaf and Philips -electrical and 
transformation of aluminum... (1). In the chemical and paper 
industries, the colonial inheritance was quite large 
consisting of: Veuve Cote, Duco, Astral, Freitag, Ripolin, 
Willemer, Fepe, Norcolor, Unilever & Detersal (2) producing 
detergent, glass, mirrors, paints, varnish and household 
cleaning products. There was also a plant producing 
fertiliser and plants producing paper bags, pulp and writing 
and printing paper. Algeria also inherited two oil pipelines: 
the Haoud-El-Hamra Bejaia and the In-Amenas-La Skhirra 
pipeline (Tunisia). Some of the plants were still under 
construction at independence. These were, for instance, the 
steel making plant of El-Hadjar and CAMEL LNG plant (part of 
the Constantine plan). 
References 
1 See Benachenou, A.: Planification et Developpement en 
Algerie 1962-80 (Press de 1'EN Imprimerie Commercial, 
Algiers, 1980) p 15. 
2 Refer to Schnetzler, J.: Le developpement Algerien, op cit. 
pp 121. & 122 for more details. 
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APPENDIX B. 2: The restructuring of 
Algerian u 
related to hydrocarbons 
1) Public enterprise of refinement and distribution 
2) Public enterprise of plastic and rubber 
3) Public enterprise of petroleum works 
4) Public enterprise of civil engineering 
5) Public enterprise of geophysics 
6) Public enterprise of LNG 
7) Public enterprise of engineering 
8) Public enterprise of petrochemicals and fertilisers 
9) Public enterprise of maintenance 
10)Public enterprise of pipelines 
11)Public enterprise of well works 
12)Public enterprise of well services 
13)Public enterprise of drilling. 
enterprises 
The public industrial enterprises are planned to be 
restructured into a certain number of public enterprises as 
follows: 
SONATRACH : 13 new public enterprises which will nlI hA 
SNMETAL :4 new public enterprises which will all be related 
to metallurgy 
1) Public enterprise 
2) Public enterprise 
3) Public enterprise 
4) Public enterprise 
SNS :9 
industrial 
of capital goods 
of railway materials 
of metallic construction 
of smelting products. 
1) Public enterprise of 
2) Public enterprise of 
3) Public enterprise of 
4) Public enterprise of 
5) Public enterprise of 
6) Public enterprise of 
7) Public enterprise of 
8) Local study bureaus 
9) Public enterprise of 
flat products. 
SONACOME : 11 
1) Public 
2) Public 
3) Public 
4) Public 
equipm 
5) Public 
6) Public 
7) Public 
8) Public 
9) Public 
10)Public 
11) Public 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
ent 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
metallic containers 
industrial gas 
promotion of steel products 
salvage products (3) 
transformation of long products 
iron and steel 
local works (4) 
(3) 
transformation of tubes and 
of hydraulic equipment 
of machine tools 
of nut, bolt & screw and cutlery 
of distribution of industria? 
of cars, cycles 
of public works 
of engineering 
of industrial v, 
of agricultural 
of distribution 
of building and 
& motorcycles 
materials 
ehicles 
machines 
of cars 
construction. 
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OUNAREM :2 
1) Public enterprise of mine exploration 
2) Public enterprise of development and exploitation. 
SONELEC 
SNERI : 
8 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
of telecommunications 
of electrical appliances. 
5 
1) Public enterprise of engineering (EDIL) 
2) Public enterprise of technical setting up 
3) Three public enterprises of building and 
construction. 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
produc, 
Public 
Public 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
is 
enterprise 
enterprise 
of cables 
of electrotechniques 
of electrochemicals 
of electronics 
of lift services 
of distribution of electrical 
SNIC :4 
SNLB :4 
SNMC :4 
1) Public enterprise 
2) Public enterprise 
cleaning products 
3) Public enterprise 
4) Public enterprise 
1) Public enterprise 
2) Public enterprise 
furniture 
3) Public enterprise 
construction 
4) Public enterprise 
1) Public enterprise 
2) Public enterprise 
3) Public enterprise 
4) Public enterprise 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
paints 
detergent and household 
glass and abrasives 
earthenware. 
cork 
wood transformation and 
carpentry and unit 
hardware. 
red brick and tile 
hydraulic binder material 
ceramics 
distribution. 
SNSEMPAC :5 
Five regional public grain processing enterprises. 
SONIPEC :3 
1) Public enterprise of first stage processing goods 
2) Public enterprise of manufactured goods 
3) Public enterprise of distribution. 
SONITEX :6 
1) Public 
2) Public 
3) Public 
4) Public 
5) Public 
6) Public 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
enterprise 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
cotton 
wool 
industrial textiles 
silk 
ready-to-wear 
distribution. 
Source: Comite National pour la Restructuration des 
Entreprises: Location des Sieges des Nouvelles 
Entreprises (MPAT, Algiers, March 1982). 
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APPENDIX C. 1: DIFFERENT FORMS OF 
CONTRACTS IN ALGERIA 
Due to the lack of skilled labour and, more importantly, 
the shortage of Algerian entrepreneurship, the only option 
open to Algeria with regard to the construction of the various 
projects which were part of its ambitious industrial develop- 
ment plans, was reliance on foreign contractors. The various 
contractual forms used for plant construction were the decom- 
posed, turnkey, product-in-hand (or run-in) and cost-plus-fee 
contracts. The most commonly used form is the turnkey 
contract; currently, however, the product-in-hand form has 
become more popular. The different forms of contract are 
described below. 
1. The decomposed contract 
In this type of contract, a line is drawn between the 
supply of equipment and the supply of services. As indicated 
in Figure C. 1.1, the project is divided into different subcon- 
tracts with distinct suppliers and is characterised'by the 
individualisation of the different phases. Thus, the realisa- 
tion of each phase, from engineering, equipment supply, the 
setting up of installations, technical assistance and the 
training of personnel or sometimes a combination of several 
subcontracts, is given to a distinct supplier. The realisa- 
tion of the project, the setting up of production lines and 
the coordination of the whole operation are the responsibility 
of the public enterprise. An example of this type of contract 
is the vast iron and steel industrial complex of El-Hadjar 
(SNS). This type of contract seems to be favoured by foreign 
contractors who are not required to provide numerous 
guarantees. Experience 
is crucial to effectively realise this 
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L. ype or contract. The different advantages of this form of 
contract are control of the situation by the public enter- 
prise, the experience gained by the Algerian managers and the 
saving realised by the public enterprise. In addition, the 
public enterprise has a choice between the different offers. 
The disadvantages, on the other hand, include the risks of 
malpractice and overlapping of responsibilities. The reasons 
for the relative failure of this type of contract are the lack 
of skilled labour in Algeria and the inexperience of the 
public enterprise in these matters (1). In addition, the 
nature of this contract can lead to various inefficiencies 
which have, direct consequences on plant performance. This 
type of contract is expected to become more common in the 
future when an industrial base will be well established. 
2. The Turnkey contract 
The relative failure of the decomposed contract (as in the 
El-Hadjar complex (2)) led the Algerian authorities to adopt 
the turnkey contract -one which is used to establish a plant 
in a green field site. It is a combination of the complemen- 
tary projects which are used in underdeveloped and developed 
countries. In this sort of contract, the contractor agrees to 
build a plant for a predetermined price over a given time 
period. The turnkey contract does not isolate the supply of 
services from that of equipment. It foresees the reproduction 
of a plant as it exists and functions abroad. As illustrated 
in Figure C. 1.1, engineering studies, which include design 
engineering, are under the entire responsibility of one 
contractor. The contractor is, in addition, held responsible 
for supervising the setting up of the building site, civil 
engineering of the various construction phases, and the 
purchase and supply of materials. The contractor 
is also in 
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charge of the choice of equipment, the testing of the plant, 
the initiation of production and the supply of licenses, 
patents and manufacturing processes of the plant. The public 
enterprise becomes responsible for the plant only after a team 
of experts, consisting of members on both the contracting and 
public enterprise sides, has decided and agreed that plant 
construction is completed. The point of this type of contract 
is to alleviate any constraints on the public enterprise (lack 
of skilled labour) by placing responsibility for all construc- 
tion operations on the contractor. A turnkey contract is 
designed to easily and rapidly pinpoint the responsibilities 
on the part of the supplier and to determine deviations from 
the contractual specifications for which the contractor can be 
held responsible (3). 
The major advantage of a turnkey contrat is that a plant 
is built, an essential step in the process of laying an indus- 
trial bases in an underdeveloped country such as Algeria, 
without mastering the techniques of design, implementation, 
control and coordination. In addition, the whole operation is 
more cohesive since there is only one foreign partner, shorte- 
ping, to a certain extent, delays in delivery. The main 
drawbacks of-this type of contract, besides its expense, are 
an absence of guarantees covering normal operation of the 
plant and, more importantly, a lack of public enterprise 
participation. This situation can be somewhat prejudicial 
since the contractor, who is only concerned with delivery time 
and not the quality and quantity of outputs produced, 
decides 
on the cost, the choice of technology and the production 
processes to be adopted. In addition, not only does the 
public enterprise lose much needed industrial experience, but 
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it is left with the entire responsibility for training the 
labour force. The numerous cases of misuse and abuse, 
resulting from the total lack of control by the public 
enterprise, led to the development of a new form of contract 
which follows. 
3. The product-in-hand contract 
The availability of financing and the shortage of compe- 
tent personnel and technicians in the field of industrial 
engineering have prompted Algerian planners, who were not 
satisfied with turnkey contract, to choose another method of 
industrial transfer. This has resulted in the launching of a 
new form of contract called product-in-hand. 
The contractor is committed under this contract to deliver 
a plant in working order with price and plant specifications 
fixed at the time the contract is signed. The product-in-hand 
contract, as indicated in Figure C. 1.1, unlike the turnkey 
contract, requires a deep commitment from the foreign partner 
(4). This commitment is not limited to a certain period but 
is spread out over a long period of time. It is an equipment 
and service contract where high managerial skills and services 
are required. The contractor is required to deliver a turnkey 
plant with the additional stipulation that the training of 
Algerian personnel in Algeria and abroad is guaranteed. In 
addition, the contractor would provide the necessary technical 
assistance for the proper functioning of the plant and the 
initial management until production reaches its planned level 
(in terms of ý. ý` ý quantity and quality) . By the time the 
plant is built, all the records and licenses of manufacturing, 
know-how anc show-how should be communicated to the public 
enterprise. Theoretically, this formula is ideal; despite the 
appreciable practical advantages, however, it presents some 
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disadvantages as well (5). 
The advantages of such a contract are obvious. Continuity 
between the implementation and initial production stages and 
the final results (quality and quantity of outputs) is guaran- 
teed by the contractor. In addition, the product-in-hand 
contract specifies in great detail the penalties in case of 
delays in delivery or malfunctioning of the plant. Another 
advantage is the financial participation of the international 
firms in the construction of the plant (6). It is still 
premature to fully appreciate the product-in-hand contract, 
but it seems to be adapted to the Algerian case. On the other 
hand, it is possible to outline some disadvantages related to 
contract cost which are common to both the product-in-hand and 
turnkey contracts. They are the result of the lack of 
participation by the public enterprise's managers during the 
design and implementation phases. It is also the case that, 
despite the preventive measures taken-in the devalopmen} of 
this type of contract, some abuses and misuses have also been 
encountered. 
4. Cost-plus-fee contract 
In the cost-plus-fee contract, used mainly in the hydroca- 
rbon industries, the contractor guarantees implementation of 
the plant according to a predetermined date ordered by the 
public enterprise in return for payment of the real cost of 
the project and its fees. Since the contractor is not submit- 
ted to any pressure as a result of additional urrianned 
financial cost, there is hardly any conflict of interest 
between the two partners. This situation has all the necessa- 
ry conditions for normal realisation of a project. It 
is not 
in the interest of the contractor to minimise losses and to 
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supply equipment and materials of bad quality. In most cases 
the fee, which includes contractor profit, is a fixed part of 
the total cost of the project, although sometimes the fee is a 
percentage of the cost. Among the numerous advantages presen- 
ted by this form of contract is the precise evaluation of the 
potential financial risks at the beginning of the project. 
Such an evaluation, however, requires a complete set of 
engineering studies, which may delay initiation of the 
project, but the advantage of such a procedure outweighs this 
inconvenience. Regarding equipment selection, the contractor 
inquires as to its availability among the various suppliers 
and recommends the type best suited for the plant accordingly. 
The final decision, however, rests with the public enterprise. 
This process allows more active participation of the public 
enterprise which leads to a more appropriate transfer of 
technology. Higher public enterprises participation may be 
regarded as disadvantageous because of the shortage of skilled 
workers, but it can be argued that the experience gained 
outweighs this problem. 
In conclusion, Table C. l. l indicates the number of 
contracts signed during the different plans and their 
evolution. The number of contracts signed increased sharply 
during the two successive four-year development plans. The 
number of decomposed contracts decreased relative to the 
increase in the number of turnkey and product-in-hand 
contracts. In addition, a slight increase in the number of 
cost-plus-fee contracts can be noticed. The Algerian 
government's change of attitude can only be explained by the 
experience gained as a result of the problems encountered in 
adopting one form of contract or another. 
Irrespective of the form a contract takes, each has its 
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advantages and disadvantages. The main differences are in the 
training of personnel, the responsibilities of the contractor 
and the cost. The fact that a plant is built under a 
decomposed, turnkey, product-in-hand or cost-plus-fee contract 
has different consequences on the functioning of a plant, its 
number of skilled workers and eventually, on its performance. 
The outcomes of adopting each of the various contractual forms 
are detailed in Chapters Four through Ten. 
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APPENDIX C. 2: THE BANKING SYSTEM IN ALGERIA 
Financing policies of public investments are based on the 
present banking system and credit policies. In contrast to 
the Soviet union where a single central bank controls the 
banking system, Algeria's present banking system is based on 
the existence of various banking organisations which have 
specialised functions as described below. 
1-The Algerian Treasury was established in 1963 and 
assumes the function of gathering the revenues obtained from 
regular and exceptional taxes, such as the oil and gas tax. 
Treasury resources come mainly from petroleum taxes, treasury 
bonds, deposits from the postal checking system (local gover- 
nment and private individuals) and external borrowings. These 
resources are used not only to finance the recurrent budget 
but also the capital budget. 
2-The Central Bank of Algeria (BCA) was founded in early 
1963 (the same year as the Treasury). This organisation, 
which assumes the function of issuing money, is required to 
formulate overall monetary and credit policies according to 
the economic and financial guidelines advocated by the gover- 
nment (1). It also guards the national and currency reserves. 
In addition to working as an issuing bank, the BCA acts as a 
banker and financial agency for the government and as a banker 
for the depository institutions. As a result of these activi- 
ties, the BCA has the power to use various monetary policy 
instruments such as open market operations, liquidity ratios 
and discount ceilings. The bank, however, makes little use of 
these instruments, with the exception of discount ceilings. 
3- The Algerian Development Bank (BAD) was also created in 
1963 and was initially called the Algerian Development Fund. 
Its role was originally to administer and control government 
expenditures and supervise the execution of projects financed 
by foreign credit. Since 1971, its role has been extended to 
the management of long term loans granted by the Treasury to 
public enterprises and the mobilisation of foreign loans 
through direct long term borrowing and floating loans on the 
international financial market. The BAD does not manage the 
capital budget which is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance. The BAD finances investments in all sectors of the 
economy except in the agricultural and housing construction 
sectors. Its activities allow it. to finance projects in the 
private sector as well. 
4-The Commercial Banks (the Algerian Foreign Bank (BEA), 
the Algerian National Bank (BNA) and the Algerian Popular Bank 
(CPA)) are in charge of financing medium term loans. These 
banks are allowed to automatically discount their credit at 
the BCA when they have insufficient resources. Prior 
agreement with the BAD, however, is necessary to utilise this 
service. The activities of the Primary Banks are, in fact,. 
subject to strict control before they reach such a point. The 
BNA, the BEA and the CPA are all state-owned depository insti- 
tutions which handle all external financial transactions and 
conduct all banking activities in conjunction with the postal 
checking system. The National Bank of Algeria (BNA) is in 
charge of the industrial and trade sectors and has a monopoly 
on banking services for the socialist farm sector. It 
supervises the allocation of credit to the industrial, trade 
and socialist farm sectors as well as controls their financial 
flows in accordance with their expenditure programmes (2). 
The role of the Algerian Popular Bank (CPA) is to promote and 
develop the industrial, craft,. tourism and fishery sectors. 
This bank only deals with small and medium size firms (3). 
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The Algerian Foreign Bank (BEA) is essentially involved in 
foreign transactions. The commercial banks have expanded 
rapidly since 1971 and make a considerable contribution to 
economic development. 
5-Other financial institutions, such as the Credit 
Council, Technical Committee of Banking Institutions, 
Insurance Council, Postal Checking System, National Saving 
Funds and Insurance Companies also play an important role in 
the Algerian banking system. The most important are the 
Credit Council and the Technical Committee. The Credit 
Council is in charge of the examination and advice on all 
matters related to monetary and credit policies. It studies 
the volume and cost of credit in the framework of the develop- 
ment programmes and identifies ways of mobilising and 
centralising financial resources. The Technical Committee is 
in charge of studying problems related to the banking system 
as well as coordinating financial activities, such as the 
extension of credit. In addition, it proposes measures for 
more efficient execution of public enterprise production and 
investment objectives and promotes the standards of banking 
practices. 
The Algerian banking system is mainly oriented towards the 
financing of public investments made by the government and the 
public enterprises. Moreover, its role is to manage Treasury 
lending and credits from the BAD, whose resources originate 
from Treasury credits and international financial markets. It 
also exerts financial control on the current operations of 
public enterprises, investment financing and foreign transactio 
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APPENDIX D_ SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name of the public enterprise: 
Address of plant visited: 
Date: 
Respondent(s) name(s) and title(s): 
1. Plant characteristics 
1.1 Product(s): % of sale abroad: 
1.2 of If 
1.3 of if 
1.2 Process of production : Is it one two or n stages of 
production ? Quick explanation of the process of production. 
(Visit of the plant). 
Is it a capital intensive or labor intensive technology ? 
1.3 When was the plant built ? Last major expansion ? 
1.4 Suppliers of the technology ? 
Country of origin ? Who choose the contractor ? 
How long did it take to build the plant ? 
any delays ? 
Cost: how much was it estimated to cost? How much did it cost? 
Type of contract: Turnkey ? Product-in-hand ? Decomposed ? 
Cost-plus-fee ? 
Did it include training ? 
Did the contract enclose any clause to sanction the contractor 
in case of delays ? 
1.5 Size of the plant ? 
2. Labour force 
Number of workers ? 
Rate of absenteeism ? 
Any overstaffing ? 
What are the qualifications of the labour force ? 
Is there any lack of skilled labour force ? 
If yes, in which functions: management, engineers, 
technicians...? 
What is the turnover of the labour force ? 
What is the productivity ratio ? 
3. The level of utilisation of fixed capital 
3.1 What is the planned capacity output by products ? 
3.2 What is the actual output ? 
3.3 What is the technical or contractor capacity by output ? 
3.4 Number of shifts by output ? 
3.5 Technical number of shifts ? 
3.6 Does the plant work on Thursdays and Fridays ? 
How many hours a day ?a week ? 
3.7 Excess capacity 
At what percentage did the plant or line of production operate 
last year (%) ? 
Was the actual operation last year different from the planned 
level ? 
Why ? list reasons given for each output. Give % if possible? 
3.8 Does the plant encounter any particular problems ? 
4. Inputs 
4.1 Raw materials and intermediate inputs: 
origin of the inputs ? 
Within the public enterprise, local and international markets? 
Lrr 
Are there enough inputs ? 
Are the inputs imported ? 
If yes, which one(s) ? percent of the total ? 
Is there any stock management of inputs ? scientific? 
4.2 Spare parts 
Explanation of the process of AGI ? 
Are there delays in allocation of the 
Do you bargain ? or obtain what you 
Who allocates spare parts ? 
Management of stock is based on what 
Are there delays ? Why ? 
Shortages ? Why ? 
How many suppliers ? 
Is there a loss of references ? 
At what. underutilisation of capacity 
shortage of spare parts ? 
AGI ? 
have requested ? 
2 
ratio do you estimate the 
At what underutilisation of production capacity ratio do you 
estimate the shortage of imports ? 
5. Sales revenue 
What was the sales revenue for last year ? 
What were the financial charges as a percentage of the sales 
revenue ? 
The intermediate inputs as a percent of the sales revenue ? 
Do you calculate production costs ? 
Variable and fixed charges ? 
Do you calculate the break even point ? 
Estimation for last year ? 
Did the plant make a profit or a loss last year ? 
How much as a percent of the sales revenue ? 
Was there a distribution of profit to the workers last year ? 
6. Do you know the internal demand for the outputs produced by 
the plant in Algeria? 
Is production sufficient to satisfy 
Do you export ? Are you planning or 
What is the proportion of exports to 
Did you encounter any international 
local demand ? 
did you plan to export ? 
the total production ? 
competition ? 
7. Commercialisation: trade mechanism 
National ? 
International ? 
8. Transport 
Does the plant have its own park ? or public enterprise ? 
Does the plant use SNTR facilities ? In what proportion ? 
Are there delays in deliveries due to lack of means of 
transport ? of inputs, imported inputs, spare parts....? 
9. Customs 
What are the customs regulations ? 
Are they difficult to implement and/or 
Are they too cumbersome because they are too long ? 
lO. Quality of the outputs 
Is the quality of the inputs and outputs up to standard ? 
Is there a quality control system ? 
11. Maintenance 
Is there a sufficient number of staff ? of tools ? 
Is there a sufficient number of spare parts ? 
Do you service the machines regularly or only when they break 
down ? 
12. Planning 
Does the plant have targets of production to meet ? 
Are they obligatory or indicative targets ? 
Who set them ? 
If the targets are not met, what are the consequences ? 
Does the plan contain output targets ? 
cost of production targets ? Labor productivity indices ? 
are the resources lacking to meet the targets ? 
13. Control 
Who controls what and whom ? 
What is controlled by the head office and ministries ? 
14. Financial autonomy 
Does the plant have financial autonomy ? 
15. Decision making process 
Is there overcentralisation of decision making ? 
What is the extent of the authority of the plant managers 
What are the responsibility of the management staff ? 
Who makes the decisions concerning everyday management ? 
Who makes the decisions concerning long term management ? 
16. Communication 
Do you think that there is an efficient or extensive 
communication system ? 
17. Price 
Are prices fixed ? 
If prices are fixed, who fixed them ? 
On what criteria ? 
Is the price equal to the production cost ? 
Does the plant receive any subsidies ? 
18. Salary: Incentives, bonus 
What is the salary basis ? 
What are the indemnities, premiums....? What is their 
percentage compared to basic wages ? 
Are the workers satisfied with the present system ? 
? 
Is there a bonus system ? 
Who decides about the wage system ? 
Is there a standardized wage system for all public enterprises? 
19. Organisational structure 
Is there a clear chart ? 
Is there a description of job, of position, of responsibility 
and of procedures.... etc. ? 
Is it difficult to coordinate workers ? 
Is it difficult to control workers ? 
20. Relations with the banks 
What are the relations with the bank 
Does the plant have problems with the 
Is the working capital financed with 
term credit ? 
S 
working capital ? 
short, medium or long 
Does the plant receive credit easily ? 
On what basis is the credit allocated ? 
What are the different rates of interest ? 
ci 
Is credit accepted on the order of the Ministry of Finance ? 
How are investments financed ? The State ? 
The public enterprise itself ? Foreign investment ? 
If different, which one and in what proportions ? 
21. Relations with the head office 
What are the relations of the plant with the head office ? 
Cooperation ? orders ? Participation ? etc. 
22. Relations with the supervisory ministry 
What are the relations of the plant with the supervisory 
ministry ? 
Head office of public enterprise 
1. General information 
1.1 Number of plants ? 
1.2 Number of distributions centres ? 
1.3 Number of maintenance units ? 
1.4 Number of public works owned by the public enterprise ? 
1.5 Number of mixed plants, if any ? 
1.6 Number of projects under construction and planned ? 
2. Proj ect level 
Who chose the contractor ? 
On what criteria ? 
Description of the investment policy ? 
3. Do all the plants produce the same outputs ? 
Do they encounter problems ? 
Do they have similar problems ? 
Can you describe them briefly ? 
4. What are the problems encountered by the head office ? 
5. At what level are decisions concerning the plants taken ? 
Plant head office, ministry, etc. 
Who takes the final decision ? 
6. How many persons are working in the head office ? 
7. What are the functions of the head office ? 
Supervisory ministry level 
l. Organisation of the ministry ? 
2. What are the objectives and tasks of the ministry ? 
3. What are the different departments of the ministry ? 
4. How many persons work in the ministry ? 
5. In which matters does the ministry take decisions concerning 
the plant and public enterprise ? Long, medium, short term ? 
1. Co 
Ministry of Planning 
At the Ministry of Planning, first are the five questions 
described above and then the questions specific to the MPAT: 
1. Who chose the project and on what basis ? 
2. Who chose the location and on what basis ? 
3. Does planning encourage large, medium or small scale ? 
4. What are the methods of planning ? 
5. Is planning indicative or authoritarian ? 
6. Who decides which sector to develop ? 
7. Who decides which output to produce ? 
B. Does the MPAT impose targets for the existing public 
enterprises to reach concerning their production, their 
outputs, their inputs ? 
9. Does the role of planning stop when the 
production ? 
lO. Who decides on the level of integration 
11. Who decides on the technology to import 
plant enters 
? 
? 
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Table E. 2: Origin of the technology and type of 
contract signed in SONIC 
SONIC Plants Origin of the Type of Delay in 
technology contract implementation 
Mostaganem pulp &) 
paper complex )Great Britain Decomposed 2 years 
-Electrolyse 
workshop )Italy Turnkey 0190 
Baba Ali pulp &) 
paper plant )France Nationalised 
Saida wrapping &) 
packaging paper & )France & 
board plant )Great britain Decomposed 9 months 
Ain El Hadjar kraft) 
paper plant )France Nationalised - 
El Arba kraft paper) 
plant )France Nationalised 
El Harrach wrapping) 
& packaging plant )France Nationalised - 
-Extention of 
El-Harrach plant )Great Britain Decomposed 2 years 
Souk Ahras househ. 
& sanitary paper ) 
plant )Great Britain Decomposed 2 years 
Bouarrerridj 
packaging board ) 
plant )Italy Turnkey .... 
Oran grocery ) 
bag plant )France Nationalised 
Oued Smar sack ) 
kraft paper plant )France Nationalised 
Recovery plant France Nationalised - 
Source: Survey data. 
462 
APPENDIX F 
ö 
Co 
C 
äi 
C 
C 0 N 
<0 
C 
0 
l0 
N 
. Z; 
4J 
OL 
U 
CJ 
L 
L 
N 
O 
N 
a-+ 
C 
W 
a 
U 
f 
2 
N 
r 
d! 
J 
c0 
rn c 
4-w o r- 
to a, a" 
l9 L 
oc a, 
0 
Co ý LA 03 2N e 
4-f 7 O'O Cp ýnI- M 
" ý 'O MCO'Oýn F-IALAM C 
3 c0 ýT 
-. C 
0 (9 C -" in OOOOMNOO 
CO - OOOLA -0In, 0 0-1 Ln M'OIA-t'OM -tM oft 
LU M 
N 0! 
a f- 
O OOOOOOOO 
MO000 Co 000 Co 
C rC C-e-ý--e-C-1 
MC! 0 
(2 (zczcz IN ti%0rr- oCo Co 
O 
C 
0 
N 
D 
7 
41 
NV 
7 ý0 
O 
t 
OC 
C 
LJ 
C 
O 
L 
IO Q 
aý 
0 
ti 11 c 
a 
doN %0 %0 ooM 
rY Ný; lOONO"O: u1 
A MMMMNCOý 
MOOOO Cl OO 
.M 
M NO-t-N'-f'' 119 ý Lr% M -tNNOPI -* M UNLnLAONO -tLIt -t -t Cl C) -T 
CO M[VLAýOIA1- M U, U, 0. IA U4U40600 IAIAO IAN '- LAF IAt-0 t -1Oý 
tF- IA - - NN (V - nI-NMNMM In NIAIA - . OU, W MIA-t%t0M'ON -t M 
BOO'M'- ý r - IA M -tfn w Cl 
f r r 
U- 
O 00000000 O Nu1U- OHO 1! 1 ,a- F- c> ei P- %r LAS taa -r -. t -t -taa as 
O t! 101! 100000 1` NCO LAU CO NONLA MU- " en U- r1- tCD tit -! mot-! _OOOf- 
N M CD%0P- - -t U-U- In r- U-r 
ir 
O00000000NN V% LA NOO Co OMO ýt c) NO Co I` ýt CO t c> ýt ýt ttt c> OOO 
O 'O-tCh CD 0O00 N NCOenu% O. %O NIAýty-(Mr4 týýt(D ttt %t-t'0000 
M ýtýt0CD 0CD 01A LA r4 r- Co 
QprrNrr 
sti oMý, n " fý ti a+ 1` 1ý fý Iý fý Iý fý fý fý fý PPPýýtititi a+ ý+a+ CO a+ v a+sý v a+ a+ý+ aý N ýýý ýýýýý~ 
PP e0 ý0 ý0 i0 19 ý0 Co (o Co PP (0 PPPPPPPPPP "\ P \P PP 
ýý 
rl') rý rrrZZZ 31 ZZZZZZZZZýýZýýýýýýlý ""' l> 
CO 10 M IU 
ZPiP P 
L -C 
L G) L U N 
ý+ N ++ Q1 v CL L 
to L 
U) 
a- ý to 
>. 
CU 
U fý 
Co te 
L 
" 
OO 'ý 
cc0 `\' ý 
:2 s (J 
ä 
d D) 
ýl 
¢ O. 
T-. 
OI 
Ü 
7 
0) 
a , "C 
.CY 
o E 
CQW NNC 
0) 
Y 
E 
Y cG L ý0 /0 "W 
T 
C7 N N .cU (L) a+ 
L 
<0 
Y (L) 
CE ++ 3 0) 
0 
-C 
1+ x N tCN W Q1 -ý l0 7 7 Co L Y G! W C CW 0 A) N """ _ 
dJ l0 "7LL- W 
C CO t0 NNN :ýE " <0 L L. 41 0. OL l0 C. C L. t /0 W L. 
O -Y O0ML (9 
O 
E 
N /0 v) ++ W 
" 
N "ý 
iiL 
d7 4-J 7 m +" N 
L 
CLO CO NN 
- c» :0 r4 - 
CYYYN "ý a+ v- 
4-0 
NC 
L JJ 
d J (5 (p OO (5 "ý ", .C t Qý 7 O t0 
O Gl O" e0 -ý -Y Co /0 a! OO Sm Co OC 
GJ to 
Z ca 
u ix N ZWQ Co Co d oif C 12 t7 U. Lß- OC E W Cy H F- C) J Co i Co WWNm 
ýt 1ýºIýýt ýOOOMCD 00CD CD Co 1`«a00N-- Out 
cmN Ott- ýO OO«OOLnLt. % -r-%p-OLM r4't%0 M 00> 000 
""' MMrr N- '- rr Qý rrrt Ln CM 
.... ._.. 
O r[+1 CO F- f- %0 %0 NCMf- NOsO N- . tLA(b sOsOs0N-Ostý-- tn %0 Ln NCO 10` P- 
rNLA 
i- ýLACO 1t ý(PM t1- -YCU (> 0 Ct01 
nýnn 
0U1N ON- - 0N-0 e N- Opp O (D v%CD 1AOCM 00000 
N so Ldl% O X01/1 NO -tLrLA: - "A OOPM O U) -N -lM M M%t0%c>(> 
rte. - - LA 1n NUNU U-U- U- r4 r4 
NNNN .f -* ýl 3 ýt ý1 ýt -t ýt -4 -4 
IA OOOO sO sO O 00 OOOOOOOONNONNNNNNNNNN 
00 OOOON NO sO OOOCD OOOCD U1M101A1f1 LA 1! 1 Lr%1f11! lt Ln LA V% 
%0 OO *t OOO Co -t OOO in %0 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
........ O... .t....... NOOOOO ýp r'; sOONOOOMOO r- 00000000 Os OOU)0000U) OP O% OD Os Os0U- DOU)DOOs000000Of- 
e- "-- a-- U- U- U- Ur r- Ur U- e- .- e- r- U- . -- ý 
It. 000.0 000MOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
................... 
ti 
** OOOONLAO N- N- LAN(>CO(b %0M N; 
0 %0 CM 
ulý o 
463 
c 
c 0 U 
v 
r 
4J 
f0 
H 
rn c 
4-4- 04- m 
.J 
U) 
(0 L 
oc a, 
0 
m 
CU 
7N 
-C 
N c9 
C -' CQ 
O\ 
fq L 
LU 
d d! 
a 1-- 
M 
M 
N 
0 
a. ý 
Co 
O 0 
1 Co 
4.1 
C 
O-8 
+-' c 
vc 
öä 
Co 
u 
c 
V 
d 
I- 
ý o c "- d ." V 
w o. g 
LL 
Bo a a, 
aý 
a+ c 
to 
CL 
O0 co OOO O Cl OO IA O CD .r N N00000000 M O .0 
Mý -.. N 0; 
; 
O O ; O; M M NO (4 06 rý: t0 O Oý ; CO O -ý 
, 
fý 
, 
N ý .-N , " C*j r- 1A N N 
ti `L . 0u NO .p NN O N Cm a-- %0 co F- O 0. ONMMý('JNPs0.0 M CO NO .- NOONO P ýONN rcoýo cm I'-- -(%j U) NOOCOLn-0.0.0. r-r co N NN r f. - NNN IA 
r 
.t 1A IA .t mau. 
U- 
N 
00000. p 000 
ON 0'. 0.000000'. 0 
O co 
IA'0 AA 
N 
O 
aLn -LAM U) U) 00 03. *0 N O IA 
rrr 
I '. OMN Iý " 0U)IAe- -(J - . U- IAº lV .t rr rrý ' Na- N N 
U 
-t '1'-* M 
U 
M U-U-e-U-U-U -* N 
r 
-t It -t ýt -t 't *t 
M 
NNNNNNN 
M 
NNNNN N... N NNN N NNN co OO. OO'O'O'OO'o'o 
ýp 
'0 
00000000 
00000000 Lf%U%inIAIAIA If% 1A IA 1n IA IA 1n U1 -t OONONNNNN(J rrrUU- -w-ý 
000000 O 
. 
OOO 
... 
O OOO 
. 
M O to 00000000 
IC 
9000 M 99 
r- O. OOOa. 
%0 %t OOO 
O 
O 
OOO 
OOO '0 0. 
. 
OO pp 
OO CO 
. 
N 
CO 
....... 
OMOOOOOOOC. 
OOFF. O NN 
p. ý Co MON N- 
rUr r f- Ur e-- r 
S - N rr a- O. OOO Co OP O. O O. e-- r- rrr 
000000 
.... 
ýt 
. 
OOO 
.. 
O OOO to OOOOOOOOOO 
q%o 
MOODOOO 
OO MONO """ 
ýtlnýt 
rti N. Ln 
N 
.O 
.. 
{AN 0 
. 0rs t 
M 
t 
...... 
ýt NSNqkONONNNO 
ANNO O NN t 
. 
O 
.. 
V1OOýp O"%O M 
* . I ý M M'. O co O. O'O. C) cliLA 
Ur 
co F- 000 '0 NI^0 IA 0. OOF --- Fn CM ON UN 00NM00 '0 C00 N0O N 
ýCM %tMcol Ma. I V%' tIAN 
O 
p. ýT 1`iztN O 
ýp 
O 
Or; P4 
` 
Mt00MO; OPt00 pý 'O'atLA N 'O LA 
f'- ý f- IA IA 
ý 
O ý 
in 0. 
M -t N 
1 
%t 
IA 0. *TNN. 00IA .N MMMN N- N 'r 
f- 
co 
NMin N 
I 
M O' 
ýO. 000 .a. O 000 O 000 M OOOMO00000 I,, - O. 0 IA fV' 0' 
NO -t OO IA IA Cl 0 IA M OOM U- IA M co M0000 Co 0 ßf1 -1 in IA 0. 'O rr '. O 000 '0 IA '. 0 IA N IA 
PN 
I- F- F- F- F- ýt r 
C N; U . - 1f1 N 
CD 00 Co 00000OOO Co 
Co OOOO in OOO 1n OO IA 
r rre-r a+ýý ýO 0040 
N11 
CD CD C: ) Z r_ ti2 lPlo NIMM Co Co ;0 ;e P2 aaaaaaaa aaa 
OOO Co W- C) 
N %O ". O In 
ate- ti 
Ic ti ti 
aaa 
W- T- q- 
L 
L 4+ 
Z 4) 
dJ 0 
:3 ei :x (0 Co 8 
t 0 3 t 
L CO) 
Ü 
"ý C " # 
L 2 L N _ _ y Gý V_ t 10 
" 
O tu < 4) 40 4+ ZN 4) 
l0 41 N -- GJ 40 
. - 
4! - C! 
- 
- .. 
c 
W Co x cn (0 mX mG C) OC W- VW W CZ H 
OOOMOOOOOOMO 1f% to O Co O 
O 00 OMOOOOOO %0 -t M in O *-O - 
inP- N0 00000 -t 
1- r- IrrN 
,: : %'+%ntia°oIZ 
ti 
4: 4ý ýo eoa (>(>(>oý W 'o 
a) v- 
aý ai Co u 4) p, 3 ýf Y Y 
L 0 du 0 
0 0 
L 
2 
LO 
O> 
1 
J d) A 
0 O0 
4+ 
L 
j2 j 
" 1, " 
" . 
`ö-. Z0 aa, ä 3.4 1 9 a+ ". - e0 7CWN7 "- 0 a+ sr 41 01 4J e0 -7 WO 7 0- N7 O C! d 41 C 4-+ W c9 C 
O 
Qc7 
ý' 
( 
544. 
A 0 4- «C r4 
) Ic <ý 
f 
UU C 
_ - . 0_. aE)v 
Co 
a) 
Co 
c 41 0 2NW 
Co NC C 
p 
C to O O C- 4i 
O 
L _ Co e0 d -" t "- ... " "ý d O L Cý Cý Cý C f- Cý U C7 mW3WU 1- W U) mt U O "" " Q" " 
0% 
a. ' 
rn 
Co a 
0 C 
O 
ö 
C 
O 
N u) 
C 
C 
O 
U 
O 
.D CD 
464 
vs 
c 
ww 04- 
to 4) 
Co i- 
Cc a, 
0 
J 
Co 4+ 7 
Cu 
o no 
J' C w to 
W 
C- 
C 0- 
0 \ 
0L 
w, 
Vw' 
WW 
CL. k 
N 
0 
NZ) 
c 
O 
OW 
vl 3 
7 a+ 
OU 
L 10 
w 
C 
Oý 
UC 
7 /0 
V 
"C 
V 
A! 
H 
LC 
+r O 
C "ý 
a! 4-! 
U 
ý- 7 
Oý 
a, to 
ä 
a, 
1I 
c 0 
1r 
O 
W ý+ 
C 
.0O e0 J 
OOOO (> Co OOONMOOO 
NM 00 'O N ýO MO ti NMM NNNS r- N. 
V1 O V1 fý N2 Ol O0 NO ON 1` r- M co CD co N ti 
LlN 
pn A 
N 
ti 
rIAN- 
1N IA 
NOOOON '- 0000 CO OOO 
e In '0 'O '0 CO '0 NM -t r41 -t CO Co Co 
NNNN uyý MM M 1. - r' 
NNNNNNNNNNNNN 
............. NNNN 
0000000O 'O NO 'O .O 'O OOOOOOOOOOOOO 
OOOOOOONNNNNNNN Al NNNNNNOOOOOO lO lO lO .O 
U- U-U-U-U-UU U- . -U- U-U-U N NNN 
ti 
000000000000000000000 Oao9C 0 
. 
000 
.................. 000000000000000000000 . %0 OM000 "0 000 OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
-e-v- e- e- v- v- Ir- r- 1- _r- _ýý_ýe-ýe-le- r- 
P e- f- OOO 
q- .- e- e-- v- 
O u1 O 
r- r- 
000000 F- 000000000OOOO N OOOOO M OOO 
ä. 
r{ý 
. 
r. 
.r 
F) 
.M 
OO H. O. -t -t P- O: NM.. (- 
. 
M- tN 
O F ` r 1-0 
O , 
.. 
M1 
. 
MNN 
tW% f-M t 
cý 
.. O 
. 
O f- 
f- OM 1n - in 0OPOI - . ir ... t %0 . oM M P 
rrr 
r % . 
r 
CO - F-00> in %0 %-- - in0Co PM in 000 .! .. t IACD CD 1n .. 00 
0. Op ý1 N0. .O rJ - -t in. 0-0 ..; c -j in fV -i -2 U. % MN 
in in M'- M .* in r4 rn CO Ln MNN O MNNN O' Mrrrrr -- in 
00 00 'O 
0 Ul% -. CN O OO't OOO.! OOO -t 'o N-! OOO NMO F--! im- .t LA in p- .r Uº Ne--t 1A F- 
2 
0- -t in in in 10 N 
C 
N 0 
17p O to %0 NOOO-? OOOSOOO -t .. t Co -. O OOO NNO 
2OF- N qr- *t in InN -t IA In F- -t in to(- ýt O. M W% U% in %0 O 
MN w- NýNu v- qm» `0 
U- 
4i 4.0 
ic 12 
WäO. ä 
2Z r' r' 
UUUU 
O000 
ý. 
E 
0. 
OMM- 
0. 
E. Co 
0. 
E0 
_0. 
E. 0 
"- 10 .-. .- .- 10 "- /0 Co 
ja 0 0) 4-0 49 4-0 
ýQ c .ýE .ýd rn .r rn AJ l0 v Q) 
i 
a! 0 i+ Cf 
iW 
c vý-ý cýsc c-' tZc c-' `: c-. L. (D 
tý 
U. 
_-1y 
UOo 
_-eýr 
U WC 
_-+ 
U 
"ý 
-1EC, O 
"N 
CE 
Ö` 
"-- EO C( EO «9HV 
ýVf V V"ýUI--VIU 4VHVfU NUF- tou 
V 
V 
V 
O 
V 
L M 
O: 
O. 
ON 
fl- 
NO 
Z8 
ä 
W . (> 
äO' 
Zze-ýý G r-'r 
O 
ai # V 7 
l0 0 4J. -y 
0 a! Nt V 
Nl dL U XO _ 
to Co V- N W O4. x a- w.. aý t 1ý L7 10 S d1 'F 
O0 
`' « (0ßm0 O & "^ -0) oN 47Lw "LO Co (L) to L _ 0) ""- ý 
V 
Vr 
-i xmN a. 91 Cl) Cl))- =O 
c, 
x z V) 
W 
O 
f- 
0 
4. - 0 
c 
O 
c 
Y 
N 
"ý ar 
V- 
"N 
N 
L 
N_ 
" 
L (0 
d 
-r- 4J 4 
O 
C 
aý O 
4-0 
l0 L 
41 
N 
++ C 
OO 
E 
a+ 
"ý 
LN 
w CJ 
N Cf 
C AJ C 
OL ýC "ý 
a+ tC U C_ 
7" 
UQL t0 
NýL "L 
V 41 
to (a N c0 E 
N 44 O 
7 Gl uý 
O-. 0 
"-+ 
to4"ý"0 
N a+ a+ O Li 
7L co 
ocova CD 
r Gl L L+ 
ý+ L Cl) o-D 
t "aý in 7ý> 
Cu0 CD > 
N77 C-ý L 
41 > 
i-' 
OQ 
L /0 
C . 1' ßL 41 U d is C1 a+ O L- 
4) ac Oz 7 
JH2"N 
465 
i 
APPENDIX G 
ti OOOOOOOOOO 
M 
IP- 
.0 II1 ONOOOOOOOOM 
N"i"""O. O". 
Ný000 000 000 Oi ti M" 
IA OO 
ý` ti OOOOOOOOM 
0 
Co 
oý 
C 
C O 
to 
Z 
Co 
u 
x 
w 
L 
t 
ar 
N 
N 
7 
O 
N 
C 
Co 
Q 
V 
Z 
N 
. 
t. 7 
d1 
W 
H 
L N 
Qý ' Ö Ö p e Co Q. 
r 
....... 
r 
..... 
r 
O. .. 
- 
. ... 
C ý r ý 
00 CO 
Ö 
00 ý0 CO (> 
M1 
(` 
Mp rr Ö ti ý 
%0 Co Lt% C> N1 A 
Co ýt F. 0'D NI`O' 
ý , .*-Q2 
IA IA N t I- u% 
4J 
. A MNC pl 
O0M 
r 
ý 
IA L ýn p p ý 
0 IAA ... 
Co 4 r4 - I A 1. -2 
N IA'0ý4 NM 
.... 
1/1ýý- ý 
.. 
IA IA e- 00 N w- NN v- e- 'r 
C Cs 
Gc 
LA MN Oýy (, - MNN O 
co Oýp M 0 N N Po 00 O 
W. ýO 
ýt 
APN- 
-*IAA0' pý r ä; 8 
inNNÖý 
` ' ÖÖÖÖ 
U., t 
a. 1 _i ...... , ... .. 
' 
.. Ud q- '0IA-*N 
: 
N. 't f+1 CO N, MM II CO N N wr rr 
aW u 
_ 
V 1 M 
w, co co 1N- 
Ö 
E-- M 1n M M O 
N- N 
.J 
C 
O >. 
Lw 
(0 C 
dd 
C 
O 
4J 
U 
L. 
a u) 41 
C 
r 
N7 
VO 
C 
W 
J 
NN NC tCo WC NC NC 0 to (Ca HC to t555 o WmNC 0C N WN 
0ÖOOOOOÖÖOOÖOO 
050 
1F- 1- F- 1- HHHHHHHH h- h- HHHHH 
a: 12 4; /0 a e0 Co 
z r- zz 
L /0 
L 
l5 
O to 
" W 
45 
Y 
G5 
of 
-i c0 0 
w 
0 a+ +-+ 
Ni. - 0 +r +ý 
w 
0 
4- 
0 
C C C C 
ýý 
C 0. C l. 
. 4.0ý 
0.0. 
4.1 41 
CO C 
4.1 41 
COC 
O " 
ää 
c,. (5 - 
ää - ää 
ä 
L 
O .ý /0 a" pý " .. 
- <0 
ar pý "ý a+ pý aý pý 
a+ L C C t a+ CCL C C C CC 
_ 
&-y 
NC 
_ _ 
Co 
- " 
, 
a+ 45 7 40 O>- 73 Co O d 45 O 0 tN C LCo «. <>Nd( Zm-<>U) tm 
C . . . 
a 
u1CO Oyý 
Oo 
NOO 
fc 
fZ cO p l; 
NM 
ON PO 
MNMO 
P- ýO O 
ýt M IA 
In 
pZC C to 
O 
le 
4; 4.: Co 
O> Co Co A co 
v- 39 Z 1- Z 
0 
"I"0 
ooNO Co 
%0ON CM i` 
PO ti s 
N op 
CD 00 0 
Lr% in (D C: ) o0-4t f- 
O. MNM 
0 
0 
M 
NNNN 
CCCC 
0000 
ti 
O- 
r 
41 
.`c 
tNC 
ýg W7tE 
JSO -r 
a+ OOO C7 
U 
ö -g aas. LO 
a+ Ld a+ ac. äa 0 
4.0 433 
cý 
N ýl C a+ a+ C 
C -ý -- Co ++ CC C1 G. CUUU -+ C 10 Co G) O) 
o ýc a Co -.. 41 o) L aý m vvv -r aC C- 0) 4) t- :. " 4) -. - "r ,. " n. Co ar 4.0 L in Q. OoOc c13 -, 4.0 C) 73 
5" 41 
L41 de2. 
C) 
0. M 00 
C) 
C 
NC ß_ NNNL-tLCNL 
OO00 
00 4) 00 
Gam! 
0 
'ß 0L 
Uýtt .C CC x .0 
N_ 
(4 0oG! 
0) N0 47 d 41 4J L- 1>- 2 
02 ZZ (L) ob m Cm 4)MM 0 3 
I-HI- . tF- I- u. 
I. It 
.. 
rn 
co 
a 
rn 
O 
O 
d 
C 
O 
N 
d) 
C 
C 
O 
V 
dJ 
466 
M Ö -* ÖÖ C N Ö 
3 N (> O OO O ýO O Ln M"" O OO". ""O. "". N 
In 
~ 
L N v Qº 
0 
th p p CO M O 
. Oý 00 . 1ý . ."p ." " Lr% 
C 
ti 
eo 
V 
oc 
ua 
- 
IL C13 u 
c 
u d 
4a 
.c 
D 
o >. 
L 4+ 
c vd 
C, c 
o c 
ä+ u 
c 
O v 
a U, 
c 
07 
C1 s+ O 
^ Co 
(Q J 
º- a 
M 
ýC%j t 
co 
N 
OP% 
Q MýtýtN ;t Ln ; &l: S NMONCMC Q0 %0%0'0 *0M00 " N01p co tr CO a0ýIn CO Ln fýý8 N -tco%tN 
oW 
-tMU1 M -t -t ' N. t -t 
1ý- C) CI 
- 
U) Ll% W- 00, C4 P O e co Pt M A cm f- NM 
L M F IAN 0 00 ti'- M 
L O"N F- AU) .. 
O 001`0)e- "p Oin r Q. NIA co ON ulk MIA NN co .O I- M NO MNN '- .O IA N 
MLA F- 
NO'-I[º 
O C30 IC OIA'- 
U) F- 
f-%0 F- 
TOM 0% in. 
0- .00 '- 
-Min 
000000 Co 0 
1A 00 yý 000 . U) IA ON -Ct . N '- Ifß IA O 00 . Cl IA CO IA f- 00 Ct . .... . ... . ... ... ...... 
O [-'- 0cm M co It co NO . t'0N, -t O. Cm in NI- Oý N0-t co I-CM MN f- IA .. tM .t X00. M In -t 
Ä Ö ý Ö Ö 
N 
. .. ". 
O 00 N O r 
. ...... 
C"i 
..... . ...... "". 
O. 
IA 
4-+ C 
" 
C N NU1W (AWtoNN0W(A WOM WW WW too 
D M C CCC CCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCC 
C) a: =0 000 00000000 N 000000000 
º-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-a- 
o 
1-I ý% a+ NO 
ti 
I- a 0 
to i0 0 o.. 0. Ol 
Z z z V- '- e- . - r 
LA 
0 
S 
V 
H 
L 
d 
" 
L a) 
7 -ý t V 
Co Co 
0 
0 C C C 
CO C .C r- 
L b- C ( L Ö 
w- 
C 
L. + + 
nC 0 Co 0 0 " 
4 
Q %4. - 4) Q °s 0 ° ö C 
t0 ý«- L N 01 0) 0 Hl a+ to Z 0 
N C Q 
24- IC 0 0 10 Q Q 
Co fý 
v- Q = 
^ 
N 
Q .V 0 - lý Q to 1.1 O! N 3 Ql Q EL v 
f+ s+ E 4.0 
0 
Cl) 0j 4. - 0 0). 
C 
Al 
N 
cm a) 
d otJ .-C OI 
" ^ 
V_ 
ý - OA of W 2 --1 a nl L "C N " dl uONC Z e p to C 0 ý+ 4! E E Cl) E ý > " ýp j 
ý 
U 4-0 N 0 OL " - a+ N >. a+ E E E E + E 
E7 
4º 
0 
"- 
W 
.0 
0 
Co O N -' O Co L. to O 7 "ý a+ -. .C d-. LL 
to 
to AJ dt -' d! M N 0 CO U F- C) -' en t 'o Q dUN 0 ca c2 39 07 0 Co CIS 
.C . 
U) ' Co .C to . =" 8 1" it. 8. "0 t. 8 . ""4.1.11 
4. + 
O 
a. + 
O 
C 
C 
-O rN Q GJ 
vL 
N ýf 
Ow 
%0 J 
Co 
2 
"1> 
W CC co 
J "Tr 
w' 
VW 
Co "ý- M 
ý ý. J 
>0 ` 
^ 
4- 
y 
Co L. 
C 
J "- J 
>. _W7 
Al Co a+ U 
> 0.0- 
9- C Co 
V) 0 Q. NU 
c0 2L 
d 0) 7 
0X 0 
U0Q 
Oý 
7W2 OO 
0 
N#" '- N 
467 
APPENDIX H 
ö 
Co o' 
I- 
C 
c 
0 
4J 
7 
N 
CL 
Co 
u 
3 
x 
w 
L 
W 
O 
N 
d0 
CL 
ZO 
oc 
Vl 
dl 
e0 
>" 
ýv 
0 -: ) 
C( 1 34 1 o . -0 U 
to UU 
- 
tC 
++ xU 
qý 
w 
HN 
NL 
v 
4J a+ U 
"9 C 
OC 
Co Co 
"- a 
C 
0 
W U 
C 
0t 
LU 
a C, 
f- 
41 
CC 
O 
LU 
ß l. + 
O0 
LL 
tv a 
H 
4 
S3 
VC 
Q\ 
GC co 
H 4. & 
QC 
= 10 
O 
rn a 
rz rz rz O 
NNNN " 
N . "" ,, ' 
MMMMM M 
n 
OOO 
n 
O OOO OOO OO O 
MMMMM , . M 
MM L1 
MMN 
LA 
N 
MMM 
MMM 
MM 
MMM 
MM M 
N 
v 
p 
CoCMO ÖO5 " p5 ""N ö "" " " ýOýO OýOý 
" 
NP 
M 
^ ^ 
ýQ M OO to M ti `o MOOCO 
CD ýN (2 
LnM 
%0 Lt% CM 
i -4CCo W%%0Co 
0- tn OU)05 
- 
* -MM1- MMý LeN Ö '0 N 
3 'O 
n 
bU) 
Co 00 M 
OIA'. O{ý 
O fý 
0o O Of- OMM 1AOM O %0 
O OEM 
.. 
In M 
NM%OM 
. 
Co IA O 
-t CO 
O 
O 
Co Co 
%t 
O 
"0 
NO Co O 
0.01 
%0 -1 
'. O 
t! ý 1z ei to .. NN . O" N Lt 
.. 
r p. 
n 
-O Co %t NaM. t 11000 000 000 Co F'-O O OM I! M CO'- 
A0 ' 
%t 1n O. f- Oinin OOO (> q- IAOý LA OU% 00 p9 I '. 
. . 
-5 IA'. 0A 
. 
- t%0 000 %0 1n0 - IA '0 %0 Oý 
1` N 1! 1; M 
.. 
N {` 
ý 
... 
%0 NO (Ni 
. 
%t 
.. 
%0 1 N a- ýO 
n 
nn 
(D CD 0o O O O 0 00 O CD VN CD CO O C> CD C> i in Ö 0 - ti N I I M Ö ÖMÖ 
OO N ýO N N O ON L 
Lrt %O ON 
cYl cal CC C C C CC 
E to E 
OO 
a+ + 4. 
O. 
4+ Cl) 
0 
a+ 
0 
a+ a+ Co a0 + cn S., = cr1 c r1 cr r- ZZM 
M ýr y 
F- - r- r r- a+ a+ e- 
C 
äP 
ää r-i 
ä 
ä 
ä ä 
a+ 
N 
a+ Q a+ a+ 
r a + a+ C oC " " N 7 K _ 
+J CC CC 
7 
N7 4) C 
O 
m CC C öö ö 91 19 0 ' O L -4 CU - - - - O y C7 to c C) CO". - ++ ++ Q N CJ 41 a+ Co "- (L) 4l C "- OL 4+ ( C7 G7 Z C7 ( C) 7 Co "- L "- "- OC 3Q 7 ". "- N 4+ 7 Cl) 7 a+ t7 a+ .0 Co Cz z zJ za Q " V- V 4+ý. 0.0 v-ix w. 0.0 GJ CD V- CCw < C0 Q. O70 
WJJ J JJ L p[ L "- "- CO L L. x LL C L. O[ L. J E- L 
-+ 3s C V 
CD 
3v c9 cm - " 
4) 
cx c9 
0L -" "0 to . 
L- 
2 C) 
0 CD 
+v 
0MM 
" to . . . 
ä 
40 
0 0 
.r 3ä L C C) C) a C) Yz. - CD Co "- da 
a - O7O v- Ox 
c 
.-a 
cm . O -Ni a 
a- . OOX 
c2 CC a dO O d C) e0 e0 00 
t7 N NJ N"ýJJ ++a+ 4- NJ ZE JU 0 GC0 CM _j X. -.. J X 92 0 (AJ V)X X NV) a+++ý+a+ ZLL" LY"" 00 dJ L. ."".. . .Y. ... W. .. C. L. OOOO 
J« <Cl) 1--H 92 < Q CO) s - Q HH I- !- 
ti 
rn 
CL 
rn 
468 
ýi 
c 
c 0 U 
v 
r 
S 
Q! 
1-- 
N N 
aý M 
LA 
M 
" 
NM 
O " """ 
NMM . 400 N 
U 
" " "" P AP .. ". ýt %t CO " PO, O " Co 0 
V- V -ý 
o 
"""" 
(ý O 1A A ýT ýt NOO 
C 
Ö 
U "" . ." 
Or O """ Klýtfý "" UNLr% 
MMM rr r4 MN 
N 
UU Q 
^ 1C 000 00 000 0000000 00000 41 M MM MMM MMMMM Ni M" M LA LA LA LA C ++ 1C U 
O 
M M MM MMM MMMMMMM 0-% MI N (Ni NN 
W >- 
N 
v 
N 
v 
N 
M fý IA %0 M 
~ O c " "" 00 "" "" "" 'O ÖM 0 '' Öý 
C) O. Co . """ M . - n 
CJ 
fV L N 
v p 
K _ 
`O Ni '0 fs N -r 
Q 
C) 
C ýO 1/0000 "" " "" 03.00 f-AAACm en 0CD /000 "I "ý 
J 
_ r' N N IA NM%tcm Nýr IA LA '0 LA 
CO 
Ni OO O " " OO C> -e OI(1 J A N- 
N 
rIA N 
< C 
N- t 
U- U 
CO A y 
O h h 9-4. o 
- 
Ni E 
.-.. 1 
o 
"MM 
o Ni 
"-- r- 
' M 
Co 
Co 
P -+ N 
v- Q. Co 
A c 0 
U U OIANN O (D PM IA It 01! 100%0 0'003 N L. 
" M'OPM M I LA LPºPCD rr- NM %t PM MNý 10 C Ni - LA MN 'O 7 
t C C) 
L U f0 --ý 
~ O 
L 
ý+ N 
0=:: 0 C O: : _= e O C Co 
H 41 __ 0 C_1ý ýa+ 
;p7y 
M 
O O 
41 
M O O L U) C) 
r _C a-- r CCL 
41 r 01 7 
Cf AJ 
C c 
0 w 
L Ö Et U O ýlýOýn COMO M1COýr 
v- 41 7 f- N- :. f- N- CO N N- f- N- N- f- AA Co Co W3 41 Z 
0 c APPAP # P A AAAAA C> C> -a 
L. L N `f-`- Co O- V Co 
C a +, -, p. 41 n 41 L. CN 
O Co C U c cu 4-0 O 
> N u U Co N im C v U ß O 
a+ N E L. E ýJ a 41 : g- 0 L- 4) 
(A (5 O 'D O C) Co d! C Ul C U) Co C) C) O v- O. - 
4.0 -. . arc v- 0c 4) 16.1 C) . rte -- CU 41 C 4-I -Cy C- Ca C) E < cc > 41 LC-. Co a .ý . - U ... 4-0 Co 41 CU0 L Co a Co N-' 1-- 7 "- /0 
4+ L 
Co L Co Co 
L C) UL 
CLC 
L OJ L 
LL 
41 C) 
C 
LU 
0L 
O C) . 
UO 
L. -r i+ 0) O "-" -' 
E "^ -- < U) 4+ > . - 
2 Gý a+ U) eo a+ dJ ý+ vl ý+ v) " ý+ C to a+ 0CC 
G. Cl) d Co E 44 
L C 
z 
0 
a+ Co CJ 
"" -+ C 
(o 
> 4-0 "^ " " - " C " " K0O C 
a: 
L 419- NWC U Co 
O7 
C) t0 < 
cm 
f- 
\ 
U) 
.ý 
- 
- 
"ý 
u C- Ct 
CL 
a Cl 41 
C C" " 
3 äý 
-+ 
:r 
C C Z 
au 
t 
Ut 10 >ý 0 
03 41 yvt ci 
"ý < Gl 
O 41 -- 
di muL. 
-- 
EO 
Q c a+ C) L. L "- C) L C L 0L U) a L C) C) O -W a+ > C) M U) -0-L C0 L .- Co 
C OL 
_ L Lw ý` Z Q Lw C F ýa w~Z W dd " 
ý dL ýQN WDR 0 
: lc u 
N 
d 
Q j 
W < 
. 
Q 
CA 
Q 
C 
< 
a- " 
d< N G. H Vl ýN v- 
i, Aa 
Table H. 2: Liquefied natural gas and 
natural gas export contracts in 1983 
Main contracts Quantities Planned Period 
of 
Billion delivery contract 
m3 date (years) 
1 Operating contracts 
-British Gas Council 
(Canvey Island) 1.11 1964 15 
-Gas de France (Le Havre) 0.56 1972 25 
-Gas de France (FOS) 3.70 1972 25 
-Distrigas USA (Boston) 1.20 1978 20 
-Enagas (spain) 4.76 1980 23 
Sub-total 1 11.33 
2 Contacts signed & approved 
-Frunkline-Panhandle (USA) 4.76 1982 20 
-Thyssengas/Brigitta (West 
Germany) 4.23 1984 20 
-Ruhrgas/Salzgitter (West 
Germany) ) )) 
-Ferngas/Gasunie (The Netherlands) )11.90 ) 1983 ) 20 
-Distrigas-Belgium (Zeebruge) 5.29 1980 20 
-Gas de France (Montoire) 5.45 1980 20 
Sub-total 2 31.63 
-ENI Gas pipeline 13.07 1982 20 
-Tunisia Gas pipeline 1.20 1982 20 
Total contracts signed & approved 
Total 1&2 
3 Contract signed but stoped 
(1980) 
-El-Paso 1 (USA) 
45.90 
57.23 
10.95 
Sources: Ministry of Energy and Hydrocarbons, Sutton, K.: The 
Algerian Natural Gas Industry, op cit and press releases. 
470 
APPENDIX J 
C ^ 
0 
ZO _ 
1Z N- to - 1n U) U) - 
~ 
WW to N 2 
Vl O M '0'OO e-0.. t CO CO CO (> tL -. " to . Ps . NN in W- lO ff ff "ý IA N 0' N- i' t' M MM tnin'O -! N 
0. 
.0 LA LA %0 Co V% .O . O 
(3 J 
P 
ýp IA 
_ 
" ýO In u1 N- 'O M 1n 1n 
"C (0 O 
V 
O> M CQ N 
Co(>%t aiP- 
Op o [ý 
%0i 
O If1 Co 
rrý 
0t2ON e- O COP- %0%OMO 
'O .O N- O 'O 
N- 'O 'Q I- 
MM r LA ll1 N pý O' PN 
N . . r`W W cm cm CO Co O. O. P 00000" 
O 
Co 
" 
IA Oaf` 
MOO. 
IA V1 
OO 
O. O. 
A A 
t -. t A O. Oýp 
D - 
ýp N ON e- fs Co %t %t 00 -.! -t ;2 
_ lC 
I I ( R COMCO 0)00 OCO%0 '0 CO (D U%, 
` 
LM" 0LA Co NN 0300 N- O. N. ON N -t M ý---t ýt O. N. - O OMN 
ý-' P'- 0000 -'- NO. '-O -O ON Co -t0 O M -t '- M O'- OO "Q V IT - .t it t` %O MN '- CO Co 0" M LA -t -t 10 In NM MN < ýt ýlýT N1M r-F') Ný to 
V '- MM n i. nn i". i". Co 
Oo«? f-ZO. O 
f` '- M 
IA0 
00 
00M 
IA'- 
MM0'IA-* 0. 
NN . -00-N 
0 P-LA 30 -N- 
- 
M N-0 Ps M9-t 
C cm r4 %000 O" In 
V 
00LnNo N-0''- t 
M 
N 
LAIAM -t 0. ' 
Co P tt-Ai ! 
M 
00 
1-O"Co (D C) 
`F- C) CO r4 
-. 
N- 0.00 LA N-0ýp N 
- O CO 0. C 
a .. 
N003'0 -0' - 
'-OON 
'ONM 
0. .t at 
M't0' 
L Cd M e- r4N 
Ox en 
LA Ln 
O C '- CONOýatM 1! 1 LA NM MN 
O 
t a+ 
++ UJ OOO (3 CD Ch CD OOO O O O O O OO to Z 00 0 00 00 0 00 O O O O O OO 
. 
V OM N- 00 00 000O O O O O OO 
C) LC O N'- OO OO ".. OMOO. . O. ..... . O O. .. O LA. LA dL M OO OO Co NM at N- O O MM y tu %t PM P- .o '-'-M fs LA 
O 
F- 
. n 
Z C 0) 
0 0 0) 
ý+ f/1 41 _ 0 fA C) 0 0000000 00 000000 C) CO) 0 C) 0 C) N (0 
C C a 
N C 0') OO OO O OOOOOO OO OOOOOO 0 O 00 OOO 
O F- O H F- HH H F- F- F- F- 1- F 1- H F- F- F- H F- F- H FH f- 1- t- )- 0) C 
W 
0 g ä >. Co « 0 LL 
1 
OO\ N 
P 
r 1n N -t U) 
` 
Oý i 
+ 
J 
U) 
Z 
to 4 
(L) C 
Co CO O. 
O. O. NO 
- O. 
CO 
O.. 
f- N- P- 
O" O. O. 
1 
(> O'. O'. 
4 
N 
s 
C) 
J 0 
U) >- 4! '- e- °. '- '- '- .- r- r- . - z z w- 
a+ v) d 
N aJ C L 
CL c c rn C - E . Co " 0 0 XN O J - 
C) 
C E LC y 41 7 
d oö c. ... J CI JL" `" L " of ° ; a+ E " E y E " 1 1 - :3 ~ 
to 
+ 
.ý r_ c^ ; 
0 
N 
r_ 4 0 
"ý J 
"> 
4. 
-0 
vl 
J C 
N C Co G 
L 
OO 
C) + 
OO 
C) a+ N 
O Cl CCa 
J a+ OCO "- 40 7 2LC ++ N 
m7 
a+ v- ""- G1 3 ý+ 
C) 
V C) 
C () 
ý 
4+ C) a+ to C) C) N Cf ". LJ 41 C) O C) 7 N C) 
L0 
9 
Ul N 4. + VCJ "- -' .C "- L LL Vl C 4-+ 7 y 0 
C 
Co 
to L «a 
"' ._J" C "- 
ß_ ++ 
C" C) -ý_ 
""-J O aA 
LON . %C L 
C 
<o od 
OO Vf ul "ý 
v- v- GJ J -g 
'9 LN 
O c0 ++ 
C) 0ö C) O ++ 
++ 
V 
J CI pý 7 , 
C) 7 C! 7 -+ a+ 7CLJ UC > & -+ s+ 'p ' 
wV 
7 
Co 4+ 
Co 
C) C 
"- .C to 
Gi 
J d Co v. C0 vJ 6O 01 QJ _ u0O -- VO 0 EEOE0 OJ to C) ' M _ J __ .-L 4+ OtJL C) L "-O to C) " J G) p C 0) 7O KY) C) . .O Cl) C)UUJ XJm XJm -J- 0UH 0- C7 gx ne CC 41Ud C) C .0O 0) F-U 0C7I- W 
Z J 0. O.. wxU. 3 V) _ L7L oC f- u) 
9 
w 
L71 
C 
O 
. 
.1 IA 
O' 
N 
Co {, ý 
IA N. N cV M M e ý uJ 
. "- 
CON . to NO. %0 
.. t It O' O'. 
In 
%0 
IA NQ 
0 0' CO Co 
MM 
NN 
ýp '-' 
2O-OO. O 
.4 .pM" O'000 IA 
00 N. CoLn 
. OCO IA IA Co 
u> Co N. 0 
r4 mi ti ti 00 '. O .O N. O>00 PO 'O %0 N. 'ON. Ö N-O-'t 'ONO' 'OIn r r 
X 
OýN1AN 0000% M 0IALA0 NNO N. 0 Ni 
J 
O 
N. C%JI 0 
IA - 00 
- N. 
00p. st. t NO NO e- 
CONNM 
- 
Op. ýn ýO Nf. 
. 
i 
. 
" 
.... 
%O 
. 
O'. O'. O"e 
... 
00. N. 
. 
000 
. 
ýtA 
. 4.0 N ý pp CO PN '0 ýOOCo ei ýO" OAO ä OM s. f 'O .O u1 N 
I- 
QO 
_ 
MM 00 
000 
O NýO e- . 0Ö M ýp M C> LA aV 
A0 
ýN IA 0 
MMOO '. 
O 
O 
p. LA -M h " -" 
o0 ÖIA 
C ""'0000 ýO .... 
'. 
. 
. tN 
... 
CD ItO 
.. 
N. O'. 
. 
ON 
.. C " s O'. N. Co Q %0 st (V cV cV'- ýt0ý 0N. Co ON'O 0' N'- . - . --ý ON J -e CO O - Ca '- I O 
O -ý OO O OOOO O OOOO OO OO OO (5 OO O 0000 O N000 00 00 00 s" V 
... 
CL O 
. 
O 1(1 OO O "OOO OO OO OO 
LC OM O 
. 
O. 0 0. O 
.. %N1 LA C 
. 
'4 N 
. 
'0 0 ON 
am M O' - r- M CO '- O N ý-- '- - N %. O M V r- t+1 N d 
H 
0) 
1+ fA 0 fA p) CO) 0 fA fA fA fA N Co (0 0 00 Vl Vl fA (A 0 l0 
' cccc C cccc c ccc ccc cc cc a c 0000 O 0000 0 0000 000 00 00 f- I'- I- I- I- º- )- ý- I- - I- I- s- f- F- E- f- º- I- I- f- rn C r- ' O 3 
c0 a+ 
N. 
01 C 1_ O' O> e0 (O 01 O' O' O'. 0 
r r ýi Z r r r '. ý 
-ý c a 
ä 
E O a 
G. 
a+ 
) ' 
dJ E O 
' 8 c (L . > y L 
2 E0 
" to 3 
4.1 4.0 4) J 2 v 4.0 . 3 ' 0 C Un a1 (o JE 0 4 aý 
UEE 
e 
pE 
0 Cý ý 
v 
1L 
0)) 
0 t L J ! C Cý 0 /y C1 t 
OCO+. " HL V JO ' d a3 J W- d 4o 
J+ 
' WW 
71 
p) 
C 
uO4". - 
t0 "ý A 
"- 
'O 
7p dl C1 3 
C 
LV 
E 
e0 
' 
V agýý 3V 
3 _. 
E 
3 ý+ C1 3 
lp J 
R 
'Q 
oL 
E '¢ 
C 
U 
l0 
.ý 
L 
(ö cv - 
l0 CJ tu 
vv 
L 
a 
0 pf 
c«2 v 
Co 4+ 
u 
l0 
C C)- a 
-r 2V (0J 
l0 
(5 o 4. ' «a 
J 
:3uL 0) N 0. 2 _ t ""- L- C0 
7- V G7 L. "- 10 -+ a+ "_ M 4+ - W C) 4-0 
-+ 
Cl) 
0) C Cl 7 
G) 3 U) 
(5 C! 
C3 
m 
C 
Co LO0 
L -. ix i 
- 
7W 
Of "- N -' 
zU 
CL0d to 
C v1 zc i2 
C) Cd Cl 
G! OXi 
-X 
JWW -0 W 
c0 2 W... (7 " 0 00.0 0. N".. Qy... pý .. W.. F- 
472 
c 
0 
cJ 
C 
O 
N 
l9 N 
N 
4J 
tu 
ä- 
(: D 
u 
ýi 
x 
LA- 
(o Z 
u 
1 
C> «9 
r 
C 
C 
Co 
ca 
0 
Z 
U- 
Z to 
Lc 
CL s u 
f- 
ýc 
LL 
vc w 
N 
4J 
C 
Co 
N 
N 
ýtO 1I1 OLA. '- .- u1 ""NN"M 't N... LA %ON(- OO LA to IA C)" (>. r-w r 
M ýQ ýp 
M . --mot MOO f` (-fim pm tcm CO Co " Ot O> Op. ýN Co Oýo. o. CO O> O.. Co (> N O.. O. MMMO. O. O tý 
r r- ý 
00 
1` 
MNMM 
%000M 
M 
MN 
MO' NN O 
-MM Cl 
InN01 %0 
NoO. 
(> U% oýJ 
MMOO 
NO 
D 
%0% 
rm 
M f--Oa- 
N OO fý r 
ýO P 00 r' 
O. 
sä g 
Oý N . -- 
ON -s '. O MM 
as Co ýLn 
C) M i1 u1 
QÖ 
P- N 
-(ýt Cl NO 
r-. o 
IO 
ON ýN 
ffýý ýO 
NO 
r- '- O 
"O to O 
Ö 
Nýp M ZO 
r-I PN 
Cp r(` 
00 ýO N 
1n NO M NM 
q- Co I- Ol %O M 
N 
O 
N 
Ch (A V1 Vl i+ 
CCCC "-- 
0000C 
F- 1- HHm 
4J 
c0 
oz 
y 
y 
C of 
C ßl0 
C 
4J ýl l0 
C c0 ON 
o- 
U0N a+ 
> +r 
LN 
L Ql N 
O 
co aý le . 
NN NC NC 
ÖOOO 
F- 1- F- 1- 
1- 0o .. I! CO N1ALA 0... 
Ln Co M to In 
r 
%p 0ýp Ä 
cmC>(>CoCCo aOOOO. 
Nä C ti 
C O lý C: ) (D 
Co 1O MAO 1-%0 
0 1ý1 M r- MM CO M lt 
ýO '- OO 
AO (> OO 
OOOO M Co 
LA A CD N "i M Co N1 W% 
o00o0 
Ln in ooo 
M W- NOO 
OOOO 
U.. .. t O' N 
I- 
d 
rn Wccccccä 
0000000 0 f- ýý F- F- f- 
ICY) 
Co .d4 41 
oý eo a a 41) go (o a z ý- z zz I- 
ö C N L 0 
L . ++ L 
C1 ä L V "ý 
"c 0 a, o.. - " a, m0 a v- -" a' N l0 a -' C -' N 4J l0 a+ 
of a+ " C1 - .0 " C0 C -r U Cc E C 4 0 a Co 'ý' 
" 0 3 
C ( 
" (5 a 
C 
mo 
0 
. 01 
c 
E 
" 
C) N 
4-J 70 
0) 
«o gi .- 
. 
Co N 
O N> 
> (0 
CI 
v> Co 
4+ 
N 7 
"N 
a+ O Co 
" 
a-a 
0C 7 0 C1 4.1 a Co 1-' _0 Co > 7 0 4.1 C C1 -+ 
tu "- J C CI to ++ 0) "- V > -' O L CJ e0 C L LOU) a e0 0 0. - l0 l0 L ý1 Z -+ - Z GJ LZ 
Co .CL 
0 
L. L- L C) Co 0N L oa JE u 0 
x ý[ ua co a-' m 0) C- C) c tu 6 " Cl V 4+ t cN U t Co a+ a+ 4- v- 0 
" 
NN i- 
" 
-C N-L 
0 to 
L 0 0 to c. 7 /C 0 - C) l0 C! C +-' L NNU Cl) N 
C 
UB 
Q Y .. ap g. . lo U W3 0 C C7 >. " ". a 
N ++ N i+ 
C C" 
0C0C 
491 
U) W0 
ccc 
000 
F- H i- 
0 
_ N 
4 
l0 N v 
O O O. LA MM '- O I- CD - N" (, " r4 rm CONS 'O LA 
Co 
ýC O LA-tANM%t0M ýp in O in U Oý ICbLn(. '0'-0'- 
r 
OLA CO 00 
ß r 
K 
i 0 t y, " 
N 
ä 
Qý _ r 
(U 
LA ýt (D 
A N- 
Z L 0-. 00 
7 
M1 AI I '- N C> 
... 
O 
Cp 
V LA ýtýO . a+ N 
O> 
0 
rý r- C: ) CD ch -* %0 0 CD '- 0 N 'O-ttu V%u F'-. LA ON 4) C M I` O .- r- O" O. a+ U) 
Ca 0 
dJlr/1 
U- . 4O MO N. -OO %t 41 
<0 ONA. 00 '-COO O" " C Co : 0 f-. f-'-M '- MN00 - O +. 0 
LC NCo IA NN a, 
" 
4+ 
y 
d. i- '-- N -t U to 
J a y 
_ In 
E 
ME yEE ME 
C a 
r _ 
l Z 
In n" In ö0 C 
0ý CI 
w 
-n = F-mex. -1- '-. -ý IC) 
Co a! 
`- C 
0 O . 92 
0 Z O 
4 1C a+ Q . tö AJ lo Ou > 
Z > 
W 
/0 dJ 
" Q L /0 
C 0 c0 0) L. 
L V -+ 0 O C C 
C JW L : 
"- C ß to C i 'O CC 0 t0 C >N 
v 0) M. - (0 LX 0 - LZ 41 
O i+ 0 fý v v O 
GJ KO . v f ß 
r Co C0CC C0 N Vl V) c " a! N 
««3 L 4.1 CV7 Cf V IM C M (A to 
4. + 7 
Q 
>. d .-QQ "3 Q C 
C .-L 7 - 
4) 
U 
di Co 
) +r a, O. 0 - d >'. Q 4+ ý+ L a) a» l0 L 
c 
X 
Co >. 0X "- ""- "- ""- A (U L "- 000 a+ 7 W 
Co Z m <0-1 Z Z_j=U Q. 1U 0 0 
L1 7/1 
Table J. 2: Origin of the technology in SNS complex and plants 
Plants Contractors & Type of 
their origin contract 
Plants in operation 
El Hadjar complex 
-Coking plant 
-Cast iron no. 1 plant 
-Cast iron no. 2 plant 
-Oxygen steelmill no. 1 
-Electrical steelmill 
-Hot rolling mill 
-Cold rolling mill 
-Galvanised and tin 
plating plant 
-Spirale tube plant 
-wire & round mill 
-Seamless tube plant 
Transformation group 
Tube & flat division 
-Gardaia spiral tube p. 
-Reghaia 
-Reghaia 
-Reghaia 
cold steelmill 
big tube plant 
small tube pla. 
Metallic 
division 
container 
-Arzew packaging plant 
-Kouba packaging plant 
KOPPERS-France 
USSR Turnkey 
SOFRESID-France Engineering 
SIDL & CAFF-France Realisation 
TIAJPROMEXPORT-USSR Turnkey 
LENGIRROMELZ-Sweeden ) Engineering 
TIAJPROMEXPORT-USSR ) Supply of 
equipment 
SOFRESID-France ) Engineering 
ASEA-Sweeden ) Supply 
KUTTNER-GFR** ) of 
CLARK CHAPMAN-GB* ) equipment 
LLIMEX-GDR*** 
SOFRESID-France ) Engineering 
INNOCENTI-Italy ) supply of 
MARELLI-Italy ) equipment 
DAVI & UNITED-GB* ) engineering 
VOEST-Austria ) supply 
DEMAG-GDR+ ) of 
STEIN Roubaix-Belgium) equipment 
Supply & 
WEAN-GB* ) setting up 
equipment 
HOESCH-GFR** ) Supply & 
setting up 
equipment 
TIAJPROMEXPORT-USSR Turnkey 
SOFRESID-France ) Enginnering 
INNOCENTI-Italy ) Supply & 
& MARELLI-Italy ) setting up 
equipment 
HOESCH-GFR** ) 
COMEC-France 
France 
France 
KRUPP-GFR** 
SABATIER-France 
FMI-MELFOND-Italy 
SOUDRONIC-Switzerlan 
France 
of 
of 
Supply & 
setting up 
equipment 
Nationalised 
Nationalised 
Nationalised 
Supply 
of 
equipment 
Nationalised 
(Table continues on e following page. ) 
Table J. 2. (Continued) 
Plants Contractors & Type of 
their origin contract 
-Kouba kitchen 
utensile plant France Nationalised 
-Batna gas bottle plant SMG-GFR** ) SUDDly of 
-Mascara gas bottle p. SMG-GFR** 
Long products division 
-Oran steelmill 
-Oued Smar electrode 
-El Eulma electrode 
-Sig nail plant 
Salvage plants 
France 
p. France 
p. ATKINS & GKN-GB* 
HOESCH-GFR** 
Non ferrous transformat- 
ion group 
-Ghazaouet zinc 
electrilysis plant 
-Industrial gas plants 
Plants under construction 
-Welded wire mesh plant 
in El Hadjar complex 
and 
Algiers welded wire 
mesh plant 
-Extention of the roll- 
ing mills of El Hadjar 
complex 
-M'Sila aluminum plant 
France 
France 
MECHIN, 
Vielle Montagne, 
FABRICOM-Belgium 
& COCEI, Jeumont 
Schneider-France 
France 
HOESCH-GFR** 
EVC/KATZENBERGER 
-Austria 
11 Different firms 
of which: C. ITOH & 
ITACHI-JAPAN (40%), 
& DEMAG-GFR** 
USSR 
equipment 
Supply of 
equipment 
Nationalised 
Nationalised 
) Engineering 
) supply of 
equipment 
Nationalised 
Nationalised 
) Engineering 
) Supply of 
equipment 
) 
Nationalised 
j Supply of 
equipment 
Setting up 
equipment 
Product-in- 
hand 
* GB: Great Britain 
** GFR: West Germany 
*** GDR: East Germany. 
Sources: Collected from different sources in particular: 
-Dersa : L'Algerie en Debat: Luttes et Developpement 
(Francois Maspero, Paris, 1981); 
-Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, France, 
different volumes; 
-Chauleur, P.: L'Afrique Industrielle (GP, 
Maisonneuve et la Rose, Paris, 1979) and 
-Survey data. 
476 
Table j"3: SNS personnel (1980) 
Skill categories Managers Technicians/ Semi-skilled/ Total 
supervi sors unskilled 
Plants and head office (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
El Hadjar complex 533 2.9 2,339 12 14,685 80 18,166 46.8 
-Total plants 414 77.6* 1,775 76* 14,383 98* 16,572 92* 
-Complex head office 119 22.3* 564 24* 302 2* 985 8* 
Transformation group 274 3.2 
Long products division 85 3.7 
1,022 11.9 7,287 84.9 8.583 22.1 
250 11 1,895 83.5 2,267 5.8 
-Oran steelmill 48 5.6 
-Oued Smar electrode p. 1 0.9 
-El Eulma electrode p. 20 3.1 
-Sig nail p. 5 1.4 
-Reghaia welded wire 
mesh & metallic beam p. 6 3.7 
-Annaba welded wire 
mesh & metallic beam p. 5 3.1 
Tube and flat products 
division 102 4.1 
-Ghardaia spiral tube p. 25 3.3 
-Reghaia big tube p. 26 3.7 
-Reghaia cold steelmil l 24 4.6 
-Reghaia small tube p. 27 5.4 
Metallic container 
11 4 652 854 
9 101 111 
65 544 629 
32 309 351 
18 138 162 
12 
367 1 4.9 
118 
95 
88 
66 
151 140 
1,972 80.4 2,451 
606 749 
563 687 
406 521 
397 494 
6.3. 
division 73 2.5 336 11.5 2,505 85 2,915 7.5 
-Kouba alum. ustensile p 9 2.5 45 304 358 
-Batna gas bottle p. 20 5 48 377 445 
-Algiers metallic 
container p. 30 1.8 190 19421 1,642 
-Arzew metallic 
container p. 7 3.1 18 194 219 
-Mascara gas bottle p. 7 2.7 35 209 
251 
Salvage division 14 1.4 69 6.9 915 91 998 2.5 
-Central salvage p. 6 1.4 37 388 
431 
-East salvage p. 5 1.2 21 
368 394 
-West salvage p. 3 1.7 11 
159 173 
Non ferrous transfor- 
oration group 24 3 104 12 692 84 
820 2.1 
-Ghazaouet zinc 
electrilysis plant 24 3 104 12 692 
84 820 2.1 
Industrial gas group 22 2.8 151 19 612 78 785 2 
-Algiers indust. gas p. 
5 1.4 63 271 339 
-Annaba indust. gas p. 3 3.4 12 71 
86 
-Constantine indust. g. p. 
4 5.5 9 59 72 
(Table continues on the following page. ) 
Table J. 3. (Continued) 
Skill categories Managers Technicians/ Semi-skilled/ Total 
supervisors unskilled 
Plants and head office (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
-Oran industrial gas p. 7 3.2 54 156 217 
-Ouargla indust. gas p. 3 4.2 13 55 71 
Distribution group 74 4.1 170 9.6 1,526 86 1,770 4.5 
-Central unit 36 4.5 67 683 786 
-East unit 20 3.5 50 501 571 
-West unit 18 4.3 53 3 42 413 
SNS administrative 
department 483 24.6 423 21.6 848 43 1,956 5 
-Training centre 72 20 116 165 353 0.9 
-Oran training c. 17 28 49 94 
-El Hadjar trainig c. 55 88 116 259 
Project department 444 7.8 901 15.8 41284 75 5,676 14.6 
Promotion department 40 54 307 401 
Total SNS 2,017 5.1 5,335 13 30,573 78.7 38,839 100 
-Foreigners 174 8.6 7 16 197 0.5 
Source: Survey data. 
1 Total by skill category in the plant, complex, division, group & SNS as 
a whole. 
2 Percentage of the total by skill category in the plant, complex, 
division, group & SNS as a whole. 
Percentage of the El Had jar complex total labour force. 
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